THE  BUDGET 
AND  RESPONSIBLE  GOVERNMENT 


Hmertcan  Social  progress  Series 


SAMUEL  McCUNE  LINDSAY,  Ph.D.,  LL.D., 
Columbia  University 

A  series  of  handbooks  for  the  student  and  gen- 
eral reader,  giving  the  results  of  the  newer  social 
thought  and  of  recent  scientific  investigations  of 
the  facts  of  American  social  life  and  institutions. 
Each  volume  about  200  pages. 

1.  The    New    Basis    of    Civilization.    By 

Simon    N.    Patten,    Ph.D.,    LL.D.,    Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvania. 

2.  Standards  of  Public  Morality.    By  Ar- 

thur    Twining    Hadley,     Ph.D.,    LL.D., 
President  of  Yale  University. 

3.  Misery  and  Its  Causes.     By  Edward  T. 

Devine,    Ph.D.,    LL.D.,    Columbia    Uni- 
versity. 

4.  Governmental   Action   for   Social  Wel- 

fare.    By    Jeremiah    W.    Jenks,    Ph.D., 
LL.D.,  Cornell  University. 

5.  Social    Insurance.     A    Program    of    So- 

cial  Reform.     By   Henry   Rogers    Sea- 
ger,  Ph.D.,  Columbia  University. 

6.  Social    Reform    and    the    Constitution. 

By  Frank  J.  Goodnow,  LL.D.,  Columbia 
University. 

7.  The  Church   and   Society.    By   R.   Ful- 

ton Cutting,  LL.D. 

8.  The  Juvenile  Court  and  the  Community. 

By  Thomas  D.  Eliot,  M.A.,  Ph.D. 

9.  The  City  Worker's  World  in  America. 

By  Mary  Kingsbury   Simkhovitch. 

10.  The   Housing   of  the  Unskilled   Wage 

Earner.     By  Edith  Elmer  Wood. 

11.  The    Budget    and    Responsible    Govern- 

ment.    By      Frederick      A.      Cleveland, 
Ph.D.  and  Arthur  Eugene  Buck,  Ph.D. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers      64-66  Fifth  Avenue      New  York 


THE  BUDGET 

AND 

RESPONSIBLE    GOVERNMENT 

A  Description  and  Interpretation  of  the  Struggle  for 
Responsible  Government  in  the  United  States,  with 
Special  Reference  to  Recent  Changes  in  State  Con- 
stitutions and  Statute  Laws  Providing  for  Ad- 
ministrative   Reorganization    and    Budget    Reform 


BY 

FREDERICK  A.  CLEVELAND 

AND 

ARTHUR  EUGENE  BUCK 


INTRODUCTION  BY 

WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT 


jfteto  gork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1920 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1920, 
Bt  the  macmillan  company 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  May,  igao. 


1 

EDITOR'S  NOTE 

Along  with  the  discussion  of  a  budget  system  and 
budgetary  procedure  in  city,  state  and  nation,  which  has 
progressed  with  growing  intensity  during  the  past  fifteen 
years,  there  has  been  a  wide  range  of  practical  experi- 
mentation in  the  application  of  the  budget  idea,  especially 
in  municipal  and  state  governments  in  the  United  States. 
It  seemed  a  few  months  ago  when  the  National  Budget 
Committee  was  organized  and  incorporated  under  the 
laws  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  as  a  citizens'  movement, 
that  the  time  had  come  to  have  this  experience  summar- 
ized and  interpreted  by  competent  authorities,  especially 
when  the  appointment  of  select  committees  of  inquiry  in 
both  houses  of  Congress  indicated  that  we  were  likely  to 
have  national  legislation  in  the  near  future  looking  to  the 
establishment  of  some  kind  of  a  national  budget  system. 

The  editor  of  this  series  was  gratified  to  find  that  he 
could  get  Dr.  Frederick  A.  Cleveland  and  Mr.  Arthur  E. 
Buck  to  undertake  the  task,  and  former  President  Wil- 
liam Howard  Taft  to  furnish  an  introduction  to  the  vol- 
ume. Dr.  Cleveland  is  not  only  a  pioneer  but  also  the 
foremost  authority  in  America  on  the  subject  of  the  bud- 
get. He  has  had  an  exceptional  professional  training 
and  experience  in  the  underlying  political  theories  of 
democracy,  and  the  technical  problems  of  public  account- 
ancy. The  whole  budget  movement  in  the  United  States 
owes  much  to  his  persevering  activities,  since  he  planned 
and  installed  the  budget  system  of  the  great  municipal 
government  of  New  York  City  ten  years  and  more  ago, 
on  a  scale  that  almost  rivalled  in  complexity  and  size  of 
operations  the  business  of  the  Federal  Government  not 
many  decades  ago.     Later  he  was  the  Chairman  of  Presi- 


vi  Editor's  Note 

dent  Taft's  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency,  and 
in  that  capacity  directed  and  made  the  first  and  only  com- 
prehensive catalogue  and  survey  of  the  operations  of  the 
Federal  Government.  In  connection  with  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  191 5  in  New  York  State  he  directed 
and  made  a  similar  survey  of  the  organization  of  the 
government  of  the  Empire  State. 

President  Taft  was  the  first  chief  executive  of  the  na- 
tion, or  of  any  American  state,  who  fully  grasped  and 
presented  the  issues  of  the  budget  principle  in  relation  to 
legislation  and  public  administration  in  any  government. 

Mr.  Buck  was  not  only  trained  under  Dr.  Cleveland  as 
a  member  of  the  staff  of  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Munic- 
ipal Research,  with  which  Dr.  Cleveland  had  been  con- 
nected from  its  organization  and  of  which  he  was  some- 
time Director,  but  had  also  had  notable  experience  as 
adviser  to  Governor  Harrington  of  Maryland,  in  the 
preparation  of  the  first  Maryland  state  budget,  and  in 
other  states  as  well.  Mr.  Buck  was  therefore  exception- 
ally qualified  to  deal  with  the  subject  matter  of  Parts  II 
and  III  of  this  volume,  for  which  he  is  chiefly  responsible. 

This  volume  is  dedicated  to  the  proposition  that  the 
foundations  of  all  democratic  institutions  must  rest  on  an 
effective  means  of  making  government  responsive  to 
public  opinion.  The  method  of  exposition  is  historical 
and  descriptive  of  the  devices  developed  in  response  to 
the  popular  demand  that  public  business  shall  be  "  vis- 
ible "  and  that  leadership  shall  be  "  responsible."  After 
laying  down  the  commonly  accepted  proposition  of  popu- 
lar control  (right  of  election,  acquiescence  in  the  decision 
of  a  majority,  and  the  need  for  a  forum  before  which 
the  responsible  heads  of  the  public  service  may  be  ar- 
raigned), Dr.  Cleveland,  as  author  of  Parts  I,  IV,  and  V 
of  the  text,  maintains  this  thesis: 

( 1 )   That  the  outstanding  need,  which  our  federal  con- 


Editor's  Note  vii 

stitution  was  designed  to  meet,  was  a  need  for  executive 
leadership,  which  vested  in  the  President  "  the  executive 
power  "  and  gave  to  him  the  means  for  making  his  leader- 
ship effective ; 

(2)  That  the  "  visibility  "  of  leadership*  is  provided 
for  by  requiring  "  a  regular  statement  and  account  of 
receipts  and  expenditures  of  all  public  monies,"  and  mak- 
ing it  the  duty  of  the  President  "  from  time  to  time  to  give 
to  Congress  information  of  the  State  of  the  Union  and 
recommend  to  their  consideration  such  measures  as  he 
shall  deem  necessary  and  expedient  " ; 

(3)  That  means  of  enforcing  "  responsibility  "  were 
put  in  the  hands  of  Congress,  and  the  electorate,  by  giv- 
ing to  Congress  the  control  over  the  purse,  and  making 
both  the  President  and  the  controlling  representative  and 
appropriating  body  answerable  to  the  people  for  the  man- 
ner in  which  their  powers  are  exercised; 

(4)  That  immediately  after  this  new  federal  govern- 
ment had  been  set  up,  these  underlying  principles  of 
popular  control  were  violated,  by  Congress  insisting  on 
retaining  to  itself  the  leadership  which  during  the  revo- 
lutionary period  had  been  exercised  by  committees  and 
refusing  to  permit  Hamilton,  as  President  Washington's 
representative,  to  come  before  them  to  give  an  account  of 
stewardship  and  to  submit  plans  and  proposals  to  be  fi- 
nanced —  the  result  being  the  centralized  government  by 
standing  committees  administrated  by  a  bureaucracy,  with 
a  board  of  strategy  organized  outside  of  the  government 
by  irresponsible  political  parties. 

The  constructive  proposals  in  this  part  of  the  book  are 
largely  those  which  will  be  found  in  the  report  of  Presi- 
dent Taft's  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency. 
They  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

1.  "That  the  President  shall  each  year  get  before  the 


viii  Editor's  Note 

country  what  it  is  that  the  administration  desires  to  do: 
shall  indicate  in  a  budget  message  wherein  action  is  nec- 
essary to  enable  the  administration  adequately  to  meet 
public  needs.  .  .  .  That  the  President,  under  the  powers 
given  to  him  by  the  constitution  is  in  a  better  position 
than  any  one  else  to  dramatize  the  work  of  the  Govern- 
ment, to  so  impress  this  upon  the  attention  of  the  people 
through  the  public  press  ...  as  to  arouse  discussion  and 
elicit  comment  such  as  will  keep  the  Congress,  as  well  as 
the  administration  in  touch  with  public  opinion  when  de- 
ciding whether  or  not  the  proposals  are  such  as  will  best 
meet  welfare  demands." 

2.  That  "  as  an  incident  to  such  procedure  it  is  thought 
that  there  must  necessarily  develop  a  system  of  represen- 
tation which  will  consistently  support  the  administration 
program  which  is  submitted," —  The  same  idea  being 
elaborated  and  the  report  continuing  to  show  that  "  a 
budget  system  necessarily  carries  with  it  means  for  de- 
veloping an  administrative  program  and  means  for  pre- 
senting it  and  defending  it  before  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government  and  the  country." 

3.  Having  provided  adequately  for  executive  leader- 
ship the  exercise  of  effective  control  over  this  leadership, 
both  by  the  representative  branch  and  the  electorate,  de- 
pend on  the  development  of  a  procedure  of  inquest,  criti- 
cism, and  discussion  in  Congress  before  the  whole  body 
as  an  open  forum,  in  which  each  member  shall  be  called 
upon  to  vote  for  or  against  the  plan  or  program  to  be 
financed,  section  by  section  and  as  a  whole.  In  this  con- 
nection it  is  claimed  that  the  recognized  purpose  of  com- 
mittees of  Congress  should  be  to  find  out  what  is  being 
proposed  and  to  bring  every  proposal  into  critical  review 
before  the  members  and  the  country.  In  other  words, 
the  committees  should  be  of  two  kinds,  those  acting  as 
attorneys  for  the  administration,  and  those  as  its  critics. 
Therefore,  the  committee  assuming  leadership    for  the 


Editor's  Note  ix 

budget  should  be  taken  from  the  pro-administration  party 
and  the  committee  assuming  critical  leadership  should  be 
made  up  chiefly  from  the  opposition. 

In  the  ranks  of  the  National  Budget  Committee  there 
developed  differences  of  opinion  almost  from  the  start 
concerning  the  relative  merits  of  the  proposals  for  a  na- 
tional budget  system,  especially  with  respect  to  the  loca- 
tion of  the  budget  bureau  and  the  concentrating  of  re- 
sponsibility for  the  initiation  of  the  budget  in  the  office 
of  the  President,  as  provided  for  in  the  Good  bill  which 
passed  the  House  of  Representatives  almost  unanimously 
Oct.  21,  1919,  and  the  plan  of  the  McCormick  bill  in- 
troduced in  the  Senate  but  not  yet  reported  out  by  the 
Select  Committee  of  which  Senator  McCormick  is  chair- 
man. Senator  McCormick's  plan  puts  the  budget  bureau 
under  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  divides  respon- 
sibility for  revision  of  the  estimates  and  preparation  of 
the  budget  between  that  officer  and  the  President  who, 
however,  must  transmit  and  assume  financial  responsibil- 
ity for  the  initiation  of  the  budget.  The  difference  of 
opinion  on  this  point  is  largely  one  of  emphasis. 

Mr.  Taft  is  primarily  interested  in  seeing  executive 
responsibility  fixed  and  strengthened  and  therefore  nat- 
urally prefers  the  Good  plan,  while  Dr.  Cleveland  is  so 
much  attracted  by  other  features  of  the  McCormick  plan 
which  seems  to  him  to  spell  executive  representation  be- 
fore the  legislature  and  the  putting  of  the  "  opposition  " 
where  it  can  make  clear-cut  issues  and  public  debate  of 
budget  questions,  that  he  seems  to  prefer  it  as  a  whole 
and  to  think  that  the  Good  bill,  even  with  the  revision  of 
rules  contemplated  by  separate  resolutions  not  yet  acted 
upon  by  the  House,  would  mean  the  perpetuation  of  many 
evils  of  the  present  committee  system. 

The  National  Budget  Committee's  position  is  that  a 
combination  of  the  two  plans  in  a  McCormick-Good  bill, 


x  Editor's  Note 

which  may  finally  be  enacted  by  Congress,  will  give  us 
the  advantages  of  a  budget  system  in  which  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  President  for  the  initiation  of  the  budget, 
and  for  the  correction  of  the  evils  which  any  budget  sys- 
tem is  sure  to  reveal  in  the  business  organization  of  the 
Government,  through  some  such  powers  as  were  con- 
ferred on  the  President  as  a  war  measure  by  the  Overman 
Act,  but  practically  unused  by  him  hitherto,  will  be  made 
unquestionably  secure,  and  Congressional  responsibility 
for  criticism  and  decision  of  clear-cut  issues  of  policy 
will  be  made  equally  clear  and  effective. 

Samuel  McCune  Lindsay. 
Columbia  University, 
March  17,  1920. 


PREFACE 

This  volume  was  begun  as  a  report  to  the  National 
Budget  Committee.  Much  has  been  written  and  pub- 
lished on  the  subject  of  budget  since  1912,  when  propa- 
ganda for  a  national  budget  was  seriously  begun  by  Presi- 
dent Taft  in  a  special  message  to  Congress  urging  the 
adoption  of  the  recommendations  of  his  Commission  on 
Economy  and  Efficiency.  In  the  seven  years  following 
Congress  did  nothing.  Meanwhile  action  was  taken  look- 
ing toward  the  introduction  of  a  budgetary  procedure  by 
forty-four  of  the  states  and  scores  of  cities.  And  now, 
out  of  the  entanglements  of  war  finance  the  question 
has  come  back  to  bother  Congress. 

During  the  last  year  a  volume  was  brought  out  by 
Dr.  W.  F.  Willoughby,  descriptive  of  the  budget  legis- 
lation passed  in  the  several  states.  The  story  of  how 
these  laws  have  worked,  where  they  have  been  in  opera- 
tion long  enough  to  judge,  was  still  to  be  written.  In 
undertaking  this  task,  it  at  once  became  evident  that, 
since  a  budget  is  only  a  method  or  mechanism  of  control, 
judgment  as  to  the  value  of  one  budget  system  or  an- 
other must  take  into  account  the  working  relations  be- 
tween the  representative  or  controlling  body  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  administrative  leadership  over  which  con- 
trol is  to  be  exercised  on  the  other.  This  in  turn  led  to  a 
consideration  of  the  manner  in  which  leadership  is  or- 
ganized and  expressed.  In  other  words,  a  study  of  the 
organic  laws  of  the  several  states  was  found  to  be  an  es- 
sential part  of  a  report  on  budgetary  procedure. 

Upon  taking  stock  of  what  had  been  done  in  this  par- 

xi 


xii  PREFACE 

ticular  it  was  found  that  in  addition  to  the  wealth  of  pub- 
lished materials  made  available  by  state  boards  and  com- 
missions, a  report  was  in  course  of  preparation  by  the 
Governor's  Reconstruction  Commission  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  dealing  with,  among  other  things,  the  subject 
of  administrative  reorganization  in  the  several  states. 
Mr.  Buck  of  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Re- 
search was  a  member  of  the  staff  of  this  commission  and 
was  immediately  responsible  for  the  preparation  of  these 
materials.  He  was,  therefore,  asked  to  collaborate  in  the 
collection  of  further  materials  dealing  with  the  budget 
experience  in  the  states.  Chapters  IX,  X,  XI  and  XII 
in  this  book  contain  the  materials,  in  modified  form,  which 
have  appeared  in  the  Commission's  Report  on  Retrench- 
ment and  Reorganization  in  the  State  Government. 
Chapter  XIII  was  prepared  with  the  assistance  of  Mr. 
Luther  H.  Gulick  of  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal 
Research,  who  as  secretary  of  the  Joint  Special  Com- 
mittee on  Finance  and  Budget  Procedure  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts Legislature  was  particularly  qualified  to  make  this 
contribution.  I  take  this  opportunity  also  to  acknowl- 
edge indebtedness  to  Dr.  Samuel  McCune  Lindsay,  Vice- 
Chairman  of  the  National  Budget  Committee,  and  editor 
of  the  Series  in  which  this  volume  appears. 

F.  A.  C. 
Norwood,  Mass. 
February  i,  1920. 


INTRODUCTION 

I  am  glad  to  write  a  Foreword  to  this  book.  Mr. 
Cleveland  I  have  known  for  a  number  of  years.  He  is  a 
pioneer  in  the  reform  of  the  wasteful  methods  of  govern- 
ment finance  in  municipal,  state  and  the  federal  field.  He 
is  not  a  mere  public  accountant  —  he  is  a  student  of  gov- 
ernment, and  he  has  thought  out  methods  for  avoiding 
the  ordinarily  sloppy  and  irresponsible  manner  of  man- 
aging the  public  business  in  a  Democracy,  by  giving  to 
our  ubiquitous  sovereigns,  the  people,  the  knowledge 
which  they  should  have  of  the  numerous  monetary  trans- 
actions of  their  agents  in  which  they  are  interested.  The 
great  problem  of  popular  government  on  its  practical  side 
is  to  create  machinery  by  which  those  for  whom  govern- 
ment is  carried  on,  and  who  should  control  and  direct  gov- 
ernment in  a  large  way,  shall  be  advised  of  the  facts,  and 
upon  those  facts,  correctly  interpreted,  shall  exercise  dis- 
criminating criticism  and  ultimate  decision.  Mr.  Cleve- 
land rightly  conceives  that  one  of  the  great  defects  in  the 
past  which  has  led  to  wastefulness  and  ineffectiveness  in 
government  finance  is  the  failure  to  keep  the  public  thus 
advised.  This  leads  to  invisible  government  which  does 
not  make  for  either  efficiency,  economy  or  honesty.  Mr. 
Cleveland  regards  a  proper  governmental  budget  as  very 
important  in  eliminating  "  invisible  government." 

The  budget  system  for  governments  has  had  its  fullest 
and  most  successful  development  in  Great  Britain,  and  it 
has  squared  with  the  whole  structure  of  government  in 
that  country.  When  therefore  we  attempt  to  adapt  the 
results  there  attained  to  our  own  case  we  are  somewhat 


xiv  Introduction 

embarrassed  by  the  constitutional  differences  between  the 
British  governmental  system  and  ours. 

In  English  history,  the  King  was  the  Executive,  and 
Parliament  and  the  House  of  Commons,  as  the  originator 
of  financial  legislation,  were  the  donors  of  the  funds  with 
which  the  King  was  to  conduct  his  government.  He  ap- 
plied to  Parliament  for  enough  to  run  the  nation.  Par- 
liament considered  his  application  and  determined  whether 
he  was  not  asking  too  much.  In  order  to  induce  com- 
pliance with  his  request,  he  found  it  wise  to  elaborate 
the  details  of  his  needs  and  prove  them  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  representatives  of  the  people  who  were  to  be  bur- 
dened with  the  cost.  Each  year  Parliament  had  to  deter- 
mine how  much  it  thought  the  King  needed  of  what  he 
asked,  and  the  particular  methods  of  taxation  by  which 
the  money  could  be  taken  from  the  people.  It  was  this 
statement  which  constituted  the  budget.  It  showed  how 
much  was  to  be  spent  in  detail  and  showed  the  source 
from  which  and  method  by  which  what  was  to  be  spent 
should  be  secured.  The  natural  attitude  in  such  an 
arrangement  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  was 
that  of  closest  scrutiny  of  the  petition  of  the  King  for 
appropriation  and  of  reluctance  and  opposition  toward  too 
great  expenditure.  It  did  not  enter  into  the  early  idea  of 
the  relation  between  the  executive  and  legislative  branches 
that  the  legislative  branch  could  be  a  factor  in  increasing 
the  appropriations.  Hence  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne  it 
became  a  standing  order  of  the  House  of  Commons  that 
no  motion  to  increase  any  item  in  the  supplies  should  be 
in  order  except  upon  motion  of  the  Crown.  Of  course 
the  relations  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
branches  have  had  a  revolutionary  change  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, so  that  the  King  has  ceased  to  be  the  executive,  and 
the  Government  is  carried  on  by  a  Premier  and  a  Cabinet, 
who  are  the  real  executive  and,  as  leaders  of  the  majority 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  also  constitute  the  moving 


Introduction  xv 

party  in  the  legislative  and  appropriating  branch.  But 
whatever  changes  the  constitutional  changes  in  the  British 
government  have  made,  the  important  features  of  the 
budget  remain.  Detailed  estimates  are  made  by  the  gov- 
ernment and  furnished  for  examination  and  determination 
by  the  committees  in  Parliament  and  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  as  a  representative  of  the  Crown  ultimately  pre- 
sents to  Parliament,  in  a  succinct,  graphic  way,  the  general 
financial  condition  of  the  Treasury,  what  is  needed  to  run 
the  Government  for  another  year,  and  the  taxation  method 
by  which  it  is  to  be  raised.  It  is  a  comprehensive  speech, 
adapted  to  popular  understanding,  and  the  result  of  ex- 
pert work  in  the  executive  offices  and  in  committee,  and 
is  presented  in  such  a  way  as  a  whole  that  the  press  and 
other  instruments  of  publicity  can  bring  it  to  the  people 
and  present  the  issues  arising  out  of  its  important  factors 
clearly  and  with  a  sense  of  proportion.  The  people  can 
judge  from  such  a  budget  how  much  each  important  item 
costs  and  how  they  could  be  relieved  from  taxation  if  the 
item  were  omitted. 

Except  in  the  very  early  days  of  the  Republic,  when 
Hamilton,  with  his  wonderful  genius,  was  inaugurating 
the  business  side  of  our  Government,  we  never  had  any- 
thing like  a  proper  budget.  We  have  never  had  concen- 
trated in  one  capable  body  the  duty  of  detailed  calculation 
of  what  is  needed  to  run  the  Government  for  a  year  and 
the  systematic  fixing  of  the  taxation  sources  from  which 
the  money  needed  is  to  be  procured.  It  is  true  that  the 
General  Appropriation  Committee  of  the  House,  until 
within  some  decades,  did  have  the  function  of  making 
all  the  appropriations  for  the  Government,  and  it  is  also 
true  that  earlier  the  function  of  determining  the  ways 
and  means  was  united  with  that  of  fixing  the  expendi- 
tures; but  we  never  have  had  executive  responsibility 
for  the  preparation  of  the  expense  plan  of  the  Govern- 
ment, with  a  suggestion  of  the  means  by  which  it  could 


xvi  Introduction 

be  met.  The  Executive  spends  the  money.  The  Execu- 
tive operates  the  machinery  of  government.  Therefore, 
the  Executive  is  much  more  intimately  associated  with  the 
facts  upon  which  the  cost  of  government  is  to  be  deter- 
mined than  the  legislative  branch  can  be,  and  if  it  is  so 
minded,  is  better  qualified  to  determine  where  real  econ- 
omy can  be  effected  and  where  apparent  economy  will  be 
wasteful.  This  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  argument  in 
favor  of  taking  away  from  the  legislative  branch  the  ul- 
timate decision  as  to  the  expenditure  of  the  funds  of  the 
Government  and  the  methods  of  taxation  to  raise  them, 
but  it  is  a  strong  reason  why  the  legislative  branch  of  the 
Government  in  its  work  of  ultimately  determining  how 
much  should  be  spent  and  where  it  should  be  raised  should 
have  the  benefit  of  the  assistance  of  the  executive  de- 
partment in  an  elaborate  statement  of  how  much  the 
Government  can  be  run  for  and  where  the  money  can  be 
had. 

What  should  be  the  machinery  to  secure  it  ?  From  my 
personal  experience  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  responsibility 
and  power  should  be  given  directly  to  the  President ;  that 
he  should  be  allowed  funds  from  which  to  create  a  bud- 
get bureau,  and  that  the  estimates  prepared  by  the  heads 
of  departments  should  be  subjected  to  the  pruning  and 
veto  power  of  the  President,  as  assisted  by  his  Budget  Bu- 
reau. There  is  a  difference  between  the  House  and  the 
Senate  over  the  pending  bill  as  to  whether  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  should  have  the  Budget  Bureau  as  a  part 
of  the  Treasury  Department  and  should  himself  exercise 
the  pruning  and  limiting  power.  The  Senate  bill  re- 
lieves the  secretary  from  some  of^  his  duties  in  order  to 
enable  him  to  discharge  this  additional  burden.  Sup- 
porters of  the  Senate  bill  object  that  the  President  has 
not  the  time  to  do  this  thing.  I  venture,  in  the  light  of 
the  experience  I  have  had,  to  differ  radically  with  this 
latter  view.     The  preparation  of  the  budget  is  going  to 


Introduction  xvii 

be  one  of  the  most  important  functions  that  the  whole  Ad- 
ministration performs.  Therefore  the  President  may 
well  devote  all  the  time  that  is  needed  to  giving  general 
form  to  the  budget  and  deciding  the  questions  that  are 
certain  to  arise  between  his  Budget  Bureau  and  the  de- 
partments whose  estimates  are  to  be  subjected  to  a  prun- 
ing. The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  will  not  have  suffi- 
cient prestige  with  the  other  departments  to  avoid  the 
effect  of  the  jealousies  that  any  one  familiar  with  the 
working  of  departments  knows  must  exist.  The  Presi- 
dent himself  will  have  sufficient  difficulty  in  adjusting  the 
differences  between  his  own  Bureau  and  the  various  de- 
partments, but  he  can  do  it  with  his  power  —  I  doubt  if 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  can.  The  conservatism  of 
chief  clerks  and  those  who  have  been  long  in  the  service 
and  under  whose  influence  the  heads  of  departments 
must  come  is  a  very  difficult  obstacle  to  overcome  in  seek- 
ing proper  economy  and  a  change  of  method.  When  one- 
third  of  the  expenditures  of  the  Government  is  to  be 
through  the  Treasury  Department  itself,  the  expenses  of 
that  department  should  be  passed  upon  by  a  higher  power. 
The  Good  House  bill,  therefore,  in  providing  for  a  Pres- 
idential budget,  is  much  <to  be  preferred  to  the  McCor- 
mick  Senate  bill.  The  former  bill  gives  the  President  an 
unusually  effective  method  of  keeping  proper  watch  on 
the  departments  and  of  stimulating  the  heads  of  the 
various  departments  to  greater  detailed  care  in  the  saving 
of  public  money.  More  than  this,  the  budget  will  neces- 
sarily contain  recommendations  involving  high  and  im- 
portant governmental  policies,  and  it  is  right  that  the 
head  of  the  Administration  should  be  directly  responsible 
for  such  recommendations.  Of  course  all  these  matters 
will  be  considered  in  Cabinet  and  in  respect  to  all  of  them 
the  President  must  be  the  ultimate  judge.  He  can  be 
saved  detail,  but  he  can  not  be  saved  and  ought  not  to  be 
saved  the  duty  of  exercising  deliberate  judgment  on  the 


xviii  Introduction 

main  issues  which  the  budget  will  necessarily  present. 

Mr.  Cleveland  in  this  work  deals  with  another  feature 
that  can  not  be  suppressed  in  the  consideration  of  a  budget 
system,  and  that  is  the  way  in  which  Congress  shall  dis- 
charge its  duty  in  respect  to  the  executive  budget  after  it 
has  been  presented.  The  mere  publication  of  an  execu- 
tive budget  and  its  submission  to  the  committees  of  Con- 
gress is  not  enough  to  give  it  proper  weight  and  effect. 
Improved  as  the  means  of  publicity  and  information  have 
been,  the  spoken  word,  with  its  accompanying  incidents, 
is  still  a  most  important  factor  in  bringing  home  to  the 
people  the  critical  points  in  any  measure,  especially  in 
that  of  a  budget.  The  'Administration  as  the  proponent 
of  the  budget  should  have  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in 
the  court  to  which  it  submits  its  case  —  that  is,  in 
Congress.  The  President  should  make  the  same  kind 
of  a  speech  to  Congress  as  the  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer in  Great  Britain  makes  to  Parliament,  and  then 
his  Cabinet  ministers  should  be  given  the  opportunity 
on  the  floor  of  each  House  to  support  and  defend  the 
features  of  the  budget  for  which  they  are  responsible 
and  with  which  they  are  familiar.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  reason  why  the  heads  of  the  departments  should 
not  be  given  seats  in  both  Houses,  with  an  opportunity 
to  take  part  in  any  debate.  In  the  discussion  of  the 
budget,  both  in  the  explanation  before  it  shall  be  referred 
to  the  committees,  and  in  criticism  of  the  action  of  the 
committee  after  the  committee  has  made  its  report,  the 
Administration  should  be  heard. 

It  is  suggested  that  the  heads  of  departments  could 
hardly  support  and  defend  estimates  which  had  been 
pruned  down  or  changed  by  the  President.  This  is  a 
reason  of  no  substance  whatever.  The  heads  of  depart- 
ments are  and  should  be  loyal  to  the  Administration,  and 
should  take  and  support  the  view  which  the  President  has 
adopted  as  the  Administration  view  in  respect  to  the 


Introduction  xix 

budget.  They  will  have  no  difficulty  in  so  doing.  If 
any  head  of  a  department  does,  then  his  place  is  not  in 
the  Cabinet. 

Just  after  the  Civil  War,  the  leading  statesmen  of  both 
political  parties  recommended  that  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments be  given  seats  in  each  House  and  an  opportunity 
to  join  in  the  debate.  Some  twenty  years  later,  men 
equally  prominent  in  the  Government,  experienced  in  Con- 
gress, made  a  similar  recommendation.  Such  an  ar- 
rangement would  greatly  facilitate  the  business  of  Con- 
gress in  getting  at  the  facts  through  the  interrogation  of 
members  of  the  Administration  on  the  floor  of  each 
House;  and  it  would  give  the  members  of  each  House  a 
clear  conception  of  the  needs  of  the  Government  as  the 
Administration  thinks  them  to  be,  backed  by  arguments 
of  men  who  must  by  reason  of  their  duties  know  what 
they  are  talking  about.  Indeed  the  very  function  thus 
added  to  the  others  of  the  Cabinet  ministers  will  stimu- 
late them  to  a  closer  attention  to  their  departments  and  a 
more  intimate  knowledge  of  their  working. 

But  more  important  even  than  giving  the  Administra- 
tion a  chance  to  explain  and  defend  its  budget  in  the  very 
forum  where  questions  are  to  be  decided  is  the  reform 
of  the  two  Houses  of  Congress  themselves  by  creating  a 
committee  whose  functions  shall  cover  the  whole  field  of 
expenditures  and  receipts.  The  division  of  authority  in 
making  up  appropriation  bills  between  a  dozen  commit- 
tees in  each  House  is  a  travesty  which  necessarily  leads 
to  expansion  of  governmental  expenditure  far  beyond 
what  it  would  be  restrained  to,  if  all  expenses  were  in 
the  control  of  one  body  which  at  the  same  time  was  vested 
with  the  duty  and  power  of  arranging  for  the  raising  of 
the  money.  Congress,  as  Mr.  Good,  the  Chairman  of 
the  Appropriation  Committee  says,  must  put  its  own 
house  in  order  before  it  shall  have  a  right  to  criticise  the 
executive  for  extravagance. 


xx  Introduction 

One  may  note  in  opposition  to  the  budget  the  claim 
that  Congress  always  cuts  down  and  never  adds  to  the 
estimates  of  the  various  departments.  Doubtless  the  sta- 
tistics will  prove  this  in  respect  to  what  may  be  called 
routine  expenses,  but  that  is  due  to  the  complete  abcence 
of  restraint  upon  executive  estimates.  Each  bureau  chief 
and  each  department  head  now  make  estimates  and  no- 
body curbs  them.  The  executive  budget  places  responsi- 
bility on  the  President  to  do  this.  The  custom  has  grown 
among  executive  chiefs  of  bureaus  and  departments  to 
ask  for  much  more  than  it  is  expected  will  be  appropriated 
in  order  to  avoid  their  being  cut  below  actual  requirements. 
Such  a  haphazard  method  of  estimates  and  their  pruning 
is  certain  to  be  wasteful  and  often  misdirected  and  likely 
to  hamper  governmental  operation.  The  President  with 
his  control  may  easily  see  to  it  that  only  that  is  asked 
which  is  needed,  and  he  and  his  Administration  can  ex- 
plain why.  Congress  can  then  exercise  the  discretion 
that  it  should  have  in  either  approving  the  judgment  of  a 
responsible  maker  of  a  budget  or  in  differing  from  him. 
In  such  a  case  Congress  will  be  dealing  with  real  esti- 
mates and  a  real  plan  and  their  judgment  will  be"  based 
on  the  best  judgment  which  the  Administration  can  fur- 
nish them. 

Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  country  has  reform 
of  its  ridiculous  system  of  spending  and  raising  money 
been  so  critically  important.  For  years  we  shall  have 
to  raise  enormous  amounts  and  the  dangers  of  inter- 
fering with  our  prosperity  by  the  stifling  weight  of  tax- 
ation must  convince  everyone  who  thinks,  of  the  impera- 
tive necessity  of  improving  our  national  business  system. 

Mr.  Cleveland  was  a  chief  participant  in  the  great  work 
done  for  the  city  of  New  York  by  the  Bureau  of  Munici- 
pal Research  which  after  a  struggle  of  fourteen  years  has 
brought  about  a  radical  improvement  in  the  management 
of  the  finances  and  expenditures  of  New  York  City.     He 


Introduction  xxi 

was  the  Chairman  of  the  Economy  and  Efficiency  Com- 
mission which  under  the  authority  of  an  appropriation 
from  Congress  I  appointed  during  my  Administration  to 
investigate  the  proper  methods  of  introducing  economy 
in  the  business  of  the  Government  through  a  budget  sys- 
tem and  in  many  other  ways.  That  commission  made 
reports  which  I  transmitted  to  Congress,  which  ought  to 
be  of  great  value  in  assisting  the  present  Houses  in  the 
preparation  of  a  proper  bill.  The  recommendations  and 
reports  of  the  commission  did  not  meet  the  favor  of  lead- 
ing Congressmen  and  all  the  work  done,  contained  in 
printed  reports  and  unprinted  manuscripts,  has  been  dust 
covered  until  now.  Of  course  the  bureaus  and  divisions 
of  governmental  work  have  been  vastly  increased  in  num- 
ber and  expanded  in  function  since  that  time,  due  to  the 
war.  Still  those  reports  are  instructive.  The  discussions 
and  researches  of  that  commission  reflect  the  highest 
credit  on  its  very  able  members,  of  whom  Mr.  Cleveland 
was  the  official  head.  Mr.  Cleveland  had  much  to  do  in 
aiding  the  very  thorough  investigation  of  the  proper  meth- 
ods of  budget  reform  embodied  in  the  proposed  New  York 
Constitution  of  191 5.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  we  may 
welcome  this  book  from  Mr.  Cleveland. 

William  Howard  Taft. 


CONTENTS 


PACK 

Introduction xiii 


PART  I.  HISTORIC  BACKGROUND  AND  INTERPRE- 
TATION OF  THE  RECENT  MOVEMENT  FOR  AD- 
MINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION  AND  BUDGET 
PROCEDURE 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Principles  and  Essentials  of  Popular  Control  ...      3 

Popular  Good  Will  —  the  only  Safe  Foundation  for  Institu- 
tion Building 3 

Class  Domination  —  the  Cause  of   Social   Unrest    ....  4 

Need  for  Means  of  Peaceable  Adjustment 4 

Revolution  —  the    Result    of    Lack    of    Means    of    Peaceable 

Adjustment 5 

Realization  of  Ideals  of  Democracy  —  Essential  to  Peace  .     .  5 

What    Is    a    Democracy? 6 

Where  Justice  Resides 7 

Present-day    Meaning    of    "  Liberty " 8 

Meaning  of   "  Equality  "   and  "  Fraternity  " 10 

Practical  Application  of  Concepts  of  Democracy   ....  10 

Need  for  Providing  Organs  of  Volition  as  Well  as  of  Action  12 

Two  Types  of  Organization  and  Leadership 12 

Essential  Characteristics  of  Organization  and  Leadership  for 

Action 14 

Essential  Characteristics  of  Democratic  Agencies  for  Deliber- 
ation and  Decision 15 

Essentials  of  Popular  Control  as  Exemplified  in  Popular  As- 
sembly               ....  16 

Procedure  of  Deliberation  as  Exemplified  in  Trial  by  Jury  .  18 

Procedure  of  Deliberation  in  Representative  Government  .  20 
Procedure  for  the  Conduct  of  Deliberation  in  Representative 

Assembly 21 

How  Publicity  Can  Be  Given  to  Acts  of  Government  ...  22 

The  Need  for  Responsible  Leaders 23 

Appeals  to  the  People 25 

xxiii 


xxiv  Contents 


CHAPTER  II  page 

Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  in  the  Development 

of  Our  Political  Institutions 26 

Attempts  Made  to  Account  for  "  Social  Unrest "    .      .      .     .26 

Appeals  to  Patriotism  to  Maintain  the  Status  Quo  ....  27 

Popular  Concept  of  Right 27 

Evidence  of  Institutional  Maladjustment 27 

American  Institutions  as  Appraised  by  James  Bryce   ...  28 

Short-Comings  Described  by  President  Wilson 28 

The  Picture  Drawn  of  Senator  Hoar 29 

President  Roosevelt's   Stand 30 

Proposals  of  Governor  Hughes 30 

Defects  Described  by  President  Taft 30 

Causes  of  Popular  Resentment  Described  by  Senator  Root  .  31 
The  Need  for  an  Institutional  Means  of  Obtaining  Expression 

of   Popular  Will   Based  on   "  Deliberation "    .      .      .      .34 

Standard  for  Judgment  of  Institutional  Fitness 34 

Wanted  —  An  Effective  Mechanism  of  Popular  Control   .     .  35 

CHAPTER  III 

Principles  of  Popular  Control  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  .  37 

Popular  Control  the  Essence  of  Democracy 37 

How  Popular  Control  Is  Made  Effective  through  Representa- 
tives          38 

Restatement  of  the  Problem 39 

An  East  Indian  View 40 

Democracy  Insists  that  Leadership  Shall  Be  Subservient  .      .  41 

Jefferson's  Four  Principles  of  Popular  Control 42 

The  Principle  of  Popular  Elections 45 

Acceptance  of   the   Principle  of   Majority   Rule    ....  45 
Arraignment  of  Administration  in  Representative  Forum   .  46 
The  Right  of  Leaders  to  Appeal  to  the  People  from  De- 
cision  of    Representative    Body 50 

Experience  of  Other  Countries 51 

Neglect  of  Last  Two  Principles  in  United  States   ....  52 

CHAPTER  IV 

Irresponsible    Leadership — Its     Contribution    to    Institu- 
tional Maladjustment 54 

The   Boss  —  the    Product   of    Conditions 54 

Lack  of  Appreciation  of  Need  for  Leadership 54 

The  Leadership  of  Standing  Committees 57 

Acceptance  of  the  Principle  of  Oligarchy 58 

The  Rise  of  Humanitarian  Civic  Leadership 59 


Contents  xxv 

PAGE 

Three  Groups  of  Irresponsible  Leaders 60 

1.  The  Irresponsible  "  Boss  "  and  the  Irresponsible  "  Party  "  61 

2.  Irresponsible  Humanitarian  Leadership 63 

3.  Irresponsible  Agencies  to  Pomote  Responsible  Leadership 

Within   the    Government 69 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Beginning  of  the  Recent  Movement  for  Administrative 

Reform  and  a  Budget  System 72 

New  York  City  a  Center  of  Interest  in  Better  Administration  72 

A  Question  of  News 73 

A  Question  of  Sick  Babies  and  Padded  Rolls 74 

Beginning  of  a   Nation-Wide   Campaign 75 

The  Inspirational  Leadership  of  President  Roosevelt   ...  76 

The   Contribution   of    President   Taft 77 

An  Effort  to  Institutionalize  Executive  Leadership   ...  78 

A  Portrayal  of   Conditions  to  Be  Corrected 79 

A  Definite  Program  Proposed 81 

Preliminary   Staff   Inquiry 81 

The  President's  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency  .      .  82 

Request  for  Cooperation  of  Congress  in  a  Budget  Procedure  83 

Order  of  the  President  to  Prepare  a  Budget 85 

Attempt  of  Opposition  Leader  to  Prevent  Action  ....  85 

Favorable  Reception  Given  by  the  Public 86 

Concrete  Results   which   Followed 87 

CHAPTER  VI 

State  Commissions  to  Investigate  and  Report  on  the  Need 
for  Administrative  Reorganization  and  an  Effective 

Budget  Procedure 89 

Investigations  of  Need  for  Economy  and  Efficiency  as  Old  as 

Our  Government 89 

The  Role  of  Civic  Agencies  and  Bureaus  of  Municipal  Re- 
search       91 

Commissions  to  Recommend  Administrative  Reorganization  in 

the  State  Governments 92 

Recommendations    for   Government  by   Commissions    ...  96 

Recommendations  for  Single-Headed  Administration  ...  98 

CHAPTER  VII 

General  Discussion  of  Recent  Administrative  Reorganiza- 
tion Plans  to  Provide  for  Responsible  Leadership  .  100 

Boss  Rule  vs.  Responsible  Leadership 101 

Reorganization    and    Financial    Responsibility    in    the    Large 

Cities 103 


xxvi  Contents 

PAGE 

The   Program  of  the   National   Municipal   League  —  Federal 

Plan ;  Commission  Plan ;  Commission  Manager  Plan  .  105 
The  Propaganda  of  the  Short  Ballot  Association  ....  106 
Beginning    of    Administrative    Reorganization    Movement    in 

State  Governments 107 

Reorganization  Plans  Providing  for  Centralization  of  Execu- 
tive   Authority 109 

The  Proposed  New  York  Plan  of  1915 109 

Illinois    Plan      .      .  109 

Plans  of  Idaho  and  Nebraska in 

"  The  Wisconsin  Idea  " 113 

Wisconsin  Idea  vs.  Illinois  Plan 116 

The  New  York  Standing  Committee  System  .     .     ■.     .     .     .116 

CHAPTER  VIII 

General   Description   and   Classification   of   Recent   State 

Budget  Enactments 118 

Budget  Legislation  in  California  and  Wisconsin 118 

Budget  Legislation  in  Other  States 120 

Budget  Movement,  a  Quest  for  Responsible  Leadership  .     .  121 

Three  General  Types  of   State   Budgets 123 

Appraisement  of  Types  of  State  Budgets 126 

PART  II.  DETAILED  ACCOUNTS  OF  PROPOSED 
PLANS  AND  RECENT  LEGAL  ENACTMENTS  FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION  IN  STATE 
GOVERNMENTS 131 

CHAPTER  IX 

Earlier   Proposed   Plans    for   Centralization   of   Executive 

Authority 133 

The    Minnesota    Plan 133 

Two  Reports  and  Findings  of  Commission 134 

Recommendations  of   Preliminary  Report 135 

Executive    Heads    of    Departments 135 

Advisory   Boards 136 

Recommendations  of   Final   Report 137 

Results  Achieved 137 

The  Iowa   Plan 137 

Report   of    Efficiency   Engineers 138 

Report  of  Committee 139 

Results 140 

The  New  York  Plan  of  1915 *4<> 

Recognition  of   Need   for  Reorganization 141 

Study  of  Existing  Machinery 142 


Contents  xxvii 

PAGE 

Political  Parties  Become  Interested 142 

The  Work  of  the  Constitutional  Convention 143 

Plan  of  Reorganization  Proposed  by  the  Convention   .     .  145 

Proposed  Reorganization  Defeated  at  the  Polls  ....  147 

CHAPTER  X 

Plans  for  the  Centralization  of  Executive  Responsibility 

in  Operation 148 

Illinois    Plan 148 

Work  of  the  Committee  on  Efficiency  and  Economy  .  .  .  148 
Committee's  Plan  of  Administrative  Reorganization  .  .  .  149 
Governor  Lowden's  Role  in  the  Reorganization  ....  150 
Organization  Under  the  Civil  Administrative  Code    .     .     .   152 

Department  Heads 153 

Subordinate   Administrative   Officers 153 

Quasi  Legislative  and  Quasi  Judicial  Boards   ....   155 

Advisory  Boards 157 

Office  Tenures 158 

Location  of  Offices 158 

Functions   of   Departments 159 

Operation  of  the  Reorganization  Plan 161 

Criticisms   of    the    Code    Organization 162 

Idaho   Plan 164 

Organization  Under  the  Administration  Consolidation  Act  165 

Single-headed  Departments 165 

Administrative    Officers 166 

Agricultural  Advisory  Board 167 

General  Powers  of  Department  Heads 168 

Functions  of  Departments 168 

What  the  Reorganization  Accomplishes 172 

Nebraska  Plan      .     .  173 

Organization  Under  the  Civil  Administrative  Code  .     .     .   174 

Department  Heads  and  Subordinates 174 

Functions    of    Departments 175 

What  the  Code  Accomplishes 178 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Plan  of  Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachu- 
setts       179 

Preliminary   Surveys 179 

Constitutional  Amendment  Providing  for  Consolidation   .      .   180 
Reorganization  Proposed  by  Supervisor  of  Administration   .   181 

Organization  Under  the  Consolidation  Plan 183 

Complicated  and  Involved  Scheme .   183 

Status  of  Constitutional  Officers 184 

Administrative  Machinery  of  the  Statutory  Departments   .   184 
Plan  Violates  Principles  Establishing  Executive  Responsibility  190 


xxviii  Contents 


CHAPTER  XII  page 

Plans  for  Centralization  of  Executive  Responsibility  Under 

Consideration 193 

Proposed   Oregon    Plan 193 

People's  Power  League 193 

Commissions    to    Investigate    Administration 193 

Report  of  Consolidation  Commission 194 

Departmental   Organization 196 

Proposed  Delaware   Plan 199 

Findings  of  Survey  Report 199 

General  Recommendations 201 

Departmental  Organization 203 

Proposed  California  Plans 204 

Plan  of  the  Taxpayers'  Association 204 

Plan  of  the  Committee  on  Efficiency  and  Economy  .     .     .  205 

New  York  Plan  of  1919 207 

Report  of  Reconstruction  Commission 207 

Departmental  Organization 208 

Tendencies  in  Other  States 210 

Ohio 211 

Indiana 211 

Vermont 212 

North  Carolina,  New  Mexico  and  Others 213 


PART  III.  DETAILED  ACCOUNTS  OF  THE  CHARAC- 
TERISTICS AND  OPERATION  OF  RECENT  STATE 
ENACTMENTS  PROVIDING  FOR  A  BUDGET  PRO- 
CEDURE      21s 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Massachusetts  Constitutional  and  Statutory  Budget  Pro- 
visions—  A  Product  of  Mixed  Political  Emotions  .  217 

Legislative  Organization  and    Procedure 217 

Constitutional  and  Statutory  Budget  Provisions 219 

Position  of  the  Governor  in  the  Administration 224 

Filing  of  Estimates  with  Supervisor  of  Administration       .      .  225 
Estimates  Reviewed  and  Budget  Prepared  by  Office  of  Super- 
visor of  Administration 225 

Form  and  Content  of  the  1919  Budget 228 

House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  Remake  Budget  .      .      .  229 
Chairman  of  House  Committee  gives  News  Value  to  Budget 

Issues 232 

Action  of  Senate  calls  forth  Conference  Committee  ....  234 


Contents  xxix 

PAGE 

Form  of  General  Appropriation   Bill 235 

Two  Supplemental  Budgets  Submitted  by  Governor  ....  235 

Additional  and  Special  Claims  Appropriations 237 

Total  Appropriations  Carried  in  Seven  Acts 238 

Summary  of  Facts 238 


CHAPTER  XIV 

The  "Executive  Budget"  Idea  as  Exemplified  in  Illinois  — 

Its  Accomplished  Results 240 

Recent  Administrative  Reorganization  Makes  Possible  Opera- 
tion of  Executive  Budget 240 

Legislative  Organization  and   Procedure   Unchanged    .     .     .  241 

Legislative  Reference  Bureau 242 

Department   of   Finance 243 

Statutory  Budget  Provisions 244 

Budget  Staff  in  Department  of  Finance 245 

Estimates  and  Other  Information  Gathered  by  Department  of 

Finance 246 

Review  and  Revision  of  Estimates  by  Director  of  Finance  .  247 

Budget  Speeches  Delivered  to  Legislature 247 

The  Budget  and  Budget  Supplements 248 

Legislative  Procedure  and  Action  on  the  Budget  ....  249 
Many  Emergency  Appropriation  Measures  Passed  ....  250 

General  Appropriation   Bills 251 

Effect  of  Legislative  Action  on  Governor's  Proposals  .  .  253 
Control  by  Department  of  Finance  over  Expenditure  .  .  .  253 
Conclusions 253 


CHAPTER  XV 

The  "  Commission  Budget  "  Idea  as  Exemplified  in  Wisconsin  256 

"  Government  by   Commission "   Seriously   Limits   Power  of 

Governor 256 

The  State  Board  of  Public  Affairs 257 

Statutory  Provisions  for  Budget  Procedure 258 

Budget  Staff 260 

Preparation,  Filing,  and  Review  of  Estimates 260 

Public  Hearings  on  Estimates 261 

The   Compilation  of    Estimates    ...  261 

Budget  Recommendations  of  Board  of  Public  Affairs  .     .     .  262 

Organization  and  Work  of  Joint  Committee  on  Finance  .     .  263 

The    Appropriation    Bills 264 

The  Wisconsin  System  of  "  Continuing  Appropriations  "  .     .  265 

The  Result  of  "  Government  by  Commission " 266 


xxx  Contents 

CHAPTER  XVI  page 

The  "  Legislative  Budget  "  Idea  as  Exemplified  in  New  York  268 

Vacillating  Party  Positions  on  New  York's  Budget  Issue  .      .  268 

Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization 270 

Governor  not  a  Chief  Executive 271 

Efforts  of  Governors  Hughes  and  Sulzer 273 

Budget  Provisions  of  Proposed  Constitution  of  1915   .           .  273 
Governor  Whitman's   Budget   Conference  and   Recommenda- 
tions        274 

The  Present  Budget  Law  and  Its  Provisions 276 

The  Joint  Legislative  Budget  Committee 280 

Form  and  Preparation  of  Estimates 280 

Budget  Staffs 281 

Three  Compilations  of  Estimates 282 

Review  of  Estimates  —  Hearings 282 

The  General  Appropriation  Bill 284 

Scores  of  Special  Appropriation  Bills 285 

No  Definite  Revenue  Plan 286 

Responsibility    for    Budget    Scattered 286 

New  York  System  Resembles  the  Present  National  Plan  .     .  288 


CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans  .     .     .  289 

Ohio 290 

Disintegrated    Administrative    System 290 

Limited   Power  of   Governor 291 

Organization  and  Procedure  of  the  Legislature   ....  292 

Provisions  of  the  Budget  Law 293 

The   Budget   Commissioner   and    Staff 294 

Filing  and  Review  of  Estimates 295 

Budget  Commissioner  Prepares  Budget  Document  .  .  .  296 
The  Appropriation  Committees  and  Their  Work  ....  297 
Legislative  Handling  of  General  Appropriation  Bill  .  .  299 

Numerous  Special  Appropriation  Bills  Passed 300 

Provisions  for  Transfers  and  Emergencies 301 

Governor  Cox  Condemns  Present  Budget  Procedure  .  302 

The  Ohio  System  Fails  to  Fix  Responsibility  or  to  Provide 

Publicity 302 

Maryland     .      .  303 

Scattered  and   Uncontrolled  Administrative   Agencies    .      .  303 
Governor  without  Assistance  to  Prepare  or  Power  to  Exe- 
cute the  Budget 305 

Budget  Amendment  and  Its  Provisions 306 

Form,  Preparation,  and  Filing  of  Estimates 309 

Public  Hearings  and  Revision  of  Estimates 310 


Contents  xxxi 

PAGE 

Budget  Submitted  to  Legislature 310 

Form  and  Content  of  Budget 3II 

Form  and  Provisions  of  Budget  Bill  .  312 

Standing  Committee  Consideration  of   Budget   Unsatisfac- 
tory   313 

Legislative  Action  on  the  Budget  Bill 314 

No  Supplementary  Appropriation  Bills  Enacted   .      .     .      .315 
The  Serious  Weaknesses  of  the  Maryland  System   .     .     .316 

New  Jersey     .  317 

A  Short  Ballot  which  does  not  Centralize  Executive   Re- 
sponsibility        317 

The   Edge   Budget  Law  —  Its   Provisions 318 

Form  and  Preparation  of  Estimates 320 

Two  Budget  Assistants 321 

The    "  Budget    Commission " 322 

Review  and  Revision  of  Estimates 323 

Public    Hearings 323 

The  Budget  Message 323 

The  Joint  Appropriation  Committee  and  Its  Work   .      .      .  324 
Legislative  Action  on  the  General  Appropriation  Bill    .      .  326 

Effect  of  the  Governor's  Veto 327 

Form  and  Provisions  of  the  General  Appropriation  Act  .     .  327 
Use  of   Civil   Service  and  Central   Purchasing   Records  in 

Budget   Making 328 

New  Jersey  Budget  a  Hybrid  Type 329 


PART  IV.    PROPOSED  NATIONAL  BUDGET  LEGISLA- 
TION       • 33i 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

Recommendations  of  the  Taft  Commission 333 

Specific  Recommendations  of  Commission 333 

Submission  of  Budget  by  President  Taft 337 

Why  Commission's  Recommendations  were  Limited   .     .     .  339 

CHAPTER  XIX 

Proposals  of  Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon  341 

Opposition  to  Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Congress  ....  342 

Recognition  of  Need  for  Change  of  Rules 343 

A  Proposal  which  Would  Have  Given  to  the  Nation  an  Ex- 
ecutive   Budget 344 

Mr.  Fitzgerald's  Proposal  to  Return  to  the  Old  Practice  .     .  345 

Mr.  Sherley's  Proposal 348 

Support  Given  by  Mr.  Cannon 350 


xxxii  Contents 

PAGE 

Constitutional  Objections  Urged  to  Executive  Budget  .  .  .351 
These  Objections  Answered  by  Members  of  Congress  .  .  .  352 
A  Question  of  Responsible  Government 354 


CHAPTER  XX 
Budget  Bills  Before  Congress 355 

Attempt  to  Preserve  the  Status  Quo .     .  355 

Reorganization  of  Legislature  and  Revision  of  Rules  Needed  357 

Party  Interest  in  a  National  Budget  System 357 

Bills  Before  Congress 358 

The  Frear  Bills 359 

The  Green  Resolution 362 

The  Good  Bill 363 

The  Andrews  Resolution 364 

The  Tinkham  Resolution 365 

Critical  Discussion  of  Executive  Proposals  Before  the  House  366 
Appointment  of  a  "  Select  Committee  on  the  Budget "...  371 
The  Amended  Good  Bill  (H.  R.  9783)  Recommended  by  the 

Committee 372 

Only  One  of  Three  Essentials  to  an  Executive  Budget  Pro- 
vided   for 373 

The  President  Already  Has  All  the  Powers  Provided  for  .  375 
Intent   of   the  Committee   not  to   Provide   for  an  Executive 

Budget 376 

Action  in  the  Senate 378 

The  McCormick  Budget  Bills 378 

PART  V.    CONCLUSION 383 

CHAPTER  XXI 
The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government 385 

A  Question  of  Machinery  for  Making  Popular  Control  Ef- 
fective     385 

Adequacy  of  the  Instruments  Provided 387 

The   Purpose  of  the  Mechanism  of  Control 387 

The  Mechanism  not  Properly  Used 389 

A  Question  of  Leadership 389 

Refusal  of  Constitutional  Reviewing  and  Controlling  Bodies 

to   Surrender  Leadership 390 

Leadership  and  Responsibility  Part  Company 390 

"  Invisible  "  Government  —  Electorate  Left  Helpless   .     .  392 
Organization  by  Irresponsible  Bosses  to  Control  the  Elec- 
torate      392 

Protest  Against  Irresponsible  Leadership 393 


Contents  xxxiii 

PAGE 

Recent  Acts  Looking  Toward  Establishing  Responsible  Gov- 
ernment in  the  States 394 

The  Contest  Now  Before  Congress .     .  395 

Fight  Over  Using  Power  to  Control  the  Purse  to  Protect 

Irresponsible   Leadership 396 

The  Cause  of  the  Independent  Voter 396 

The  Irresponsible  Party  One  of  the  Questions  in  Issue  .     .  397 
Government  by  Chairmen  of  Irresponsible  Committees  Must 

Go 400 

Mr.    Cannon's   Defense 402 

The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government 403 

Responsibility  for  Unrest 405 


PART  I.  HISTORIC  BACKGROUND  AND  INTER- 
PRETATION OF  THE  RECENT  MOVE- 
MENT FOR  ADMINISTRATIVE 
REORGANIZATION  AND 
BUDGET  PRO- 
CEDURE 


THE  BUDGET  AND  RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   PRINCIPLES  AND  ESSENTIALS   OF  POPULAR   CONTROL 

There  is  no  human  phenomenon  more  depressing,  no 
political  condition  more  fraught  with  peril  to  society, 
than  a  government  unsupported  by  the  good  will  of  the 
people  —  a  condition  which,  unabated,  causes  increasing 
distrust  and  social  unrest,  leading,  when  long  continued, 
to  popular  despondency  or  acts  of  violence.  Under  such 
circumstances  no  permanence  can  be  given  to  the  institu- 
tions to  which  society  looks  for  its  ministry  of  justice  and 
service,  except  as  such  institutions  can  be  maintained  by 
an  overriding  and  overruling  militarism  —  the  discipline 
enforced  by  a  dominant  autocracy. 

Popular  Good  Will  —  the  only  Safe  Foundation  for  In- 
stitution Building 

Class  rule  in  any  form  is  autocratic.  Autocracy  in  any 
form  violates  the  most  persistent  and  compelling  ideals 
of  group  consciousness.  And  when  group  consciousness 
is  awakened  there  is  no  resort  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  established  order  except  to  corruption  or  terrorism. 
Both  of  these  methods  of  control,  when  exercised  by 
persons  in  authority,  carry  with  them  the  seeds  of  de- 
struction of  the  very  institutions  which  autocracy  seeks 
to  protect. 

3 


4  The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Whether  the  governing  class  be  an  established  nobility, 
a  legalized  aristocracy,  an  extra-legal  plunder-bund,  a 
privileged  plutocracy,  or  a  soviet  of  terrorists  acceptable 
to  a  misguided  proletariat,  the  continuing  consent  of 
other  classes  cannot  be  assumed.  Every  institution  so 
set  up  rests  upon  a  smoldering  volcano. 

Class  Domination  —  the  Cause  of  Social  Unrest 

The  reason  for  this  uncertainty  and  unrest  is  obvious. 
Both  the  motive  and  the  underlying  assumption  of  class 
rule  are  hostile  to  the  ideals  that  move  the  masses.  The 
usual  motive  of  class  rule  is  exploitation.  The  underly- 
ing assumption  in  every  case  is  superiority  of  the  ruling 
class  —  an  assumption  which,  in  the  end,  arouses  the 
organized  opposition  of  the  masses.  Both  the  motive 
and  the  assumption  breed  distrust  in  the  government  and 
resentment  toward  the  governing  class.  For  this  reason 
any  government  which  does  not  provide  a  means  for  the 
peaceable  abatement  of  class  rule  as  a  condition  which 
arouses  continuing  popular  distrust  and  resentment  must 
be  prepared  to  meet  its  doom.  The  end  is  either  eco- 
nomic and  social  degeneration,  with  corresponding  po- 
litical weakness,  or  revolution. 

Need  for  Means  of  Peaceable  Adjustment 

The  need  for  providing  means  of  peaceable  adjust- 
ment of  institutions  to  social  environment  finds  another 
justification  —  it  is  a  condition  essential  to  survival. 
Political  institutions  grow  and  are  subject  to  much  the 
same  conditions  as  other  living  organisms.  In  the  proc- 
ess of  growth,  class  rule  at  some  time  or  other  asserts 
itself  because  of  its  temporary  superiority  —  a  superiority 
gained  through  leadership.  But  class  rule  is  advantage- 
ous only  so  long  as  class  leadership  can  appeal  to,  and 
obtain  the  support  of,  the  masses,  and  the  favoring  con- 
dition is  the  absence  of  a  nation-wide  popular  conscious- 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  5 

ness  of  desire  for  individual  equality  of  opportunity. 
When  such  a  consciousness  is  present  class  rule  gives  way 
to  democracy,  for  the  reason  that  only  democratic  leader- 
ship can  command  the  confidence  and  support  of  the 
people.  From  class  rule  to  democracy,  however,  is  a 
long  and  devious  road.  Changes  at  best  must  come 
slowly.  But  politically  organized  peoples  ultimately  in- 
sist on  change,  when  they  become  conscious  of  the  need. 
Revolution  cannot  operate  as  a  positive  principle ;  its  only 
service  is  negative.  It  may  be  highly  serviceable,  just  as 
a  great  conflagration  at  times  has  proved  to  be.  But 
constructively,  as  a  method  of  adjustment,  it  is  unfavor- 
able to  democracy.  It  is  unfavorable  because  a  revolu- 
tion can  be  brought  about  only  by  class  conflict;  and, 
left  to  itself,  in  the  end  it  establishes  class  rule  —  the 
danger  being  that  the  dominant  class  will  seek  to  intrench 
itself  in  the  newly  established  order. 

Revolution  —  the  Result  of  Lack  of  Means  of  Peaceable 
Adjustment 

A  war  of  defense  against  foreign  aggression  con- 
tributes to  national  unity  of  purpose  and  action,  but 
revolution  does  not.  Civil  war  may  be  necessary  to 
break  the  domination  of  a  ruling  class  which  has  become 
intrenched;  but,  as  has  been  said,  the  immediate  result, 
if  the  insurgents  are  successful,  is  to  set  up  at  least  a 
temporary  domination  of  another  ruling  class.  The  best 
that  can  come  from  revolution  is  a  leadership,  and  a 
following  favorable  to  the  holding  of  governing  powers 
in  trust  for  all  the  people,  till  peace  conditions  may  be 
reestablished  conformable  to  democratic  ideals. 

Realization  of  Ideals  of  Democracy  —  Essential  to  Peace 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ideals  of  democracy  operating 
under  conditions  which  admit  of  peaceable  adjustment  of 


6  The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

existing  institutions  to  meet  social  needs  are  such  that, 
if  realized,  they  make  civil  war  impossible;  for  they  con- 
tain in  themselves  the  principles  essential  to  the  reconcil- 
ing of  class  conflict  and  the  inspiring  of  mutual  confi- 
dence. They  are  ideals  of  social  optimism.  The  vision 
of  democracy  is  a  vision  of  a  society  ruled  by  "  justice." 
Peace  is  assured  by  a  good  will  that  rests  on  the 
consciousness  that  every  man  is  ready  to  do  his  bit  for 
the  benefit  of  all  —  a  concept  of  brotherhood  that  means 
that  each  person  is  a  member  of  a  family  having  common 
rights  and  opportunities. 

What  Is  a  Democracy? 

A  democracy  is  a  politically  organized  society  the 
members  of  which  undertake,  one  with  another,  to  ac- 
cept, for  purposes  of  control,  the  deliberate  judgment  of 
a  majority.  Institutionally,  democracy  means  that  the 
public  agencies  of  the  politically  organized  society  shall 
be  controlled  by  the  will  of  a  majority  of  its  members  and 
conducted  for  their  benefit ;  or,  to  use  the  words  of  Lin- 
coln, the  demands  of  a  democracy  are  that  the  "  govern- 
ment of  the  people  "  shall  in  the  last  analysis  be  "  by  the 
people  "  and  at  all  times  be  "  for  the  people."  In  the 
exercise  of  popular  control  over  the  government,  de- 
mocracy means  the  decision  of  every  question  of  public 
policy  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  social  conscience ; 
it  means  that  there  must  be  a  meeting  of  the  minds  of 
not  less  than  a  majority  of  the  whole  society  as  deter- 
mined by  a  plebiscite  or  representative  body,  or  both,  in- 
stead of  the  society  being  subject  to  the  dictates  of  a 
personal  sovereign  or  the  consensus  of  the  minds  of  a 
minority  as  a  dominant  privileged  class.  It  means  rule 
by  the  consensus  of  public  opinion,  including  all  classes, 
arrived  at  after  due  deliberation ;  i.  e.,  after  each  ques- 
tion at  issue  has  been  clearly  stated,  the  facts  supporting 
the  claims  and  contentions  of  all  parties  are  made  known, 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  J 

and  the  arguments  of  the  recognized  leaders  of  all  parties 
have  been  heard.  Democracy  assumes,  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  its  successful  operation,  that  means  must  be 
employed  to  give  to  its  people  full  knowledge  of  facts 
and  conditions,  and  the  benefits  of  full  discussion  and 
interpretation,  before  a  consensus  of  opinion  is  taken. 
Public  opinion  to  be  just,  must  be  deliberate ;  and  it  is  a 
primary  duty  of  all  democratic  society  to  provide  the 
means  to  make  it  such. 

Where  Justice  Resides 

Given  adequate  means  of  enlightenment,  democratic 
justice  rests  on  the  superior  rights  of  the  whole  people  to« 
sit  in  judgment.  This  superior  right  is  insisted  on,  in 
order  that  the  politically  organized  society  may  be  as- 
sured that  each  decision  will  be  consistent  with  com- 
monly held  ideals  of  "  liberty,"  "  equality,"  and  "  fra- 
ternity," as  against  the  selfish  desires  of  a  class  to  es- 
tablish an  order  of  things  favorable  to  an  assumption  of 
its  own  superiority  —  the  notion  that  an  individual  or  a 
class  has  a  right  to  claim  advantages  and  opportunities 
not  enjoyed  by  others. 

The  language  of  democracy —  that  is,  the  terms  in 
which  the  consensus  of  opinion  shall  express  itself  — 
needs  no  definition  or  elucidation  because  it  proceeds 
from  the  thought  of  the  people;  the  very  essence  of 
which  is  that  they,  the  people  who  make  the  decision, 
shall  insist  on  their  own  interpretation.  For  judgment, 
democracy  assumes  to  need  no  guidance  in  arriving  at 
conclusions  consistent  with  group  conscience  other 
than  that  of  its  own  chosen  leadership.  It  only 
insists  that  it  be  informed  and  provided  with  a  means 
of  arriving  at  a  consensus  of  opinion;  that  it  be  per- 
mitted to  express  its  will;  and  that  its  decision,  when 
reached,  may  be  enforced. 

By  long  experience  it  has  been  found  that  the  most 


8  The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

human,  the  most  just,  the  most  socially  sound,  judgment 
on  matters  of  right  and  duty  is  not  the  judgment  of  an 
individual  or  the  judgment  of  a  class,  but  the  judgment 
of  a  majority  of  the  whole  society  affected.  Never  has 
the  question  as  to  where  justice  resides,  what  is  the  best 
test  to  be  applied  to  any  matter  of  public  policy,  been 
more  ably  expressed  than  by  Alexander  Hamilton  when 
discussing  the  virtues  of  democracy  in  a  letter  written  to 
a  farmer  in  1775.  He  said:  "The  sacred  rights  of 
mankind,  are  not  rummaged  for  among  old  parch- 
ments or  musty  records.  They  are  written  as  with  a 
sunbeam  in  the  whole  volume  of  human  nature  .  .  .  and 
cannot  be  erased  or  obscured  by  mortal  power." 

There  is  a  universal  longing  among  mankind  for  "  jus- 
tice " —  a  justice  which  satisfies  the  desires  of  the  human 
heart.  And  the  most  fundamental  of  all  human  desires 
is  for  that  respect  and  opportunity  which  is  expressed  in 
demands  for  "  equality."  Equality  of  opportunity  re- 
quires that  each  individual  shall  be  free  —  hence  the  de- 
mand for  "  liberty."  The  most  complete  expression  of 
this  ideal  is  found  in  the  common  notion  of  "  brother- 
hood." 

Wherever  there  is  class  domination  and  exploitation 
this  popular  ideal  of  justice  is  violated  and  organized  op- 
position is  aroused.  Individuals  may  object  to  popular 
notions  of  justice,  carping  critics  may  endeavor  to  show 
that  in  human  society  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  lib- 
erty, equality,  and  fraternity ;  but  nevertheless  these  ideals 
persist  and  are  made  the  basis  for  every  appeal  to  group 
endeavor.  They  have  been,  are  to-day,  and  ever  will  be 
the  dominating  motive  in  every  democratic  social  action. 

Present-day  Meaning  of  "  Liberty  " 

The  voice  of  democracy  speaks  in  terms  of  the  highest 
inspiration  of  the  human  race.     These  ideals  form  the 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  9 

basis  of  social  ethics.  Under  conditions  of  inequality 
enforced  through  institutional  restraint,  liberty  has  been 
given  a  negative  meaning.  But  with  slavery  abolished, 
and  the  harshness  of  the  law  abated  liberty  becomes  con- 
structive. In  our  democratic  society,  liberty  is  inter- 
preted as  "  the  right  of  self-determination,"  and  this 
right  is  given  an  unselfish  meaning. 

By  "  the  right  of  self-determination "  we  mean  the 
right  of  every  individual  to  choose  his  own  career  and 
make  the  most  of  it,  so  long  as  thereby  he  does  something 
that  is  serviceable  to  society.  That  is  to  say,  democracy 
has  no  place  for  slackers;  it  demands  service.  And  the 
liberty  longed  for  by  a  democratic  society  is  that  each 
person  must  be  free  to  choose  how  he  shall  undertake  to 
serve  himself  by  serving  others. 

In  other  words,  the  free  will  and  choice  of  each  man 
must  always  be  subject  to  the  right  of  the  society  of 
free  men  of  which  he  is  a  part  to  decide  what  is  service- 
able and  what  is  not.  Thus  the  only  restriction  placed 
on  the  individual  is  the  mandate  of  society  that  each 
man,  in  order  to  gain  his  liberty,  shall  go  through  the 
service  gate ;  that  he  shall  gain  his  freedom  by  service  to 
his  fellow  men.  This  is  the  only  view  which  is  con- 
sistent with  democratic  notions  of  human  happiness  and 
common  well-being. 

Adopting  this  definition  of  liberty,  only  those  who  are 
not  socially  minded  are  not  free.  This  view  sets  up  no 
barriers  except  to  those  who  would  claim  for  themselves 
privileges  which  they  would  not  accord  to  others.  This 
is  the  ideal  which  marks  the  distinction  between  autocracy 
and  democracy.  Autocracy  insists  that  a  "  divinely  ap- 
pointed "  person  or  a  privileged  class  must  decide  what 
is  serviceable;  democracy  insists  on  the  judgment  of  the 
whole  political  society,  leaving  to  the  individual,  however, 
the  fullest  freedom  to  employ  and  develop  his  faculties 


io        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  to  express  his  deepest  longings  within  the  ever  widen- 
ing range  of  serviceable  activities  made  possible  by  social 
cooperation. 

Meaning  of  "  Equality  "  and  "  Fraternity  " 

In  our  democratic  society  "  equality  "  is  interpreted  to 
mean  that  each  person  shall  have  a  like  opportunity  to 
achieve  success  in  whatever  specialized  field  of  service  to 
mankind  he  may  choose ;  and  "  fraternity  "  is  interpreted 
to  mean  that,  by  common  consent,  all  are  members  of  a 
political  family  whose  supreme  law  is  mutual  considera- 
tion and  a  desire  to  serve  others  carrying  with  it  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  that  the  individual  shall  at  all  times 
be  ready  and  willing  to  subordinate  self  to  the  common 
good. 

Democracy,  in  its  present-day  interpretation,  therefore, 
carries  with  it  the  notion  that  service  to  one's  fellows 
stands  above  self.  Or  to  put  it  in  another  way,  each  shall 
be  free  to  find  his  greatest  happiness  in  his  own  choosing 
to  do  things  which  are  serviceable  to  the  society  of  which 
he  is  a  member,  claiming  for  himself  the  success  which 
those  who  are  served  may  award.  It  is  in  this  concept  of 
justice  that  the  ideals  of  democracy  begin  and  end.  In 
this  philosophy  there  is  no  room  for  class  domination  and 
class  exploitation.  Every  individual  and  group  accom- 
plishment or  success  is  the  accorded  measure  of  service, 
whether  the  rewards  are  material  or  otherwise;  they  are, 
nevertheless.,  the  rewards  to  man  by  man  for  benefits  con- 
ferred. 

Practical  Application  of  Concepts  of  Democracy 

Making  practical  application  of  this  concept  of  social 
justice  to  everyday  affairs,  it  is  insisted  that  society  has 
the  right,  by  well-considered  majority  opinion,  to  decide 
not  alone  what  is  serviceable  and  what  is  not,  but  also 
to  decide  what  services  can  best  be  rendered  through  the 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  n 

government  as  its  organ,  and  what  can  best  be  left  to 
private  arrangements  or  contract  between  individuals. 
Having  decided  that  certain  services  can  best  be  rendered 
through  the  government,  it  is  for  the  society  served  to 
determine  what  shall  be  performed  by  national,  state  or 
local  agencies,  and  how  each  shall  be  organized  and  con- 
trolled. With  respect  to  that  broad  domain  left  to  pri- 
vate initiative,  it  is  for  society  to  decide  what  may  be  per- 
formed by  corporate  and  what  by  noncorporate  agencies ; 
what  shall  be  regulated  as  public  utilities  and  what  left 
to  private  arrangements ;  what  services  offered  to  society 
shall  have  professional  technical  qualifications  prescribed 
by  law;  what  shall  be  regulated  to  insure  health  and 
safety  and  what  not;  what  provision  shall  be  made  to 
prevent  profiteering  through  capitalistic  monopoly  and 
control.  In  fact,  every  relation  of  life  must  come  within 
the  rule  of  democratic  justice  to  have  any  status  or  right 
at  all;  and  the  rule  of  justice  having  been  established  no 
one  has  any  right  or  reason  to  complain.  He  may  seek 
change  in  the  order  of  things,  but  unless  and  until  his 
proposal  meets  with  favorable  consideration  he  must  ac- 
cept the  judgment  of  mankind  that  what  is,  is  right. 

Thus  the  solid  foundations  of  government  and  of  all 
human  institutions  and  all  vested  rights  are  to  be  found 
in  the  laws  and  customs  of  a  contented  people;  in  laws 
which  express  the  will  of  a  majority;  in  constitutions 
which  leave  to  the  people  as  a  whole  the  right  of  self- 
determination,  giving  them  the  means  of  gradual  growth 
in  adaptation  of  their  institutions  to  an  ever  changing 
environment.  Accepting  this  as  the  paramount  justice 
to  be  attained  through  adequate  and  effective  means  of 
popular  control,  it  is  conceived  that  every  constituent 
part  of  society  may  find  a  place  and  be  an  element  of 
strength  in  the  structure  reared  for  the  continuing  service 
and  happiness  of  the  people, —  that  the  "  government  of 
the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people  shall  not 


12        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

perish  from  the  earth,"  and  that  in  even  more  perfect 
adaptation  the  spirit  and  the  institutions  of  democracy 
may  go  on  forever. 

Need  for  Providing  Organs  of  Volition  as  well  as  of 
Action 

The  practical  problems  of  democracy  lie  in  providing 
institutional  means  of  self-expression:  self-expression  on 
matters  of  social  justice;  self-expression  in  the  choice  of 
effective  instruments  and  agencies  for  individual  and 
group  accomplishment;  self-expression  in  control  over 
its  corporate  and  governmental  servants,  its  organs  of 
collective  action. 

Wherever  government  rests  on  the  popular  will  there 
must  be  organs  of  volition  as  well  as  for  action  —  organs 
of  popular  perception,  resolution,  and  control  as  well  as 
agencies  for  rendering  community  service.  That  is  to 
say,  the  mind  of  the  nation  must  be  organized  as  well 
as  the  body  —  a  personnel  must  be  provided  for  delibera- 
tion and  expression  of  opinion,  as  well  as  a  personnel  for 
performing  physical  ministerial  acts.  In  these  two  fields, 
the  one  for  successful  functioning  of  organs  of  voli- 
tion, the  other  for  the  successful  functioning  of  organs 
of  administration,  lie  every  problem  of  politics  and 
government  —  every  consideration  which  has  to  do  with 
the  formulation  and  outworkings  of  rules  of  justice 
and  social  conveniences  as  interpreted  by  group  con- 
science and  translated  in  action  by  the  politically  organ- 
ized people  —  the  state. 

Two  types  of  Organization  and  Leadership 

Organization  is  a  means ;  its  success  depends  on  adap- 
tation to  an  end  to  be  achieved.  The  whole  purpose 
of  organized  effort  is  to  get  things  done,  which  could  not 
be  so  well  done  or  at  all  if  left  to  individual  effort.  The 
problem  of  democratically  organized  group  action  is  to 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  13 

enable  society  to  avail  itself  of  the  benefits  of  teamwork, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  enable  the  membership  to  control 
the  team.  Therefore,  in  a  democracy  there  is  something 
more  to  be  done  than  in  an  autocracy ;  in  an  autocracy  it 
is  only  necessary  to  provide  the  means  for  getting  things 
done;  in  a  democracy  means  must  be  found  for  making 
the  doing  organization  responsive  to  the  will  of  the  people. 
To  this  end  all  democratically  controlled  group  activities, 
whether  political,  industrial,  social,  or  otherwise,  must 
provide : 

1.  An  organization  and  leadership  which  is  effective 

for  action,  for  teamwork  in  rendering  service,  for 
achieving  results. 

2.  An  organization  and  leadership   for  enabling  the 

membership  to  determine  what  service  or  results 
are  desired  and  to  know  whether  the  results  which 
are  achieved  through  teamwork  are  consistent 
with  their  determining  will. 

The  first  provision  is  essentially  administrative,  its  end 
is  ministerial;  the  second  is  a  deliberative  and  inquisi- 
tional function.  For  the  first,  the  form  of  organization 
and  procedure  must  be  suited  to  teamwork  or  effective 
group  action ;  for  the  second,  the  form  of  organization 
and  procedure  must  be  suited  to  deliberation  and  in- 
quisition —  deliberation  and  inquisition  which  has  for 
its  purpose  the  arriving  at  conclusions  through  member- 
ship control.  For  the  first,  the  leadership  must  be  ex- 
ecutive, directive  —  leadership  in  planning  for  the  devel- 
opment of  a  subordinate  organization  for  the  execution 
of  plans,  in  imposing  a  discipline  which  will  assign  to 
each  man  a  part  and  make  him  promptly  responsive  to 
every  executive  order  given ;  for  the  second,  the  leader- 
ship must  be  inspirational,  and  suggestive  or  critical  as 
the  case  may  require  —  leadership  which  foresees  needs 


14        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

for  adaptation,  proposes  change,  arrays  facts  and  argu- 
ment in  an  appeal  to  reason  to  win  the  approval  or  dis- 
approval of  a  majority  of  the  deliberative  body  with  a 
view  to  making  this  reflect  the  popular  will. 

This  means  that  every  cooperative  body,  if  it  is  to 
succeed  in  the  achievement  of  its  ends,  must  provide  for 
itself  two  groups  of  servants;  that  is,  it  must  provide  ser- 
vants who  are  responsible  as  doers,  and  it  must  provide 
servants  who  are  responsible  as  determiners.  It  must 
organize  each  of  these  groups  of  servants  in  a  different 
way,  must  arrange  and  dispose  of  the  personnel  of  each 
group  in  a  manner  adapted  to  performing  these  two  es- 
sentially different  functions.  The  one  must  be  adapted 
to  rendering  service  —  administration ;  and  the  other  must 
be  adapted  to  ascertaining  the  will  of  members  and  im- 
pressing this  will  on  the  service  group  —  the  exercise  of 
popular  or  membership  control. 

The  present  purpose  is  to  point  to  the  principles  and 
essentials  of  popular  control.  But  before  doing  so,  it 
may  be  helpful  first  to  note  the  distinguishing  character- 
istics of  the  organization  upon  which  the  will  of  the  mem- 
bership is  to  operate. 

Essential  Characteristics  of  Organization  and  Leader- 
ship for  Action 

The  ministerial  service,  the  organization  of  the  mobile 
service  group,  in  order  that  it  may  achieve  the  purpose 
for  which  the  institution  exists,  must  be  so  developed 
that  its  leadership  may  be  effective.  The  controlling  law 
of  administration  must  be  the  law  of  obedience;  its  dis- 
cipline must  aim  to  develop  in  each  member  ability  to 
act  in  cooperation.  And  to  accomplish  this  every  in- 
dividual and  working  group  must  respond  to  a  dominat- 
ing directive  will.  The  rank  and  file  must  be  made  up  of 
superiors  and  subordinates,  each  subordinate  in  the  or- 
ganization being  responsive  and  responsible  to  executive 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  15 

authority.  There  must  be  an  attitude  of  respect;  there 
must  be  personal  loyalty.  Such  organization  and  dis- 
cipline is  necessary  to  get  things  done  through  teamwork 
whether  the  institution,  of  which  the  serving  group  is  a 
part,  be  autocratic  or  democratic. 

The  difference  between  an  autocracy  and  a  democracy 
lies  not  in  its  administrative  organization,  but  in  the  ab- 
sence or  presence  of  a  controlling  electorate  or  repre- 
sentative body  outside  of  the  administration  with  power 
to  determine  the  will  of  the  membership,  and  to  enforce 
the  will  on  the  administration.  To  satisfy  the  require- 
ments of  a  democracy,  this  nonadministrative  controlling 
group  must  be  a  voting  personnel,  an  electorate,  broad 
enough  to  include  all  classes.  The  working  or  admin- 
istrative group  must  be  controlled  for  the  benefit  of  the 
whole  membership  as  its  needs  are  adjudged  by  a  ma- 
jority. To  serve  the  purposes  of  a  democracy,  the  ad- 
ministrative group  has  the  same  need  of  a  directing  execu- 
tive, single  or  multiple,  as  in  an  autocracy.  Effective 
cooperation  is  possible  only  when  there  is  a  supreme  au- 
thority to  command ;  but  in  a  democracy  this  must  be 
amenable  to  a  group  not  under  the  domination  of  the 
executive  but  which  rises  superior  to  it  in  its  power  to 
decide  what  the  service  organization  shall  be  and  who 
shall  be  responsible  for  leadership.  But  if  the  controlling 
group  is  not  to  be  destructive  of  its  own  purpose,  it  must 
be  able  to  enforce  its  decisions  upon  the  service  group 
without  interfering  with  its  discipline.  Therefore  the 
controlling  group  must  speak  to  the  service  organization 
through  its  executive  leadership. 

Essential   Characteristics   of   Democratic   Agencies   for 
Deliberation  and  Decision 

Coming  now  to  the  principles  which  govern  the  organ- 
ization and  leadership  of  a  popular  controlling  group, —  to 
be  effective  and  at  the  same  time  democratic,  each  mem- 


1 6        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ber  of  it  must  be  free,  a  law  unto  himself  —  the  purpose 
being  through  individual  freedom  to  arrive  at  a  group 
opinion  on  any  question  brought  up  for  decision,  whether 
it  be  a  question  of  group  policy,  or  a  matter  of  inquest 
into  the  acts  and  proposals  of  the  executive,  or  deter- 
mination as  to  whether  the  executive  is  worthy  of  the 
confidence  and  the  authority  reposed.  The  purpose  of 
the  organization  and  leadership  of  this  controlling  group 
is :  ( i )  to  find  out  and  state  in  form  for  consideration 
what  are  the  questions  with  respect  to  which  the  collective 
judgment  of  a  numerous  voting  membership  is  to  be  had ; 

(2)  to  provide  a  method  of  inquiry  and  discussion  which 
will  get  the  question  fully  before  this  numerous  member- 
ship  with   all   its   social   and   institutional    implications; 

(3)  to  put  the  question,  after  consideration,  in  such  form 
that  it  may  be  answered  "  yes  "  or  "  no,"  and  to  record 
accurately  the  opinion  of  each  person  authorized  to  vote; 

(4)  to  devise  an  effective  procedure  for  impressing  and 
enforcing  this  collective  judgment  —  the  ascertained  will 
of  the  membership. 

Essentials  of  Popular  Control  as  Exemplified  in  Popular 
Assembly 

In  the  outworking  of  a  small  local  democracy  the 
problem  of  devising  an  organization  and  procedure  to 
make  the  controlling  group  effective  is  a  simple  one. 
Nevertheless,  its  essentials  are  the  same  as  must  govern 
the  organization  and  procedure  of  the  controlling  group 
in  a  populous,  widely  scattered  democratic  society.  For 
this  reason  it  seems  worth  while  first  to  consider  what 
these  essentials  are  as  they  find  expression  in  the  small 
political  unit. 

In  a  simply  democratic  society  the  entire  voting  mem- 
bership, or  electorate,  meet  and  organize  themselves  into 
a  deliberative,  inquisitorial,  and  determining  body.  Such 
an  organization  is  found  in  the  New  England  township; 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  if 

such  were  the  folkmoots  of  the  ancient  Teutons  and 
early  English;  such  was  the  controlling  group  as  first 
constituted  by  agreement  on  the  Mayflower  before  the 
Pilgrim  fathers  set  about  founding  a  colony  at  Plymouth. 
In  a  controlling  body  of  this  kind  the  first  business  is  to 
organize  and  to  provide  for  leadership  for  purposes  of 
deliberation.  To  this  end  a  chairman  or  moderator  is 
appointed  to  conduct  the  proceedings  and  to  keep  order, 
in  which  purpose  he  is  assisted  by  one  or  more  sergeants 
at  arms.  There  is  also  a  secretary  to  keep  a  record. 
Leadership  is  provided  for  by  having  matters  of  business 
brought  forward  in  one  of  two  ways :  ( i )  by  executives 
or  officers  of  the  administrative  group  who  are  called  to 
account  by  having  them  appear  before  the  controlling 
body  to  report  on  their  stewardship  —  and  to  submit 
proposals  for  change  in  administrative  law  and  grants 
of  authority;  (2)  by  members  of  the  controlling  group 
itself,  each  of  whom  on  his  own  initiative  may  submit 
proposals  for  discussion  and  action. 

In  case  a  report  or  proposal  is  brought  forward  by  an 
executive  officer,  it  is  presented  to  the  whole  body  of 
voting  members  by  the  officer  in  person.  After  making 
his  presentation  he  submits  himself  to  questioning  by  any 
members  of  the  controlling  body  who  may  desire  further 
information.  If  the  proposal  comes  from  a  member  it 
is  expected  that  it  will  be  explained  and  defended  by  that 
member;  and  if  the  proposal  calls  for  a  committee  as  an 
aid  to  deliberative  action  it  is  usual  to  make  the  proposer 
the  chairman  of  the  committee  —  unless  the  motion  for 
a  reference  to  a  committee  comes  from  the  opposition 
when  the  opposition  leader  should  be  in  control  of  the 
committee.  If  opposition  is  developed  which  calls  for 
action,  the  opposition  or  criticism  must  be  offered  in  the 
presence  of  the  leader  criticized  in  order  that  he  may  be 
given  full  opportunity  to  explain  and  defend.  In  any 
case,  every  proposal  must  be  presented  by  its  sponsor  in 


i8        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  form  of  a  motion  or  resolve  so  stated  that  there  can 
be  no  question  about  its  meaning;  and  so  stated  that 
decision  may  be  reached  by  a  "  yes  "  or  "  no  "  vote. 

When  issue  is  joined  on  any  proposal,  great  care  is 
taken  not  to  have  any  uncertainty  about  it,  a  special  pro- 
cedure being  used  so  as  not  to  confuse  the  opposition  or 
criticism  with  the  original  motion.  An  issue  presented 
by  an  opposition  must  therefore  be  clearly  set  forth  in 
the  form  of  an  amendment  and  a  vote  must  be  taken 
on  the  amendment  before  the  main  question  is  put.  The 
purpose  of  this  special  procedure  is  to  make  the  leaders 
take  sides  —  to  enable  each  member  to  know  what  each 
leader  stands  for  when  he  makes  an  appeal  for  votes. 
Before  a  vote  is  taken,  arguments  are  heard  from  the 
leaders  of  each  party  —  those  who  are  sponsors  for  the 
measure,  and  those  who  lead  the  opposition  being  re- 
quired to  submit  to  questioning  by  the  voting  members. 
It  is  only  after  each  member  of  the  deliberative  body 
has  had  every  chance  to  become  informed  that  the  matter 
in  hand  is  then  brought  to  a  vote  and  decided.  Thus 
every  provision  is  made  in  order  that  every  action  by  the 
controlling  group  may  be  taken  after  due  consideration, 
and  that  the  group  opinion  may  be  an  act  of  deliberate 
judgment. 

Procedure  of  Deliberation  as  Exemplified  in  Trial  by 
Jury 
This  procedure,  developed  for  insuring  that  group 
action  shall  be  based  on  deliberation,  is  not  alone  con- 
fined to  controlling  bodies  which  sit  in  judgment  on 
questions  of  social  and  political  justice,  as  in  a  town 
meeting  or  a  f olkmoot ;  it  is  exemplified  in  Anglo-Saxon 
courts  of  justice  for  the  application  of  rules  of  law  and 
equity  to  controversies  between  individuals  and  the  ad- 
judication of  vested  rights.  For  this  purpose  a  jury  is 
chosen  to  sit  as  a  small  body  of  citizens  so  selected  that 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  19 

they  may  act  for,  and  express  the  opinion  of,  the  com- 
munity. This  jury,  together  with  a  presiding  officer,  a 
judge,  constitutes  the  popular  forum.  To  the  end  that 
the  court  thus  constituted  may  act  with  due  deliberation, 
the  following  are  considered  as  essentials : 

(1)  Before  the  trial  or  hearing  begins,   each  party 

must  be  "  in  court ;  "  that  is,  each  must  submit 
a  carefully  prepared  statement  of  his  claims, 
and,  if  there  is  any  opposition,  issue  must  be 
joined  —  there  must  be  no  doubt  in  the  mind 
of  the  presiding  officer  and  the  parties  con- 
cerned as  to  what  is  the  question  to  be  decided ; 
in  case  motions  and  counter-motions  are  in- 
terposed those  are  taken  up  and  disposed  of  by 
the  court,  one  at  a  time. 

(2)  When  the  case  is  ready  for  hearing  on  its  merits, 

each  party  has  a  right  to  be  confronted  by  his 
adversary  in  order  that  he  may  hear  his  state- 
ments and  criticisms,  and  answer  them.  The 
jury  has  the  right  to  hear  the  evidence,  and  to 
listen  to  cross-examination  of  witnesses  to  test 
the  creditability  of  the  evidence  submitted  for 
its  information. 

(3)  Before  the  jury  is  asked  to  vote  each  has  a  further 

right  to  be  fully  informed  as  to  all  pertinent 
facts  and  to  hear  arguments  of  the  moving 
parties  on  the  application  of  recognized  and 
accepted  principles  of  justice,  to  the  facts  as 
developed  at  the  hearing. 

(4)  The  hearing  having  been  closed,  each  member  of 

the  jury,  being  fully  informed  as  to  the  facts 
and  contentions  of  parties,  has  a  right  to  vote 
according  to  his  own  consciousness  of  right  — 
the  consensus  of  opinion  arrived  at  thus  being 
taken  as  the  will  of  the  whole  political  society, 


20        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

unless  appeal  is  permitted  and  taken  in  a  man- 
ner prescribed. 

The  jury  system  is  a  departure  from  the  methods  of 
direct  democratic  control  in  that  a  representative  body 
takes  the  place  of  a  meeting  of  the  whole  voting  member- 
ship of  the  political  society  served.  But  the  principles 
governing  the  deliberations  of  the  jury  are  in  effect  the 
same  as  those  governing  the  folkmoot.  In  fact,  they 
are  the  recognized  essentials  of  every  deliberative  body 
which  is  controlled  by  democratic  ideals. 

Procedure  of  Deliberation  in  Representative  Government 

It  is  only  in  a  very  small  political  society  that  all  the 
voting  members  can  get  together  personally  to  participate 
in  deliberations  which  lead  up  to  an  expression  of  group 
opinion.  It  is  found,  however,  that,  when  political  so- 
cieties grow  beyond  the  possibility  of  such  participation 
by  the  whole  electorate,  the  representative  principle,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  jury,  may  be  effectively  used.  That 
is,  practical  application  is  given  to  democratic  principles 
of  control  by  creating  an  intermediate  representative 
body  to  sit  as  a  court  of  political  inquest  and  deliberation 
in  place  of  the  electorate,  the  proceedings  being  so  con- 
ducted that  what  takes  place  in  the  court  may  be  known 
to,  and  reviewed  by,  the  whole  membership.  In  other 
words,  a  representative  body  is  created  to  assist  the  elec- 
torate and  to  act  for  them  on  matters  delegated  to  it. 
Thus  the  representation  principle  does  not  change  the 
function  of  the  electorate;  it  only  changes  the  method 
of  procedure  whereby  the  electorate  may  be  informed. 
The  whole  voting  membership  still  retains  the  power  of 
ultimate  or  supreme  control.  When  inquest  is  made  into 
the  acts  and  purposes  of  an  executive  officer,  the  elec- 
torate, in  theory  at  least,  still  retains  the  right  to  settle 
all  issues  on  matters  of  public  policy;  it  still  retains  the 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  21 

right  to  enforce  its  decisions  and  make  the  administra- 
tive organization  and  leadership  subservient  through 
"  election  "  and  "  control  of  the  purse."  In  a  democracy, 
the  electorate  is  the  organ  of  society  for  giving  voice  to 
the  will  of  the  people;  and  where  a  representative  body 
is  interposed  for  purposes  of  inquest  and  discussion,  it 
serves  as  a  court  of  first  instance,  the  electorate  being 
the  court  of  last  resort. 

Whether  the  practice  coincides  with  the  theory  depends 
on  the  procedure  developed  and  used  ( 1 )  in  the  conduct 
of  the  deliberations  of  the  representative  body;  (2)  in 
provision  made  for  giving  publicity  to  its  inquiries  and 
discussions;  (3)  in  the  opportunity  given  to  leaders  for 
appeal  to  the  electorate,  and  (4)  in  the  methods  em- 
ployed for  the  conduct  of  the  appeal  to  the  people. 

Procedure  for  the  Conduct  of  Deliberation  in  Representa- 
tive Assembly 

Wherever  the  representative  principle  is  applied,  these 
proceedings  are  found  by  practical  experience  to  be  es- 
sentials to  effective  popular  control;  they  are  essentials 
because  they  are  the  processes  by  which  the  motor  centers 
of  the  body  politic  are  brought  under  the  domination  of 
the  will  of  the  people  —  the  only  processes  by  which 
popular  sovereignty  can  be  made  real.  It  is  important, 
therefore,  that  each  of  these  processes  be  carefully 
worked  out,  reduced  to  a  definite  procedure,  and  that  this 
procedure  be  protected  and  maintained,  otherwise  the 
processes  of  popular  control  may  be  prostituted  to  the 
purposes  of  class  rule,  and  action  taken  of  the  people  will 
not  be  deliberate. 

It  is  necessary  that  all  of  the  essentials  of  deliberative 
procedure  be  developed  for  the  conduct  of  the  business 
of  the  representative  political  branch  of  the  government 
that  by  experience  has  been  found  necessary  to  the  en- 
lightenment of  voting  members  of  a  folkmoot  or  a  repre- 


22        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

sentative  court  of  justice.  By  no  other  process  can  the 
members  of  the  representative  political  body  act  intelli- 
gently in  an  effort  to  voice  their  own  opinion  or  to  voice 
the  will  of  their  constituencies.  For  purposes  of  in- 
quest into  matters  of  administration,  it  is  necessary  that 
the  executive  or  responsible  directing  officer  be  brought 
before  those  who  are  to  sit  in  judgment:  unless  this  is 
done  the  members  are  deprived  of  opportunity  to  ques- 
tion them;  unless  this  is  done  they  must  accept  hearsay 
evidence  as  to  the  facts ;  unless  this  is  done  no  oppor- 
tunity is  given  to  members  sitting  as  a  political  grand 
jury  to  listen  to  cross-examination  to  test  the  credita- 
bility  of  witnesses;  unless  this  is  done  the  case  of  admin- 
istration must  be  tried  on  information  by  star-chamber 
proceedings  —  without  opportunity  to  explain  and  defend 
when  changes  are  made,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  con- 
vict them  of  malfeasance  or  nonfeasance  or  breach  of 
trust  and  to  rob  them  of  their  "  character  "  as  public  serv- 
ants in  the  interest  of  persons  of  selfish  design.  These 
are  essentials  not  alone  to  the  protection  of  the  public 
servant,  but  also  to  the  whole  morale  of  institutions  of 
political  and  social  justice. 

How  Publicity  can  be  Given  to  Acts  of  Government 

Provision  must  be  made  by  the  representative  body  for 
giving  publicity  to  its  inquests  and  deliberations,  for  this 
is  the  only  way  that  a  large  and  widely  scattered  elec- 
torate may  become  informed.  It  is  only  through  such 
a  procedure  in  the  representative  body  as  has  been  de- 
scribed, and  a  means  of  publicity  which  will  make  its  acts 
known  to  the  people,  that  an  informed  public  opinion 
can  be  developed.  And  in  making  such  provision  this 
fact  is  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that  the  only  way  that  a  city, 
state,  or  nation  can  be  kept  informed  is  through  the  news 
columns.  The  proceedings  of  the  representative  body, 
therefore,  must  be  so  staged  and  so  conducted  as  to  make 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  23 

news.  This  means  that  the  proceedings  of  inquest  and 
deliberation  of  the  representation  must  be  conducted  as 
a  public  forum  in  order  that  the  whole  people  may  "  listen 
in  "  through  the  public  press.  This  means  that  every 
issue  must  be  dramatized ;  it  means  that  the  chief  actors 
must  be  persons  who  will  be  listened  to  —  that  the  great 
leaders  must  be  brought  upon  the  stage  where  those  who 
are  the  recognized  advocates  of  the  people  in  the  trial  of 
issues  of  political  and  social  justice  may  be  pitted  against 
each  other.  The  scene  in  the  forum  in  the  trial  of 
issues  joined  on  questions  of  common  welfare  and  justice, 
must  be  a  battle  of  giants  —  recognized  champions  ulti- 
mately must  stand  before  the  whole  electorate  for  a 
verdict  of  thumbs  up  or  thumbs  down.  This  is  the  pur- 
pose for  which  the  representative  body  is  created :  to 
sit  in  council  as  the  duly  constituted  forum  of  the  people 
and  try  causes  of  political  and  social  justice,  and  to  do 
this  in  such  a  manner  as  not  only  to  make  the  decision 
one  of  deliberative  judgment,  but  to  make  every  act  and 
expression  "  visible  "  to  the  whole  people.  A  primary 
essential,  therefore,  is  a  procedure  which  will  make  news 
of  the  inquiries,  and  deliberation  of  the  causes  which  are 
being  heard  by  the  deliberative  branch  of  the  government 
involving  questions  of  welfare  and  social  justice. 

The  Need  for  Responsible  Leaders 

An  opportunity  must  be  given  for  appeal  from  the 
decision  of  the  representative  body  to  the  whole  elec- 
torate—  that  is,  when  the  chosen  leader  of  a  majority 
in  the  deliberation  body  or  responsible  head  of  the  ad- 
ministration whose  acts  are  under  review,  may  not  deem 
the  action  taken  to  be  to  the  highest  interest  of  the  public, 
opportunity  should  be  given  to  sound  public  opinion 
though  the  electorate.  It  is  only  by  giving  an  oppor- 
tunity to  leaders  to  make  an  appeal  to  the  electorate  as  the 
final  authority  in  a  democracy  that  popular  opinion  can 


24        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

control.  Nothing  short  of  this  will  enable  the  people 
to  express  their  will  on  issues  that  they  have  not  already 
passed  on,  nothing  short  of  this  can  prevent  representa- 
tive government  being  controlled  by  an  oligarchy  —  a 
designing  minority.  Since  group  opinion  organizes  it- 
self around  the  proposals  of  leaders  in  the  representative 
body,  it  is  only  by  giving  to  leaders  the  right  of  appeal 
that  they  can  be  made  responsible  to  the  people.  In  no 
other  way  can  action  or  proposals  for  action  be  brought 
to  a  final  test.  And  the  appeal  must  be  taken  at  the  time 
when  a  question  at  issue  is  under  discussion,  when  the 
facts  and  the  arguments  may  be  voted  on  without  con- 
fusion. This  is  a  recognized  rule  in  every  deliberative 
proceeding.  It  is  even  more  important  in  making  an 
appeal  to  the  country  than  it  is  for  obtaining  a  vote  in 
the  representative  body. 

Another  principle  must  also  be  borne  in  mind :  that 
in  taking  a  vote  on  any  question  which  involves  executive 
responsibility  or  leadership,  the  continuing  confidence  of 
the  people  in  the  man  is  quite  as  important  as  the  measure 
or  act  in  controversy.  Responsibility  is  a  personal  thing. 
The  vote  to  be  taken  must  therefore  be  a  vote  for  or 
against  the  officer  whose  act  or  proposal  has  been  the 
subject  of  inquest  and  deliberation  in  the  forum  of  the 
people  where  the  issue  may  first  be  tried.  The  initial 
proceeding  must  be  had  in  a  duly  constituted  forum,  in 
order  that  the  decision  may  be  based  on  evidence,  with 
full  opportunity  given  for  hearing  and  argument.  It  is 
only  by  such  proceeding  that  a  deliberate  decision  may  be 
reached  by  the  representatives.  It  is  only  after  such  a 
proceeding,  with  full  publicity  given,  that  judgment  on 
appeal  may  be  deliberate;  it  is  only  by  process  of  appeal 
on  a  record  thus  developed  that  the  electorate  may  act 
as  a  positive  constructive  force  in  voicing  the  popular 
will 


The  Principles  of  Popular  Control  25 

Appeals  to  the  People 

Appeal  to  the  people  must  be  taken  before  them  and 
conducted  by  recognized  advocates.  If  leadership  is  to 
be  made  responsible,  these  advocates  before  the  people 
must  be  leaders;  and  the  issues  must  be  those  actually- 
developed  in  the  transaction  of  the  public  business.  This 
is  vital  to  effective  exercise  of  popular  control.  The  proc- 
ess of  appeal  must  necessarily  be  one  of  "  election  " — 
of  choice  between  men  who  stand  for  measures.  If  the 
real  leaders  are  not  the  ones  who  go  before  the  people 
and  if  the  issues  which  the  people  are  asked  to  decide  are 
framed  in  camera,  by  irresponsible  persons  or  groups  who 
have  not  been  required  to  stand  up  in  a  forum  constituted 
by  the  people  for  inquest,  trial,  and  discussion,  if  the 
contest  is  not  framed  under  such  conditions  that  evidence 
can  be  adduced,  witnesses  examined  and  cross-examined, 
the  whole  process  of  popular  appeal  is  degraded  to  a 
mock  trial,  and  action  by  the  people  decides  nothing  ex- 
cept who,  among  irresponsible  leaders,  shall  be  given  a 
chance  to  work  out  his  selfish  designs.  Under  such  con- 
ditions the  electorate  has  no  opportunity  to  exercise  its 
true  constitutional  function;  and  the  Constitution  itself, 
by  which  popular  control  is  sought  to  be  established,  be- 
comes a  dead  letter. 


CHAPTER  II 

ESSENTIALS    OF    POPULAR    CONTROL   LACKING   IN    THE 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  OUR  POLITICAL  INSTITUTIONS 

Americans  have  been  characterized  as  "  a  good- 
natured  people  dominated  by  an  irresponsible  political 
boss."  This  observation  may  have  been  apt  in  times 
past,  but  it  is  not  to-day.  We  are  still  dominated  by  an 
irresponsible  political  boss,  but  we  are  no  longer  good- 
natured  about  it.  We  resent  the  fact  of  this  autocratic 
control;  we  resent  any  characterization  which  assumes 
that  we  willingly  accept  autocracy  in  any  form  —  al- 
though we  can  not  and  do  not  deny  that  we  are  still  a 
boss  ridden  people.  Every  page  of  our  political  history 
since  the  days  of  Jackson  fairly  shouts  boss  rule.  And 
it  is  a  part  of  the  personal  experience  of  every  citizen 
that  when  one  boss  has  been  overthrown  another  has 
stepped  into  his  waiting  shoes.  Following  every  cam- 
paign to  crush  boss  rule,  "  the  system  "  has  insidiously 
found  its  way  to  the  forefront  of  political  organization 
and  leadership,  first  to  surprise  and  later  to  madden  the 
people. 

Attempts  made  to  Account  for  "  Social  Unrest  " 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  account  for  this 
most  persistent  of  all  our  political  phenomena.  Some 
have  thought  of  it  as  an  inherent  weakness  of  democracy 
—  the  only  alternative  remaining  after  monarchy  and 
aristocracy  have  been  laid  aside.  Others  have  explained 
it  as  an  Americanism  —  the  necessary  political  result  of 
a  dominant  commercialism.  Still  others  have  attributed 
it  to  lack  of  public  spirit  on  the  part  of  our  citizenry  and 

26  , 


Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  27 

to  an  effort  on  the  part  of  impractical  reformers  to  de- 
tract from  American  institutions.  Again  it  has  been 
ascribed  to  a  too  rapid  influx  of  foreign  peoples. 

Appeals  to  Patriotism  to  Maintain  the  Status  Quo 

In  this  time  of  great  social  unrest,  not  infrequently 
appeals  are  made  to  the  patriotism  of  citizens  to  preserve 
the  status  quo.  The  value  of  such  appeals  is  questioned. 
For,  it  is  said,  is  not  the  fact  of  such  widespread  dis- 
satisfaction in  itself  sufficient  evidence  that  the  status  quo 
should  not  be  preserved?  In  other  words,  when  it  is 
urged  that  institutions  as  they  exist,  in  some  important 
particulars,  are  not  in  keeping  with  common  ideals  of  jus- 
tice when  they  do  not  serve  as  instruments  or  means  of 
expressing  and  serving  those  common  purposes  which 
give  to  the  people  their  impulse  to  group  action  —  in  these 
circumstances  all  effort  made  to  induce  men  to  close  their 
eyes  to  the  things  which  offend  common  sense  can  have 
no  other  result  than  to  weaken  the  government  at  is 
foundation. 

Popular  Concept  of  Right 

This  harks  back  to  the  principle  laid  down  by  Pro- 
fessor Giddings  in  his  illuminating  volume  of  lectures 
published  under  the  title  of  "  The  Responsible  State  " : 
That  the  people  insist  on  distinguishing  between  what  is 
established  by  law  and  what  is  right;  and  that  the 
"  liberty  "  to  make  this  distinction,  to  assert  the  judg- 
ment of  the  individual  and  the  group  as  to  what  is  right 
as  distinguished  from  the  status  quo,  is  the  fundamental 
on  which  responsible  government  rests.  It  is  by  reason 
of  this  fact  that  popular  control  is  insisted  on. 

Evidence  of  Institutional  Maladjustment 

Instead  of  drawing  our  inspiration  from  those  who  ap- 
peal for  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  as  a  patriotic 


28        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

duty  at  a  time  like  this,  instead  of  seeking  to  pillory  those 
who  point  to  institutional  defects  and  maladjustments, 
it  would  seem  the  part  of  wisdom  to  heed  the  voice  of 
popular  protest,  and  to  take  the  best  advice  which  may 
be  had  for  determining  what  is  wrong  —  not  with  results, 
for  the  people  themselves  insist  on  being  the  judge  of 
results  —  but  with  the  institutions  that  have  produced 
these  results. 

To  make  sure  that  our  advisers  have  not  lost  perspec- 
tive, let  us  go  back  to  a  period  before  the  War,  and  before 
the  days  when  those  who  ventured  to  criticize  the  govern- 
ment were  labeled,  when  honest  criticism  was  not  con- 
sidered dangerous,  when  the  voice  of  dissent  was  a  voice 
of  protest  that  carried  with  it  no  threat  of  violence.  And 
in  looking  back,  let  us  go  over  again  the  pictures  drawn 
by  men  of  known  conservatism  and  highest  standing. 

American  Institutions  as  Appraised  by  James  Bryce 

First  let  us  read  again  the  pages  of  Bryce's  "  American 
Commonwealth."  In  this  he  repeatedly  points  to  what 
we  know  to  be  institutional  weaknesses  in  that  they  have 
developed  inadequate  means  for  recording  public  opinion, 
for  impressing  the  will  of  the  people  on  real  issues.  He 
points  to  what  we  know  to  be  maladjustment  in  state  and 
Federal  Government  and  characterizes  the  government  of 
our  cities  as  a  byword  and  a  shame .  for  Americans  all 
over  the  world. 

Shortcomings  Described  by  President  Wilson 

In  1885,  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  a  popular  rendition  of 
his  scientific  treatise  on  our  Federal  system,  a  work  that 
gave  to  him  a  national  reputation,  said : 

"  For  a  long  time  this  country  of  ours  has  lacked 
one  of  the  institutions  which  freemen  have  always 
and  everywhere  held  fundamental.     For  a  long  time 


Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  29 

there  has  been  no  sufficient  opportunity  of  counsel 
among  the  people ;  no  place  or  method  of  talk,  of  ex- 
change of  opinion,  of  parley.  .  .  .  Congress  has  be- 
come an  institution  which  does  its  work  in  the  privacy 
of  committee  rooms  and  not  on  the  floor  of  the  cham- 
ber. .  .  .  Party  conventions  afford  little  or  no  oppor- 
tunity for  discussion;  platforms  are  privately  manu- 
factured." 

The  Picture  Drawn  by  Senator  Hoar 

And  in  support  of  this  conclusion  Mr.  Wilson  quotes 
from  Senator  Hoar,  one  of  the  oldest  and  best  informed 
men  in  American  public  life.  After  describing  the  Con- 
gress as  a  body  which  had  lost  its  character  as  a  national 
public  forum  —  as  having  abdicated  its  powers  and 
turned  over  the  work  of  deliberation  to  its  standing  com- 
mittees —  to  a  large  number  of  "  little  legislatures  "  that 
do  business  behind  closed  doors  —  he  says  : 

"  Hundreds  of  measures  of  vital  importance  receive 
—  near  the  close  of  an  exhausted  session,  without  being 
debated,  printed,  or  understood  —  the  constitutional 
assent  of  the  representatives  of  the  American  people." 

Mr.  Wilson,  commenting  on  the  results  of  this  evident 
perversion  of  representative  government,  further  says : 

"  Our  legislation  is  conglomerate,  not  homogeneous. 
The  doings  of  one  and  the  same  Congress  are  foolish 
in  pieces  and  wise  in  spots.  They  can  never,  except  by 
accident,  have  any  common  features.  .  .  .  Only  a  very 
small  part  of  its  most  important  business  can  be  done 
well ;  the  system  provides  for  having  the  rest  of  it  done 
miserably  and  the  whole  of  it  taken  together  done  hap- 
hazard." 

Since  that  time  he  has  continued  to  hold  this  picture 


30        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

up  before  the  American  people.  In  191 2,  in  his  campaign 
for  the  presidency,  this  portrayal  was  repeatedly  used, 
with  new  setting,  and  the  lesson  was  drawn  therefrom 
—  that  the  people  had  lost  control  over  their  govern 
ment;  that  this  was  a  system  which  lent  itself  to  the 
uses  of  persons  seeking  and  enjoying  special  privilege; 
that  it  was  undemocratic;  that  it  could  lead  to  nothing 
but  lack  of  confidence  in  our  government,  popular  dis- 
trust, and  discontent. 

President  Roosevelt's  Stand 

President  Roosevelt,  differing  widely  from  Mr.  Wilson 
both  in  temperament  and  in  politics,  spent  his  whole  life 
in  calling  the  people  to  a  realization  of  their  duties  and 
opportunities  as  citizens;  and  his  whole  life  stands  out 
as  a  protest  against  the  practices  and  methods  which  had 
deprived  the  people  of  their  right  to  control  the  govern- 
ment. And  as  he  ripened  in  years  and  experience  it  was 
this  moral  aspect  of  public  duty  that  led  him  to  stand 
forth  as  leader  of  a  new  party  —  in  doing  which  he  was 
vigorously  condemned  by  his  opponents  as  leading  a 
popular  movement  which,  if  successful,  would  undermine 
and  destroy  American  institutions. 

Proposals  of  Governor  Hughes 

But  even  the  most  conservative  have  recognized  that 
the  basis  for  criticism  was  sound  —  that  there  was  serious 
need  for  institutional  change.  In  19 10,  Governor 
Hughes  of  New  York  in  his  annual  message  to  the  legis- 
lature pointed  to  cogent  reasons  why  the  people  of  that 
state  had  irresponsible  government.  And  in  doing  so  was 
among  the  first  of  a  long  line  of  governors  who  rendered 
a  like  service. 

Defects  Described  by  President  Taft 

President  Taft,  whose  judicial  mind  led  him  to  consider 


Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  31 

the  problem  of  administration  and  the  discharge  of  exec- 
utive duty  as  consciously  as  if  he  were  sitting  in  a  court 
of  equity,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress,  transmitting 
one  of  the  reports  of  the  commission  appointed  by  him 
"  to  inquire  into  the  methods  of  transacting  the  public 
business"  in  June,  1912,  said: 

"  Generally  speaking,  however,  the  only  conclusions 
which  may  be  reached  from  all  this  are  that : 

"  No  regular  or  systematic  means  has  been  provided 
for  consideration  of  the  detail  and  concrete  problems  of 
the  government. 

"  A  well-defined  business  or  work  program  for  the 
government  has  not  been  evolved.  .  .  . 

"  The  committee  organization  is  largely  the  result 
of  historic  development,  rather  than  of  a  consideration 
of  present  needs." 

Causes  of  Popular  Resentment  Described   by  Senator 
Root 

With  respect  to  the  political  aspects  of  institutional 
maladjustment  in  this  country,  no  one  has  more  faithfully 
portrayed  the  causes  of  popular  resentment  and  social 
unrest  than  Senator  Elihu  Root.  Standing  before  the 
Constitutional  Convention  of  New  York  in  the  summer 
of  191 5,  after  weeks  had  been  spent  by  members  con- 
sidering what  changes  should  be  made  to  make  the  govern- 
ment more  responsive  to  public  opinion,  and  to  provide 
the  means  of  enforcing  accountability,  Mr.  Root  stepped 
out  of  the  chair  to  present  what  to  him  seemed  an  out- 
standing fact  —  a  condition  that  could  not  be  overlooked 
by  men  who  had  been  sent  to  Albany  by  the  people  to  read- 
just the  governmental  organization.  In  the  course  of 
his  remarks,  he  went  to  the  very  vitals  of  the  problem  by 
making  the  following  statement: 


2,2        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

"  I  am  going  to  discuss  a  subject  now  that  goes  back 
to  the  beginning  of  the  political  life  of  the  oldest  man 
in  this  convention,  and  one  to  which  we  cannot  close 
our  eyes,  if  we  keep  the  obligations  of  our  oath.  We 
talk  about  the  government  of  the  constitution.  We 
have  spent  many  days  in  discussing  the  powers  of  this 
and  that  and  the  other  officer.  What  is  the  govern- 
ment of  this  state?  What  has  it  been  during  the  forty 
years  of  my  acquaintance  with  it?  The  government 
of  the  constitution?  Oh,  no;  not  half  of  the  time, 
nor  halfway.  When  I  ask  what  do  the  people  find 
wrong  in  our  state  government,  my  mind  goes  back  to 
those  periodic  fits  of  public  rage  in  which  the  people 
rouse  up  and  tear  down  the  political  leader,  first  of  one 
party  and  then  of  the  other  party.  It  goes  back  to  the 
public  feeling  of  resentment  against  the  control  of  party 
organizations,  of  both  parties  and  of  all  parties. 

"  Now,  I  treat  this  subject  in  my  own  mind  not  as  a 
personal  question  to  any  man.  I  am  talking  about  the 
system.  From  the  days  of  Fenton,  and  Conkling,  and 
Arthur,  and  Cornell,  and  Piatt,  from  the  days  of  David 
B.  Hill,  down  to  the  present  time,  the  government  of 
the  state  has  presented  two  different  lines  of  activity, 
one  of  the  constitutional  and  statutory  officers  of  the 
state,  and  the  other  of  the  party  leaders  —  they  call 
them  party  bosses.  They  call  the  system  —  I  do  not 
coin  the  phrases,  I  adopt  it  because  it  carries  its  own 
meaning  —  the  system  they  call  '  invisible  government.' 
For  I  do  not  remember  how  many  years,  Mr.  Conkling 
was  the  ruler  of  the  states ;  the  governor  did  not  count, 
the  legislature  did  not  count,  comptrollers  and  secre- 
taries of  state  and  what  not  did  not  count.  It  was 
what  Mr.  Conkling  said ;  and  in  a  great  outburst  of  pub- 
lic rage  he  was  pulled  down. 

"  Then  Mr.  Piatt  ruled  the  state ;  for  nigh  upon 
twenty  years  he  ruled  it.     It  was  not  the  governor;  it 


Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  33 

was  not  the  legislature ;  it  was  not  any  elected  officers ; 
it  was  Mr.  Piatt.  And  the  capitol  was  not  here  [at 
Albany]  ;  it  was  at  49  Broadway,  with  Mr.  Piatt  and 
his  lieutenants.  It  makes  no  difference  what  name  you 
give,  whether  you  call  it  Fenton  or  Conkling  or  Cor- 
nell or  Arthur  or  Piatt,  or  by  the  names  of  men  now 
living.  The  ruler  of  the  state  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  forty  years  of  my  acquaintance  with  the  state 
government  has  not  been  any  man  authorized  by  the 
constitution  or  by  the  law ;  and,  sir,  there  is  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  this  state  a  deep  and  sullen 
and  long-continued  resentment  at  being  governed  thus 
by  men  not  of  the  people's  choosing.  The  party  leader 
is  elected  by  no  one,  accountable  to  no  one,  bound  by  no 
oath  of  office,  removable  by  no  one." 

This  was  in  19 15.  It  is  the  statement  of  a  man  who 
was  an  honored  member  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  cabinet,  and 
who,  though  he  has  always  been  clear  of  vision,  incisive 
in  analysis,  and  outspoken  in  the  advocacy  of  institutional 
adaptations,  when  needed,  is  considered  as  without  any 
of  the  aberrations  of  an  emotionalist  —  at  all  times 
"  safe  and  sane."  And  what  was  his  vision  of  the  press- 
ing need,  the  remedy  demanded  to  cure  this  "  deep  and 
sullen  and  long-continued  resentment  "  ?  He  did  not  pre- 
scribe palliatives  or  narcotics ;  he  did  not  propose  to  take 
away  the  constitutional  guaranties  of  free  speech  and  free 
press ;  he  prescribed  surgery  —  some  far-reaching  ortho- 
pedic surgery  to  be  performed  on  the  government  itself. 
He  also  proposed  breaking  up  the  adhesions  that  had  been 
established  between  the  "  irresponsible  party  "  organiza- 
tion and  the  agencies  of  public  service ;  he  proposed  the 
normal  functioning  of  the  body  politic  and  to  this  end 
the  reestablishing  of  the  nerve  centers  of  popular  control. 
The  high  purpose  which  he  urged  upon  American  citizen- 
ship and  American  statesmanship  was  "  to  destroy  autoc- 


34         The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

racy  and  restore  power  so  far  as  may  be  to  the  men 
elected  by  the  people,  accountable  to  the  people,  remov- 
able by  the  people." 

The  Need  for  an  Institutional  Means  of  Obtaining  Ex- 
pression of  Popular  will  based  on  "  Deliberation  " 

This  is  a  vision  that  goes  back  to  Jefferson,  "  America's 
great  prophet  of  democracy,"  who  before  the  advent  of 
this  malignant  growth  on  the  body  politic  which  has 
come  to  be  popularly  described  as  the  "  boss  and  his 
machine,"  laid  down  what  he  regarded  as  the  laws  of 
democratic  institutional  hygiene.  The  ideals  of  democ- 
racy have  not  been  misunderstood.  At  no  time  when  any 
great  issue  has  been  presented  has  there  been  any  uncer- 
tainty about  what  was  conceived  by  the  people  as  right. 
There  has  been  no  cause  for  questioning  the  right-mind- 
edness of  the  people.  The  great  problem  of  democracy 
has  been  and  ever  will  be  to  develop  an  organization  and  a 
leadership  which  is  serviceable  —  institutions  by  and 
through  which  the  servants  of  the  people  may  be  made 
responsive  and  responsible  to  the  will  of  the  people.  How 
may  the  will  of  the  people  be  an  expression  of  deliberate 
judgment  instead  of  an  outburst  of  passion  after  "  deep 
and  sullen  and  long-continued  resentment  "  has  destroyed 
faith  and  given  to  the  institutional  firebrand  a  dangerous 
following?     This  is  the  real  problem  before  us. 


Standard  for  Judgment  of  Institutional  Fitness 

For  Americans  there  can  be  but  one  standard  for  judg- 
ment as  to  whether,  amid  the  shifting  scenes  of  an  ever- 
widening  pluristic  life,  their  welfare  institutions  need 
modification,  and  that  is  the  standard  laid  down  by  every 
great  interpreter  of  democracy.  It  is  the  standard  which 
Edmund  Burke  had  in  mind  when  he  said : 


Essentials  of  Popular  Control  Lacking  35 

"  If  any  one  ask  me  what  a  free  government  is,  I  reply 
it  is  what  the  people  think  so." 

This  is  the  standard  which  President  Hadley  of  Yale 
had  in  mind  when  he  said: 

"  The  thing  that  governs  us  is  public  opinion  —  not 
the  nominal  public  opinion  of  creed  and  statute  book, 
but  the  real  public  opinion  of  living  men  and  women. 

"  Liberty  is  essential  to  progress,  democracy  is 
needed  to  prevent  revolution,  constitutional  govern- 
ment is  requisite  for  that  continuity  and  orderliness  of 
living  without  which  no  worthy  life  is  possible. 

"  Democracy  is  right  when  it  is  used  as  a  means  of 
keeping  the  government  in  touch  with  public  opinion, 
it  is  wrong  when  it  encourages  a  temporary  majority 
to  say  that  their  vote,  based  on  insufficient  information 
or  animated  by  selfish  motives,  can  be  identified  with 
public  opinion  concerning  what  is  best  for  society  as 
a  whole. 

"  Constitutional  safeguards  are  absolutely  necessary 
to  make  any  measure  of  liberty  or  democracy  possible; 
but  when  they  are  used  to  protect  the  liberties  of  a 
class  bent  on  its  own  interest  rather  than  on  the  general 
interest  of  society,  they  cease  to  be  a  safeguard  and 
become  a  source  of  peril." 

Wanted  —  an  Effective  Mechanism  of  Popular  Control 

For  democratic  institutions  there  can  be  but  one  founda- 
tion —  the  common  sense  of  justice,  the  right-mindedness 
of  an  intelligent,  patriotic  people,  who  believe  in  what  is 
because  they  have  the  institutional  means  of  expressing 
their  will  and  impressing  it  on  their  governmental  and 
service  agencies  through  an  outstanding,  farsighted,  clear- 
thinking  leadership,  whose  acts  and  proposals  are  at  all 
times  open  to  public  scrutiny,  and  whose  powers  rest  on 
the  confidence  and  support  of  a  majority  of  the  people. 


36        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

The  present-day  problem  of  democracy  is  primarily  a 
problem  of  institutional  mechanics  —  or  to  use  a  figure 
which  carries  with  it  the  notion  that  institutions  are  living 
organisms,  a  problem  of  hygiene.  It  is  only  when  a 
mechanism  or  an  organism  is  kept  in  constant  repair  and 
adjustment,  that  it  may  be  of  continuing  service  and  saved 
from  an  appraisal  which  condemns  it  as  unfit.  The 
American  people  know  that  their  institutions  are  right 
in  principle  and  fundamentally  sound;  they  also  know 
that  in  the  conflicts  of  contending  interest,  the  efforts  of 
some  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and  of  others  to  bring 
about  readjustment,  there  can  be  only  one  place  where 
the  power  to  decide  questions  of  policy  can  safely  reside, 
namely  :  in  the  people  themselves.  They  know  that  what- 
ever be  the  cost  of  overhauling  or  readjustment,  Ameri- 
can institutions  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  demands 
of  a  right-minded  nation  unless  they  provide  for  an  ef- 
fective means  of  popular  control.  This  is  a  part  of  the 
mechanics  of  institution  building  to  which  too  little  at- 
tention has  been  given. 

This  is  a  matter  to  which  the  conservative  well  wish- 
ers of  America  should  give  prayerful  consideration.  In 
these  days  when  men  by  the  million  are  ready  to  make  the 
supreme  sacrifice  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy 
there  must  be  unrest  until  institutional  adjustments  are 
made  whereby  the  voice  of  its  people  may  be  impressed 
on  their  leadership  and  through  majority  leadership  on 
the  government  —  until  American  institutions  and  rights 
may  rest  on  the  abiding  faith  of  citizens  that  the  prevail- 
ing ideals  of  right,  the  commonly  accepted  notions  of 
individual,  political,  economic  and  social  justice  inspirit 
those  who  are  entrusted  with  the  exercise  of  the  nation's 
sovereign  powers. 


CHAPTER  III 

PRINCIPLES    OF    POPULAR    CONTROL    LAID   DOWN    BY 
JEFFERSON 

Four  conditions  are  essential  to  stable,  effective 
democratic  government:  (i)  consciousness  of  common 
ideals  and  purposes  to  be  realized:  (2)  organization  to 
secure  these  ends;  (3)  leadership,  as  an  essential  to  co- 
operation: (4)  popular  control  to  make  the  organization 
and  leadership  consistent  with  the  conscious  ideals  and 
purposes  of  those  who  are  served.  The  American 
people  as  a  whole  have  been  moved  by  the  highest  ideals. 
They  have  developed  a  genius  for  organization.  But  in 
government  they  have  purposely  deprived  themselves  of 
responsible  leadership  and,  consequently,  have  not  devel- 
oped an  effective  mechanism  of  control  over  leadership. 
In  other  words,  the  means  for  making  popular  control 
effective  being  lacking,  leadership  has  been  irresponsible 
and  the  government  has  not  been  popular. 

Popular  Control  the  Essence  of  Democracy 

Popular  control  is  the  very  essence  of  democracy.  But 
to  make  popular  control  effective  it  is  necessary  to  pro- 
vide a  mechanism  by  which  the  popular  will  can  func- 
tion —  an  effective  method  of  enabling  the  people  to  know 
currently  what  is  being  done  or  proposed,  of  determining 
what  the  popular  will  is  and  of  impressing  this  will  on 
governing  agents.  This  mechanism  or  procedure  must 
be  developed  not  in  the  administrative  branch,  but  out- 
side of  it,  with  a  view  to  exercising  control  over  it.  There 
is  a  distinction  to  be  made  between  the  machanism  of  a 

37 


38        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

people  for  developing  power,  and  the  mechanism  for 
controlling  its  development  and  use.  The  administrative 
branch  is  the  power  mechanism.  The  deliberative  branch 
and  the  electorate  are  the  mechanism  of  control.  The 
principle  cannot  be  too  much  magnified,  that  the  purpose 
of  a  mechanism  of  control  is  not  to  develop  or  to  use 
power,  but  to  regulate  the  development  and  use  of  power; 
in  a  democracy  its  purpose  is  to  enable  the  people  through 
their  representatives  to  make  their  political  engines  and 
all  the  machinery  of  public  service  responsive  to  their 
will. 

How  Popular  Control  is  Made  Effective  Through  Repre- 
sentatives 

The  method  by  which  this  may  be  done  effectively  finds 
apt  illustration  in  the  method  used  by  the  Allied  Powers 
during  the  World  War.  The  movements  of  all  the  ship- 
ping of  the  world  were  controlled  through  "  the  bunker 
privilege."  That  is,  the  representatives  of  the  Allied 
Powers  having  gained  control  over  necessary  supplies, 
the  "  council  "  did  not  take  away  from  the  shipping  com- 
panies and  agencies  their  leadership,  but  they  undertook 
to  control  the  companies  and  agencies  by  controlling  their 
leadership.  To  do  this  the  council  required  each  captain 
of  each  ship,  the  active  executive,  to  tell  in  such  detail 
as  was  desired  what  he  proposed  to  do  before  further 
supplies  were  made  available.  Then,  if  a  satisfactory 
statement  were  made,  he  was  given  as  much  of  each 
kind  of  supply  needed  as  was  deemed  necessary  to  carry 
him  to  another  port  where  supplies  could  be  furnished 
subject  to  the  same  scrutiny  and  control.  And  in  case 
he  did  not  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  his  sailing  or 
if  he  so  conducted  the  vessel  as  to  seem  to  be  untrust- 
worthy, further  supplies  were  denied  until  some  one  else, 
in  whom  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers  had 
confidence,  was  put  at  the  helm.     This  method  of  en- 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  39 

forcing  accountability,  it  is  to  be  noted,  not  only  placed 
control  of  supplies  in  a  representative  council,  but  pre- 
sumed that  the  captain  was  responsible  for  the  crew  under 
him  and  was  able  to  protect  his  own  responsibility  through 
the  authority  which  he  had  over  his  crew  without  any 
intermeddling  with  the  discipline  of  the  crew  by  the 
council. 

The  American  people  are  sailing  a  large  fleet,  compris- 
ing a  flagship,  the  Federal  Government,  and  forty-eight 
regular  line  ships  of  state,  each  of  which  is  accompanied 
by  from  fifty  to  five  hundred  lesser  auxiliary  craft.  The 
organization  and  mechanism  of  control  over  this  great 
fleet,  the  process  of  forcing  responsibility  upon  the  cap- 
tain and  crew  of  each  craft,  large  or  small,  are  of  the 
utmost  importance.  The  question  of  control  over  govern- 
ment is  as  important  as  "  liberty "  or  "  justice "  or 
"  general  welfare."  It  involves  the  vital  interests  and 
opportunities  of  every  citizen  and  every  group. 

Restatement  of  the  Problem 

Organization  and  leadership  in  a  democracy  must  be 
of  two  kinds:  1.  the  organization  and  leadership  for  the 
flagship  and  each  of  these  ships  of  state,  the  administra- 
tion; 2.  organization  and  leadership  for  purposes  of  citi- 
zen control  —  a  representative  body  and  an  electorate. 
Budget  making  is  only  a  process  in  the  operation  of  the 
mechanism  of  popular  control  over  government  by  which 
the  people  have  given  over  to  their  representative  coun- 
cils control  over  all  needed  supplies;  a  means  by  which 
they  expect  the  council  to  exercise  control  over  the  public 
service  through  the  bunker  privilege.  Thus  the  budget 
comes  to  be  a  matter  of  supreme  importance.  To  repeat 
the  much-quoted  statement  of  Gladstone,  the  greatest 
political  mechanician  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  has 
produced :  "  Budgets  are  not  merely  affairs  of  arith- 
metic, but  in  a  thousand  ways  go  to  the  root  of  the  pros- 


40        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

perity  of   individuals,   the   relations  of   classes   and  the 
strength  of  kingdoms." 

Budget  making  is  something  which,  if  made  func- 
tional, must  be  integrated  with  that  part  of  our  moral 
philosophy  which  concerns  itself  with  the  popular  will. 
That  is,  the  budget  making  process,  if  it  is  to  be  made 
effective  for  purposes  of  control  in  a  democracy,  must 
be  a  means  of  enabling  the  representative  branch  of  the 
government  to  reach  to  the  popular  consciousness,  find 
its  final  authority  in  the  will  of  the  people,  as  it  is  given 
expression  by  the  electorate.  This  is  what  gives  discus- 
sion of  the  mechanics  of  administration  and  the  proce- 
dure of  budget  making  a  place  in  the  literature  of  de- 
mocracy. 

An  East  Indian  View 

There  is  a  point  of  more  than  passing  interest  in  the 
observation  made  by  an  East  Indian  philosopher  while 
visiting  America.  Being  asked  about  the  attitude  of  his 
people  toward  the  British  rule,  he  said : 

'  The  British  do  the  rough  work  of  government  very 
well.  They  seem  to  like  that  sort  of  thing  and  we  are 
glad  to  be  rid  of  it.  Other  people  gifted  in  the  art  of 
organization  have  come  down  upon  India  and  taken  over 
her  public  service.  To  some  we  paid  very  dearly  and 
got  little  in  return.  But  the  British  —  they  are  good 
servants ;  they  are  courteous ;  and  on  the  whole  they  have 
proved  to  be  honest.  They  do  the  rough  work  of  keep- 
ing order ;  they  protect  our  borders  from  invaders ;  they 
carry  the  mail  and  parcels ;  they  build  and  repair  our 
roads,  clean  our  streets  and  do  a  lot  of  other  useful  things, 
so  that  we  are  free  to  do  pretty  much  as  we  choose." 

Kipling  in  his  "  White  Man's  Burden  "  has  stated  the 
most  up-to-date  British  imperialistic  theory  of  the  service 
rendered  to  dependent  peoples. 

The  East  Indian's  idea  of  freedom  was  that  he  had  d 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  41 

white  man  working  for  him.  It  differs  radically  from 
ours  in  one  respect,  but  it  is  quite  consistent  with  it  in 
another.  The  idea  that  government  exists  to  serve  the 
people  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  democracy.  The 
individual  member  of  a  democratic  society  is  usually  glad 
enough  to  be  rid  of  the  "  rough  work  "  of  satisfying 
those  wants  which  common  necessity  and  convenience 
create  —  glad  to  be  rid  of  the  need  of  carrying  a  gun  and 
of  bearing  the  burdens  incident  to  life  in  a  primitive 
society  in  which  each  man  or  family  stands  alone  as  an 
isolated  protective  and  producing  unit.  He  is  glad  to 
avail  himself  of  broader  and  still  broader  cooperation 
made  possible  through  a  well-ordered  and  highly  devel- 
oped and  centralized  public  service,  provided  this  is  sub- 
servient to  public  opinion  —  to  the  will  of  the  majority. 

Democracy  Insists  that  Leadership  shall  be  Subservient 
But  democracy  has  no  sympathy  with,  or  interest  in, 
any  philosophy  which  stops  short  of  popular  control  over 
government.  It  insists  upon  political  as  well  as  indi- 
vidual freedom.  It  conceives  that  without  the  right  of 
group  self-determination,  individual  liberty  has  no 
guaranty;  that  members  of  the  group  have  the  right  to 
organize  and  decide  what  laws  they  shall  have  for  the 
regulation  of  their  conduct,  so  that  each  may  have  equal 
opportunity  and  each  may  enjoy  the  full  benefit  of  asso- 
ciation ;  that  members  have  a  right  to  settle  among  them- 
selves which  services  or  activities  shall  be  left  to  indi- 
vidual initiative  and  which  shall  be  organized  and  con- 
ducted in  common.  These  are  matters  to  be  determined 
by  representative  and  electoral  common  sense  and  not  by 
benevolent  paternalism. 

Democracy  must  possess  and  control  all  of  the  organ- 
ized means  of  protecting  its  interests  as  it  understands 
them.  In  other  words,  the  people  themselves  must  be 
master  of  those  who  master  the  ship ;  through  the  master 


4-2        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

they  must  control  the  crew.  This  is  what  must  be  done 
if  they  act  positively.  They  may,  however,  act  negatively 
and  tie  up  the  ship.  When,  therefore,  those  who  are 
employed  or  who  by  self -appointment  undertake  to  do 
"  the  rough  work  "  in  rendering  common  service  incur 
the  displeasure  and  lose  the  confidence  of  those  whom 
they  serve,  it  is  time  to  change  servants  rather  then  stop 
the  service  by  embargo;  and  if  those  who  are  in  posses- 
sion of  the  implements  and  institutions  of  service  use  the 
resources  of  the  people  to  fortify  themselves  and  remove 
themselves  from  popular  control,  democracy  claims  the 
right  to  tear  down  such  part  of  their  institutions,  public 
and  private,  as  give  them  shelter,  to  enable  the  people  to 
put  an  end  to  practices  hostile  to  concepts  of  justice. 
This  is  the  right  of  control  by  revolution  —  the  funda- 
mental doctrine  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  But 
democracy  does  not  stop  here.  Revolution,  though  justi- 
fiable under  circumstances  such  as  are  described  in  the 
Declaration,  is  tyrannical  and  wasteful.  The  only  use- 
ful thing  about  it  is  the  social  impulse  which  it  serves. 

Jefferson's  Four  Principles  of  Popular  Control 

The  highest  welfare  of  the  people  depends  on  dis- 
covering some  method  of  control  which  will  not  require 
a  democracy  to  tear  down  its  house  in  order  to  oust  its 
distrusted  servants.  The  author  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  did  not  stop  in  his  thinking  about  democ- 
racy with  a  formulation  of  the  right  of  revolution.  Just 
twenty-five  years  after  the  Declaration  was  signed  (July 
4,  1776),  lacking  three  months,  on  the  fourth  of  March, 
1 80 1,  Jefferson  put  forth  another  declaration  of  princi- 
ples which,  in  his  opinion,  would,  if  applied,  make  revolu- 
tion unnecessary.  Independence  had  then  been  won; 
threatened  war  with  France  had  been  averted  —  and  no 
foreign  foe  threatened ;  a  constitution  of  perpetual  union 
had  been  adopted;  a  new  house  of  their  own  design  had 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  43 

been  built  by  the  people  to  live  in ;  and  for  twelve  years 
(1789  to  1 801)  the  same  servants  (the  Federalists)  had 
been  employed  to  run  it.  But  in  this  new  house  there 
had  been  trouble  between  the  servants  and  the  members 
of  the  household.  Many  of  the  latter  complained  that  the 
former  were  seeking  to  free  themselves  from  control. 
There  was  growing  discontent  among  the  people,  at 
times  bordering  on  revolt. 

When  in  1801,  Jefferson,  America's  first  great  apostle 
and  prophet  of  democracy,  on  the  occasion  of  his  in- 
auguration as  President  addressed  his  fellow  country- 
men he  protested  against  the  aristocratic  tendencies  of 
those  in  control  of  the  Federal  Government.  He  was 
not,  however,  opposed  to  the  federal  idea ;  he  urged 
federal  union.  On  this  occasion  he  urged  its  preserva- 
tion "  in  its  whole  constitutional  vigor."  He  character- 
ized the  federal  charter  "  as  the  sheet  anchor  of  our 
peace  at  home  and  safety  abroad."  By  him  it  was  re- 
vered as  a  holy  creed,  an  object  of  high  inspiration,  a 
vital  thing  set  up  by  the  fathers  "  to  establish  justice,  to 
insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  common 
defense,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the 
blessings  of  liberty  to  themselves  and  their  posterity." 
To  make  sure  that  the  Federal  Constitution  might  be  pre- 
served, he  laid  down  in  his  inaugural  address,  at  a  time 
when  his  political  enemies  had  cast  doubt  on  the  sanity 
of  his  views,  what  he  understood  to  be  the  principles  of 
democracy.  Among  these  he  gave  voice  to  the  follow- 
ing principles  of  popular  control : 

(1)  "A  jealous  care  of  the  right  of  election  by  the 
people  —  a  mild  and  safe  corrective  of  abuses  which  are 
lopped  by  the  sword  of  revolution  where  peaceable 
remedies  are  unprovided ; 

(2)  "Absolute  acquiescence  in  the  decisions  of  the 
majority,  the  vital  principles  of  republics  from  which 
there  is  no  appeal  but  to  force; 


44        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

(3)  "The  diffusion  of  information  and  the  arraign- 
ment of  all  abuses  at  the  bar  of  the  public  reason." 

Another  principle,  not  listed  by  him,  was  included  in 
the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  address : 

"  Relying,  then,  on  the  patronage  of  your  good  will 
I  advance  with  obedience  to  the  work,  ready  to  retire 
from  it  whenever  you  become  sensible  how  much  better 
choice  it  is  in  your  power  to  make." 

Jefferson's  mind  was  not  analytical,  nor  did  he  have 
Gladstone's  faculty  for  institutionalizing  ideals,  but  he 
was  gifted  with  clear  vision  and  sound  instinct  in  things 
democratic,  and  in  enumerating  what  he  believed  to  be 
the  fundamentals  of  democracy,  he  included  the  four 
principles  which  have  subsequently  been  adopted  and  en- 
larged upon,  recognizing  them  as  essential  to  an  effec- 
tive mechanism  of  popular  control  over  government. 
These  essentials  may  be  expressed  as :  ( 1 )  popular  elec- 
tion; (2)  acceptance  of  the  judgment  of  the  majority  as 
a  rule  of  political  justice;  (3)  arraignment  of  persons 
at  the  head  of  the  administration  for  trial  on  evidence; 
(4)  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  electorate  or  popular  re- 
call —  in  the  broad  sense  in  which  that  term  is  herein- 
after employed. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  not  one  of  these  four 
principles  of  control  had  been  institutionalized  up  to  that 
time  either  here  in  America  or  in  any  other  country; 
neither  had  executive  leadership  become  fully  institution- 
alized on  lines  adapted  to  popular  control.  A  mechan- 
ism of  efficient  service  was  not  as  yet  developed  here;  and 
the  mechanism  of  popular  control  by  any  method  other 
than  revolution  was  as  yet  experimental  or  wholly  unde- 
veloped in  any  country.  America  was  far  in  advance  in 
devising  a  government  which  frankly  rested  on  popular 
sovereignty,  and  Jefferson's  administration  went  far  to 
prove  its  ability  to  weather  the  storms  of  class  conflict. 
In  this,  the  newly  founded  government  proved  to  be  a 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  45 

success  beyond  the  wisdom  of  its  authors,  and  despite  the 
predictions  of  contemporaries. 

The  Federal  Constitution  having  been  set  up,  an  aris- 
tocracy reached  out  for  and  obtained  control  over  the 
government;  and  Jefferson  went  before  the  public  as  the 
apostle  of  popular  control  —  his  preachment  being  that 
the  masses,  not  the  classes,  should  rule.  Here  were  the 
principles  that  in  his  opinion  were  to  be  adhered  to  in 
order  to  make  democracy  safe.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
principles  of  mechanics,  means  had  to  be  found  for  their 
integration  into  the  scheme  of  things  with  which  men 
work,  in  order  to  make  them  of  practical  consequence. 

The  Principle  of  Popular  Elections 

As  suggestive  of  the  fundamental  importance  of  these 
four  principles  and  also  indicative  of  the  time  required 
for  an  institutional  overhauling  in  the  process  of  adjust- 
ing new  devices,  these  facts  should  be  noted :  It  was  not 
until  after  a  half  century  of  agitation  and  two  partisan 
overturnings  here  in  America,  the  Jeffersonian  and  the 
Jacksonian,  that  manhood  suffrage  took  electoral  con- 
trol out  of  the  hands  of  the  propertied  classes.  In 
most  of  our  states  where  women  have  not  yet  been  per- 
mitted to  vote,  the  "  right  of  election  by  the  people  "  is 
still  an  issue.  In  Great  Britain,  electoral  adjustment  to 
a  basis  of  manhood  suffrage  came  later  and  more  slowly, 
beginning  with  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  and  continuing  to 
the  present  time. 

Acceptance  of  the  Principle  of  Majority  Rule 

Great  Britain  has  long  been  schooled  in  the  principle, 
"  acquiescence  in  the  decisions  of  the  majority."  But 
it  has  only  a  qualified  meaning.  The  controversy  over 
the  right  of  the  House  of  Lords  to  overrule  the  Commons 
—  the  representatives  of  the  people  —  was  not  finally 
settled  until  the  twentieth  century,   and  even  now,  the 


46        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

will  of  a  majority  of  the  representatives  of  the  people 
may  be  held  in  abeyance  till  confirmed  by  subsequent 
expression.  In  America,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,  there  was  great  fear  of  majorities ; 
and  it  was  not  until  after  the  failure  of  many  efforts  to 
thwart  the  will  of  the  majority,  including  the  Whisky 
Rebellion,  the  movements  culminating  in  the  Kentucky 
and  Virginia  Resolutions,  the  Hartford  Convention, 
South  Carolina's  Nullification,  and  the  Civil  War,  that 
the  operation  of  this  principle,  as  far  as  provided  for  in 
the  Constitution,  came  to  be  accepted  in  its  national  ap- 
plication. 

Arraignment  of  Administration  in  Representative  Forum 

The  importance  of  the  third  principle  (the  "  arraign- 
ment of  all  abuses  at  the  bar  of  public  reason  "  and  the 
"diffusion  of  information")  can  be  fully  appreciated 
only  as  we  weigh  Jefferson's  words.  Jefferson  was  a 
lawyer.  To  him  the  word  "  arraignment  "  must  have 
had  a  significance  quite  different  from  "  accusation  "  or 
"  condemnation "  or  other  words  simply  implying  in- 
dividual denunciation  or  public  appeal.  "  Arraignment  " 
implies  three  things :  A  person  or  persons  responsible 
for  some  fault  or  abuse;  an  information  or  indictment 
by  a  responsible  person ;  a  duly  constituted  tribunal  for 
the  determination  of  the  facts  and  application  of  rules 
of  justice. 

Whether  the  Constitution  was  set  up  by  an  aristocracy 
or  a  democracy,  this  was  thought  of  as  essential  to  re- 
sponsible government,  to  the  enforcement  of  political 
as  distinguished  from  legal  responsibility.  The  Magna 
Charta  was  forced  upon  King  John  by  a  group  of  aristo- 
crats who  commanded  in  their  armed  retainers  the  force 
necessary  to  apply  the  principle  of  control  by  revolution, 
if  the  principle  of  continuous  control  by  peaceful  means 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  47 

was  not  accepted.  More  than  six  hundred  years  after  the 
barons  at  Runnymede  had  made  their  experiment,  in  the 
mechanics  of  control  over  government,  after  autocracy 
had  gradually  yielded  to  democracy  as  the  controlling 
force  in  the  English  state,  John  Stuart  Mill  gave  it  as 
his  view  that  the  following  were  the  true  functions  of  the 
House  of  Commons : 

"  To  watch  and  control  the  government ;  to  throw  the 
light  of  publicity  on  its  acts;  to  compel  a  full  explana- 
tion and  justification  of  all  of  them  which  any  one  con- 
siders questionable;  to  censure  them  if  found  condemna- 
ble;  to  be  at  once  the  nation's  committee  on  grievances; 
an  arena  in  which  not  only  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  but 
that  of  every  section  of  it,  as  far  as  possible,  of  every 
eminent  individual  that  it  contains,  can  produce  itself 
in  full  sight  and  challenge  full  discussion." 

In  other  words,  Mill's  view  was  that  the  representa- 
tive, deliberative,  appropriating  body  was  not  a  mechan- 
ism for  leadership  but  a  mechanism  for  the  exercise  of 
control  over  leadership.  This  was  his  contribution  to 
a  broad  propaganda  which  was  then  in  progress  in  Eng- 
land under  the  leadership  of  Gladstone,  the  aim  of  which 
was  to  perfect  the  processes  and  institutional  adjust- 
ments necessary  to  make  the  third  Jeffersonian  principle 
of  control  effective  in  the  English  system  of  government. 
Early  in  the  century,  about  the  time  of  Jefferson's  in- 
augural, the  first  step  in  this  direction  was  taken  in  Eng- 
land by  establishing  the  principle  of  responsible  leader- 
ship, the  principle,  namely,  that  if  anything  goes  wrong, 
some  one  must  be  answerable  for  it,  some  one  must  be 
"  arraigned  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion."  That  person 
was  the  prime  minister.  And  to  make  responsibility  cer- 
tain, it  came  to  be  accepted  that  his  whole  cabinet  was 
on  trial,  on  the  theory  that  the  prime  minister  was  re- 
sponsible for  them  and  that  they  must  stand  or  fall  to- 


48         The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

gether.  This  was  a  measure  of  justice,  since  it  at  once 
insured  loyalty  to  leadership  and  provided  for  locating 
responsibility. 

The  next  step  was  to  constitute  the  House  of  Commons 
a  court  of  inquest.  The  rule  of  "  Cabinet  solidarity  " 
made  certain  that  the  prime  minister  would  be  brought 
before  this  court  to  give  an  account  of  his  stewardship 
and  that  his  colleagues  must  share  in  paying  the  penalty 
if  anything  went  wrong.  A  regular  form  of  accounting 
and  trial  practice  was  provided  for  in  the  budget  pro- 
cedure. When  an  accounting  was  to  be  had,  the  mem- 
bership of  the  House  was  organized  as  a  jury  sitting  as 
a  committee  of  the  whole.  Provision  was  made  which 
required  members  of  the  administration  requesting  funds 
to  be  present  to  explain  past  acts.  Provision  was  made, 
also,  for  the  three  essentials  of  trial  practice  in  a  jury 
proceeding:  (1)  the  party  arraigned  had  a  right  to  be 
confronted  by  his  adversary  —  the  accuser  must  be 
brought  face  to  face  with  the  accused;  (2)  each  party 
had  a  right  to  be  represented  by  counsel  —  their  leaders ; 
(3)  when  Gladstone  came  to  power  and  found  that  pro- 
vision was  lacking  for  trying  the  administration  on  evi- 
dence, he  proposed,  and  during  the  later  sixties  his  pro- 
posals became  laws,  that  each  member  of  the  House 
should  be  provided  with  the  means  for  having  every  act 
of  the  administration  involving  money  transactions  re- 
viewed and  reported  on  with  approval  or  disapproval  by 
an  officer  of  the  House  to  be  called  Comptroller  and 
Auditor  General.  This  official  was  placed  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  administration  by  being  given  an  independent 
status  with  tenure  for  life.  Gladstone  also  insisted  that 
his  political  adversaries,  the  organized  "  opposition,"  be 
given  every  facility  for  informing  themselves  in  order 
that  the  "indictment"  or  "information"  on  which  the 
administration  was  arraigned  might  come  from  a  re- 
sponsible party.     That  is,  he  insisted  that  if  the  cabinet 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  49 

was  to  be  held  responsible  for  its  acts,  through  leader- 
ship, the  opposition  should  also  be  made  responsible  for 
criticism  through  leadership,  the  Parliament  and  the  na- 
tion to  be  the  judges  as  to  which  leadership  would  be 
supported.  But  to  make  the  opposition  leadership  re- 
sponsible, as  critic,  it  was  necessary  that  every  oppor- 
tunity be  giv^en  for  obtaining  information,  and  for  ar- 
raignment of  the  administration  —  the  only  limitation 
being  that  the  accuser  should  be  required  to  confront  the 
accused,  and  that  the  issue  should  be  tried  before  the 
whole  membership  with  both  parties  present.  This  pro- 
cedure not  only  gave  to  England  responsible  leaders,  but 
also  responsible  parties,  since  the  parties  consisted  of 
those  who  stood  for  or  against  the  leadership  of  the  ad- 
ministration. In  order  that  the  opposition  might  be  made 
responsible,  Gladstone  insisted  that  there  should  be  a 
Committee  on  Public  Accounts,  the  chairman  of  which 
was  to  be  a  member  of  the  opposition,  which  would  have 
power  during  sessions  and  between  sessions  to  inquire 
into  the  acts  of  the  administration  —  with  access  to  public 
records  and  the  right  of  subpoena.  That  enabled  the  mem- 
bers to  have  the  best  evidence.  The  Auditor's  critical 
report  filed  at  the  beginning  of  the  session  was  referred 
to  this  committee,  the  staff  of  the  comptroller  and  auditor 
general  being  available  to  help  the  committee  to  a  com- 
plete understanding  of  the  facts.  He  also  insisted  that 
when  the  budget  and  the  accounts  of  the  administration 
were  presented,  each  member  of  the  House,  the  trial  jury, 
should  be  given  fullest  opportunity  to  question,  criticize, 
offer  evidence,  and  propose  votes  of  censure.  All  this 
was  to  be  done  openly,  and  with  the  members  of  the 
administration  arraigned  to  answer  all  questions  and  de- 
fend, so  that  members  of  Parliament  and  the  people 
would  not  be  misinformed  when  the  time  came  for 
them  to  vote.  These  where  the  institutional  adjustments 
which  were  worked  out  largely  under  the  leadership  of 


50        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Gladstone  to  make  the  third  Jeffersonian  principle  of 
popular  control  effective  in  England,  while  we  in  America 
were  trying  by  civil  war  to  establish  the  second. 

The  Right  of  Leaders  to  Appeal  to  the  People  from  De- 
cision of  Representative  Body 

England  was  the  first  country  to  make  effective  the 
fourth  principle,  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  people  —  an 
effective  means  of  recall  in  case  it  is  found  on  appeal 
that  the  executive  on  the  one  hand  or  a  majority  of  the 
representative  body  on  the  other  did  not  have  the  sup- 
port of  the  people  in  the  issue  on  which  appeal  was  taken. 
During  the  half  century  following  Jefferson's  statement 
of  principles,  coincident  with  the  establishment  of  the 
solidarity  of  cabinet  responsibility,  the  passage  of  the 
reform  acts  and  the  definition  of  trial  practice  before 
the  committee  of  the  whole,  the  crown  was  made  a 
part  of  the  machinery  of  control  over  the  executive. 
After  the  cabinet  became  responsible,  the  crown,  no 
longer  the  head  of  the  administration,  was  made  to  rep- 
resent sovereignty  of  the  whole  nation,  so  far  as  the 
king  functioned  at  all  politically ;  on  the  crown  was 
placed  responsibility  for  administering  the  principle  of 
appeal  to  the  people.  To  this  end  a  rule  was  adopted, 
that,  in  case  there  should  develop  a  deadlock  between 
the  executive  (the  prime  minister  and  his  cabinet)  and 
the  House  (as  a  court  of  inquest  representing  the  people) , 
it  was  incumbent  on  the  crown,  with  the  consent  of  the 
prime  minister,  to  ask  some  one  else  to  organize  a  cabinet 
which  would  have  the  confidence  and  support  of  the 
majority;  but  if  the  prime  minister  thought  that  the 
majority  in  the  House  did  not  fairly  represent  the  people 
on  the  issue  in  question,  and  that  the  people  would  sup- 
port him  and  defeat  the  hostile  majority  in  the  House, 
then  it  was  made  the  duty  of  the  crown  to  call  an  elec- 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  51 

tion.  This  placed  "  the  people  "  in  control.  It  made 
popular  sovereignty  real.  Thus  it  was  by  a  gradual 
process  that  the  millwrights  of  English  democracy 
worked  out  a  mechanism  for  making  the  last  two  of  the 
four  principles  of  popular  control  over  their  government 
effective. 

Experience  of  Other  Countries 

As  a  further  sidelight  on  these  principles  first  stated 
by  Jefferson,  it  is  of  interest  to  note  what  happened 
during  this  time  in  some  of  the  other  countries  which 
adopted  constitutional  forms  of  government.  In  France, 
the  principles  of  popular  election,  acceptance  of  the  de- 
cision of  a  majority,  and  popular  recall  by  dissolution 
administered  through  an  elected  president,  were  devel- 
oped; but  an  effective  procedure  for  the  arraignment  of 
the  administration  before  the  bar  of  public  opinion  for 
trial  on  evidence  was  not  devised.  There,  as  with  us,  the 
principle  of  responsibility  is  still  confused;  the  cabinet 
is  required  to  come  before  the  assembly,  but  does  not 
have  to  stand  or  fall  as  a  man ;  the  prime  minister  and 
cabinet  are  not  responsible  in  the  same  direct  way  as  in 
England  through  control  over  supplies,  but  the  estimates 
of  each  minister  go  before  a  legislative  budget  commis- 
sion, and  the  commission,  selected  from  the  whole  House 
by  lot,  submits  the  financial  plan  for  action.  Leader- 
ship and  responsibility  for  the  project  as  presented  is  in 
the  commission.  Many  eminent  Frenchmen  have  long 
been  working  for  a  more  effective  trial  practice  which 
would  place  responsibility  on  the  executive  and  hold 
him  to  account  to  the  assembly  as  a  court  of  inquest,  and 
to  insure  that  the  action  taken  would  be  on  evidence, 
instead  of  on  gossip  and  impulse.  The  French  practices 
have  been  severely  criticized  by  men  like  M.  Ribot  as 
conducive    to    patronage    and    waste.     Their    criticisms 


52        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

translated  into  English  might  be  mistaken  for  excerpts 
from  our  Congressional  Record} 

In  the  German  Empire  none  of  the  four  principles 
of  popular  control  were  made  effective. 

In  Canada  the  principles  of  popular  election,  acceptance 
of  the  decision  of  the  majority,  and  recall,  are  in  full  and 
effective  operation,  but  the  third  principle  (the  arraign- 
ment of  the  administration  before  the  bar  of  public  opin- 
ion to  be  tried  on  evidence)  has  been  made  ineffective. 
This  has  come  about  in  a  very  interesting  way.  While 
all  of  the  machinery  developed  under  the  leadership  of 
Gladstone  was  imported  into  Canada,  in  the  British  North 
America  Act  and  subsequent  statutes,  it  has  been  so  run 
as  to  defeat  its  purpose.  The  Committee  on  Public  Ac- 
counts, instead  of  being  made  an  effective  agency  for 
arguing  the  case  against  the  administration,  by  being  put 
under  the  leadership  and  control  of  the  opposition  has 
been  subordinated  to  the  control  of  the  cabinet,  the  very 
persons  to  be  investigated.  Instead  of  being  an  effective 
means  of  enabling  the  representative  body  "  to  watch 
.  .  .  the  government ;  to  throw  the  light  of  publicity  on 
its  acts;  to  compel  full  explanation  of  all  of  them  which 
any  one  considers  questionable,"  it  has  been  appropriated 
by  the  majority  and  used  to  enforce  "  gag  rule."  The 
office  of  each  minister,  as  a  result,  has  become  a  political 
bargain  counter  for  the  dispensing  of  "  patronage  "  and 
"  pork,"  as  it  is  called  on  this  side  of  the  line,  with  little 
opportunity  given  to  the  opposition  leaders  to  let  the 
people  and  their  representatives  know  what  the  facts 
are  before  a  vote  is  taken  —  and  the  vote  has  been  largely 
a  matter  of  testing  irresponsible  party  loyalty. 

Neglect  of  Last  Two  Principles  in  United  States 

Now  to  return  to  the  outworkings  of  these  principles 

1  See  Rene  Stourm,  "  Le  Budget,"  translation  published  by  Insti- 
tution of  Government  Research,  Washington,  191 7,  page  59. 


Principles  Laid  Down  by  Jefferson  53 

in  the  United  States.  As  has  been  said,  we  have  given 
much  thought  to  the  first  two  principles  of  popular  con- 
trol laid  down  by  Jefferson  in  1801.  The  vote-casting 
mechanism  has  been  worked  out  fairly  well  —  by  ex- 
tension of  the  suffrage,  corrupt  practice  acts,  and  adop- 
tion of  the  Australian  and  other  systems  of  secret  ballot; 
and  since  the  Civil  War,  the  principle  of  majority  rule, 
so  far  as  this  is  provided  for  or  permitted  under  our 
constitutions,  has  not  been  challenged  by  organized  force, 
although  threatened  on  at  least  one  occasion  —  that  of 
the  Hayes-Tilden  election.  The  first  two  principles  have 
thus  been  developed  in  practice  in  a  sufficiently  satis- 
factory manner,  but  they  have  been  ineffective  for  pur- 
poses of  popular  control  for  a  very  simple  reason.  This 
is  because  the  other  two  necessary  parts  of  the  mechanism 
of  popular  control  have  not  been  worked  out ;  and  those 
which  have  been  developed,  being  without  the  comple- 
mentary parts,  were  geared  up  with  the  existing  institu- 
tion in  such  a  way  as  periodically  to  put  the  stamp  of 
popular  approval  on  the  very  thing  that  the  mechanism 
of  control  was  designed  to  prevent  —  irresponsible  gov- 
ernment. 


CHAPTER  IV 

IRRESPONSIBLE  LEADERSHIP ITS   CONTRIBUTION   TO   IN- 
STITUTIONAL   MALADJUSTMENT 

A  constant  danger  to  democracy  is  to  be  found  in 
those  political  neuropsychic  disorders  —  the  symptoms 
of  which  are  class  rule  and  the  social  demoralization 
which  attends;  it  must  be  the  constant  care  of  statesmen 
to  prevent  these  disorders. 

The  Boss  —  the  Product  of  Conditions 

Any  study  of  political  pathology  must  begin  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of  a  healthy  organ- 
ism. Samuel  P.  Orth,  discussing  "  The  Boss  and  the 
Machine,"  makes  an  observation  which  is  worthy  of  more 
than  passing  thought. 

"  It  was  discovered  early  in  American  experience  that 
without  organization,  issues  would  disintegrate  and  prin- 
ciples remain  but  scintillating  axioms.  This  necessity  en- 
listed executive  talent  and  produced  a  politician  who, 
having  achieved  an  organization,  remained  at  his  post 
to  keep  it  intact  between  elections  and  used  it  for  purposes 
not  always  prompted  by  public  welfare  "  (p.  20). 

Lack  of  Appreciation  of  Need  for  Leadership 

It  is  a  strange  fact  that  it  was  left  to  the  "  boss  "  to  im- 
press on  the  American  people  the  idea  that  social  and 
political  ideals  can  be  made  real  and  practical  only  through 
organization;  and  that  leadership  is  essential  to  both. 
The  very  existence  of  the  "  boss  "  and  the  absence  of  re- 
sponsible leadership  in  American  political  life  speak  of 

54 


Irresponsible  Leadership  55 

a  condition  and  an  environment  which  must  produce 
disease.  This  condition  and  environment  has  been  a 
mental  attitude  on  the  part  of  people  —  induced  by  their 
effort  to  get  away  from  government  as  they  knew  it, 
and  by  experiences  in  a  new  continent  which  caused  them 
to  accept  a  philosophy  of  extreme  individualism  as  a 
reasoning  basis  for  appeals  for  support  in  a  war  for 
independence.  In  the  one  great  enterprise  before  them, 
war,  they  recognized  the  need  for  leadership,  and  the 
need  for  organization  and  discipline  to  make  such  leader- 
ship effective.  But  with  the  War  for  Independence 
ended,  it  remained  for  an  irresponsible  oligarchy  which 
had  reached  out  and  possessed  itself  of  institutions  of 
common  welfare  to  bring  to  the  people  a  consciousness  of 
need  for  responsible  leadership.  It  was  this  fundamental 
necessity  for  leadership  of  some  kind  which,  being  over- 
looked, finds  organic  accommodation  in  the  growth  of  an 
irresponsible  boss,  supported  by  a  privileged  class. 

Thus,  in  explaining  a  pathological  condition,  explain- 
ing why  we  in  America  have  a  "  boss  "  and  a  "  machine," 
the  diagnosis  has  reference  to  a  principle  that  inheres  in 
group  action  —  broader  than  democracy  itself.  The 
same  observation  might  as  well  have  been  made  in  dis- 
cussing the  normal  and  abnormal  outworkings  of  the 
political  organization  following  the  Norman  conquest; 
of  the  upbuilding  of  the  Christian  Church;  of  the  success 
of  Harvard  College;  of  the  organization  of  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Company;  of  the  New  York  World;  namely,  that 
strong,  able,  farsighted,  commanding  leadership  is  neces- 
sary to  the  success  of  every  enterprise,  public  and  pri- 
vate —  to  institutions  both  autocratic  and  democratic. 
The  success  of  a  democracy,  however,  depends  in  leader- 
ship being  made  responsible.  Responsible  leadership  is 
the  very  keystone  of  the  democratic  institutional  arch. 

The  causes  which  have  produced  the  result  (our  "in- 
visible "   and  "  irresponsible "   government)    are  clearly 


56        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

seen  in  every  period  and  at  every  point  of  our  national 
history.  They  are  seen  in  the  growth  of  legislative  dom- 
ination in  the  colonies  under  conditions  unfavorable  to 
responsible  executive  leadership;  in  the  extra-govern- 
mental and  irresponsible  committees  of  correspondence, 
the  aim  of  which  was  to  create  sentiment  to  overthrow  the 
foreign  autocracy ;  in  the  temporary  and  interim  agencies 
of  the  Revolutionary  War  in  which  the  governing  bodies 
sought  to  conduct  public  affairs  through  committees  with- 
out a  chief  executive;  in  the  methods  and  organization 
of  the  Continental  Congress  and  the  discussions  of  the 
convention  of  delegates  which  framed  our  Federal  Con- 
stitution ;  in  the  writings  of  public  men  who  showed  a 
profound  distrust  of  the  wisdom  and  right-mindedness  of 
a  broad  electorate,  and  who  have  urged  a  type  of  organ- 
ization which  would  insure  a  form  of  self-government  to 
be  worked  out  by  an  "  aristocracy  of  refinement  and 
wealth  " ;  in  the  fact  that  during  the  whole  controversy 
about  rights  of  self-government  from  1765  till  the  French 
Revolution,  almost  no  steps  were  taken  to  establish  a 
democratic  electorate;  in  failure  to  invoke  a  plebiscite 
for  the  adoption  of  revolutionary  and  of  post-revolu- 
tionary charters ;  in  provision  of  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion for  the  election  of  senators  by  "  councils  of  the  wise  " 
(the  state  legislatures),  for  the  election  of  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  by  the  propertied  class, 
and  for  the  choice  of  the  President  by  an  electoral 
college ;  in  refusal  of  Congress  to  accord  to  the  executive 
branch  a  position  of  equality  in  its  first  session  when  it 
denied  Hamilton's  request  to  come  before  it  to  present 
and  explain  the  plans  of  administration  and  financial 
support  which  Washington  had  gone  over  and  made  his 
own;  in  the  treatment  accorded  Washington  himself  by 
his  constitutional  advisers,  the  Senate,  which  caused  him 
to  turn  away  in  disgust. 


Irresponsible  Leadership  57 

The  Leadership  of  Standing  Committees 

Bringing  over  from  an  older  regime  the  idea  of  com- 
mittee domination,  and  the  preferability  of  a  "  coun- 
cil of  the  wise"  to  an  effective  plan  of  popular  control, 
the  "  standing-committee  "  system  was  developed  for  the 
transaction  of  business  in  the  representative  branch;  the 
committee  of  the  whole  procedure  for  purposes  of  in- 
quest and  informal  discussion  was  permitted  to  degen- 
erate or  go  into  disuse;  the  "lobby,"  "logrolling" 
methods,  the  secret  "  party  "  caucus,  and  "  gag  rule  "  to 
muzzle  opposition  on  the  floor  grew  up  as  naturally  as 
mushrooms  grow  around  a  compost  pile.  And  out  of  all 
this  came  the  irresponsible  "  boss  "  and  the  irresponsible 
"  party  "  or  the  organization  controlled  by  the  boss.  Or 
again  to  quote  from  Dr.  Orth :  these  conditions  "  pro- 
duced a  politician  who,  having  achieved  an  organization, 
remained  at  his  post  .  .  .  and  used  it  for  purposes  not 
always  prompted  by  public  welfare." 

The  secret  lobby  maintained  by  persons  and  corpora- 
tions seeking  special  privileges ;  the  domination  of  party 
organization  by  a  boss  and  his  "  organization  "  for  the 
nomination  of  representatives  and  executive  officers  to 
be  chosen  by  the  electorate  after  the  suffrage  had  been 
broadened ;  the  making  of  platforms  to  secure  votes  for 
the  candidates  of  irresponsible  parties ;  control  of  elec- 
tions; the  organization  of  legislative  "committees  on  ex- 
penditure "  to  secure  information  for  party  use,  with 
little  or  no  regard  for  real  issues ;  an  irresponsible  party 
controlled  press ;  the  "  spoils  system  "  and  secret  logroll- 
ing methods  of  obtaining  public  money,  for  distribution 
through  contractors  in  order  to  maintain  irresponsible 
party  allegiance  and  enforce  party  discipline;  the  "party 
secret  service,"  a  system  of  district  leaders  and  walking 
delegates  organized  first  by  Aaron  Burr  and  his  con- 
temporaries as  a  junta  for  the  control  of  the  political 


58        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

underworld,  later  adopted  and  made  more  perfect  as  a 
means  of  rinding  out  who  are  the  faithful  —  these  have 
been  an  integral  part  of  our  irresponsible  "  party " 
system,  unwittingly  aided  and  abetted  by  a  territorially 
widening  and  ever  more  keenly  conscious  and  correspond- 
ingly more  distrustful  democratic  citizenship. 

Acceptance  of  the  Principle  of  Oligarchy 

The  hold  which  this  idea  of  a  determining  "  council 
of  the  wise,"  an  oligarchy  as  opposed  to  a  democracy,  has 
had  may  be  seen  not  alone  in  the  forms  mentioned  but 
also  in  the  methods  and  practices  of  discontented  "  inde- 
pendent "  reform  bodies  as  well.  When  a  protesting 
people  have  sought  to  overthrow  the  boss  and  his  machine, 
the  same  methods  have  been  used  by  them  to  obtain  re- 
sults as  had  been  developed  and  were  used  by  persons  and 
the  "  party  "  whose  acts  had  caused  resentment.  These 
have  been  the  only  methods  that  have  found  a  place  in 
our  political  life  except  at  times  when  a  Jefferson  or  a 
Roosevelt  has  violated  all  "  party  "  traditions  and  shown 
his  confidence  in  the  right-mindedness  of  the  masses  by 
direct  appeal. 

But  in  all  this  there  have  been  evidences  of  the  sound- 
ness of  the  foundations  of  our  institutions.  While  the 
need  for  providing  institutionally  for  responsible  leader- 
ship and  an  effective  means  of  popular  control  has  not 
been  perceived  until  very  recently,  in  every  case  where 
great  leaders  have  gone  to  the  people  the  principle  has 
become  operative.  The  reason  that  no  great  national 
leader  has  labored  for  an  effective  mechanism  of  popular 
control  seems  to  be  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  of 
paternalism.  In  no  class  or  political  group  has  the  opera- 
tion of  this  principle  been  more  strongly  exemplified,  the 
principle  that  a  select  few  should  determine  what  is  best, 
than  in  those  self-appointed  civic  committees  and  other 
agencies  of  humanitarian  motive  developed  outside  the 


Irresponsible  Leadership  59 

government  and  in  opposition  to  the  "  boss  and  his 
machine  "  for  the  guidance  of  the  electorate.  Instead 
of  this  opposition  leadership  insisting  on  the  development 
of  a  procedure  in  the  representative  body,  the  established 
forum  of  the  people,  to  make  this  organ  of  the  popular 
government  effective  for  inquiry,  discussion  and  publicity 
—  instead  of  seeking  to  provide  within  the  government 
itself  a  means  for  the  exercise  of  critical  judgment  and 
for  informing  the  people,  so  that  public  opinion  might 
be  deliberately  formed  on  current  issues  after  due  con- 
sideration, the  uniform  method  had  been  both  for 
"  parties  "  and  for  persons  interested  in  reform  to  or- 
ganize irresponsible  committees  and  to  give  to  the  people 
gratuitous  advice.  These  committees,  in  so  far  as  they 
have  had  any  public  function  to  perform,  have  under- 
taken gratuitously  to  do  through  irresponsible  persons 
exactly  what  should  have  been  done  by  the  representa- 
tives and  executive  officers  who  by  every  tenet  of  demo- 
cratic faith  should  have  been  made  responsible  by  the 
adoption  of  a  procedure  suited  to  this  purpose. 

The  Rise  of  Humanitarian  Civic  Leadership 

In  the  absence  of  responsible  leadership  —  and  an  open 
public  forum  composed  of  representatives  of  the  people 
organized  to  inquire  into,  approve,  and  disapprove  the 
acts  and  proposals  of  leaders,  and  to  carry  disputed  issues 
to  the  people  —  in  the  absence  of  this,  each  community 
has  accepted  the  leadership  of  irresponsible  "  party " 
leaders  organized  for  patronage  and  spoils ;  either  this 
or  the  communities  have  supported  the  hands  of  various 
irresponsible  specialized  civic  agencies,  whose  motives 
were  good  but  whose  methods  were  the  same  as  those 
of  the  "  boss "  and  the  corporation  "  lobbyist."  The 
prevalence  and  persistence  of  this  type  of  leadership  is 
evident  on  every  hand.  For  example,  in  Philadelphia 
there  are  some  two  thousand  irresponsible  detached  or- 


60        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ganizations,  each  with  its  leader  or  committee,  inquiring 
into  some  one  or  more  subjects  of  interest,  seeking  to 
serve  its  special  constituency  with  a  view  of  making  more 
intelligent  citizens  or  to  bring  about  some  special  im- 
provement. New  Yofk  has  two  or  three  times  as  many, 
Boston,  St.  Louis,  Chicago,  San  Francisco,  Cleveland  — 
every  city  and  town  has  its  proportional  share.  Each  in 
turn,  when  it  has  sought  to  bring  about  a  change  of  law, 
establish  a  new  branch  of  public  service,  or  make  one 
already  established  more  serviceable,  has  worked  through 
the  "  system "  of  irresponsible  parties  or  irresponsible 
legislative  committees ;  employs  the  lobby ;  has  used  log- 
rolling methods;  has  helped  to  make  the  irresponsible 
boss  and  his  machine  more  powerful  —  not  from  prefer- 
ence, however,  but  because  there  has  been  no  other  way  to 
get  things  done. 

American  citizenship  instead  of  providing  itself  with 
responsible  leadership  and  providing  a  means  of  control 
over  the  public  service  in  the  representative  branch  and 
the  electorate,  without  realizing  the  significance  of  its 
habits  and  prejudices,  first  followed  the  leadership  of  the 
boss,  then  followed  the  leadership  of  a  multitude  of  paid 
secretaries  of  independent  civic  agencies  outside  the  gov- 
ernment. That  is,  the  people  have  not  undertaken  to  take 
the  steps  necessary  to  prevent  the  breeding  of  a  foreign 
malignant  growth  which  has  come  to  sap  the  vitality  of 
the  body  politic ;  but  have  undertaken  to  make  itself  im- 
mune to  infection  by  a  benevolent  culture.  It  has  not 
resorted  to  hygiene  but  to  the  development  of  antibodies. 

Three  Groups  of  Irresponsible  Leaders 

Generally  speaking,  these  irresponsible  agencies  which 
have  grown  up  have  been  of  three  kinds,  which  in  the 
order  of  their  historic  development  may  be  characterized 
as  following :  ( i )  the  kind  which  is  so  freely  discussed 
as  a  thing  quite  undemocratic  —  i.  e.  irresponsible  politi- 


Irresponsible  Leadership  61 

cal  "  parties "  which  aim  to  nominate  and  secure  the 
election  of  members  of  their  organization  so  that  those 
who  make  "  politics  "  a  business  may  obtain  the  patronage 
and  the  profit  that  attend  an  alliance  of  government  with 
private  undertaking;  (2)  irresponsible  civic  societies  and 
committees,  not  interested  in  spoils  —  but  organized  to 
promote  specialized  humanitarian  projects  each  of  which 
has  taken  upon  itself  leadership  to  obtain  action  looking 
toward  the  improvement  of  a  particular  governmental 
service  or  activity;  and,  (3)  irresponsible  civic  agencies, 
not  interested  in  spoils,  and  not  interested  in  the  promo- 
tion of  any  special  humanitarian  project  —  but  which, 
being  opposed  to  waste  and  inefficiency,  have  undertaken 
to  obtain  the  information  needed  to  arouse  public  opinion 
to  demand  better  public  administration,  more  intelligent 
executive  planning,  and  effective  execution  of  plans. 
This  third  class  of  agencies  were  interested  in  economy, 
efficiency,  and  budget  making  as  a  means  of  locating 
and  enforcing  executive  accountability.  Let  us  get  be- 
fore us  a  little  more  clearly  the  conditions  which  gave  rise 
to  these  three  kinds  of  irresponsible  agencies  : 

The  Irresponsible  "  Boss  "  and  the  Irresponsible  "  Party  " 

1.  The  first  of  these  groups,  irresponsible  political 
"  parties,"  came  into  being  after  the  Jefferson  and  Jack- 
son influence  had  broadened  the  electorate  and  after  con- 
trol by  a  landed  aristocracy  had  been  overthrown. 
Their  forerunner  had  been  the  congressional  caucus. 
But  this,  with  the  broadened  electorate,  developed  a  vul- 
nerable point  in  its  protective  armor.  The  caucus  was 
made  up  of  representatives  elected  by  the  people.  Its 
doom  was  sealed  when  Jackson  went  out  and  won  over 
to  his  leadership  the  support  of  the  unaristocratic  majority 
of  the  electorate. 

Thus  aristocratic  control  was  first  defeated  by  Jeffer- 
son, and  its  controlling  body,  "  the  legislative  caucus," 


62        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

was  killed  by  Jackson.  With  "  the  legislative  caucus  " 
died  the  last  vestige  of  responsible  leadership.  Then  it 
was  that  a  new  type  of  practical  politician  came  to  the 
front ;  men  like  De  Witt  Clinton  of  Jackson's  time ;  and, 
after  his  time,  men  like  Fenton,  Quay  and  Hanna  and 
Piatt.  There  was  an  important  function  to  be  performed, 
for  which  no  institutional  means  was  provided.  Their 
practical  problem  was  to  organize  and  make  effective  for 
purposes  of  nomination  and  election  a  "  party  " —  and  to 
organize  in  such  manner  that  the  controlling  group  would 
be  fortified  against  the  electorate.  Having  made  their 
leadership  safe  through  well-chosen  devices  like  "  plat- 
forms," a  hand-picked  hierarchy,  and  judicious  distri- 
bution of  spoils,  they  undertook  to  secure  their  ends 
by  controlling  the  ever  widening  democratic  electorate. 

Having  nominated  his  candidates  and  secured  the 
election  of  men  who  were  trusted  by  his  "  party,"  the 
boss  found  that  the  secret  processes  of  the  irresponsible 
legislative  committees  and  the  methods  which  had  been 
inaugurated  by  the  controlling  aristocracy  before  the 
electorate  had  been  broadened  and  the  unaristocratic  boss 
and  his  machine  got  control  were  admirably  suited  to 
his  purposes.  Therefore  party  managers  fostered  gov- 
ernment by  standing  committees,  the  rule  of  seniority, 
and  all  that  went  with  irresponsible  leadership.  When 
the  people  rebelled  and  demanded  direct  election  of  a 
multitude  of  executive  officers,  the  bosses  accepted  the 
situation  and  made  nomination  and  election  of  an  increas- 
ing number  of  officers  grist  for  their  own  mill.  And 
from  time  to  time,  as  one  reform  measure  after  another 
gained  favor  in  appeals  to  the  people  to  "  overthrow  the 
boss  and  his  machine,"  thev  were  able  to  accept  each  new 
proposal  made  in  the  interest  of  "  reform  "  so  long  as 
they  could  control  nominations  and  elections  and  remain 
the  chief  beneficiaries  of  the  standing-committee  system 
with  its  methods  of  dealing  in  the  dark. 


Irresponsible  Leadership  63 

Irresponsible  Humanitarian  Leadership 

2.  The  second  group  of  civic  agencies  to  take  a  signifi- 
cant part  in  our  political  life,  the  irresponsible,  special- 
ised civic  committee  interested  in  humanitarian  projects, 
found  an  environment  suited  to  their  growth  when  the 
people  began  to  look  to  the  government  for  improved 
service.  The  prevailing  political  philosophy  of  the  first 
half  century  after  our  independence  was  that  government 
was  an  evil  —  necessary,  to  be  sure,  but  an  evil  to  be 
abated  as  far  as  possible.  The  average  American  felt  in- 
dependent. Except  to  protect  his  property  rights  and  to 
secure  personal  safety  he  held  the  view  that  he  did  not 
need  to  look  to  the  government.  When  any  one  lost 
out  in  his  efforts  to  possess  himself  of  ample  means  for 
working  out  his  own  salvation,  all  he  had  to  do  was  to 
"  Go  West,"  possess  himself  of  an  allotted  part  of  a 
great,  unused  fertile  public  domain  and  "  grow  up  with 
the  country."  The  chief  demand  on  the  government 
was  to  apportion  the  land  to  the  citizenship  which,  col- 
lectively as  sovereign,  had  become  successors  to  the 
British  Crown.  Here  was  an  empire  wide  and  rich  be- 
yond human  conception.  The  chief  cost  in  the  distri- 
bution was  small.  The  only  thing  necessary  was  to  drive 
the  Indians  back  as  fast  as  the  white  man  wanted  more 
land,  and  to  provide  for  maintaining  such  police  as  were 
needed  to  protect  the  frontiersman  from  the  uncivilized 
rage  of  aboriginal  tribes. 

But  finally  these  rich  lands  ready  for  the  ax  and  plow 
became  scarce,  and  the  inducements  offered  to  collective 
capital  to  develop  manufactories  and  commerce  began 
to  bring  large  populations  together  as  urban  dwellers. 
Then  a  new  attitude  toward  the  government  began  to  as- 
sert itself.  The  government  was  found  to  be  the  only 
agency  to  which  the  urban  dwellers  could  look  for  such 
common  necessities  as  good  water,  sunshine,  and  pure 


64        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

air;  for  protection  against  contagious  disease  and  epi- 
demic; for  defense  against  the  exploitation  of  monopo- 
lists and  profiteers. 

Living  conditions  in  the  towns  became  very  complex. 
Those  who  busied  themselves  making  a  living  as  wage 
earners  and  as  small  business  men  under  these  new  con- 
ditions did  not  know  and  could  not  find  out  why  their 
lot  was  made  hard  —  but  economic  adversity,  ill  health, 
and  physical  suffering  often  was  found  in  the  midst  of 
plenty.     In  this  enviroment  humanitarian  instincts  came 
to  the  front.     Persons  who  had  means  of  support  and 
time  to  think  interested  themselves  in  these  conditions, 
and  in  doing  what  they  could  to  make  the  government 
more  serviceable.     Some  interested  themselves  in  the  sick 
poor;  others  in  the  industrially  disabled;  others  in  the 
pauper;  others  in  the  insane;  others  in  causes  of  crime 
and  the  treatment  of  prisoners;  others  in  regulation  of 
food  supply ;  others  in  the  prevention  of  disease ;  others 
in  hours  and  conditions  of  work  and  so  on.     All  sorts 
of  conditions  which  constituted  social  ills  were  made  the 
subject  of  special  inquiry  and  care  by  benevolent-minded 
persons  whose  social  vision  went  beyond  their  own  family 
and  set.     To  make  their  efforts  more  effective  it  became 
the  fashion  to  inquire  into  causes,  and  in  most  instances 
this  led  to  a  knowledge  of  what  the  government  was  doing 
and  to  a  consideration  of  what  it  could  do  to  make  it 
more  serviceable.     And  as  each  of  these  various  special- 
ized civic  agencies  applied  themselves  each  to  its  task, 
each    found   itself   face  to    face  with  these  two   forces 
with  which  they  had  difficulty  in  coping:    (1)   the  un- 
aristocratic  and  also  quite  autocratic  party  leader,  who, 
from  choice,  remained  outside  the  government  in  order 
that  he  might  fortify  himself  and  build  up  an  organization 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  electorate ;  (2)  an  electorate  which 
had  come  to  be  broadly  democratic  but  which,  having 
failed  to  provide  the  means  of  protecting  itself  by  con- 


Irresponsible  Leadership  65 

stitutional  or  other  means  of  insuring  responsible  leader- 
ship, was  being  used  to  further  the  interests  of  the  boss. 

Out  of  this  situation  a  new  species  of  political  propa- 
ganda came  forth.  Each  of  these  specialized  humani- 
tarian civic  agencies  sought  to  get  and  keep  the  particular 
governmental  activity  in  which  it  was  interested  "  out 
of  politics  " —  out  from  under  the  control  of  the  irre- 
sponsible boss  and  his  machine  and  also  where  it  could 
not  be  reached  by  the  electorate.  In  a  political  campaign, 
a  quest  for  votes,  these  specialized  humanitarian  societies 
and  their  non-political  leaders  were  no  match  for  the 
party  boss  and  his  machine ;  but  they  could  beat  the  party 
manager  when  it  came  to  making  a  human  appeal  for 
service.  They  did  find  a  public  opinion  favorable  to 
their  appeal  in  the  democracy;  and  for  this  reason  they 
did  get  a  sympathetic  response  to  the  demand  that  the 
public  service  be  taken  "  out  of  politics."  The  practical 
solution  was  that  one  service  after  another  was  by  law 
set  apart  and  placed  under  an  appointed  board  or  com- 
mission. 

The  arguments  of  the  specialized  civic  agencies  and 
of  their  secretaries  ran  like  this :  "  By  placing  each  of 
the  particular  public-service  activities  in  which  they  were 
interested  under  a  board  with  overlapping  terms,  the 
experience  of  the  administrative  body  would  be  made 
continuous ;  by  making  the  term  of  each  member  of  the 
board  longer  than  the  term  of  office  of  the  politically 
elected  candidate  who  was  made  the  appointing  agent, 
the  appointing  agent  would  stand  in  fear  of  the  effect  of 
a  bad  appointment  in  the  next  election ;  by  making  the 
terms  long  enough  even  a  venal  political  appointing  agent 
could  not  control  the  board ;  by  making  the  appropriation 
continuous  the  board  would  be  relieved  of  going  before 
a  politically  controlled  standing  committee  of  the  legis- 
lature every  time  it  needed  funds ;  and  finally,  being  thus 
relieved  of  the  necessity  for  dealing  with  the  boss  and 


66        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

his  machine,  the  board  could  employ  and  retain  the  serv- 
ices of  experts  —  men  qualified  to  deal  effectively  with 
the  intricate  questions  of  administration." 

But  there  was  another  advantage  which  was  not  set 
forth  in  the  propaganda  which  gave  to  our  states  a  mul- 
titude of  administrative  boards  and  commissions.  The 
standing  committee  system  in  the  legislatures  was  not 
touched.  There  was  no  effort  made  to  dethrone  the  irre- 
sponsible leader  outside  the  government  by  setting  up  a 
method  by  which  leadership  would  be  responsible.  The 
many-headed,  much-divided  management  did  not  take  the 
people  at  large  into  confidence  in  matters  of  administra- 
tive acts  and  proposals.  This  gave  to  the  humanitarian 
committees  and  their  secretaries  the  same  sort  of  ad- 
vantage as  had  been  used  by  the  boss ;  in  fact  their  organ- 
izations were  patterned  after  the  institutions  of  the  boss 
and  his  machine,  being  different  only  in  the  end  which 
they  sought  to  achieve.  And  just  to  the  extent  that  the 
service  was  taken  out  from  under  the  control  of  the  boss 
and  his  machine  —  to  that  extent  it  fell  under  the  domina- 
tion of  the  specialized  civic  committee  and  its  secretary. 
The  people  were  relieved  to  a  certain  extent  of  the  re- 
sults of  control  of  the  bosses  of  irresponsible  political 
"parties"  whose  aims  were  spoils;  they  received  the 
benefits  of  a  benevolent  paternalism  by  putting  their  af- 
fairs under  the  domination  of  a  multitude  of  bosses  of 
humanitarian,  though  irresponsible,  specialized  civic  so- 
cieties. 

It  is  a  fact  to  be  squarely  faced  that  while  the  prevail- 
ing spirit  of  America  has  always  responded  to  appeals 
to  the  highest  ideals  of  democracy,  this  spirit  has  not 
found  an  institutional  means  of  expression  in  the  form  of 
devices  for  controlling  the  motor  system  of  the  body 
politic.  The  spirit  of  the  people  has  been  democratic. 
But  the  movements  of  the  body  politic  have  been  domin- 
ated by  local  and  class  impulses.     Political  action,  ex- 


Irresponsible  Leadership  67 

cept  in  time  of  great  national  emergency,  has  not  been  a 
reflex  of  the  soul  of  the  people,  but  the  reflex  of  localized 
or  specialized  class  interests.  To  use  a  figure  drawn 
from  physical  life:  The  mind  of  the  people  has  not 
been  in  coma,  it  has  been  at  all  times  alert  to  appeals  of 
idealism;  but  with  respect  to  all  objective  relations,  the 
senses  of  sight  and  touch  and  hearing  were  linked  up 
with  local  centers  of  control,  which  in  turn  linked  up  with 
an  outside  boss  —  humanitarian  or  venal  as  the  case 
might  be.  They  did  not  reach  the  reasoning  and  think- 
ing of  a  responsible  leadership.  Popular  sovereignty 
was  not  real,  for  there  was  a  hiatus  between  the  seat  of 
the  popular  will  and  the  local  centers  of  motor  control. 
Continuously  operating  means  of  communication  with  the 
mind  of  the  people  had  not  been  established.  The  motor 
system,  having  adapted  itself  to  being  actuated  by 
stimuli  controlled  by  the  party  boss  or  latterly,  in  part 
at  least,  by  stimuli  furnished  by  a  multitude  of  secre- 
taries of  independent  humanitarian  committees  who  got 
their  desired  results  through  the  many  independent  nerve 
centers  —  the  body  members,  even  though  they  might  be 
made  to  operate  strongly,  acted  without  coordination, 
except  in  so  far  as  this  might  be  brought  about  by  com- 
mand or  agreement  of  the  outside  irresponsible  leaders. 

The  political  spinal  cord  that  was  provided  for  in  the 
Constitution,  automatically  to  link  the  mind  of  the  people 
with  the  motor  centers  of  the  government,  was  atten- 
uated or  in  a  condition  of  temporary  paralysis.  It  was 
constricted  initially  by  the  makers  of  the  Constitution  who 
distrusted  the  people ;  later  this  constriction  was  taken 
advantage  of  by  those  outside  organizations  who  found 
it  to  their  advantage  not  to  have  public  opinion  function 
except  at  the  end  of  fixed  terms  and  then  in  response  to 
stimuli  coming  from  irresponsible  leaders ;  and  the  bosses 
spent  their  time  devising  ways  and  means  whereby  the 
people   could  have  no   choice  at  the   end   of  the  fixed 


68        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

terms  except  as  between  alternatives  dictated  by  bosses. 

This  system  has  caused  the  people  to  grow  more  dis- 
trustful and  resentful,  so  that  when  the  electoral  system 
acts  independently  it  reflects  only  inhibitory  or  negative 
conclusions.  The  system  thus  actuated  has  produced  re- 
sults which  are  a  mockery  to  the  spirit  of  democracy. 
The  voice  of  the  people  has  been  a  voice  to  condemn  its 
servants  to  political  death  for  conditions  which  have  made 
for  distrust  and  over  which  the  servants  of  the  people 
have  had  little  or  no  control.  Time  and  again  the  people 
have  commissioned  a  set  of  new  servants,  and  because 
of  these  conditions  the  political  boss  has  known  that  only 
the  untried  could  be  elected.  Then  these  new  servants 
in  turn  have  fallen  victims  to  the  system.  But  the 
"  boss  "  and  the  irresponsible  "  party  "  and  the  "  stand- 
ing committees  "  and  "  invisible  government  "  have  lived 
on. 

The  point  made  here  is  that  while  the  servants  of  the 
people  have  been  condemned,  the  system  which  makes 
for  "  invisible  government  "  and  "  irresponsible  "  leader- 
ship, has  gone  on  and  on. 

The  contest  between  the  outside  irresponsible  boss  with 
his  servile  party  and  the  opposition  made  up  of  outside 
irresponsible  secretaries,  both  fortified  by  establishing 
their  organizations  on  foundations  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  electorate,  who,  "  in  periodic  fits  of  popular  rage," 
turned  out  their  helpless  servants  and  condemned  them 
to  political  death  —  the  contest  between  those  two  politi- 
cal forces  has  been  a  contest  for  control  over  the  de- 
centralized motor  bodies  of  the  government.  And,  as 
has  been  said,  in  this  struggle  the  civic  secretaries  had  the 
advantage,  because  their  motives  were  true  to  the  ideals 
of  democracy,  although  their  methods  were  paternalistic 
and  autocratic.  Whenever  a  definite  humanitarian  issue 
has  come  before  the  people,  the  party  has  usually  lost 
out  because  the  motives  of  the  boss  were  known  to  be  self- 


Irresponsible  Leadership  69 

ish.  The  civic  secretary  in  each  case  has  sought  to  make 
the  specialized  service  in  which  he  was  interested  more 
serviceable  to  the  people,  while  the  party  boss  was  seek- 
ing to  monopolize  the  commercial  transactions  of  the 
government  for  the  selfish  advancement  of  members  of 
the  organization  of  which  he  was  the  head.  Both  the 
boss  and  the  secretary  were  irresponsible.  The  one  how- 
ever has  had  a  benevolent  interest;  the  other  has  been 
dominated  by  the  spirit  of  the  profiteer. 

Irresponsible  Agencies  to  Promote  Responsible  Leader- 
ship within  the  Government 

3.  Now  comes  upon  the  stage  a  third  group,  another 
group  of  independent,  unofficial,  irresponsible  Soviets  in 
whose  eyes  the  need  of  the  hour  seemed  to  be  lack  of 
coordination  of  public  functions;  lack  of  planning  for 
the  government  as  a  whole;  lack  of  managing  ability  at 
the  head.  With  this  came  loss  of  energy  in  the  body  poli- 
tic because  of  the  overlapping  conflicting  claims  and 
jurisdictions  of  the  scores  of  independent  or  semi-inde- 
pendent centers  of  administrative  control,  as  they  came 
to  assert  themselves  through  the  efforts  of  social  groups 
which  favored  decentralization. 

The  leadership  in  this  third  group  of  committees  and 
societies  came  largely  from  two  sources :  the  nonspecial- 
ized  humanitarian  and  sociologist  on  the  one  hand;  the 
taxpayers  and  economists  on  the  other. 

The  nonspecialized  humanitarian  was  born  in  the  en- 
vironment of  those  eleemosynary  institutions  which  took  a 
broad  survey  of  social  relations  as  expressed  in  human 
want  —  such  as  the  charity  organization  societies.  They 
had  grown  up  under  a  leadership  which  had  sought  to 
render  to  society  a  service  by  better  coordinating  the 
activities  of  the  various  detached,  unofficial,  specialized, 
eleemosynary  societies ;  they  had  sought  to  overcome  some 
of  the  evils  of  social  sectarianism  and  the  efforts  of  social 


yo        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

forces  which  had  favored  governmental  decentralization. 

The  taxpayer  and  the  economist  gained  their  inspiration 
largely  from  the  rapidly  rising  cost  of  government  and  the 
economic  waste. 

Both  of  these  types  of  persons  were  aided  and  abetted 
by  the  student  of  political  and  social  sciences  in  the  uni- 
versities. 

When  this  third  group  of  civic  agencies  entered  the 
political  arena,  they  did  so  on  the  assumption  that  the 
chief  cause  of  the  high  cost  of  government  was  the  waste 
and  inefficiency  which  came  from  prostituting  the  public 
service  to  the  selfish  purposes  of  the  irresponsible  party 
boss  and  his  machine  —  "  graft,"  "  patronage,"  "  spoils." 
But  as  the  work  of  these  new  bodies  went  on  they  found 
that  quite  as  much,  possiblv  more,  of  the  inefficiency  and 
waste  was  due  to  the  headless,  spineless  system  of  gov- 
ernment; they  found  that  the  incoordinate  acts,  the  con- 
flicts and  the  lack  of  cooperation  were  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  administrative  motor  bodies  were  actuated  from 
unrelated  centers  of  control,  each  of  which  was  made  re- 
sponsive to  stimuli  from  the  outside  and  did  not  record 
themselves  at  the  political  brain  center  —  a  chief  exec- 
utive that  in  turn  was  accountable  to  the  whole  people 
for  leadership. 

Or,  to  state  the  problem  in  terms  of  positive  function, 
the  chief  executive  was  used  as  a  convenience  to  affix 
the  sign  manual  of  authority  to  acts  initiated  in  irre- 
sponsible standing  committees  of  the  representative 
branch ;  or  to  the  designs  initiated  in  unofficial  bodies 
entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  the  electorate  controlled  by 
the  "  party  "  boss  or  secretaries  of  nonpartisan  eleemosy- 
nary societies. 

This  third  group  of  agencies  therefore  set  themselves 
at  work  to  develop  processes  whereby  the  local  stimuli 
of  social  need  and  the  experience  derived  from  contact 
with  the  administrative  problem  might  come  to  be  known 


Irresponsible  Leadership  yi 

at  the  brain  center  of  the  government  —  become  known 
to  some  one  in  chief  authority  who  might  stand  before 
the  people  as  responsible  leader;  processes  which  would 
enable  the  members  of  the  representative  body  to  act  as 
a  court  of  inquest  for  the  people ;  processes  which  would 
enable  the  electorate  to  think  and  have  a  will  in  final 
determination  of  questions  of  public  policy. 

Thus  it  was  that  propaganda  for  better  accounting, 
periodical  reporting  of  conditions  and  results,  budget 
making  as  a  procedure  of  planning,  and  administrative 
reorganization  as  a  means  of  locating  and  enforcing  re- 
sponsibility came  to  make  itself  felt.  These  measures 
were  put  forward  for  popular  consideration  and  approval 
along  with  the  propaganda  for  more  effective,  better 
social  service. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  RECENT  MOVEMENT  FOR  ADMIN- 
ISTRATION REFORM  AND  A  BUDGET  SYSTEM 

Twelve  years  ago  the  machinery  of  administration 
was  not  a  subject  of  popular  interest,  and  the  word 
"  budget "  was  seldom  used  by  the  American  people. 
When  either  subject  was  introduced  into  conversation,  it 
was  almost  without  meaning.  Now  reorganization  meas- 
ures are  being  passed  by  every  city  and  state,  and 
"budget"  is  a  part  of  the  vocabulary  of  every  one  —  a 
subject  of  common  talk.  We  can  scarcely  pick  up  a  mag- 
azine without  seeing  something  about  scientific  manage- 
ment, city  planning,  household  economics,  the  wage 
earner's  budget,  the  housewife's  budget,  the  city  budget, 
the  state  budget,  or  the  national  budget. 

New  York  City  a  Center  of  Interest  in  Better  Adminis- 
tration 

Twelve  years  ago,  when  a  New  York  editor  was  asked 
to  make  his  "  daily  "  a  medium  through  which  the  public 
might  be  kept  in  touch  with  administrative  reorganiza- 
tion, budget  and  accounting  work  then  in  progress,  his 
answer  was  :  "  It  can't  be  done.  We  do  not  make  news ; 
we  print  news.  The  work  of  an  editor  is  not  to  find  out 
what  people  ought  to  know,  but  what  they  will  read. 
News  is  made  by  persons  who  do  things  or  by  happenings 
that  the  public  are  interested  in.  They  are  not  interested 
in  methods  of  administration ;  they  are  not  interested 
in  budgets;  are  not  interested  in  accounting.     Most  of 

them  have  never  heard  of  a  budget;  and  the  rest  of  them 

72 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  73 

don't  care  to  hear  about  management  or  budget  methods." 
This  editor  was  right.  Stories  of  current  happenings 
to  people  and  things  that  the  public  are  interested  in  are 
news;  and  what  the  people  think  about  the  news  topics 
of  yesterday  and  to-day  is  public  opinion.  Community 
thought  and  talk  about  current  happenings  carried  in  the 
news  columns,  headlined  in  black  face,  is  the  thought 
and  talk  that  controls  the  destinies  of  cities  and  nations. 
But  the  people  themselves  and  those  to  whom  the  people 
look  as  leaders  make  news. 

A  Question  of  News 

The  sayings  and  doings  of  men  who  are  looked  to  as 
leaders  is  always  news.  It  is  this  interest  in  outstanding 
persons  that  gives  to  leadership  its  hold  on  public  opinion, 
and  makes  the  press  a  force  in  a  community.  A  great 
leader  is  like  a  great  newspaper  in  this  respect ;  his  great- 
ness largely  depends  on  his  knowing  what  the  people  want. 
The  leader  is  made  by  his  following.  He  cannot  go  far- 
ther than  his  following  will  go.  Whatever  other  qualities 
the  leader  must  posses  he  must  have  ability  to  forecast 
popular  approval.  It  is  from  this  that  he  takes  his 
reckonings.  The  fact  that  administrative  reorganizations 
and  budgets  have  come  to  be  talked  about  means  that 
through  changed  conditions  and  leadership  the  people 
have  developed  a  new  interest.  What  is  news  to-day 
was  not  news  yesterday.  The  vital  concerns  of  com- 
munity life  have  taken  on  a  new  emphasis  and  leadership 
has  a  new  basis  for  appeal. 

The  story  of  the  recent  movement  for  responsible  gov- 
ernment and  budgets  in  America,  of  how  this  new  in- 
terest has  developed  during  the  last  ten  years,  is  signifi- 
cant. A  budget  has  come  to  mean  a  method  of  dealing 
with  this  question  of  vital  concern.  We  have  always 
accepted  the  theory  that  government  should  be  respon- 
sible.    This  is  one  of  the  primary  demands  of  democracy. 


74        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

But  the  truth  is  America  has  not  had  enough  of  an  in- 
terest in  democracy  before  to  think  out  what  is  needed 
to  make  the  government  responsible.  The  Revolutionary 
War  was  not  a  war  for  democracy ;  it  was  a  war  for 
political  independence.  The  second  war  with  Great 
Britain  was  necessary  to  make  good  the  fruits  of  the 
first.  Our  Mexican  War  was  a  war  of  aggression.  Our 
Civil  War  was  to  compel  economic  and  political  unity. 
Our  Spanish  War  was  to  abate  a  nuisance.  The  cam- 
paigns waged  by  Roosevelt  and  Wilson  against  special 
privilege  were  the  beginning  of  a  national  democratic 
awakening.  The  war  against  Germany  was  our  first  war 
for  democracy.  The  twentieth  century  interest  in  democ- 
racy carried  with  it  a  demand  for  responsible  government. 
Our  recent  movement  for  administrative  reorganization 
and  a  budget  procedure  is  one  of  the  fruits  of  this  de- 
mand. 

A  Question  of  Sick  Babies  and  Padded  Rolls 

While  the  public  cannot  be  interested  in  doing  things 
through  abstract  discussion,  it  may  be  aroused  by  relat- 
ing the  methods  to  a  result  to  be  achieved,  and  abstract 
discussion  follows.  Twelve  years  ago,  when  the  happen- 
ings about  work  under  way  looking  toward  the  introduc- 
tion of  new  methods  of  administration  and  control  in 
New  York  City  had  no  news  value,  there  was  a  deep- 
seated,  long-enduring,  and  increasing  resentment  on  the 
part  of  the  people  which  had  been  provoked  by  old 
methods  that  made  for  popular  unrest.  This  long-en- 
during resentment  had  periodically  expressed  itself  in 
"  paroxysms  of  popular  frenzy  "  which  made  and  unmade 
political  leaders  and  overturned  administrations.  While 
budget  methods  and  accounting  and  the  machinery  of 
government  had  no  news  value,  these  were  made  vital 
through  stories  of  happenings  about  men  in  the  public 
eye;  and  those  stories  of  happenings  carried  conviction 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  75 

that  the  methods  of  administration  and  the  machinery  of 
public  business  needed  overhauling.  The  rising  tax  rate 
became  news.  Money  wasted  which  was  needed  to  save 
babies  became  news;  children  on  the  street,  while  public 
funds  raised  to  build  schoolhouses,  playgrounds,  and 
public  baths,  were  being  diverted,  became  news.  The 
uncared-for  sick  and  poor,  and  padded  health  rolls  were 
news.  The  rapid  rise  in  cost  of  government  and  some 
forty  thousand  obsolete  brass  fixtures,  bought  from  a 
friend  by  a  retiring  officer  in  the  water  department,  made 
news.  And  above  all  things  else  the  thought  that  some 
one  in  the  public  service  should  be  held  to  account  for  the 
abuse  of  the  public  trust  came  to  be  a  subject  of  daily 
comment. 

And  so  it  was  that  in  the  city  of  New  York  the  people 
came  to  talk  in  terms  of  administrative  reorganization 
and  budgets :  a  budget  as  a  means  of  holding  officers  to 
account;  a  budget  as  a  means  of  telling  the  people  before- 
hand what  money  was  wanted  for;  a  budget  as  a  means 
of  planning  for  service  needed  and  locating  responsibility 
for  the  execution  of  plans ;  a  budget  as  a  community  pro- 
gram to  be  financed.  Thus  it  was  that  red  tape,  unbal- 
anced bids,  obsolete  fixtures,  and  wasteful  methods  of 
doing  business  were  made  the  mediums  for  clothing  budg- 
ets with  flesh  and  blood ;  the  current  happenings  incident 
to  efforts  to  introduce  a  budget  into  the  management  of 
affairs  in  New  York  were  made  news. 

Beginning  of  a  Nation-wide  Campaign 

This  was  the  beginning  of  a  nation-wide  campaign. 
First  it  took  hold  of  the  people  in  the  cities.  Propaganda 
for  budget  making  was  read.  The  need  for  a  budget 
spoke  through  educational,  social,  and  business  leaders 
in  every  American  municipality  and  through  the  press ; 
and  the  people  applauded.  From  the  cities  it  spread  to 
the  national  government;  and  from  the  national  govern- 


j6        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ment  it  took  hold  on  the  political  leadership  in  the  states. 

The  Inspirational  Leadership  of  President  Roosevelt 

President  Cleveland  had  been  elected  in  a  campaign 
which  had  for  its  slogan :  A  public  office  is  a  public 
trust.  President  Roosevelt  did  much  to  quicken  public 
conscience  —  more,  perhaps,  than  any  man  since  the  days 
of  Jefferson.  He  was  an  outstanding  leader,  who  re- 
sorted to  methods  of  direct  appeal  to  the  people  through 
the  press.  And  in  this  he  followed  in  the  footsteps  of 
Jefferson,  Jackson,  and  Lincoln.  Through  the  news 
columns  he  went  before  a  people  conscious  of  political 
practices  of  which  they  would  be  rid.  Roosevelt  had 
become  President  at  a  time  of  great  popular  feeling 
against  men  and  methods  through  which  special  interests 
had  gained  control  of  the  resources  of  the  nation.  This 
control  was  being  exercised  through  men  not  of  the 
people's  choice.  It  had  been  reduced  to  a  system.  The 
system  was  in  control  of  an  irresponsible  boss  —  the  head 
of  an  irresponsible  party  organization.  And  by  opera- 
tion of  the  system  special  privilege  had  found  its  way 
into  legislatures  and  departments  of  public  service.  The 
system  worked  in  defiance  of  public  opinion.  Through 
the  system  the  government  had  become  "  irresponsible  " 
and  "  invisible."  The  people  felt  that  they  had  lost  con- 
trol of  their  institutions  of  service. 

President  Roosevelt  divined  the  cause  and  led  the  at- 
tack. To  fight  special  privilege  and  to  satisfy  the  demand 
for  more  and  better  service  was  the  task  which  he  set  for 
himself.  By  his  direct  appeal  and  his  forcefulness 
in  action,  President  Roosevelt  gained  the  confidence  of 
a  great  following.  Consideration  was  also  given  to 
methods  of  administration  to  prevent  waste.  Much  was 
done  under  his  leadership  to  give  new  direction  to  national 
thought.  In  it  all,  his  strong  personality  stood  out  as  a 
public  officer,  devoted  to  the  cause  of  better  service.     But 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  77 

little  legislation  had  been  undertaken  which  had  a  direct 
bearing  on  administrative  law  and  none  that  had  to  do 
with  budget  making  as  a  method  of  planning  and  enforc- 
ing executive  accountability  when  his  mantle  fell  on 
Mr.  Taft. 

The  Contribution  of  President  Taft 

President  Taft  had  been  a  strong  and  sympathetic 
member  of  President  Roosevelt's  cabinet ;  he  had  made 
an  enviable  reputation  as  a  constructive  administrator  in 
the  Philippines;  he  was  Mr.  Roosevelt's  choice  for  suc- 
cessor, acceptable  to  his  party  and  to  the  people.  By  his 
aggressiveness  the  President  had  made  many  enemies : 
Mr.  Taft  carried  with  him  the  full  strength  of  President 
Roosevelt's  supporters  as  well  as  others  who  distrusted 
his  political  opponent  —  Mr.  Bryan. 

In  1909,  Mr.  Taft  became  President.  During  the  cam- 
paign he  had  detracted  nothing  from  Mr.  Roosevelt's  ac- 
complishments in  righting  against  special  privilege  and  in 
fighting  for  the  enlargement  and  betterment  of  the  public 
service  to  meet  popular  demands.  But  much  was  said 
by  him  about  a  more  businesslike  handling  of  public  af- 
fairs —  making  a  dollar  do  more  and  better  work. 

President  Taft  began  his  official  term  with  the  largest 
popular  backing  of  any  chief  executive  since  the  Civil 
War.  He  was  trusted  both  by  the  friends  of  progress 
and  reform  who  had  made  up  President  Roosevelt's  fol- 
lowing and  by  those  who  were  President  Roosevelt's 
ardent  haters  —  the  representatives  of  special  privilege. 
Thus  for  a  time  the  political  sea  which  had  been  stirred  by 
storms  of  abuse  during  the  Roosevelt  administration  be- 
came quiet.  For  a  period  of  six  months  after  March  4, 
1909,  these  storms  had  subsided  only  to  break  again 
with  renewed  violence.  But  the  storm  center  was  not 
waste  of  public  resources  and  cost  of  government,  though 
Mr.  Aldrich  and  others  helped  to  dramatize  the  need  for 


78        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

improved  methods  through  interviews  in  which  the  senior 
senator  from  Rhode  Island  was  quoted  as  saying  that  if 
he  could  run  the  Federal  Government  as  he  would  man- 
age a  private  business,  he  could  save  $300,000,000  a  year. 
The  storm  center  had  become  "  the  Payne-Aldrich  tariff," 
"  standpatism,"  "  the  capture  of  President  Taft  by  the 
forces  of  plutocracy,"  "  the  dominance  of  special  priv- 
ilege." 

An  Effort  to  Institutionalize  Executive  Leadership 

Mr.  Taft  had  seemingly  gone  out  of  his  way  to  take 
personal  responsibility  for  a  tariff  revision  that  proved 
to  be  unpopular  —  a  revision  which  was  viewed  by  Mr. 
Roosevelt's  progressive  and  radical  following  as  a  sur- 
render to  "  the  interests."  This  view  was  also  accepted 
and  advertised  by  the  organized  opposition,  the  Demo- 
cratic party.  And  then  followed  a  letter  to  a  congress- 
man which  seemed  to  stamp  the  President  as  a  reactionary 
on  matters  of  patronage.  These  acts  of  the  President 
were  unfortunate  as  viewed  by  those  who  were  interested 
in  the  development  of  greater  economy  and  efficiency  in 
the  public  service,  and  the  budget  idea,  for  Mr.  Taft  had 
seriously  intended  to  use  the  great  powers  and  influence 
of  his  office  to  enlarge  on  this  part  of  his  program. 

The  news  value  of  a  stand  taken  for  any  measure  by 
the  President  as  national  leader  cannot  be  estimated. 
The  novel  thing  about  President  Taft's  stand  was  that 
he  used  it  to  make  news  of  "  the  need  for  a  national 
budget."  In  the  midst  of  a  storm  of  abuse  President 
Taft  turned  from  the  issues  of  special  privilege  to  make 
news  and  to  stir  editorial  comment  on  the  waste  of  re- 
source and  the  demand  for  economy  by  asking  Congress 
for  an  appropriation  of  $100,000  "  to  enable  the  President 
to  inquire  into  the  methods  of  transacting  the  public 
business  —  and  to  recommend  to  Congress  such  legisla- 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  79 

tion  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  changes 
found  to  be  desirable  that  cannot  be  accomplished  by 
executive  action  alone." 

This  request  in  itself  gained  wide  publicity.  After 
several  months  of  waiting,  the  amount  asked  for  was 
granted ;  and  again  every  newspaper  advertised  the  fact 
as  an  accomplishment.  After  the  funds  became  avail- 
able (June  30) ,  President  Taft  issued  instructions  to  his 
secretary,  Mr.  Charles  D.  Norton,  to  make  plans  for  the 
organization  of  the  work.  Later  one  of  the  directors 
of  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  in  charge 
of  the  budget  work  there  was  chosen  to  head  a  White 
House  staff.  These  happenings  in  sequence  as  news  items 
brought  the  subject  repeatedly  to  public  notice.  A  meet- 
ing at  the  White  House  was  called  in  September  and  a 
preliminary  inquiry  was  begun,  and  again  the  idea  had 
news  value.  The  first  task  was  to  organize  in  each  de- 
partment a  committee  which  would  cooperate  with  the  staff 
of  the  President  in  developing  a  definite  plan  of  work,  the 
announcement  of  which  gave  new  publicity.  The  inquiry 
was  immediately  got  under  way,  with  the  result  that  an 
analysis  had  been  made  of  expenditures,  and  a  number 
of  departmental  studies  were  in  progress  when  the  Presi- 
dent reported  to  Congress ;  again  the  idea  was  given  news 
value. 

A  Portrayal  of  Conditions  to  be  Corrected 

This  narration  has  for  its  purpose  to  show  how  it  was 
that  news  value  was  given  to  the  subject  of  methods  of 
doing  business  in  the  National  Government  through  the 
leadership  of  the  President.  In  his  first  report  to  Con- 
gress, December,  1910,  President  Taft  said: 

"  I  have  been  given  this  fund  to  enable  me  to  take 
action  and  to  make  specific  recommendations  with  respect 
to  the  details  of  transacting  the  business  of  an  organiza- 


80        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tion  whose  activities  are  almost  as  varied  as  those  of  the 
entire  business  world.  The  operations  of  the  Government 
affect  the  interest  of  every  person  living  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States.  In  organization  it  embraces 
stations  and  centers  of  work  located  in  every  city  and  in 
many  local  subdivisions  of  the  country.  Its  gross  ex- 
penditures amount  to  nearly  $1,000,000,000  annually. 
Including  the  personnel  of  the  military  and  naval  estab- 
lishments, more  than  400,000  persons  are  required  to  do 
the  work  imposed  by  law  upon  the  executive  branch  of 
the  Government. 

"  This  vast  organization  has  never  been  studied  in  de- 
tail as  one  piece  of  administrative  mechanism.  Never 
have  the  foundations  been  laid  for  a  thorough  considera- 
tion of  the  relation  of  all  of  its  parts.  No  comprehensive 
effort  has  been  made  to  list  its  multifarious  activities  or 
to  group  them  in  such  a  way  as  to  present  a  clear  picture 
of  what  the  Government  is  doing.  Never  has  a  complete 
description  been  given  of  the  agencies  through  which  these 
activities  are  performed.  At  no  time  has  the  attempt 
been  made  to  study  all  of  these  activities  and  agencies 
with  a  view  to  the  assignment  of  each  activity  to  the 
agency  best  fitted  for  its  performance,  to  the  avoidance  of 
duplication  of  plant  and  work,  to  the  integration  of  all 
administrative  agencies  of  the  Government,  so  far  as  may 
be  practicable,  into  a  unified  organization  for  the  most 
effective  and  economical  dispatch  of  public  business." 

In  a  special  message  to  Congress  President  Taft  asked 
for  the  continuation  of  the  first  appropriation  over  an- 
other year  and  for  $75,000  additional.  This  request 
having  been  granted  March  3d,  the  work  was  continued 
under  a  commission  by  order  of  the  President,  issued 
March  8th. 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  81 

A  Definite  Program  Proposed 

One  of  the  conclusions  reached  as  a  result  of  the  pre- 
liminary inquiry  was  the  following :  1 

"  A  very  conspicuous  cause  of  inefficiency  and  waste 
is  an  inadequate  provision  of  the  methods  of  getting  be- 
fore Congress  a  definite  budget,  i.  e.  a  concrete  and  well- 
considered  progress  or  prospectus  of  work  to  be  financed." 

When  the  commission  was  organized  sufficiently  to  per- 
mit of  collective  consideration  of  work  to  be  done  by  it, 
a  program  of  work  was  formulated  which  provided  for 
five  distinct  subjects  to  be  inquired  into,  as  follows : 

( i )   A  budget  as  an  annual  financial  program. 

(2)  The  organization  and  activities  of  the  Govern- 
ment, with  a  view  to  recommending  legislation  to  prevent 
overlapping  functions  and  conflicts  of  jurisdiction. 

(3)  Problem  of  personnel; 

(4)  Financial  records  and  reports ; 

(5)  Business  practices  and  procedures.  In  pursuit  of 
these  inquiries  the  commission  proposed  and  submitted  to 
the  President  more  than  a  hundred  reports  with  recom- 
mendations, twenty-six  of  which  were  sent  to  Congress  as 
calling  for  legislation. 

Preliminary  Staff  Inquiry 

In  the  preliminary  inquiry  one  of  the  first  steps  taken 
had  been  to  ask  the  several  departmental  committees  co- 
operating with  the  President  to  reanalyze  the  estimates 
in  such  manner  as  to  show  the  different  kinds  of  things 
that  were  being  purchased  by  the  Government  and  the 
amounts  spent  and  estimated  for  each.  As  a  result  of 
this  inquiry  the  President  for  the  first  time  had  brought 
before  him  a  summary  of  such  facts  as  the  following: 
The  amounts  spent  by  each  bureau,  by  each  department, 
and  the  Government  as  a  whole  analyzed  to  show  what 

1  See  report  covering  period  September  27,  1910,  to  March  6,  191 1, 
circular  29  of  the  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency. 


83        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

part  was  for  such  things  as  personal  services ;  services 
other  than  personal ;  materials ;  supplies ;  equipment,  etc. 
For  the  first  time  it  became  known  that  the  Government 
was  spending  nearly  $400,000,000  for  salaries  and  wages 
(the  digest  of  appropriations  made  it  appear  that  only 
$189,000,000  was  for  this  purpose)  ;  that  the  Government 
was  spending  $12,500,000  for  the  transportation  of  per- 
sons ;  that  it  was  spending  $78,000,000  for  transportation 
of  things  (freight,  express,  etc.),  and,  in  addition,  was 
spending  $18,500,000  for  provisions,  hotel  bills  and  other 
subsistence  of  persons,  and  $4,500,000  for  wearing  ap- 
parel, etc.  These  figures  now  seem  small,  but  at  that  time 
they  startled  men  to  a  new  vision. 

The  President's  Commission  on  Economy  and  Efficiency 
Among  the  first  things  undertaken  by  the  Commission 
after  its  organization  was  to  continue  the  analytical  work 
with  a  view  of  preparing  a  report  on  the  need  for  an 
annual  budget.  In  July,  191 1,  forms  were  drafted. 
These  were  discussed  with  department  heads,  and  on 
August  1st  were  submitted  to  the  President  for  his  ap- 
proval. On  August  7th  the  President  sent  those  forms 
to  the  departments  and  requested  that  they  reclassify  the 
data  which  were  being  obtained  for  the  purposes  of  of- 
ficial estimates  then  in  preparation.  The  forms  asked 
for  information  on  three  subjects:  (1)  Expenditures  for 
fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  191 1 ;  (2)  appropriations  for 
the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1912;  (3)  estimates  for 
appropriations  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  19 13. 
A  different  form  was  prepared  for  reporting  on  each  of 
these  subjects  and  a  fourth  form  for  a  recapitulation. 
Each  of  these  forms  was  so  drawn  as  to  provide  for  show- 
ing the  amounts  expended,  appropriated,  or  estimated : 
(1)  By  each  organization  unit;  (2)  for  each  class  of 
work  to  be  done  ;  (3)  by  character  of  expenditure  —  such 
as  current  expenses,  capital  outlays,  fixed  charges,  etc. ; 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  83 

and,  (4)  by  the  amount  which  had  been  expended,  ap- 
propriated, or  estimated  under  each  act  or  class  of  acts 
of  appropriation  —  whether  by  annual  appropriation,  per- 
manent legislation,  etc.  The  heads  of  departments  were 
asked  to  have  these  returns  in  by  November  1st,  but  it 
was  not  until  after  the  first  of  the  next  year  that  they 
were  made  available  to  the  President.  This  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  forms  required  by  Congress  were  along 
entirely  different  lines,  and  it  was  necessary  for  the  heads 
of  departments  to  have  the  official  estimate  in  the  hands 
of  the  Treasury  and  before  Congress  on  a  prescribed  date. 
The  report  of  the  commission  on  "  The  need  for  a 
National  Budget "  was  sent  by  the  President  to  Congress 
with  his  approval  on  June  2.7,  1912.1 

Request  for  Cooperation  of  Congress  in  a  Budget  Pro- 
cedure 

In  his  letter  of  transmittal  President  Taft  pointed  to 
the  fact  that  the  executive  is  charged  by  the  Constitution 
with  the  duty  of  publishing  "  a  regular  statement  of  re- 
ceipts and  expenditures  "  and  "  that  he  is  also  enjoined 

1  This  was  printed  as  House  document  No.  854  of  the  Sixty-sec- 
ond Congress,  second  session  (568  pages).  The  members  of  the 
commission  who  participated  in  the  preparation  and  signed  the  re- 
port, were :  Frederick  A.  Cleveland,  chairman ;  Frank  J.  Goodnow, 
for  twenty-six  years  professor  of  administrative  law  in  Columbia 
University,  now  President  of  Johns  Hopkins  University;  William 
F.  Willoughby,  for  more  than  twenty  years  connected  with  the 
government  service  in  various  capacities,  now  Director  of  the  In- 
stitute of  Government  Research ;  Walter  W.  Warwick,  for  many 
years  connected  with  the  comptroller's  office  and  auditing  service  of 
the  Federal  Government,  now  the  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury;  and 
Merritt  O.  Chance,  for  twenty-six  years  connected  with  various  de- 
partments of  the  Government,  now  postmaster  at  Washington. 
From  June,  191 1,  to  January,  1912,  Mr.  Harvey  S.  Chase  was  also  a 
member  of  the  commission,  but  due  to  illness,  he  was  not  able  to  be 
in  Washington  during  the  time  that  the  budget  report  was  being 
prepared  and  therefore  did  not  share  in  authorship  or  join  in  sign- 
ing the  report.  The  subsequent  use  which  Mr.  Chase  has  made  of 
the  report,  however,  indicates  that  he  is  in  general  accord  with  the 
recommendations  of  the  commission. 


84        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

from  time  to  time  to  give  Congress  information  on  the 
state  of  the  Union  and  to  recommend  for  consideration 
such  measures  as  may  be  deemed  expedient."  With  these 
constitutional  prescriptions,  President  Taft  held  that  the 
President  had  the  power  to  prepare  and  submit  to  Con- 
gress each  year  "  a  definite,  well-considered  budget  with 
a  message  calling  attention  to  subjects  of  immediate  im- 
portance." The  President  stated,  however,  in  his  mes- 
sage that  he  did  not  assume  to  exercise  this  power  except 
in  cooperation  with  Congress ;  and  he  urged  the  necessity 
of  repealing  certain  laws  which  were  in  conflict  with  the 
proposed  practice. 

Among  the  purposes  of  sending  the  report  to  Congress 
as  described  by  the  President  were : 

To  suggest  a  method  whereby  the  President,  as  the 
constitutional  head  of  the  administration,  and  Congress 
may  consider  and  act  on  a  definite  business  and  financial 
program. 

To  have  the  expenditures,  appropriations,  and  estimates 
so  classified  and  summarized  that  their  broad  significance 
may  be  readily  understood ; 

To  provide  each  member  of  Congress,  as  well  as  each 
citizen  who  is  interested,  with  such  data  concerning  each 
subject  of  interest  as  may  be  considered  in  relation  to 
questions  of  public  policy; 

To  have  these  general  summaries  supported  by  such 
detailed  information  as  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
economy  and  efficiency  with  which  business  has  been 
transacted ; 

In  short,  to  suggest  a  plan  whereby  the  President  and 
Congress  may  cooperate,  the  one  in  laying  before  Con- 
gress and  the  country  a  clearly  expressed  administrative 
program  to  be  acted  on  —  the  other  in  laying  before  the 
President  a  definite  enactment  for  his  judgment. 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  85 

Order  of  the  President  to  Prepare  a  Budget 

This  was  the  first  time  that  any  chief  executive  of  the 
National  Government  had  advocated  the  "  budget  idea  " ; 
it  was  the  first  time  that  responsible  leadership  had  been 
urged  as  an  essential  to  responsible  government  by  one 
high  in  authority.  This  report  not  only  contained  a  de- 
scriptive and  critical  report  on  the  past  practices  of  the 
National  Government  with  constructive  recommendations, 
but  supported  these  recommendations  with  an  appendix 
of  forms  and  a  digest  of  the  practices  of  thirty-eight 
other  countries,  in  most  of  which  the  budget  idea  had 
already  been  incorporated  and  made  a  part  of  the  public 
law. 

After  a  few  days  of  waiting  for  congressional  action 
following  the  submission  of  this  report  to  Congress,  Presi- 
dent Taft  on  July  10th  issued  an  order  to  each  head  of 
department  to  depute  some  officer  with  the  duty  to  see 
that  estimates  and  summaries  of  estimates  for  the  next 
fiscal  year  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  the  recom- 
mendations contained  in  his  message  of  June  27th.  And 
in  a  letter  the  President  directed  the  Secretary  and  Treas- 
urer to  print  and  send  without  delay  to  Congress  the 
forms  of  estimates  required  by  it;  also  to  have  sent  to 
him  (the  President)  the  information  asked  for.  Explain- 
ing the  purpose  of  the  executive  estimates  he  said: 
"  This  will  be  made  the  subject  of  review  and  revision 
and  a  summary  statement  in  the  form  of  a  budget  with 
documents  will  be  sent  to  Congress  by  a  special  message 
as  the  proposal  of  the  administration." 

Attempt  of  Opposition  Leaders  to  Prevent  Action 

At  the  time  that  this  order  was  issued.  Congress  had  not 
yet  passed  all  of  the  annual  appropriation  bills  —  some 
of  the  bills  as  passed  having  been  vetoed  by  the  President. 
When  on  August  24th  the  sundry  civil  bill  became  law 


86        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

it  contained  one  clause  modifying  the  form  of  estimates 
to  incorporate  some  of  the  suggestions  of  the  commission, 
and  another  clause  requiring  the  heads  of  departments 
to  submit  the  estimates  in  the  form  and  at  the  time  re- 
quired by  law  to  be  submitted  and  at  no  other  time  and 
in  no  other  form.  Following  this,  when  it  came  to  the 
attention  of  President  Taft  that  heads  of  departments 
expressed  some  doubt  as  to  what  were  their  duties  in  the 
matter,  on  September  9th  the  President  sent  a  letter  to 
each  member  of  the  cabinet,  in  which  each  was  instructed 
to  follow  the  orders  both  of  the  President  and  of  Con- 
gress. Both  houses  of  the  legislative  branch  were  or- 
ganized against  the  President,  who  after  the  November 
election  was  a  politically  defeated  executive.  The  ma- 
jority leaders  let  it  be  known  that  they  were  opposed  to 
the  enterprise;  and  the  estimates  asked  for  were  much 
delayed.  About  February  1st,  however,  all  the  data  had 
been  brought  together  and,  on  February  26th,  President 
Taft,  after  conferences  with  his  cabinet,  submitted  to 
Congress  a  budget  with  a  message,  which  was  referred 
to  the  Committee  on  Appropriations  and  ordered  to  be 
printed  with  accompanying  papers.  And  there  it  has 
since  laid  without  consideration,  action,  or  report. 

Favorable  Reception  Given  by  the  Public 

Although  the  budget  proposals  of  President  Taft  were 
pigeonholed  by  an  opposition  majority  in  Congress,  they 
were  not  pigeonholed  by  the  public.  They  were  taken  up 
by  the  press  throughout  the  country.  Almost  unani- 
mously they  had  the  support  of  editorial  writers.  Opin- 
ion was  further  registered  in  a  referendum  which  was 
taken  on  the  subject  by  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  of 
the  United  States.  Furthermore,  many  leading  men,  and 
even  some  of  the  members  of  Congress  who,  at  the  time, 
expressed  themselves  as  being  opposed  to  an  executive 


The  Beginning  of  Reform  87 

budget,   from  time  to  time  since  then  have   come  out 
strongly  for  the  budget  idea. 

As  has  been  said,  the  circumstances  attending  the  ef- 
forts of  President  Taft  could  not  have  been  more  un- 
favorable to  successful  leadership  in  so  far  as  his  ability 
to  obtain  legislation  was  concerned.  Not  only  had  he 
lost  much  of  his  popularity  because  of  the  stand  he  had 
taken  on  the  tariff  and  in  other  legislative  and  official 
acts  offensive  to  the  progressives,  as  they  later  came  to 
be  known,  but  the  by-election  of  191 1  returned  a  large 
majority  against  him  in  Congress.  Hostility  to  his  con- 
structive proposals  in  Congress  and  its  committee  was  a 
matter  of  course.  He  had  sacrificed  public  opinion  on 
the  altar  of  "  party  "  fealty.  Thereby  he  had  surren- 
dered his  "big  stick" — the  power  of  direct  appeal  as  a 
means  of  enforcing  action.  When  the  militant  progres- 
sive public  lost  confidence  in  him,  he  had  no  means  of 
compelling  action,  except  through  party  organization, 
and  half  of  his  "  party  "  as  it  turned  out  was  hostile  to 
his  leadership.  Not  only  his  budget  proposals  but  his 
recommendations  for  legislation  looking  toward  certain 
needed  departmental  reorganization  met  with  like  fate. 
Even  his  executive  orders  met  with  obstructions  and  de- 
lays on  the  part  of  officials  urging  statutes,  rules,  and 
practices  which  had  grown  up  in  the  course  of  a  hundred 
years  of  congressional  committee  control.  Many  admin- 
istrative changes  were  made  reducing  the  amount  of  red 
tape  with  an  annual  saving  which  far  outreached  the  total 
cost  of  the  staff  inquiry;  but  the  constructive  recom- 
mendations of  the  President  which  required  congressional 
cooperation  were  not  given  respectful  hearing  by  the  con- 
trolling majority  of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  National 
Government. 

Concrete  Results  which  Folloiued 

Ample  rewards  were  found  for  effort,  however:   (1) 


88        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

in  the  renewed  vigor  given  to  administrative  reorganiza- 
tion and  budget  procedures  introduced  into  the  hundreds 
of  American  municipalities;  (2)  in  the  appointment  of 
numerous  state  commissions  to  inquire  into  and  report 
what  changes  were  necessary  to  enable  these  states  to 
conduct  their  enterprises  with  greater  economy  and  effi- 
ciency; (3)  in  the  many  legal  enactments  in  the  states 
reorganizing  administrative  departments,  boards  and  com- 
missions, and  providing  for  a  budget  procedure,  and  (4) 
in  the  national  issue  finally  being  taken  before  the  people 
in  the  platforms  of  all  the  principal  national  parties 
pledging  candidates  for  election  to  Congress  to  the  adop- 
tion of  a  national  budget  procedure. 


CHAPTER  VI 

STATE  COMMISSIONS  TO  INVESTIGATE  AND  REPORT  ON 
THE  NEED  FOR  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 
AND  AN  EFFECTIVE  BUDGET  PROCEDURE 

Investigations  of  Need  for  Economy  and  Efficiency  as 
Old  as  Our  Government 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  one  of  the  first  results  of  the 
publicity  given  by  President  Taft  to  the  need  for  ad- 
ministrative reform  was  the  appointment  of  committees 
and  commissions  of  inquiry  to  report  on  administrative 
reorganization  of  the  state  governments.  The  use  of 
such  bodies,  however,  is  not  confined  to  the  last  ten  years. 
As  a  recognition  of  a  need  for  better  administrative  or- 
ganization and  methods,  many  commissions  of  inquiry 
have  been  appointed  since  the  beginning  of  our  Govern- 
ment. For  example,  in  the  Federal  Government  a  com- 
mittee was  appointed,  during  the  administration  of  Presi- 
dent John  Adams,  to  inquire  into  and  report  on  possible 
necessary  changes  in  methods  of  distributing  public 
moneys  appropriated  to  each  department,  whose  findings 
and  recommendations  were  published  in  1798;  following 
this,  three  other  committees  were  appointed  and  reported 
on  retrenchment  and  expenses  of  government,  in  18 18, 
1822,  and  1828.  In  1830  a  select  committee  of  Congress 
was  created  to  whom  was  referred  a  section  of  President 
Jackson's  message  respecting  the  need  for  reorganization 
of  the  executive  departments ;  other  reports  were  made  on 
the  retrenchment,  public  expenditures,  and  the  civil  service 
in  1842,  1876,  and  1882.  In  1888  the  select  committee 
headed  by  Mr.  Cockrell  was  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 

89 


90        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

methods  of  business  of  executive  departments ;  this  was 
followed  by  the  Dockery  Commission  in  1893,  which  em- 
ployed experts  and  made  voluminous  reports  on  the  sub- 
ject of  administration,  organization  and  methods.  In  the 
second  year  of  Cleveland's  second  administration,  1894, 
the  members  of  the  cabinet  made  a  joint  report.  Besides 
these  general  inquiries,  many  reports,  largely  by  com- 
mittees on  expenditures  of  Congress,  were  made  on  de- 
partments.1 

Similar  reports  by  committees  of  state  legislatures  have 
been  made  for  many  years.  Such  reports  might  be 
counted  by  the  hundreds.  But  the  significant  fact  is  that 
only  within  the  last  few  years  has  the  need  for  ad- 
ministrative reorganization  and  an  effective  procedure 
for  budget-making  impressed  itself  on  the  public.  This 
was  due  to  several  influences  and  conditions ;  namely,  the 
background  work  that  had  been  going  on  in  the  cities ;  the 
dramatic  interest  given  by  President  Roosevelt  through 
his  vigorous  and  appealing  leadership ;  the  fact  that  the 
national  and  state  governments  were  threatened  with  def- 
icits; and  the  breadth  of  vision,  the  magnitude  of  the 
inquiry,  and  the  frequent  publicity  given  to  the  need  for 
administrative  reorganization  by  President  Taft.  Thus 
there  came  to  be  a  changed  attitude  on  the  part  of  the 
public  that  could  not  be  ignored  by  legislators  and  public 
officers  seeking  electoral  support. 

1  In  addition  to  the  general  inquiries  the  following  dealt  with 
subjects  of  department  administration:  Department  of  State,  1838, 
1846,  1881,  1895,  1901,  1909;  Department  of  Treasury,  1794,  1801, 
1816,  1837,  1864,  1869,  1871,  1876,  1880,  1890,  1891,  1909;  Department 
of  War,  1824,  1843,  1854,  1873,  1876,  1878,  1881,  1904;  Department 
of  Justice,  1880;  Department  of  Post  Office,  1821,  1822,  1831,  1835, 
1836,  1881,  1884,  1901,  1902,  1908;  Department  of  Navy,  1796, 
1821,  1839,  1842,  1865,  1872,  1875,  1876,  1878,  1879,  1886,  1893,  1899, 
1901,  1902,  1905,  1909 ;  Department  of  Interior,  1882,  1886,  1892,  1901, 
1907;  Department  of  Agriculture,  1868,  1875,  1888,  1899,  1901,  1906, 
1907;  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  1891,  1893,  I905>  1906; 
Government  Office,  17  reports  between  1819  and  1909. 


Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization         91 

The  Role  of  Civic  Agencies  and  Bureaus  of  Municipal 
Research 

In  preparing  the  way  for  national  leadership,  too  much 
weight  cannot  be  given  to  the  work  of  the  many  unofficial 
civic  agencies  which  have  urged  the  need  for  better  public 
service,  or  to  voluntary  and  unofficial  committees  which 
have  conducted  staff  inquiries  and  cooperated  with  officers 
in  obtaining  intelligent  consideration  for  questions  of 
municipal  and  state  administration.  These  latter  be- 
gan their  work  during  the  Roosevelt  administration.  The 
interest  manifested  at  this  time  in  the  methods  and  results 
of  municipal  administration  is  shown  by  the  sudden  devel- 
opment of  unofficial  "  Bureaus  of  Municipal  Research." 
In  1906  a  special  committee  was  organized  by  the  Citizen's 
Union  of  New  York,  of  which  Mr.  Fulton  Cutting  was 
the  head.  Through  this  committee  and  its  staff  such  re- 
sults were  obtained  that  in  1907  it  was  incorporated  as  an 
independent,  nonpartisan  "  Bureau  of  Municipal  Re- 
search," with  a  board  of  trustees  of  nation-wide  reputa- 
tion, based  on  their  interest  in  municipal  administration. 
Its  point  of  view  was  that  the  conditions  found  and  de- 
scribed in  the  large  cities  were  quite  as  much  a  matter  of 
citizen  neglect  as  they  were  matters  of  official  wrong- 
mindedness  and  boss  rule.  New  emphasis  and  vigor  was 
given  to  unofficial  civic  enterprise  by  the  employment  of 
a  staff  which  approached  the  problem  by  the  research 
method.  During  the  next  ten  years  no  less  than  thirty 
bureaus  of  similar  character  were  organized  which  em- 
ployed trained  staffs  to  study  administration  conditions 
and  results  in  as  many  cities.  In  many  other  cities 
special  committees  of  Chambers  of  Commerce  or  other 
existing  agencies  were  organized;  or  existing  agencies, 
public  or  private,  employed  the  staff  of  the  New  York 
Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  and  other  research  bureaus, 
with  a  view  to  making  more  effective  cooperation  between 


92        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

citizen  bodies  and  officers  who  sought  to  bring  about 
efficient  administration.  The  New  York  Bureau  alone 
lent  staff  aid  in  making  about  fifty  surveys  and  reports 
to  official  and  unofficial  bodies  in  cities  scattered  over  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  United  States;  and  wherever 
these  inquiries  were  conducted  wide  publicity  was  given 
to  findings  and  recommendations  by  the  daily  press. 
A  number  of  studies  of  state  administration  have  also 
been  made  by  the  New  York  Bureau.  These  various 
civic  activities  and  the  concrete  information  given  to  the 
public,  the  new  sense  of  civic  duty,  the  larger  appreciation 
of  the  need  for  increased  efficiency  in  public  administra- 
tion in  order  to  meet  the  larger  social  demands  made  by 
a  rapidly  growing  population,  the  correspondingly  rapid 
rise  in  the  cost  of  government,  threatened  deficits,  and 
increasing  tax  rates  —  these  are  the  facts  which  were 
brought  to  the  minds  of  the  people  and  which  gave  a  new 
emphasis  to  every  appeal  for  support  by  new  leaders  who 
urged  administrative  reorganization. 

Commissions  to  Recommend  Administrative  Reorganisa- 
tion in  the  State  Governments 

"  The  state  movement  for  efficiency  and  economy " 
following  the  inquiry  begun  by  President  Taft  has  been 
described  in  a  monograph  bearing  this  title  prepared  by 
Raymond  Moley.1  In  his  first  chapter  the  author  says: 
"  The  formation  of  commissions,  boards,  and  depart- 
ments having  for  their  purpose  the  reorganization  of 
government  in  the  interest  of  efficiency  and  economy  dates 
back  to  the  year  following  the  appointment  of  the  Taft 
Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  Federal  administration.  The  first  state 
agency  created  for  this  purpose  was  the  board  of  public 
affairs   of   Wisconsin   in    191 1.     The   New   Jersey  and 

1  Published  by  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  as 
"Bulletin  No.  90,"  containing  163  pages. 


Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization         93 

Massachusetts  commissions  were  created  in  19 12,  while 
the  following  year  agencies  were  established  by  legisla- 
tive acts  in  four  more  states."  The  list  of  commissions 
which  are  described  in  this  study,  with  dates  of  estab- 
lishment, follows : 

The  State  Board  of  Public  Affairs,  Wisconsin,  July 
6,  191 1 ;  the  Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission,  New 
Jersey,  April  1,  1912;  the  Commission  on  Economy  and 
Efficiency,  Massachusetts,  June  6,  1912;  the  Committee  of 
Inquiry,  New  York,  January  6,  1913;  the  Department 
of  Efficiency  and  Economy,  New  York,  April  14,  1913; 
the  Joint  Committee  on  Retrenchment  and  Reform,  Iowa, 
February  6,  1913;  the  Efficiency  and  Economy  Commis- 
sion, Illinois,  April,  1913;  the  Economy  and  Efficiency 
Commission,  Pennsylvania,  July  25,  1913 ;  the  Economy 
and  Efficiency  Commission,  Minnesota,  October,  1913; 
the  Commission  to  Investigate  the  Advisability  of  Con- 
solidating Certain  State  Boards  and  Commissions  and  to 
Investigate  the  Public  Health  Laws,  Connecticut,  Feb- 
ruary 9,  191 5;  the  Legislative  Investigating  Committee, 
Alabama,  February  13,  1915;  the  Survey  Committee  of 
State  Affairs,  Colorado,  February,  1915;  the  Efficiency 
and  Economy  Committee,  Kansas,  March  20,  1915;  the 
Committee  on  Economy  and  Efficiency,  Virginia,  March 
16,  1916;  the  Commission  of  Seven  Business  Men,  Ore- 
gon, February,  1917;  the  Efficiency  Commission  of  West 
Virginia,  March,  191 7. 

"  It  should  be  understood,"  says  Mr.  Moley,  "  that  the 
commissions  considered  in  this  bulletin  constitute  only  a 
portion  of  the  agencies  recently  created  in  the  states, 
which  have  had  as  their  function  the  improvement  of  state 
administration.  A  number  of  states  created  commissions 
to  study  state  expenditures  and  budgetary  procedure 
while  innumerable  attempts  have  been  made  by  the  forma- 
tion of  commissions  to  hunt  graft  and  corruption.  We 
shall  consider  only  those  commissions  which  have  actually 


94        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

made  investigations  and  recommendations  covering  the 
structure  and  methods  of  administration." 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  the  reasons  assigned  and  subject 
of  inquiries  named  in  the  laws  of  states  providing  for 
these  commissions,  and  the  unanimity  of  opinion  in  find- 
ing that  the  administrative  machinery  of  the  several  states 
should  be  radically  changed. 

Among  the  duties  assigned  to  the  State  Board  of  Public 
Affairs  of  Wisconsin  were  the  following: 

"  To  coordinate,  by  mutual  agreement  with  the  several 
public  bodies,  their  investigations,  and  to  provide  for  such 
additional  investigations  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
out  the  purposes  of  the  law. 

"  To  investigate  duplication  of  work  of  public  bodies 
and  the  efficiency  of  the  organization  and  administration 
of  such  public  bodies;  formulate  plans  for  the  greater  co- 
ordination of  such  public  bodies  and  the  improvement 
of  the  state  administration  in  general. 

"  To  prepare  a  budget  report. 

"  To  publish  reports  and  make  recommendations  to  the 
legislature." 

The  powers  and  duties  assigned  to  the  commissioner 
of  efficiency  and  economy  of  New  York  were  these : 

"  Make  a  careful  and  thorough  study  of  each  office, 
institution,  and  department  maintained  by  the  state  and 
.  .  .  make  recommendations  to  the  governor,  and  to  the 
officer,  board,  or  commission  in  charge  of  said  office, 
institution,  or  department  touching  the  efficiency  and 
economy  of  the  work,  business,  and  service  therein." 

The  Committee  on  Retrenchment  and  Reform  of  Iowa 
was  authorized  to : 

"  Institute  such  changes  in  the  administration  of  public 
affairs  as  will  promote  efficiency  engineers  to  assist  in 
the  investigation." 

The  Efficiency  and  Economy  Committee  of  Illinois  was 
given : 


Need  for  Administrative  Reorganisation         95 

"  Full  power  and  authority  to  investigate  all  depart- 
ments of  the  state  government,  including  all  boards, 
bureaus,  and  commissions  which  have  been  created  by 
the  general  assembly,  such  investigations  to  be  made  with 
a  view  to  securing  a  more  perfect  system  of  accounting, 
combining  and  centralizing  the  duties  of  the  various  de- 
partments, abolishing  such  as  are  useless  and  securing 
for  the  state  of  Illinois  such  reorganization  that  will 
promote  greater  efficiency  and  greater  economy  in  her 
various  branches  of  government." 

The  Commission  on  the  Consolidation  of  State  Com- 
missions of  Connecticut  was  appointed  to  investigate  and 
report  on: 

"  The  reorganization  and  consolidation  of  the  various 
state  and  county  boards  with  a  view  to  greater  economy 
and  efficiency." 

These  are  fairly  typical  of  the  views  expressed  by  the 
legislature  of  the  need  for  reorganization  and  especially 
the  need  for  coordinating  the  work  of  the  many  inde- 
pendent or  semi-independent  offices  and  boards.  The 
commissions  almost  invariably  confirmed  this  view  and 
several  of  them  reported  specific  plans  of  consolidation. 
All  agreed  that  the  administration  should  be  more  central- 
ized ;  i.  e.  that  related  functions  and  activities  should  be 
grouped  and  administered  together.  But  there  was  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion  with  respect  to  the  place  and  power 
of  the  governor.  For  example,  the  commissions  ap- 
pointed in  New  Jersey  and  Wisconsin  adhered  to  the 
board  idea  of  administration,  recommending  the  retention 
of  the  governor  as  a  negative  force  and  advisory  to  the 
legislature.  On  the  other  hand,  the  commissions  of  Iowa 
and  Minnesota  were  convinced  that  the  governor  should 
be  made  a  chief  executive  with  heads  of  departments 
under  and  responsible  to  him. 


96        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Recommendations  for  Government  by  Commissions 

In  proposing  consolidation,  the  New  Jersey  commission 
recommended  the  reorganization  of  the  public-service 
functions  under  eight  departments,  each  of  which  would 
be  headed  by  a  board  and  a  commissioner  responsible  to 
the  board.     The  reasons  given  were  these : 

"  We  .  .  .  find  that  all  modern  enterprises  are  con- 
ducted by  corporations  .  .  .  guided  by  a  board  of  direc- 
tors ;  in  fact,  the  law  in  this  state  —  as  in  others  —  pro- 
vides that  business  of  any  corporation  shall  be  managed 
by  its  directors,  and  that  each  shall  have  a  chief  executive 
called  its  president.  ...  It  has,  therefore,  been  our  aim 
to  group  together  commissions  and  officials  engaged  in 
the  same  kind  of  work,  and  to  consolidate  such  work  in 
one  department,  with  a  board  of  directors,  and  a  chief, 
corresponding  to  the  president  of  the  corporation.  The 
powers  of  the  consolidated  departments  we  believe  should 
be  conferred  upon  the  board  of  directors,  so  that  it  may 
define  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  department,  and 
to  enact  rules  and  regulations  to  be  observed  by  the  chief 
and  all  employees." 

The  argument  for  the  separate  incorporation  of  each 
important  service  has  been  carried  to  the  point  of  giving 
to  each  board  financial  independence.  In  Wisconsin,  as 
is  pointed  out  later,  this  is  defended  as  an  element  of 
strength  in  the  organization.  The  New  Jersey  commis- 
sion was  more  frank  than  most  of  the  advocates  of  ad- 
ministration by  commissions.  It  boldly  asserted  that  the 
government  could  best  be  run  by  an  aristocracy  of  in- 
telligence with  little  or  no  regard  for  the  electorate.  This 
view  is  brought  out  by  the  further  reasoning  of  the  re- 
port : 

"  We  believe  that  the  best  class  of  men  will  be  se- 
cured to  act  on  such  boards  if  no  salary  is  paid,  and 
if  they  are  allowed  only  their  necessary  expenses.  We 
have  seriously  considered  the  advisability  of  paying  some 


Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization         97 

small  salary,  but  experience  has  shown  that  for  every 
salary  offered  there  are  numerous  office  seekers,  the  ma- 
jority of  whom  scarcely  measure  up  to  the  salaries  to  be 
paid.  We  believe  that  there  are  many  public-spirited  men 
in  the  state  who  cannot  be  induced  to  enter  the  employ  of 
the  state  on  a  salary  basis,  but  who  would  cheerfully  give 
their  services  if  they  are  afforded  fair  opportunity  to 
have  a  voice  in  shaping  the  policies  of  the  state  and  im- 
proving general  conditions." 

Such  was  the  plan  proposed  in  New  Jersey,  for  getting 
trained  men  as  department  executives.  The  single  head 
responsible  to  the  board  could  then  be  chosen  to  execute 
policies,  could  then  be  selected  because  of  his  training 
and  fitness ;  and  an  inducement  could  be  held  out  to  men 
who  would  make  public  service  a  career.  If  politics  were 
allowed  to  come  in  there  was  in  their  opinion  little  hope 
of  securing  efficiency  and  economy  in  the  service.  This 
is  also  one  of  the  accepted  doctrines  in  Wisconsin. 

All  of  the  commissions  except  that  of  Wisconsin  de- 
voted their  inquiries  and  reports  largely  to  questions  of 
reorganization  and  budget-making  procedure.  The  State 
Board  of  Public  Affairs  of  Wisconsin  was  controlled  by 
men  who  had  taken  leading  parts  in  the  development  of 
the  board  idea  in  that  state  and  had  advocated  its  adop- 
tion elsewhere  —  men  interested  in  specialized  services 
of  government  rather  than  in  questions  of  coordination 
of  functions  and  giving  balance  and  proportion  to  ad- 
ministrative plans  and  state  finances.  This  is  clearly 
shown  by  the  list  of  inquiries  made  and  reports  rendered, 
some  of  which  were  conducted  by  the  board  itself  and 
others  in  cooperation  with  departments  and  institutions. 
Twelve  of  the  eighteen  subjects  reported  were : 

Farm  tenancy  in  Wisconsin. 

Rural  credit  conditions  in  portions  of  Wisconsin. 

State  loans  to  farmers. 

Distribution  of  Wisconsin  potatoes. 


98        The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Distribution  of  Wisconsin  cheese. 

Distribution  of  Sheboygan  County  cheese. 

Feasibility  of  adopting  a  state  brand  to  standardize 
Wisconsin  products. 

Agricultural  cooperation  and  cooperative  methods. 

Survey  of  Wisconsin  rural  schools. 

Survey  of  Wisconsin  high  schools. 

Survey  of  Wisconsin  normal  schools. 

Survey  of  Wisconsin  State  University. 

The  reports  bearing  on  questions  of  administration  and 
finance  included : 

Budget  practices  of  various  states  and  nations. 

Feasibility  of  a  central  board  of  control  for  all  public 
educational  institutions. 

Departmental  reorganization  and  efficiency  of  state  em- 
ployees. 

In  these  reports  the  "  government  by  commission  "  idea 
was  taken  for  granted  or  staunchly  defended.  The  inde- 
pendent, specialized  board  idea  prevailed ;  and  the  recom- 
mendations for  budget  procedure  were  an  adaptation  to 
the  existing  establishments  which  had  been  put  under 
board  control. 

Recommendations  for  Single-Headed  Administration 

The  most  complete  plans  of  the  early  proposals  for 
administrative  reorganization  were  those  of  Minnesota, 
Iowa,  and  New  York.  The  Iowa  and  Minnesota  plans 
excluded  the  constitutional  officers,  while  the  New  York 
plan  contemplated  a  revision  of  the  constitution  and  the 
inclusion  of  all  administrative  agencies  in  the  reorganiza- 
tion. Each  of  these  plans  proposed  to  divide  the  admin- 
istrative branch  into  a  few  departments  which  were  to 
be  under  the  control  of  single  heads  appointed  by  the 
governor  and  responsible  to  him,  the  only  exceptions  being 
under  the  New  York  plan  in  the  case  of  departments 
performing  quasi-judicial  or  quasi-legislative   functions. 


Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization         99 

The  opinion  of  Mr.  E.  Dana  Durand,  chief  of  staff  of  the 
Minnesota  commission,  is  of  special  interest  when  con- 
sidered in  relation  to  the  conclusions  of  the  New  Jersey 
commission  quoted  above.  He  said :  "  Minnesota,  like 
most  other  states,  is  commissioned  to  death.  Some  of 
these  boards  are  paid,  but  most  of  them  are  unsalaried 
or  made  up  of  groups  of  state  officials  serving  ex  officio. 
Boards  are  all  right  in  their  place  .  .  .  but  that  place  is 
not  in  the  administration  of  government,  the  execution 
of  the  law.  The  board  system  tends  to  delay,  to  dissipate 
responsibility,  to  inefficiency  generally.  You  cannot  put 
your  finger  on  the  man  who  is  to  blame  if  anything  goes 
wrong.  Several  or  many  minds  for  counsel;  one  mind 
for  action  —  that  is  a  principle  long  ago  enunciated  but 
strangely  departed  from." 

The  plans  of  administrative  reorganization  and  con- 
solidation now  in  operation  in  Illinois,  Idaho,  and  Ne- 
braska provide  for  single-headed  departments  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  governor.  These,  as  well  as  the 
several  proposed  plans  for  administrative  reorganization, 
are  described  in  detail  under  Part  II. 


CHAPTER  VII 

GENERAL    DISCUSSION    OF    ADMINISTRATIVE    REORGANIZA- 
TION  PLANS  TO  PROVIDE  FOR  RESPONSIBLE  LEADERSHIP 

The  fight  in  England  in  the  reign  of  King  John,  to 
make  the  executive  responsible  through  control  over  the 
purse,  was  the  beginning  of  a  long  series  of  conflicts 
between  the  forces  for  self-government  and  a  legalized 
autocratic  ruling  class.  In  America  the  fight  to  make  the 
executive  responsible  through  control  over  the  purse  has 
been  long  delayed  —  expedient  finally  resorted  to  as  a 
means  of  making  popular  control  effective.  It  comes  at 
the  end  of  a  century-old  contest  between  the  forces  of 
popular  self-government  and  those  which  stand  for  class 
rule;  latterly  this  has  meant  war  on  the  irresponsible 
"  party  "  organizations  that  in  turn  have  profited  from 
class  rule.  In  this  conflict  the  battle  has  been  waged 
around  the  stronghold  of  the  irresponsible  boss,  the  head 
of  an  irresponsible  party  system.  The  forces  of  the  boss 
were  always  well  organized,  and  under  capable  leaders; 
when  not  occupied  in  self-defense,  they  planned  and  ex- 
ecuted forays  for  spoils.  This  was  made  possible  because 
of  lack  of  responsible  leadership  —  a  thing  that  the 
American  people  had  been  taught  was  dangerous. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  many  times,  the  whole  history 
of  American  politics  has  been  the  history  of  a  struggle 
not  for  something,  but  against  something;  ours  was  a 
negative  political  philosophy;  first  we  fought  against 
an  irresponsible  foreign  autocracy,  which  was  forced  to 
acknowledge  defeat  after  an  eight  years'  war  for  inde- 
pendence ;  then  the  electorate  asserted  itself  against  an 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  101 

irresponsible  American  commercial  and  landed  aristocracy 
which  was  first  defeated  under  the  leadership  of  Jeffer- 
son and  was  finally  overthrown  by  the  old  warrior,  Jack- 
son ;  then  began  the  struggle  of  American  democracy 
against  the  domination  of  an  unaristocratic,  and  still 
more  irresponsible,  "  party  "  organization,  the  leadership 
of  which  was  entirely  outside  the  government  and  beyond 
the  reach  of  what  had  come  to  be  a  broadly  democratic 
electorate. 

Boss  Rule  vs.  Responsible  Leadership 

For  nearly  a  hundred  years  the  struggle  against  this 
last  form  of  autocracy,  bred  in  and  of  a  desire  for 
power  and  thriving  on  a  fat  and  privileged  plutocracy,  has 
been  going  on  with  indifferent  success.  Under  these  con- 
ditions the  wellsprings  of  democracy,  impregnated  with 
ideals  of  human  liberty,  equality,  and  brotherhood,  have 
become  turbid  with  passion.  Popular  resentment  has  in- 
creased, until  it  has  threatened  disorder ;  and  by  this  fart 
the  future  of  our  institutions  has  been  made  more  uncer- 
tain. From  frontal  attack,  special  privilege,  thus  organ- 
ized, proved  to  be  fully  protected,  its  intrenchment  invul- 
nerable. The  overthrow  of  one  irresponsible  boss  or 
party  resulted  only  in  the  enthronement  of  another. 
Finally,  thoughtful  men  interested  in  the  cause  of  de- 
mocracy began  to  point  out  the  fundamental  weakness, 
not  of  our  Constitution,  but  of  the  institutions  which  the 
people  have  permitted  to  grow  up  under  them.  They 
began  to  point  to  the  fact  that  what  we  needed  was  a 
positive  philosophy  which  might  speak  in  terms  of  human 
service.  We  needed  to  organize  to  do  something  good 
and  not  simply  to  prevent  something  bad.  To  accom- 
plish what  the  people  desired,  it  was  necessary  to  pro- 
vide for  an  able,  effective  leadership  within  the  govern- 
ment. And  no  one  did  more  to  emphasize  the  need  for 
calling  the  electorate  to  the  support  of  responsible  leader- 


102      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ship  than  Mr.  Roosevelt.  In  his  efforts  to  build  up  and 
maintain  a  following,  he,  as  chief  executive  of  the  nation, 
held  that  he  was  responsible  to  the  whole  people.  Public 
opinion  was  the  "  big  stick  "  grasped  and  used  by  him  to 
command  respect  for  his  leadership  and  to  enforce  a  dis- 
cipline within  both  the  service  and  deliberative  branches 
of  the  Government  through  which  he  sought  to  get  things 
done.  He  said  to  the  people :  "  I  am  your  chosen 
leader;  come  to  me;  let  me  know  what  you  want  and  I'll 
see  to  it  that  you  get  service ;  I  will  see  to  it  that  we  have 
the  conditions  provided  for  rendering  service  if  I  have  to 
go  out  with  the  hosts  of  Armageddon  and  fight  every 
plutocrat  in  the  country  and  every  congressman  in  his 
own  district."  And  the  people  believed  in  him.  They 
were  ready  to  follow  his  leadership  because  they  believed 
in  him. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  a  new,  a  constructive,  a 
positive  philosophy  of  citizenship,  a  constructive  purpose 
for  a  nation-wide  electorate.  And  though  President 
Roosevelt  did  little  to  institutionalize  executive  leader- 
ship, a  new  drift  was  given  to  public  thought  which  ulti- 
mately carried  with  it  the  conviction  that  the  way  to  de- 
feat an  outside,  irresponsible  leadership  was  to  give  to  the 
people  a  responsible  leadership.  The  way  to  provide  pure 
air  in  the  house  of  the  people  is  not  to  try  to  create  a 
vacuum,  but  to  provide  a  means  for  drawing  in  that 
which  is  unpolluted  and  serviceable.  The  atmosphere  of 
democracy  must  be  filtered  and  made  to  flow  into  useful 
channels  by  the  power  of  leadership  which  may  be  made 
accountable.  It  was  in  the  quest  for  a  means  of  develop- 
ing responsible  government,  a  means  for  making  the 
public  service  responsive  to  public  opinion,  through  a 
leadership  that  could  interpret  and  at  the  same  time  was 
accountable  to  the  people,  that  those  who  sought  popular 
support  turned  to  administrative  reorganization  and 
budget  making. 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  103 

The  new  background  given  to  political  thought,  the 
changed  condition  which  brought  to  the  front  the  demand 
for  responsible  leadership  was  a  recognition  of  new  social 
need.  This  first  impressed  itself  on  the  agencies  of  serv- 
ice, through  the  efforts  of  various  humanitarian  civic 
societies  and  committees.  These  efforts  were  independent 
and  decentralized;  they  led  to  administrative  decentral- 
ization. The  method  used  was  a  further  application  of 
past  negative  philosophy  in  the  effort  to  dethrone  the  boss, 
but  it  carried  with  it  a  positive  principle  of  service,  and 
following  this  enlarged  service  demand  came  the  present 
movement.  The  effort  to  overcome  this  negative  phil- 
osophy resulted  in  a  positive  demand  for  responsible 
leadership. 

Reorganisation  and  Financial  Responsibility  in  the  large 
Cities 

Increasing  demands  for  service  were  first  felt  in  the 
cities  —  the  great  centers  of  population.  Here  was  first 
felt  the  need  for  administrative  reorganization  as  a  means 
of  giving  balance  and  proportion  to  plans  for  service  and 
the  apportionment  of  public  funds.  The  demand  for  ad- 
ministrative reorganization  and  centralized  financial  con- 
trol became  most  acute  in  the  national  metropolis.  When 
in  1894  the  five  boroughs, —  Manhattan,  Brooklyn, 
Queens,  Kings,  and  Richmond  —  were  about  to  be  con- 
solidated into  the  Greater  City  of  New  York  a  commission 
was  appointed  to  frame  a  new  charter.  Their  aim  was  to 
negative  the  results  of  decentralization  and  thereby  to 
prevent  boss  rule.  In  the  charter  which  was  adopted  the 
old  machinery  of  decentralization  through  control  by 
standing  committees  of  the  legislative  body  was  aban- 
doned. Control  by  a  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment composed  in  the  main  of  independently  elected  exe- 
cutive officers  was  substituted  in  its  stead.  This  central- 
governing  agency  was  charged  with  the  duty  both  of 


104      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

making  plans  and  of  executing  them.  The  institutional 
means  adopted  for  planning  was  a  charter  requirement 
that  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  should 
make  a  budget.  The  Board  of  Aldermen,  the  old  legis- 
lative body  with  its  standing  committees,  was  retained. 
But  for  purposes  of  control  over  the  purse  it  was  shorn 
of  all  but  its  reviewing  and  approving  power.  It  could 
not  initiate  finance  measures.  The  leadership  of  the  com- 
mittee chairmen  was  gone.  The  leadership  became  ex- 
ecutive. The  legislative  body  as  a  whole  could  reduce 
but  could  not  increase  items  of  the  appropriation  bill  pro- 
posed by  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment. 

Thus  it  was  that  in  New  York  City  the  principle  of 
centralization  was  introduced.  And  an  effort  was  made 
to  provide  for  responsible  executive  leadership  by  giving 
the  mayor  a  seat  in  the  Board  of  Aldermen.  But  no 
procedure  was  enacted  to  enforce  this  responsibility.  The 
mayor  was  not  made  responsible  for  the  administration. 
He  was  only  one  of  four  executives  elected  by  the  city  at 
large.  He  was  not  the  budget  maker.  He  was  not  re- 
quired to  go  before  the  appropriating  body;  he  was  only 
permitted.  Attempt  was  made  to  give  publicity  by  per- 
mitting "  nobodies  "  to  appear  before  the  Board  of  Esti- 
mate and  Apportionment.  But  nothing  was  done  to  make 
the  duly  constituted  forum  effective.  The  Board  of  Al- 
dermen could  not  change  the  terms  and  conditions  at- 
tached to  the  budget,  and  no  provision  was  made  for 
appeal  to  the  electorate  by  an  opposing  majority  in  the 
appropriating  body.  The  members  of  the  central  exe- 
cutive council,  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment, were  elected  for  a  fixed  term  of  years,  and  when 
they  came  to  an  agreement  on  a  budget  that  was,  in  effect, 
the  end  of  it.  The  Board  of  Aldermen  might  refuse 
to  pass  the  measure,  but  the  body  was  not  in  good  stand- 
ing and  there  was  no  way  to  make  a  popular  appeal,  there- 
fore  they   approved.     The    budget   and   all    matters    of 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  105 

finance  came  to  be  largely  a  matter  of  secret  compromise 
between  independently  elected  executives.  Here  was  cen- 
tralization without  the  means  of  locating  or  enforcing 
accountability. 

The  Program  of  the  National  Municipal  League  —  Fed- 
eral Plan;  Commission  Plan;  Commission  Manager 
Plan 

Soon  after  this  experiment  had  been  launched  a  civic 
organization,  the  National  Municipal  League,  began  a 
nation-wide  propaganda  for  the  administrative  and  legis- 
lative reorganization  of  American  municipalities.  In 
1899  the  league  published  a  "  municipal  program,"  which 
was  based  on  the  idea  of  a  small  council  and  a  chief  ex- 
ecutive with  power  to  appoint  and  remove  departmental 
heads.  Because  a  highly  centralized  administrative  or- 
ganization was  proposed,  the  program  of  the  League  came 
to  be  known  as  the  "  Federal  plan,"  a  designation  sug- 
gested by  analogy  to  the  plan  of  the  Federal  government. 
This  was  part  of  an  underlying  movement  based  on  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  legislative  branch.  Many  munici- 
palities adopted  the  plan  of  centralization  proposed. 

The  "  Federal  plan  "  proving  unsatisfactory,  a  new 
propaganda  sprang  up  and  the  League  shifted  its  advo- 
cacy to  "  commission  government."  This  differed  from 
the  "  government  by  commission  "  propaganda  in  the 
states  in  that  the  "  commission  government  "  idea  of  the 
cities  was  a  centralization  scheme,  while  the  state  move- 
ment was  for  decentralization.  Again  a  large  number 
of  municipalities  followed  the  leadership  and  proposals 
of  the  League  and  the  "  commission  government  "  ad- 
vocates. Reorganizations  followed  which  did  away  with 
the  legislative  council  made  up  of  the  many  representa- 
tives of  wards.  They  went  still  farther  than  the  New 
York  charter  had  gone  by  combining  both  the  legislative 
and  executive  functions  in  a  small  council  elected  "  at 


106      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

large."  The  many  decentralized  administrative  depart- 
ments were  centralized,  executive  leadership  being  allotted 
to  members  of  the  council. 

For  several  years  the  "  commission  government "  idea 
held  sway,  and  much  good  came  from  centering  public 
interest  in  the  acts  of  a  few  elected  officers  who  could 
not  shift  responsibility  either  for  administrative  or  legis- 
lative acts.  The  weakness  of  the  plan,  however,  soon 
became  apparent.  In  doing  away  with  an  independent  re- 
viewing body  the  people  had  deprived  themselves  of  the 
most  effective  means  of  publicity. 

The  people,  seeking  for  visible  government,  were  again 
disappointed ;  and  a  new  propaganda  was  launched.  The 
efforts  of  many  unofficial  civic  agencies  now  turned  to 
the  "  commission  manager  plan  " ;  and  the  program  of 
the  National  Municipal  League  was  modified  accordingly. 
This  plan  preserved  the  small  council ;  it  preserved  the 
principle  of  centralization  of  executive  responsibility,  and 
aimed  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  service  by  provid- 
ing for  the  appointment  of  a  trained  executive  account- 
able to  the  council. 

The  Propaganda  of  the  Short  Ballot  Association 

The  commission-manager  plan  was  in  the  nature  of  a 
reversion,  in  that  it  set  up  an  administrative  branch  under 
a  chief  executive,  the  manager,  and  gave  to  the  represen- 
tative council  powers  of  inquest,  criticism,  discussion, 
and  decision  on  matters  of  public  policy.  It  went  farther 
than  the  "  Federal  plan  "  in  that  it  gave  to  the  reviewing 
appropriating  body  the  power  to  appoint  and  remove  the 
manager.  The  new  form  of  organization  had  the  sup- 
port of  the  Short  Ballot  Association,  an  unofficial  propa- 
gandist civic  agency  which  sought  to  make  popular  con- 
trol more  effective  by  reducing  the  number  of  elected 
officers.  Its  mission  was  to  undo  the  work  of  the  "  back 
to  the  people  "  propagandists  of  the  first  part  of  the  nine- 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  107 

teenth  century  when  the  effort  was  first  made  to  prevent 
autocracy,  then  later  to  defeat  the  boss  by  "  electing  every- 
body." The  Short  Ballot  Association  would  center  all  ex- 
ecutive responsibility  in  a  single  person  whose  acts  could 
be  reviewed  and  who  could  be  held  accountable  to  the 
people  for  leadership.  Although  it  supported  the  com- 
mission-manager plan,  this  was  inconsistent  with  the  short- 
ballot  propaganda  in  that  the  manager  was  not  to  be 
elected.  The  commission-manager  idea  was  in  fact  an- 
other device  to  keep  the  leadership  of  the  public  service  out 
of  politics  and  free  from  electoral  control ;  it  was  another 
form  of  "  council  of  the  wise,"  without  provision  for  poli- 
tical leadership  and  without  definite  procedure  for  inquest 
and  determination  of  issues  in  a  public  forum  from  whose 
decisions  appeal  could  be  made  to  the  people  when  the  pro- 
posals of  the  head  of  the  public  service  were  not  supported 
by  a  majority  of  the  representative  body.  In  fact,  one 
of  its  claims  to  popular  support  was  that  the  manager,  as 
chief  executive,  would  not  be  in  politics. 

Beginning  of  Administrative  Reorganisation  Movement 
in  State  Governments 

The  movement  to  institutionalize  leadership  by  reor- 
ganization of  the  public  service  in  a  manner  to  make  the 
chief  executive  the  outstanding  person  in  politics  got  its 
initial  impetus  from  President  Taft's  inquiry  into  the 
methods  of  administration  of  the  Federal  Government  and 
his  recommendations  which  fell  on  the  deaf  ears  of  an 
opposition  "  party  "  in  Congress.  The  motive  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  special  executive  staff  in  19 10,  and  of 
the  Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission  in  191 1  by 
President  Taft,  had  been  to  reduce  the  waste  and  increase 
the  effectiveness  of  the  administrative  branch  of  the 
Federal  Government.  Of  the  one  hundred  and  eight  re- 
ports prepared  and  submitted  by  the  commission  to  the 
President  and  the  twenty-six  reports  sent  by  the  President 


108      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  Congress  with  special  messages  requesting  legislative 
action,  only  two  dealt  with  the  subject  of  budget  making; 
all  of  the  others  dealt  with  questions  of  administrative 
reorganization  and  procedure.  The  same  dominant  mo- 
tive was  present  in  executive  requests  and  legislative  acts 
leading  to  the  appointment  of  state  committees  and  com- 
missions on  economy  and  efficiency  from  1911  to  191 8, 
as  well  as  in  the  resolutions  calling  constitutional  con- 
ventions and  proposing  amendments  in  administrative  law. 
The  reports  and  recommendations  of  these  many  state 
committees  and  commissions,  as  well  as  the  statutory  and 
constitutional  enactments  which  speak  in  terms  of  ad- 
ministrative reorganization,  are  of  two  general  types : 

( 1 )  Those  designed  to  locate  responsibility  through 
providing  for  a  strong,  sole,  executive  leadership  —  a 
leadership  within  the  government  which  could  be  effective 
for  directing  and  improving  the  public  service  and  at 
the  same  time  could  be  reached  and  controlled  by  the 
electorate  and  their  representatives  through  their  consti- 
tutional power  to  control  the  purse,  and 

(2)  Those  designed  to  protect  and  continue  "govern- 
ment by  commission  " —  the  many  independent  boards,  to 
which  had  been  turned  over  to  the  service  functions  of 
government  to  get  them  beyond  the  reach  of  irresponsi- 
ble party  leadership  and  control,  created  to  prevent  the 
building  up  of  a  strong  executive. 

In  most  cases  the  economy  and  efficiency  commissions 
have  reported  favoring  the  first  plan.  In  some  instances, 
however,  these  commissions  were  dominated  by  the  civic 
forces  which  had  sought  to  defeat  the  boss  through  de- 
centralization. In  most  cases  statutory  and  constitutional 
proposals  and  enactments  looking  toward  administrative 
reorganization  followed  the  recommendations  of  the  econ- 
omy commissions.  In  some  instances  the  forces  favor- 
ing continued  decentralization  controlled.  A  third  group 
is  made  up  of  states  in  which  the  two  forces  found  agree- 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  109 

ment  in  compromise  with  no  consistent  policy  of  reorgan- 
ization dominating,  the  enactments  only  partially  satisfy- 
ing the  demands  of  the  opposing  force. 

Reorganisation  Plans  Providing  for  Centralization   of 
Executive  Authority 

Among  the  state  plans  actually  enacted  as  measures 
for  reorganizing  the  administration  around  a  responsible 
executive,  Illinois,  Idaho,  and  Nebraska  are  the  most 
thoroughgoing  and  consistent  in  design.  Of  those  which 
have  adhered  to  the  principle  of  decentralization  most 
closely  Wisconsin  deserves  special  mention.  New  Jersey 
is  an  outstanding  example  of  the  mixed  type. 

The  Proposed  New  York  Plan  of  icj  15 

The  Constitutional  Convention  of  New  York,  in  19 15, 
adopted  a  plan  of  state  reorganization  which  for  thor- 
oughness of  consideration  and  discussion  of  the  advan- 
tages of  the  executive  type  stands  as  a  monument  to 
statesmanship.  This  was  bitterly  opposed  by  persons  who 
combined  to  preserve  the  old  legislative  practices  on  the 
one  hand,  and  by  the  advocates  of  commission  government 
on  the  other.  The  proposed  new  constitution  was  de- 
feated at  the  polls,  but  it  has  had  a  marked  influence  on  the 
political  thinking  of  the  whole  country.  The  chief  weak- 
ness of  the  plan  as  worked  out  was  that,  while  it  pro- 
vided for  leadership,  it  did  not  adequately  provide  the 
means  for  enforcing  accountability  through  inquest  and 
appeal  —  it  did  not  provide  adequately  for  popular  con- 
trol. 

Illinois  Plan 

The  first  state  to  carry  into  execution  the  principles 
advocated  was  Illinois.  Here  the  opposition  of  the 
several  elected  constitutional  officers  was  largely  avoided 
by   making   administrative    reorganization    a    matter   of 


no      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

legislative  enactment  instead  of  constitutional  reform. 
For  this  achievement  the  way  had  been  prepared :  first 
by  the  report  of  the  economy  commission;  and  later  by 
a  campaign  before  the  people,  when  Governor  Lowden 
and  a  legislature  were  elected  on  the  issue.  As  soon  as 
Governor  Lowden  was  inaugurated  he  set  all  the  machin- 
ery of  the  government  to  work  to  accomplish  the  purpose. 
He  was  elected  as  a  Republican  following  a  Democratic 
predecessor  in  office.  He  found  the  state  offices  filled 
with  Democrats.  This  was  a  tactical  advantage,  for  it 
gave  him  opportunity  to  refuse  to  make  appointments 
until  the  new  administrative  code  had  become  law.  And 
with  very  good  reason,  too !  Had  not  the  party  given  its 
pledge?  How  could  he  make  intelligent  appointments 
before  he  knew  what  the  organization  would  be?  By 
taking  this  stand  he  not  only  had  public  opinion  back 
of  him,  but  the  pressure  of  office  seekers  was  also  put 
behind  an  early  passage  of  the  act.  And  after  a  com- 
plete reorganization  had  been  consummated  so  far  as  this 
could  be  effected  by  the  legislature  a  resolution  was  passed 
providing  for  a  constitutional  convention  to  complete  the 
work.  Fortunately,  duties  of  the  independently  elected 
officers  of  the  state  did  not  seriously  interfere  with  the 
reorganization.  The  auditor  of  the  state  retained  an  in- 
dependent check  on  the  administration,  but  control  over 
requisitions,  accounting,  and  preaudit  of  bills  was  placed 
in  the  department  of  finance  under  the  governor.  The 
state  treasurer  remained  the  custodian  of  funds,  but  all 
preparation  of  financial  plans  and  supervision  of  author- 
ized expenditures  came  under  executive  control.  The 
secretary  of  state  still  administered  a  few  functions  like 
the  collection  of  the  automobile  tax,  but  this  did  not 
seriously  impair  the  executive  function.  The  state  super- 
intendent of  education  was  independently  elected,  but  this 
did  not  stand  in  the  way  of  the  creation  of  an  executive 
department  dealing  with  education.     Through  the  whole 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  in 

reorganization   Governor   Lowden's   leadership   and   re- 
sponsibility to  the  people  stands  out. 

The  most  serious  obstacle  to  an  effective  electoral 
control  over  the  executive  is  found  not  in  the  independent 
constitutional  offices,  but  in  the  old  type  of  legislative 
procedure  which  does  not  admit  of  leadership  by  the 
governor.  Because  the  organization  and  rules  of  the 
legislature  did  not  admit  of  leadership  by  the  governor, 
openly,  there  was  no  clear  definition  of  issues  in  shaping 
matters  of  policy,  in  case  of  controversy,  on  which  sides 
could  be  taken  in  discussion  in  the  deliberative  body. 
For  the  same  reason  there  was  no  issue  developed  which 
could  be  taken  before  the  voters  either  at  the  by-election 
or  at  the  end  of  the  fixed  term  of  four  years  when  the 
governor  must  justify  himself.  The  cabinet  was  respon- 
sible to  the  governor  but  there  was  no  way  of  making 
either  the  government  or  the  cabinet  responsible  to  the 
electorate  or  to  their  representatives. 

Plans  of  Idaho  and  Nebraska 

In  1919  two  states  followed  the  Illinois  example  — 
Idaho  and  Nebraska.  Of  these  Idaho  adopted  a  code 
much  in  the  same  form  as  that  enacted  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Governor  Lowden,  by  transfer  of  function  and 
general  provisions  for  adjustment  of  conflicts  of  existing 
statutes  and  jurisdictions.  Nebraska  sought  to  avoid 
conflict  by  rewriting  and  codifying  all  of  the  existing 
organic  laws. 

This  work  was  begun  in  Nebraska,  under  authority  of 
the  legislature  of  19 13,  by  a  committee  of  the  House 
and  Senate  to  study  the  administrative  organization  of 
the  state.  The  committee  reported  May  15,  19 14.  In 
Illinois  the  recommendations  of  its  commission  were  made 
a  political  issue  on  19 16.  In  Nebraska  the  recommenda- 
tions of  its  committee  were  made  a  political  issue,  and  in 
1 918  Governor  McKelvie  was  elected  on  a  platform  which 


ii2      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

pledged  him  and  the  legislature  to  the  enactment  of  a 
civil  administrative  code  "  providing  for  the  consolida- 
tion of  boards,  institutions,  commissions,  and  different 
departments  and  agencies  of  government."  In  the  spring 
of  1919  the  legislature  passed  a  bill  grouping  all  of  the 
activities,  not  assigned  to  officers  and  board  of  the  con- 
stitution, into  six  departments.  Each  of  these  depart- 
ments was  given  a  single  head  appointed  by  the  governor, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  but  for  fixed  terms  to  end 
with  the  governor's  tenure.  There  is  in  this  a  limitation 
of  executive  power  not  consistent  with  the  responsibilities 
of  the  office.  Besides,  the  old  legislative  procedure  re- 
mains unchanged,  thereby  depriving  the  people  of  open 
discussion  of  measures  initialed  by  the  executive  with 
responsible  officers  present  to  explain  and  defend. 

The  Idaho  reorganization  code  was  passed  in  February, 
19 19.  It  provides  for  the  consolidation  of  all  functions, 
not  assigned  to  officers  and  boards  by  the  constitution,  in 
nine  departments  as  in  Illinois,  with  slight  differences  in 
the  distribution  of  duties.  Each  department  has  a  single 
head  appointed  by  the  governor  and  with  the  exception 
of  one  is  removable  by  him  at  will.  The  commissioner  of 
immigration,  labor,  and  statistics  is  a  constitutional 
officer  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  for  a  term  of  two  years.  Idaho's  gov- 
ernor, as  in  the  case  of  Illinois  and  Nebraska,  is  deprived 
of  the  opportunity  of  personally  appearing  before  the 
legislature  in  committee  of  the  whole  or  otherwise  as  a 
matter  of  regular  procedure,  for  giving  publicity  to 
measures  advocated  and  clearly  defining  issues  through 
open  question  and  discussion  of  issues;  and  there  is  no 
provision  for  appeal  in  case  of  a  deadlock,  or  an  opposi- 
tion majority. 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  113 

"  The  Wisconsin  Idea  " 

Wisconsin  has  been  foremost  among  the  states  in  its 
advocacy  of  "  government  of  commission."  In  fact,  its 
civic  leaders  have  been  so  conspicuous  in  the  propagation 
of  this  system  of  administration  that  the  government-by- 
commission  plan  is  frequently  referred  to  as  "  The  Wis- 
consin Idea " —  a  designation  taken  from  a  volume 
written  by  Dr.  Charles  McCarthy  which  bears  that  title. 
Under  the  influence  of  a  group  of  University  of  Wiscon- 
sin men,  who  interested  themselves  in  making  different 
branches  of  state  administration  more  serviceable  to  the 
people,  their  government  has  been  broken  up  into  a  large 
number  of  independent  offices  and  boards. 

While  all  of  the  states  drifted  strongly  to  this  method 
of  dealing  with  the  boss  in  seeking  to  make  the  public 
administration  more  efficient  many  of  them,  in  recent 
years,  have  abandoned  the  method  —  in  theory  at  least. 
Wisconsin,  however,  has  held  consistently  to  the  govern- 
ment-by-commission theory.  And  during  the  last  few 
years  while  consolidations  have  taken  place  the  decentral- 
ized "  commission  "  type  of  administration  is  still  retained. 

The  type  has  already  been  described.  Each  main  serv- 
ice branch,  by  act  of  the  legislature,  is  made  independent 
by  being  placed  under  the  management  of  a  board  or 
commission  —  we  may  say,  has  been  separately  incor- 
porated as  an  eleemosynary  institution.  The  members 
of  each  public-service  board  are  appointed  for  long  and 
overlapping  tenures.  The  public  functions  administered 
by  each  board  are  supported  by  continuing  appropriations, 
thereby  giving  to  them  what  amounts  to  a  state  endow- 
ment. Thus  established,  each  board  undertakes  to  de- 
velop a  more  efficient  service  by  employment  of  staff 
experts. 

But  the  various  independencies  did  not  have  the  ma- 
chinery for  giving  balance  and  proportion  to  the  state 


ii4      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

administration  as  a  whole  —  it  lacked  the  means  of  de- 
veloping a  state  program  except  as  this  came  about  in 
an  informal  and  uninstitutional  way  through  personal 
contact  and  understandings  between  propagandists  — 
leaders  who  were  in  no  way  connected  with  the  processes 
of  popular  control.  In  developing  an  official  means  for 
giving  balance  and  proportion  to  a  state  program  a  cen- 
tral commission  was  created  —  the  state  board  of  public 
affairs,  to  which  was  assigned  among  other  things  the 
duty  of  preparing  a  budget.  Thus  the  supervisory  and 
inquisitorial  function  was  performed  by  a  super-board  of 
which  the  governor  and  certain  members  of  the  legislature 
were  members. 

The  weakness  of  this  administrative  system,  lack  of 
responsibility  to  the  electorate  and  their  representatives, 
has  been  recognized.  And  in  the  last  legislature  an  effort 
was  made  to  cure  the  defect  in  a  way  that  points  to  a 
method  of  control  which  may  be  made  consistent  with 
the  ideals  of  democracy  by  establishing  a  legislative 
premiership  —  a  legislative  majority  leadership  with 
power  to  control  the  administration.  A  bill  was  intro- 
duced which,  had  it  become  law,  would  have  given  to 
the  representative  branch  of  the  government  the  right 
to  dismiss  the  administrative  heads  by  what  would  have 
amounted  to  a  vote  of  "  lack  of  confidence."  This  bill 
passed  both  houses  and  was  prevented  from  becoming  law 
only  by  executive  veto.  The  implications  of  the  enact- 
ment are  deserving  of  special  consideration,  since  it  is  the 
first  attempt  in  our  national  political  history  whereby 
government  by  commission  has  attempted  to  face  the 
question  of  popular  control  by  providing  procedure 
through  which  responsible  leadership  might  be  developed 
under  conditions  such  that  issues  might  be  clearly  drawn, 
reviewed,  criticized,  and  approved  or  disapproved  in  the 
established  forum  of  the  people.  The  virtue  of  the 
measure  lies,  not  in  its  provisions,  but  in  the  necessary 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  115 

implication  of  its  outworkings.  Assuming  that  the 
measure  passed  by  the  Wisconsin  legislature  had  not  been 
vetoed  by  the  governor,  its  necessary  operation  would  be 
to  develop  an  administrative  cabinet  responsible  to  the 
representative  body  —  and  this  body  necessarily  would 
have  developed  a  responsible  majority  and  minority 
leadership.  Any  effort  to  dismiss  an  administrative 
officer  would  have  aligned  the  forces  for  and  against  such 
action.  No  such  action  could  be  initiated  without  leader- 
ship, and  the  leadership  would  cause  the  members  of  the 
representative  body  to  take  sides.  The  procedure  of 
inquest  into  the  office  or  acts  or  proposals  of  the  officer 
would  be  given  a  dramatic  setting  that  would  give  pub- 
licity to  the  issue  involved.  The  continued  operation  of 
such  a  law  would  in  the  end  develop  a  system  of  control 
much  after  the  plan  which  has  grown  up  in  France  —  leg- 
islative leadership  itself  under  such  circumstances  would 
carry  with  it  political  issues.  This  would  accomplish  the 
desired  purpose  of  taking  control  out  of  the  hands  of  an 
irresponsible  political  boss.  The  only  leadership  possi- 
ble would  be  one  which  would  be  in  the  first  instance  re- 
sponsible to  the  representative  body,  ultimate  control  being 
in  the  state  electorate  by  making  administrative  leader- 
ship amenable  to  the  representative  body  —  the  "  parties  " 
developed  in  the  process  of  inquest  and  determination  of 
issues  would  necessarily  be  made  up  of  those  who  took 
sides.  Thus  the  party  management  would  be  made  up  of 
the  leaders  who  represented  a  majority  on  the  one  hand 
and  a  responsible  opposition.  The  necessary  result  would 
be  a  legislative  prime  minister.  In  the  evolution  of  such 
a  system,  whether  the  departments  were  managed  by 
boards  or  by  single  heads,  it  would  produce  responsible 
government ;  a  government  made  responsible  through  a 
leadership  that  would  be  under  electoral  control. 


n6      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Wisconsin  Idea  vs.  Illinois  Plan 

The  measure,  however,  did  not  become  law,  and  Wis- 
consin still  has  an  administration  which  in  type  lacks 
the  processes  of  popular  control.  Accepting  the  measure 
which  was  defeated  as  a  declaration  of  intent  and  pur- 
pose and  the  contrast  is  striking  by  which  the  two  neigh- 
bor states,  Illinois  and  Wisconsin,  are  seeking  to  develop 
responsible  government.  The  one,  Illinois,  has  sought 
to  square  its  institutions  with  the  underlying  principle  of 
democracy  through  an  elected  executive  prime  minister; 
the  other,  Wisconsin,  has  sought  to  accomplish  this  end 
through  a  legislative  prime  minister.  Neither  method  has 
been  fully  elaborated.  Each  is  lacking  in  essential  points. 
The  Illinois  plan  still  lacks  a  procedure  by  which  the 
representative  body  may  perform  the  function  of  inquest, 
discussion  of  issues  raised  by  a  responsible  leadership 
with  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  people.  The  Wisconsin  plan 
for  the  establishment  of  a  responsible  leadership  has  not 
yet  got  beyond  the  academic  stage.  But  in  case  the 
theory  of  legislative  control  comes  to  be  established  it 
must  necessarily  carry  with  it  a  procedure  which,  through 
the  definition  and  discussion  of  issues  that  arise  in  the 
contest  between  leaders,  will  reach  to  the  electorate. 

The  New  York  Standing  Committee  System 

These  two  states  are  taken  as  types  because  they  have 
gone  farthest  in  the  development  of  two  methods  of  con- 
trol over  the  administration  which  hold  out  promise  to 
the  electorate.  New  York  is  the  most  conspicuous  ad- 
herent of  the  old  type  of  control  through  standing  legisla- 
tive committees,  the  system  which  has  contributed  most  to 
the  persistent  domination  of  the  irresponsible  boss  and 
his  machine.  The  Constitutional  Convention  of  19 15 
undertook  to  reorganize  the  state  along  the  lines  later 
followed  by  Illinois,  but  the  plan  was  opposed  both  by  the 


Plans  for  Responsible  Leadership  117 

old-time  irresponsible  party  organizations  and  by  the  re- 
form element  who  had  won  their  successes  through  de- 
centralization. The  result  was  that  the  standing-com- 
mittee system  and  the  irresponsible  boss  became  the  more 
firmly  intrenched. 

In  these  states  (Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  New 
York)  are  found  the  highest  development  of  the  three 
distinct  types  of  leadership  —  the  elected  executive  type, 
the  commission  type,  and  the  legislative  standing  com- 
mittee type.  Many  other  states  have  passed  measures 
of  reorganization,  but,  generally  speaking,  they  are  the 
result  of  mixed  political  emotion,  with  lack  of  definition 
of  institutional  program.  In  each  state  the  people  have 
been  reaching  out  for  responsible  government.  In  no 
states,  however,  has  the  question  of  popular  control 
been  squarely  faced. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GENERAL   DESCRIPTION    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF    RECENT 
STATE    BUDGET    ENACTMENTS 

Although  an  opposition  party  in  power  prevented  the 
consideration  of  President  Taft's  proposed  budget  by 
Congress,  it  made  a  very  strong  appeal  to  the  country. 
The  good  opinion  gained  for  it  is  reflected  in  many  ways, 
but  in  no  way  more  convincing  than  in  the  action  taken 
by  the  several  states.  Forty-four  of  the  forty-eight 
States  have  enacted,  or  have  pending,  constitutional  or 
statutory  measures  on  the  subject. 

Budget  Legislation  in  California  and  Wisconsin 

Wisconsin  and  California  were  the  first  to  obtain  legis- 
lative action.  California  had  been  a  boss-ridden  state 
for  years,  and  its  finances  were  in  a  condition  to  call  for 
leadership.  This  was  found  in  Hiram  Johnson  who, 
after  a  vigorous  campaign,  was  installed  in  office  in  Jan- 
uary, 191 1,  with  a  sympathetic  legislature  back  of  him. 
The  appropriations  were  handled  in  the  usual  way,  and 
in  March  they  began  to  flood  the  desk  of  the  governor. 
Thereupon  he  called  for  the  information  supporting  each 
grant,  but  much  of  the  desired  data  was  wanting.  He 
signed  such  bills  as  commended  themselves,  but  character- 
ized the  proceeding  as  "  a  disgrace  to  the  people  of  an 
intelligent  commonwealth."'  A  state  board  of  control 
was  created  with  large  powers  both  of  audit  and  approval 
and  the  next  year,  19 12,  a  budget  was  prepared  for  sub- 
mission to  the  191 3  legislature. 

During  the  same  year,  191 1,  the  Wisconsin  legislature 
passed  a  law  which  created  a  state  board  of  public  affairs 

118 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  119 

to  conduct  investigations  into  state  administration  and  to 
introduce  methods  which  would  promote  economy  and 
efficiency.  Wisconsin  has  been  one  of  the  foremost  of 
the  states  in  its  effort  to  overthrow  the  rule  of  the  irre- 
sponsible party  boss.  In  the  case  of  state  reorganization, 
what  gave  body  and  vitality  to  the  movement  was  the 
increasing  demands  for  service.  In  the  case  of  the  budget 
movement,  it  was  the  lack  of  balance  and  proportion  given 
to  state  development  and  the  rapid  rise  of  expenditures 
that  led  thinking  men  to  see  the  need  for  more  effective 
control  over  the  finances.  So  long  as  the  various  special- 
ized civic  agencies  and  local  constituencies  were  each  left 
to  promote  the  subject  of  its  special  interest  through  a 
multitude  of  boards  and  commissions  on  the  one  hand, 
and  a  multitude  of  standing  legislative  committees  by 
logrolling  methods  on  the  other,  there  must  necessarily 
be  lack  of  balance  and  proportion  in  the  development  of 
the  public  service;  there  must  be  dissatisfaction  shown  at 
the  mounting  cost  of  government.  Although  Wisconsin 
was  more  fortunate  than  most  states  in  the  public  spirit 
shown  by  a  group  of  progressive  civic  leaders  who  were 
in  virtual  control  in  and  about  the  state  University  lo- 
cated at  the  capital  city,  the  need  for  some  means  of 
thinking  about  the  whole  state  enterprise  was  no  less 
apparent. 

While  the  "  Wisconsin  idea "  had  done  much  to 
make  the  state  government  effective  a  strong  opposition 
campaign  was  started.  In  1909  the  tax  commission  was 
asked  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  finances,  and  their 
report  was  submitted  in  191 1,  following  which  the  legis- 
lature put  the  finances  also  under  a  central  commission, 
the  "  State  Board  of  Public  Affairs,"  and  in  19 13  a  defi- 
nite budget  procedure  was  adopted. 

Massachusetts  had  gone  even  further  than  Wisconsin 
in  the  work  of  administrative  decentralization.  It  had 
more  than  two  hundred  independent  or  quasi-independent 


120      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

agencies,  over  forty  of  which  were  boards  and  commis- 
sions. In  191 2  the  legislature  provided  for  a  state  finance 
board,  known  as  the  commission  on  economy  and  effi- 
ciency, but  it  did  not  undertake  seriously  to  establish  a 
budget  until  19 18. 

Budget  Legislation  in  Other  States 

What  had  been  found  true  in  California,  Wisconsin, 
and  Massachusetts  was  found  true  in  other  states.  In 
19 1 3  the  budget  movement  spread  to  six  states :  Arkansas, 
Illinois,  New  York,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  and  Oregon. 
Louisiana  followed  in  19 14  and  Massachusetts  took 
further  action,  enlarging  the  powers  of  its  economy  and 
efficiency  commission.  In  191 5,  Connecticut,  Iowa,  Min- 
nesota, Nebraska,  Vermont,  and  Washington  passed 
budget  laws  and  North  Dakota  and  Wisconsin  further  de- 
veloped their  plans;  and  New  York  submitted  to  the  peo- 
ple a  proposed  new  constitution  which  had  in  it  a  budget 
provision.  In  1916  Louisiana  and  Maryland  amended 
their  constitutions  to  make  a  budget  mandatory.  New 
Jersey  provided  for  a  budget  by  statute  and  New  York 
passed  the  Sage-Maier  law. 

In  191 7  statutory  budget  provisions  were  passed  by 
Illinois,  South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Kansas,  New  Mexico 
and  Utah.  Besides  these,  Delaware  and  Mississippi 
provided  for  a  trial  procedure  for  the  next  legislative 
session,  and  North  Carolina  imposed  on  the  Legisla- 
tive Reference  Bureau  the  duty  of  collecting,  preparing, 
and  submitting  estimates.  Vermont  also  revised  the  pro- 
cedure enacted  in  19 14. 

In  1918,  two  states,  Massachusetts  and  West  Virginia, 
provided  for  a  budget  procedure  by  constitutional  amend- 
ment, and  Georgia,  Kentucky,  Mississippi,  and  Virginia 
set  up  a  regular  budget  procedure  by  statutory  enactment. 

In  the  spring  sessions  of  19 19,  Indiana  enacted  a  pro- 
posed   constitutional    amendment,    and    fourteen    states 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  121 

passed  budget  laws ;  namely,  Alabama,  Arizona,  Colorado, 
Idaho.  Maine,  Michigan,  Montana,  Nevada,  New  Ham- 
shire,  North  Carolina,  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,  Texas, 
and  Wyoming.  South  Dakota  and  Connecticut  amended 
their  laws  and  Nebraska  and  New  Mexico  repealed  their 
old  laws  by  the  passage  of  the  new  ones. 

Of  the  remaining  four  states  all  of  the  legislatures  have 
had  the  subject  before  them.  The  Pennsylvania  legis- 
lature passed  a  budget  law  in  19 17  which  was  vetoed  by 
the  governor.  In  Florida,  Missouri,  and  Rhode  Island 
the  subject  was  brought  before  the  legislature  by  ex- 
ecutive message. 

Budget  Movement,  a  Quest  for  Responsible  Leadership 

In  considering  the  recent  movement  for  a  budget  pro- 
cedure, this  fact  cannot  be  given  too  great  weight :  that 
the  quest  for  responsible  government  is  the  quest  for  a 
means  of  making  effective  popular  control  over  public 
servants  —  both  administrative  and  deliberative.  A  form 
of  organization  adapted  to  getting  things  done  is  as 
necessary  to  the  development  of  ideals  and  a  dominant 
popular  will  as  it  is  to  rendering  service  demanded.  Hav- 
ing provided  an  organization  effective  for  purposes  of 
ministering  to  public  wants,  it  is  quite  as  important  to 
provide  an  organization  and  procedure  which  will  be 
effective  as  a  means  of  popular  control.  In  fact,  these 
two  things  must  go  hand  in  hand.  If  adequate  means  of 
popular  control  are  not  provided  for,  the  people  them- 
selves in  defense  of  their  liberties  will  insist  on  a  weak 
organization  for  rendering  service.  This  is  the  normal 
and  usual  reaction  against  irresponsible  leadership  to  pre- 
vent it  from  being  so  strong  as  to  become  dangerous. 
The  overthrow  of  autocratic  power  is  always  considered 
more  important  in  a  democracy  than  efficient  service. 
And  when  the  service  organization  becomes  impaired  in 
order  to  overthrow  executive  autocracy,  executive  leader- 


122      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ship  remains  weak  until  the  demands  for  service  reestab- 
lishes it  on  a  responsible  basis.  Our  whole  history,  our 
negative  political  philosophy,  our  constantly  recurring  up- 
sets of  administrative  organization,  bear  witness  to  truth 
of  this  conclusion. 

Strong,  able  leadership  is  as  necessary  to  the  effective 
administration  of  public  service  as  it  is  to  the  administra- 
tion of  private  business.  But  the  leadership  must  be 
made  responsible  and  responsive  to  public  opinion,  other- 
wise it  will  be  inhibited.  A  democratic  electorate  is  the 
organ  or  agency  of  the  state  for  sounding  public  opinion. 
A  representative  body  is  the  only  practical  means  of  in- 
quest, criticism,  and  discussion  of  the  acts  and  proposals 
of  the  administration  in  aid  of  the  electorate.  To  con- 
nect this  organ  of  inquiry  and  discussion  with  the  people, 
its  deliberations  must  be  conducted  in  the  open  —  must 
be  made  public  knowledge. 

It  is  with  a  view  of  making  the  representative  branch 
of  the  government  effective  for  purposes  of  inquest, 
criticism,  and  discussion,  effective  for  impressing  the  will 
of  the  people  on  the  administration  through  its  leader- 
ship, that  control  over  the  purse  has  been  given  to  them. 

A  budget  procedure  is  the  only  effective  means  which 
has  ever  been  devised  for  forcing  administrative  leader- 
ship, the  responsible  executives,  to  come  before  the  repre- 
sentative body  not  alone  to  give  an  account  of  past  acts, 
but  to  require  them  to  make  known  their  plans  for  the 
future  before  further  support  is  given.  To  make  such 
a  procedure  effective  as  a  means  of  popular  control,  how- 
ever, it  is  not  enough  to  provide  a  means  whereby  a  few 
representatives,  or  all  of  them,  may  become  informed 
before  they  are  called  on  to  vote  supplies;  this  is  neces- 
sary, but  it  is  quite  as  necessary  that  the  information 
developed  shall  reach  the  people.  Any  procedure  for  the 
consideration  of  the  acts  and  proposals  of  the  public 
service,    and   the   determination   of   questions   of   policy 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  123 

and  public  law,  must  be  the  procedure  of  a  public  forum. 
The  inquiries,  discussion  and  determination  of  the  forum 
must  be  so  cast  as  to  give  them  news  value.  Otherwise 
they  cannot  be  generally  known.  This  is  the  only  way 
that  the  forum  of  the  people  can  be  made  public.  The 
conduct  of  all  proceedings  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give 
them  current  news  value  is  of  special  importance  in  the 
consideration  of  a  budget,  since  the  budget  is  at  once  the 
means  of  enforcing  accountability  and  of  promoting  and 
protecting  the  public  service.  For  either  result  it  should 
be  prepared,  explained,  and  openly  discussed  by  officers 
directly  or  indirectly  responsible  to  the  people.  The  pro- 
cedure governing  the  presentation  of  the  budget  must 
provide  the  occasion  and  the  means  of  publicly  re- 
viewing every  question  and  criticism  raised  by  repre- 
sentatives before  public  moneys  are  voted ;  and  finally 
the  procedure  developed  should  make  known  how  each 
representative  stands  with  respect  to  each  service  for 
which  support  requested  is  given  or  denied. 

It  is  by  this  standard  for  judgment  that  the  recent 
proposals  and  enactments  for  the  development  of  a  budget 
proposal  in  the  states  and  in  Congress  should  be  appraised. 

Three  General  Types  of  State  Budgets 

The  recent  enactments  for  a  budget  procedure  in  the 
forty-four  states  mentioned  above  are  of  three  general 
types,  as  shown  by  the  table  on  page  124,  the  executive 
type,  the  commission  type,  and  the  legislative  type.  The 
commission  type  is  of  two  kinds :  one,  the  membership 
of  which  is  appointed  by  the  executive  or  made  up  of 
executive  and  administrative  agents ;  another,  the  mem- 
bership of  which  is  in  part  ex  officio  or  by  appointment 
executive,  and  in  part  ex  officio  or  by  appointment  legis- 
lative. 

The  executive  type,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  a  form 
of  procedure  which  looks  to  a  popularly  elected  chief 


124      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 


executive  as  the  person  responsible  for  giving  an  account 
of  acts  of  the  administration,  involving  the  raising  and 
spending  of  public  money,  and  for  the  preparation  of  a 

TABLE  SHOWING  STATES   WHICH  HAVE  PASSED 
BUDGET  LAWS 


Year 

Executive 
Type 

Board  or  Commission 

T">'PE 

Legis- 
lative 
Type 

No. 

BY 

Yrs. 

Executive 

Mixed 
Ex-Leg. 

igu 

Calif. 

Wise. 

2 

1913 

Ore. 
Ohio 

Ark. 

3 

1915 

Iowa 
Minn. 
Neb.  (a) 

Conn,  (a) 
Wash. 

N.  Dak. 
Vt. 

7 

1916 

Md.  (b) 
N.J. 

La. 

N.  Y. 

4 

1917 

Del.  (c) 

111. 

Kan. 

N.   Mex.  (a) 

Utah 

Tenn. 

S.Dak.  (a) 

7 

1918 

Mass.  (b) 

Miss. 

Va. 

Ky. 
W.Va.(b) 

Ga. 

6 

1919 

Ariz. 
Colo. 
Idaho 
Ind.  (d) 
Nev. 
N.  H. 
Okla. 
S.    C. 
Wyo. 

Ala. 
Mont. 
Mich. 
Texas 

Me. 
N.  C. 

15 

Totals. 

24 

11 

7 

2 

44 

(a)  Provisions  changed  and  revised  in  1919. 

(b)  Adopted  constitutional  amendment. 

(c)  Experimentally,  for  one  session  only. 

(d)  Constitutional  amendment  to  be  submitted  to  people. 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  125 

plan  or  program  of  administration  for  the  future  period 
for  which  appropriations  are  asked  —  this  account  of  past 
acts  and  program  for  the  future  to  be  made  the  subject 
of  inquiry,  discussion,  and  action  in  the  representative, 
deliberative  branch  of  the  government. 

The  commission  type,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  a 
form  of  procedure  which  looks  to  a  board  as  the  agency 
through  which  the  account  of  acts  of  the  administration 
involving  the  raising  and  spending  of  public  money  is 
to  be  presented ;  and  which  is  also  to  prepare  the  estimates 
for  the  future  period  to  be  financed  that  come  before  the 
representative,  deliberative  branch  of  the  government  for 
inquiry,  discussion,  and  action. 

The  legislative  type,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  a  pro- 
cedure which  looks  to  the  legislature  for  the  preparation 
of  a  plan  or  program  for  administration  during  a  future 
period  to  be  financed  —  receiving  and  treating  all  accounts 
of  past  acts  and  all  estimates  for  the  future  period  to  be 
financed  as  advices  or  information  to  be  considered  by 
them  or  by  a  staff  or  committee  acting  for  them  —  for 
which  purpose  the  executive  and  the  administrative  offi- 
cers, in  so  far  as  they  have  duties  to  perform,  act  in  a 
ministerial  or  advisory  capacity. 

Whatever  the  type,  if  the  budget  is  to  operate  effec- 
tively as  an  agency  of  control,  the  authority  charged  with 
the  duty  of  making  it  must  be  possessed  of  these  es- 
sentials and  powers : 

1.  It  must  be  provided  with  an  adequate  staff,  com- 
petent to  study  the  needs  of  the  administration  in  order 
that  an  informing  exhibit  may  be  prepared,  showing  the 
cost  of  operation  of  the  existing  establishment,  and  accu- 
rately showing  present  financial  conditions,  so  as  to  enable 
the  sponsors  for  the  future  program  to  be  financed  to  ex- 
plain and  defend  their  recommendations  or  requests. 

2.  It  must  be  provided  with  the  means  necessary  to 
supervise  carefully  current  expenditures,  and  inhibit  ac- 


126      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tion  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  intent  of  the  grants  made 
by  the  appropriating  branch. 

And  if  the  budget  is  to  be  the  means  of  making  popular 
control  effective  there  must  be  a  procedure  developed  in 
the  appropriating  body  which  locates  responsibility  for 
leadership  —  bringing  into  relief  the  men  and  measures 
which  are  to  be  made  the  subjects  of  electoral  choice. 
Our  whole  electoral  system  is  based  on  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  institutions  must  be  operated  by  men.  Democ- 
racy insists  on  a  leadership  which  is  trusted.  The  budget 
system  to  be  effective  for  purposes  of  popular  control 
must  carry  with  it  a  means  of  determining  what  measures 
or  policies  are  to  be  adopted  and  what  men  are  to  be 
trusted  to  execute  them.  Any  system  of  budget  making 
which  fails  in  this  is  not  consistent  with  the  ideals  of 
democracy. 

Appraisement  of  Types  of  State  Budgets 

The  first,  the  "  executive  type,"  assumes  that  the  gov- 
ernment can  best  be  made  responsible  by  requiring  the 
governor,  as  the  elected  head  of  the  administration,  not 
only  to  assume  responsibility  for  past  administrative  acts, 
but  also  for  all  administrative  plans  looking  toward  the 
improvement  of  the  service.  Thus  the  budget  procedure 
is  one  of  establishing  and  enforcing  accountability  to  the 
people  and  their  representatives. 

The  second,  the  "  commission  type,"  assumes  that  both 
the  financial  statement  and  the  administrative  program 
for  a  future  period  can  best  be  prepared  by  a  group  which 
is  neither  responsible  for  executing  policies  previously 
determined  on  or  for  determining  policies  for  the  future. 

The  third,  the  "  legislative  type,"  assumes  that  the  policy 
determining  body  itself,  from  information  called  for  and 
developed  through  inquiry,  can  best  formulate  the  ad- 
ministrative policies  which  it  is  to  pass  on,  thereby  re- 
lieving the  executive  from  all  responsibility  for  leader- 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  127 

ship.  This  third  type  is  a  continuation  of  the  principle 
of  legislative  domination  established  during  the  revolu- 
tionary period  and  continued  for  more  than  a  century  —  a 
principle  in  the  operation  of  which  the  government  by 
standing  committees,  boss  rule,  logrolling  methods,  and 
pork-barrel  politics  in  its  worst  form  has  developed. 
Only  two  states  frankly  adopted  a  budget  system  of  this 
type  —  New  York  and  Arkansas.  In  New  York  a  strong 
staff  agency  has  been  created  to  assist  the  legislature 
in  its  work.  In  the  outworking  of  the  plan  in  that 
state  the  demand  for  a  more  orderly  handling  of  the 
finances  have  been  met ;  but  in  both  states  the  government 
is  just  as  invisible  to  the  people,  and  just  as  irresponsi- 
ble, as  before. 

The  second  type  is  an  outgrowth  of  that  school  of 
American  political  thought  which  had  for  its  purpose  to 
defeat  the  boss,  and  prevent  the  building  up  of  "  parties  " 
by  distribution  of  patronage  and  spoils,  thereby  weaken- 
ing both  the  executive  and  the  legislative  branches  of  the 
government  and  placing  the  administration  in  the  hands 
of  boards.  The  budget  commission  is  simply  another 
board  imposed  through  which  the  activities  of  the 
various  independent  administrative  bodies  are  to  be 
coordinated.  In  Wisconsin,  North  Dakota,  South 
Dakota,  Maine,  North  Carolina,  Vermont,  and  Georgia 
this  is  a  mixed  commission,  made  up  largely  of  ex  officio 
members  in  part  taken  from  the  administration  and  in  part 
taken  from  the  two  houses  of  the  legislature,  the  idea  be- 
ing that  by  such  means  an  agreement  may  be  reached 
through  conference.  This,  however,  confuses  responsi- 
bility and  does  not  make  for  publicity.  In  fact,  it  is  an 
abandonment  of  the  underlying  principles  of  responsible 
government.  In  California,  Washington,  Montana, 
Michigan,  Connecticut,  West  Virginia,  and  the  five  South- 
ern states,  Louisiana,  Texas,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and 
Alabama,  the  budget  commission  is  made  up  of  executive 


128      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  administrative  officers.  These  continue  to  accept  the 
idea  that  the  executive  is  not  competent  to  take  leadership 
or  is  not  to  be  trusted.  California,  perhaps,  is  to  be  ex- 
cepted, since  the  commission  under  the  strong  leadership 
of  Governor  Johnson  in  practice  operated  as  his  staff 
agency.  There  a  procedure  of  monthly  or  periodical  al- 
lotments was  adopted  by  which  the  commission  was  put 
into  constant  and  effective  supervisory  relation  over  ex- 
penditures. But,  generally  speaking,  the  plan  itself  is  one 
which  is  intended  to  relieve  the  governor  of  responsibility, 
and  it  does  not  contribute  to  making  popular  control  ef- 
fective. 

The  first,  the  executive  type,  has  been  accepted  by 
twenty-three  states.  This  has  been  the  direct  outgrowth 
of  an  effort  to  locate  and  enforce  responsibility.  But 
in  no  case  has  an  organization  and  procedure  been  effected 
which  fully  meets  the  requirement.  The  old  legislative 
procedure  has  been  retained.  Several  of  these  states 
have  provided  the  governor  with  the  staff  means  for 
keeping  in  touch  with  the  administration,  and  of  prepar- 
ing well-considered  estimates  of  expenditures  as  a  basis 
for  his  requests  for  funds.  Under  the  leadership  of 
Governor  Lowden  Illinois  has  gone  further  than  any  other 
state  in  the  organization  of  a  department  of  finance,  the 
head  of  which  is  appointed  (with  the  Senate's  approval) 
and  removable  by  the  governor  at  will.  This  department 
is  responsible  for  all  departmental  accounting,  the  prepar- 
ation of  specifications  to  be  used  in  making  purchases,  the 
review  and  approval  of  contracts.  Monthly  requisitions 
for  authorization  to  spend  departmental  appropriations 
are  required,  thereby  giving  to  the  governor  through  his 
director  of  finance  the  means  of  administering  expendi- 
tures currently;  and  a  special  officer  and  staff  is  charged 
with  the  duty  of  compiling  the  data  and  at  the  end  of  the 
year  of  preparing  the  estimates  to  be  reviewed  by  the 
governor.     Governor  Lowden  also  went  before  the  legis- 


Recent  State  Budget  Enactments  129 

lature  personally  to  present  the  budget,  and  strict  orders 
were  given  to  all  the  governor's  departments  that  no 
one  should  ask  for  appropriations  or  increases  except 
through  the  department  of  finance.  In  a  number  of 
the  states  adopting  this  type  of  budget  practically  noth- 
ing has  been  done  by  way  of  administrative  reorgan- 
ization either  to  provide  adequate  staff  facilities  to  enable 
the  governor  to  act  intelligently,  or  to  locate  responsibility. 
And  in  all  of  them  the  old  legislative  procedure  still  re- 
mains —  a  procedure  which  is  not  designed  either  for 
informing  the  members  of  the  legislature  or  for  giving 
publicity  to  inquiry,  criticism,  and  discussion  of  the  acts 
and  proposals  of  the  executive  and  spending  officers. 

Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  in  no  state  has  provision 
been  made  whereby  responsible  leaders  may  appeal  directly 
to  the  people  on  issues  in  controversy  in  case  of  a  dead- 
lock. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  the 
"  legislative  type  "  is  not  and  cannot  be  made  to  serve  the 
purposes  of  a  democracy ;  that  the  other  two  types,  while 
they  may  be  made  consistent  with  democratic  ideals,  to 
do  so  each  must  work  out  an  entirely  different  procedure 
for  locating  and  enforcing  responsibility.  Neither  the 
"  executive  type  "  or  the  "  commission  type  "  has  so  far 
developed  a  procedure  which  makes  for  publicity;  and 
neither  has  provided  or  attempted  to  provide  for  an  ef- 
fective means  of  appeal  to  the  people  on  vital  issues. 


PART  II.  DETAILED  ACCOUNTS  OF  PROPOSED 
PLANS  AND  RECENT  LEGAL  ENACTMENTS 
FOR  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZA- 
TION IN  STATE  GOVERNMENTS 


CHAPTER  IX  » 

EARLIER    PROPOSED    PLANS    FOR    CENTRALIZATION    OF 
EXECUTIVE   AUTHORITY 

Minnesota,  Iowa,  and  New  York  were  the  first  states 
to  conduct  comprehensive  and  scientific  studies  of  their 
administrative  agencies.  Although  the  plans  of  reorgan- 
ization which  were  proposed  in  these  states  were  never 
adopted,  they  are  still  of  sufficient  interest  because  of  their 
influence  on  subsequent  plans  of  centralization  in  other 
states  to  warrant  a  brief  description.  Minnesota  and 
Iowa  began  their  investigations  with  reference  to  admin- 
istrative reorganization  in  19 13.  The  Minnesota  plan 
for  consolidation  was  worked  out  with  greater  care  and 
in  greater  detail  than  the  Iowa  plan.  For  this  reason 
it  has  probably  been  more  generally  known  outside  of  the 
state  than  any  other  similar  scheme,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  the  plans  of  New  York  and  Illinois.  The 
former  was  worked  out  in  great  detail  and  at  the  same 
time  was  subjected  to  a  searching  discussion  during  the 
Constitutional  Convention  of  191 5.  These  have  all  had 
definite  influence  upon  the  reorganization  plans  which 
have  since  been  developed. 

THE    MINNESOTA    PLAN 

In  19 1 3  the  governor  of  Minnesota  appointed  an  effici- 
ency and  economy  commission.  This  commission  was 
composed  of  thirty  members  appointed  by  the  governor 

1 A  considerable  part  of  the  material  contained  in  this  and  the 
three  subsequent  chapters  has  appeared  in  a  supplement  of  the 
National  Municipal  Review,  for  November,  1919. 

133 


134      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  represented  the  political  and  industrial  interests  of  all 
sections  of  the  state.  The  commission  began  its  work 
in  the  fall  of  1913.  It  received  its  support  from  private 
sources,  since  the  legislature  provided  no  appropriation 
for  the  work.  The  commission  employed  a  staff  consist- 
ing of  a  consulting  statistician,  Dr.  E.  Dana  Durand, 
former  director  of  the  United  States  census,  a  secretary, 
and  a  clerk. 

Two  Reports  and  Findings  of  Commission 

The  commission  published  two  reports,  one  a  prelim- 
inary report  in  May,  19 14,  the  other  a  final  report  in 
November,  19 14.  The  main  features  of  the  commis- 
sion's consolidation  plan  were  outlined  in  the  preliminary 
report.  The  final  report  contained  bills  drawn  by  the 
commission  for  carrying  into  effect  the  recommendations 
of  the  first  report  with  regard  to  reorganization  and  the 
establishment  of  a  budget  system.  Each  of  the  reports 
contained  a  rather  crude  chart  showing  the  existing  organ- 
ization of  state  government  and  the  proposed  plan  of  the 
commission. 

The  recommendations  of  the  commission,  as  embodied 
in  the  preliminary  report,  related  to  three  subjects ;  namely, 
centralization  of  administrative  authority,  the  merit 
system  of  civil  service,  and  the  adoption  of  a  budget 
system.  Under  the  subject  of  administrative  reorgan- 
ization, the  principal  defects  of  the  existing  system  were 
pointed  out  as : 

(1)  Multiplicity  of  independent  branches;  (2)  diver- 
sity in  form;  and  (3)  predominance  of  the  board  system. 
The  report  showed  that  there  were  about  seventy-five 
independent  administrative  agencies,  that  a  great  number 
of  these  agencies  were  administered  by  ex  officio  boards, 
and  that  there  were  certain  essential  state  functions  per- 
formed by  private  associations.  This  variety  in  the  form 
of  organization,  the  commission  asserted,  had  no  logical 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  135 

basis  and  only  tended  to  confuse  the  public  and  destroy 
responsibility.  The  board  system,  it  declared,  tended  to 
delay,  inefficiency  and  dissipated  responsibility.  Further- 
more, it  found  that  the  necessity  for  boards  was  limited 
to  quasi-legislative  and  quasi-judicial  work,  and  thaf 
boards  were  not  useful  for  administrative  work.  Finally, 
it  asserted  that  since  board  members  usually  have  over- 
lapping terms,  and  each  governor  may  appoint  only  a 
minority,  each  board  is  a  government  by  itself. 

Recommendations  of  Preliminary  Report 

The  commission  proposed  to  set  up  six  executive  de- 
partments ;  namely  finance,  public  domain,  public  wel- 
fare, education,  labor  and  commerce,  and  agriculture. 
A  few  special  functions  were  to  be  performed  by  the  ad- 
ministrative agencies  outside  these  departments,  such  as 
the  civil  service  commission  and  the  tax  commission. 
The  constitutional  officers  were  not  to  be  affected  by  the 
proposed  reorganization.  The  heads  of  the  proposed  de- 
partments were  to  be  as  follows :  ( 1 )  Treasurer,  con- 
stitutional officer,  elected  by  the  people,  acting  as  director 
of  finance;  (2)  director  of  public  domain,  appointed  by 
the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate;  (3)  director 
of  public  welfare,  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate;  (4)  education  ;  (a)  board  of  education 
appointed  by  the  governor;  director  of  education  ap- 
pointed by  the  board;  (b)  board  of  regents  appointed  by 
the  governor;  president  of  university  appointed  by  the 
regents;  (5)  director  of  labor  and  commerce  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate;  and  (6) 
director  of  agriculture,  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  consent  of  the  Senate. 

Executive  Heads  of  Departments 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  plan  of  the  commission  con- 
templated two  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  that  there 


136      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

shall  be  a  single  head  appointed  by  the  governor  for 
each  department.  These  exceptions  were  the  department 
of  finance  and  the  department  of  education.  In  the 
former  case  the  treasurer,  who  is  a  constitutional  officer 
elected  by  the  people,  was  to  be  made  head  of  the  depart- 
ment. In  the  latter  case  the  commission  recommended 
two  boards,  the  regents  of  the  university  and  the  new 
board  of  education  having  charge  of  all  other  state  edu- 
cational work.  This,  it  appears,  was  a  concession,  as 
the  commission  said  that  in  recommending  this  form  of 
organization  it  was  following  the  general  practice  or 
custom  to  treat  education  as  independent  of  other  func- 
tions of  government. 

The  directors,  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor, 
were  to  hold  office  at  his  pleasure  and  be  responsible 
to  him  for  the  conduct  of  their  departments.  They  were 
to  be  the  assistants  of  the  governor  in  the  conduct  of 
the  administration.  Furthermore,  they  were  to  constitute 
the  governor's  cabinet,  similar  to  the  cabinet  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  thus  making  the  administration 
a  unit.  The  governor's  term  being  only  two  years,  the 
terms  of  the  cabinet  members  were  similarly  limited. 

In  each  of  the  departments  proposed  by  the  commission, 
bureaus  were  to  be  set  up  as  outlined  and  described.  The 
bureau  chiefs  under  the  directors  were  to  be  trained  ex- 
perts. They  were  to  constitute  the  permanent  depart- 
mental staff  and  were  to  come  under  the  merit  system 
of  civil  service,  and  consequently  were  not  to  be  changed 
when  a  new  governor  came  into  office. 

Advisory  Boards 

While  the  commission  recommended  the  placing  of  all 
executive  functions  in  the  hands  of  individuals,  it  saw 
the  need  for  certain  boards  with  advisory,  quasi-legisla- 
tive, and  quasi-judicial  powers.  To  the  department  of 
finance  the  commission  recommended  the  attachment  in 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  137 

an  advisory  capacity  of  the  existing  board  of  investment, 
a  constitutional  and  ex  officio  body  charged  with  the  in- 
vestment of  state  trust  funds.  It  was  proposed  to  attach 
to  the  department  of  labor  and  commerce  the  existing 
board  of  railroad  commissioners,  a  body  of  three  members 
elected  by  the  people.  For  the  departments  of  public 
domain,  welfare,  and  agriculture,  special  advisory  boards 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  overlapping  terms,  were 
recommended. 

Recommendations  of  Final  Report 

The  final  report  of  the  commission  differed  from  the 
preliminary  report  in  that  it  recommended  five  instead 
of  six  departments  —  the  department  of  finance  being 
eliminated  and  placed  among  the  general  offices  not  in- 
cluded in  the  recommendations  of  the  commission. 

Results  Achieved 

The  net  gain  for  the  State  of  Minnesota  from  the  work 
of  this  commission  was  very  small  so  far  as  administra- 
tive reorganization  was  concerned.  Only  one  piece  of 
legislation  may  be  ascribed  to  the  influence  of  the  work 
of  the  commission  and  that  was  the  budget  law  enacted 
in  1915.  The  particular  value  of  this  commission's  work 
lies  in  the  influence  that  it  has  had  upon  subsequent  plans 
of  reorganization  in  other  states. 

THE  IOWA  PLAN 

The  Iowa  legislature  of  19 13  authorized  the  joint  com- 
mittee on  retrenchment  and  reform  to  employ  expert  ac- 
countants and  efficiency  engineers  who  were  to  make  a 
survey  of  the  administrative  organization  of  the  state. 
The  committee,  in  March  of  191 3,  engaged  a  firm  of 
efficiency  engineers  to  make  the  survey.  The  sum  of 
$10,000  was  appropriated  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the 


138      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

proposed  investigations.  The  efficiency  engineers  finished 
their  investigation  and  submitted  their  final  report  in  type- 
written form  in  December,  191 3. 

Report  of  Efficiency  Engineers 

In  preparation,  the  efficiency  engineers  made  examin- 
ations of  all  offices  and  departments  located  at  the  state 
capitol,  including  both  constitutional  and  statutory  offices. 
Besides  suggesting  changes  in  methods  and  pointing  to 
possible  economies  in  the  work  of  the  several  offices  and 
departments,  the  report  recommended  a  general  regroup- 
ing of  the  administrative  functions  of  the  state  govern- 
ment. The  reorganization  program  did  not,  according 
to  the  statement  of  the  engineers,  propose  changes  thought 
to  be  desirable  in  the  constitution  of  the  state,  but  con- 
fined its  recommendations  to  changes  that  could  be 
brought  about  by  legislative  action  and  to  consolidation 
by  grouping  some  of  the  elected  offices. 

The  plan  proposed  the  union  of  the  offices  of  the  state 
auditor  and  the  state  treasurer  through  the  establishment 
of  a  finance  department.  Under  the  direction  of  this  de- 
partment was  to  be  placed  the  control  of  the  whole  ac- 
counting system  of  the  state  and  also  the  preparation  of 
a  budget.  The  plan  also  proposed  the  establishment  of 
a  legal  department  through  the  union  of  the  offices  of 
the  secretary  of  state  and  the  attorney  general.  This  new 
department  was  to  handle  all  matters  of  legal  records  and 
justice.  The  creation  of  both  these  departments  was  to 
be  effected  by  a  union  or  rearrangement  of  the  functions 
and  duties,  thus  leaving  to  each  officer  his  constitutional 
status. 

The  plan  also  proposed  to  create  the  office  of  the  state 
purchasing  agent,  an  official  to  be  known  as  the  chief 
accountant,  and  a  civil  service  commission  or  bureau  to 
be  organized  to  administer  the  merit  system  which  was 
to  be  used  in  filling  all  administrative  positions  except  the 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  139 

constitutional  offices  and  the  heads  of  the  seven  proposed 
departments. 

The  proposed  departments  other  than  the  general  ad- 
ministrative offices  mentioned  above  were  to  be  as  follows  : 
(1)  agriculture;  (2)  commerce  and  industries;  (3) 
public  works;  (4)  public  safety;  (5)  public  health ;  (6) 
education;  (7)  charities  and  corrections. 

All  the  existing  divisions  and  agencies  of  the  executive 
branch  of  the  government  other  than  the  constitutional 
offices  and  certain  general  administrative  offices  already 
noted  were  assigned  to  some  one  of  the  seven  proposed 
departments.  Each  of  these  departments  was  to  be  under 
the  immediate  control  of  a  director  general.  The  gov- 
ernor himself  was  to  assume  the  portfolio  of  director 
general  of  the  department  of  public  safety.  The  heads 
of  the  remaining  six  departments  were  to  be  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate. 

It  was  also  proposed  that  the  existing  executive  coun- 
cil should  be  abolished  and  a  new  executive  council,  con- 
sisting of  the  director  generals  of  the  seven  departments, 
should  be  created.  This  executive  council  was  to  per- 
form the  function  of  cabinet  to  the  governor,  who  was 
to  be  its  chairman. 

Report  of  Committee 

Almost  a  year  after  the  report  of  the  efficiency  en- 
gineers was  submitted  to  the  committee,  the  committee  in 
turn  prepared  a  report  which  it  submitted  to  the  General 
Assembly  of  1915.  This  report  contained  a  brief  out- 
line of  quite  a  different  plan  of  reorganization  supported 
by  a  few  general  statements  as  to  the  need  for  grouping 
together  the  administrative  agencies  of  the  state. 

One  essential  difference  in  the  scheme  of  reorganiza- 
tion proposed  by  the  report  of  the  joint  committee  ap- 
pears in  that  it  proposed  the  grouping  of  all  executive 
functions  of  the  state,  except  a  few  which  were  placed 


140      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

under  "  general  administration,"  into  three  great  divisions 
designated  under  the  heads  of:  (1)  department  of  social 
progress;  (2)  department  of  industries;  (3)  department 
of  public  safety.  The  department  of  social  progress 
was  to  include  and  have  supervision  over  educational 
and  allied  functions,  such  as  libraries  and  archives,  and 
in  addition  the  prison-parole  functions.  The  department 
of  industries  was  to  include  and  have  supervision  over 
agricultural  functions,  also  all  regulatory  functions  in 
connection  with  labor,  commerce,  insurance,  and  bank- 
ing. The  department  of  public  safety  was  to  include  and 
supervise  the  law  enforcing  functions,  the  conservational 
and  custodial  functions,  the  functions  of  registration 
and  inspection,  and  in  addition  the  work  of  the  state 
highway  commission.  Each  of  these  departments  was 
to  be  under  the  direction  of  a  head  appointed  by  the 
governor.  The  report  contained  no  statement  of  the 
functions  of  the  numerous  subdivisions  under  each  of  the 
three  proposed  departments. 

Results 

No  legislation  resulted  directly  either  from  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  efficiency  engineers  or  from  the  re- 
commendations of  the  committee  on  retrenchment  and 
reform.  A  budget  law,  however,  was  enacted  by  the 
19 1 5  legislature. 

THE  NEW  YORK  PLAN  OF  I915 

As  early  as  19 10  Governor  Hughes  in  his  annual  mes- 
sage to  the  legislature  of  New  York  State  recommended 
administrative  reorganization  and  consolidation,  which 
he  said  would  "  tend  to  promote  efficiency  in  public  office 
by  increasing  the  effectiveness  of  the  voter  and  by  dimin- 
ishing the  opportunities  of  the  political  manipulators  who 
take  advantage  of  the  multiplicity  of  elective  offices  to 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  141 

perfect  their  scheme  at  the  public  expense."  Further- 
more, he  expressed  the  belief  that  responsibility  should 
be  "  centered  in  the  governor,  who  should  appoint  a 
cabinet  of  administrative  heads  accountable  to  him  and 
charged  with  the  duties  now  devolved  upon  elective  state 
officers." 

Recognition  of  Need  for  Reorganisation 

Following  this  message  of  Governor  Hughes,  a  resolu- 
tion to  amend  the  constitution  was  introduced  in  the  As- 
sembly of  19 10  providing  for  the  appointment  of  all  state 
officers  except  the  governor  and  the  lieutenant  governor. 
A  heated  discussion  ensued,  with  the  result  that  the  resolu- 
tion failed  to  pass. 

The  movement  for  centralization  of  responsibility  was 
again  revived  in  the  election  campaigns  of  1912.  In  1913 
the  legislature  passed  a  bill  establishing  a  department  of 
efficiency  and  economy  under  a  commissioner  appointed 
by  Governor  Sulzer  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate  for  a 
term  of  five  years.  In  19 14  this  department,  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  of  New  York 
City,  began  the  preparation  of  a  report  on  the  government 
and  administration  of  the  state  for  the  Constitutional 
Convention  which  was  to  meet  the  following  year.  As 
a  result  of  the  combined  efforts  of  these  two  agencies 
there  was  published  in  January,  191 5,  a  large  volume  of 
more  than  seven  hundred  pages,  entitled  "  Government 
of  the  State  of  New  York :  A  Survey  of  its  Organization 
and  Functions."  This  volume  gave  a  minute  description 
of  the  legislative,  judicial,  and  administrative  organization 
of  the  state  government.  It  also  set  forth  graphically  all 
the  boards,  departments,  commissions,  bureaus,  and  offices 
of  the  state,  together  with  their  functions,  number  of 
their  employees,  salaries  and  other  costs,  and  their  organic 
relations  or  absence  of  relations.  The  report  showed  that 
there  were  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine  agencies  of  the 


142      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

state  government,  most  of  which  had  been  created  in 
recent  years.  It  also  pointed  out  that  the  entire  structure 
of  the  state  government  seemed  to  have  "  grown  up  from 
year  to  year,  rather  than  to  have  been  built  according 
to  any  studied  plan  of  scientific  and  economic  needs." 
Numerous  conflicts  of  authority  and  overlappings  of 
jurisdiction  were  pointed  out.  One  hundred  and  eight 
boards  were  shown  to  exist.  "  A  number  of  them,"  said 
the  report,  "  were  created  for  similar  purposes  and  a 
number  perform  functions  for  which  there  already  existed 
at  the  time  of  their  creation  fully  organized  departments 
of  the  government.  Some  are  elected  by  the  legislature, 
some  appointed  by  the  governor,  some  are  of  ex  officio 
membership,  some  are  paid,  others  are  not  paid." 

Study  of  Existing  Machinery 

Upon  the  completion  of  this  joint  undertaking  the 
Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  was  requested  by  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention  Commission  to  prepare  an  ap- 
praisal of  the  existing  organization  of  the  state  govern- 
ment. In  compliance  with  this  request  the  Bureau  issued 
a  volume  entitled  "  The  Constitution  and  Government  of 
the  State  of  New  York"  (Municipal  Research  No.  61) 
in  which  the  existing  structure  and  methods  of  the  state 
government  were  subjected  to  careful  and  comprehensive 
appraisal.  The  Bureau  also  worked  out  a  proposed  plan 
of  administrative  reorganization  which  it  laid  before  the 
committees  of  the  Constitutional  Convention. 

Political  Parties  Become  Interested 

In  1914  both  great  political  parties  of  the  state  seemed 
clearly  to  recognize  the  failure  of  the  existing  administra- 
tive system.  The  Republican  platform  of  that  year, 
framed  especially  with  a  view  to  constitutional  revision, 
said :  "  We  recommend  a  substantial  reduction  in  the 
number   of   elective   officers   by   the   application   of   the 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  143 

principles  of  the  short  ballot  to  the  executive  officers  of 
the  state.  To  prevent  the  multiplication  of  offices,  we 
recommend  that  the  various  administrative  functions  of 
the  state,  so  far  as  practicable,  be  vested  in  a  limited 
number  of  departments.  The  present  duplication  of  ef- 
fort and  expense  in  the  public  institutions  of  the  state 
should  be  remedied  by  the  establishment  of  a  simpler  and 
better  organized  system."  The  Democratic  platform  of 
the  same  year  declared :  "  There  should  be  no  divided 
authority  or  responsibility  in  executing  and  administering 
the  laws  of  the  state.  The  time  has  come  to  give  the 
people  control  of  their  executive  government.  The  re- 
sponsibility should  be  centered  in  the  governor.  He 
should  have  the  absolute  power  of  removal.  The  various 
boards  and  commissions  should  be  made  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  governor." 

The  Work  of  the  Constitutional  Convention 

As  a  result  of  the  agitation  for  administrative  reform 
and  reorganization  several  plans  were  prepared  and  laid 
before  the  Constitutional  Convention,  which  met  in  the 
summer  of  19 15.  After  due  consideration  of  these  plans 
by  the  committee  on  the  governor  and  other  state  officers, 
a  proposed  amendment  to  the  constitution  was  submitted 
to  the  Convention  for  discussion  on  August  11,  191 5. 
This  amendment  proposed  to  establish  fifteen  depart- 
ments :  namely,  justice,  audit  and  control,  education, 
public  utilities,  conservation,  civil  service,  state,  taxation 
and  finance,  public  works,  health,  agriculture,  charities 
and  corrections,  banking,  insurance,  and  labor  and  indus- 
try. The  heads  of  the  department  of  justice  and  of  the 
department  of  audit  and  control  were  to  be  the  attorney 
general  and  comptroller,  respectively,  elected  at  the  same 
time  and  for  the  same  term  as  the  governor.  The  de- 
partment of  education  was  to  be  controlled  by  the  regents 
of  the  university,  who  were  to  appoint  the  chief  admin- 


144      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

istrative  officer  of  the  department.  The  department  of 
public  utilities  was  to  consist  of  two  commissions  of 
five  members  each,  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the 
consent  of  the  Senate  for  terms  of  five  years,  and  remov- 
able by  the  Senate  upon  recommendation  of  the  governor. 
The  department  of  conservation  was  to  be  under  the 
direction  of  a  conservation  commission  of  nine  members 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate 
for  overlapping  terms  of  nine  years.  This  commission 
was  to  appoint  the  chief  administrative  officer  of  the  de- 
partment. The  department  of  civil  service  was  to  be 
under  the  direction  of  a  civil  service  commission  consist- 
ing of  three  members  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the 
consent  of  the  Senate  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years. 
The  remaining  departments  were  to  be  administered  by 
single  heads  appointed  bv  the  governor  with  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  and  removable  by  him  in  his  discretion.  After 
the  adoption  of  this  amendment,  no  new  departments 
were  to  be  created  by  the  legislature,  but  all  new  functions 
were  to  be  assigned  to  one  of  the  existing  departments. 
The  legislature  was  to  provide  for  the  internal  organiza- 
tion of  the  departments. 

The  general  principles  set  forth  in  this  amendment  had 
been  discussed  before  the  committee  on  finance  and  the 
committee  on  the  governor  and  other  state  officers  by  such 
men  as  Ex-President  Taft,  President  Lowell  of  Harvard, 
and  President  Goodnow  of  Johns  Hopkins.  Following 
the  introduction  of  the  amendment  into  the  Constitutional 
Convention,  there  were  discussions  of  various  phases  of 
the  proposed  administrative  reorganization.  Mr.  Elihu 
Root  said  that  the  existing  system  was  an  "  invisible  gov- 
ernment "  in  which  the  political  boss  ruled  the  state  in 
spite  of  the  legislature,  the  governor,  and  the  other  elec- 
tive officers.  He  said  further  that  men  were  appointed 
to  office  not  for  the  service  they  would  render  to  the  state 
but  for  the  service  they  were  to  render  to  promote  the 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  145 

power  of  political  organizations.  Such  a  system,  he  de- 
clared, found  "  its  opportunity  in  the  division  of  powers, 
in  the  six-headed  executive,  in  which,  by  the  natural  work- 
ings of  human  nature,  there  shall  be  opposition  and  dis- 
cord in  the  playing  of  one  force  against  the  other,  and 
so  when  we  refuse  to  make  one  governor,  elected  by  the 
people,  the  real  chief  executive,  we  make  inevitable  the 
setting  up  of  a  chief  executive  not  selected  by  the  people, 
not  acting  for  the  people's  interest,  but  for  the  selfish 
interest  of  the  few  who  control  the  party,  whichever  party 
it  may  be."  In  criticizing  the  provisions  of  the  proposed 
amendment  Governor  Smith,  then  a  member  of  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention,  said  that  the  governor  should  have 
the  absolute  power  of  appointment  and  removal  of  the 
heads  of  departments  without  hindrance  on  the  part  of  the 
Senate.  He  said  that  without  such  provision  responsi- 
bility could  not  be  fixed  and  the  entire  plan  might  thus  be 
defeated  (Revised  Record  of  Constitutional  Convention, 
page  3353)- 

Plan  of  Reorganisation  Proposed  by  the  Convention 

The  result  of  the  discussions  was  a  considerable  modi- 
fication of  the  plan  presented  to  the  Convention  by  the 
committee  on  the  governor  and  other  state  officers.  The 
plan  of  administrative  organization  as  finally  adopted 
by  the  Constitutional  Convention  provided  for  seventeen 
departments  to  exercise  the  civil,  executive,  and  adminis- 
trative functions  of  the  state,  scattered  among  more  than 
one  hundred  and  fifty  boards,  orifices,  commissions,  and 
other  agencies.  These  departments  were  as  follows : 
(1)  law;  (2)  finance;  (3)  accounts;  (4)  treasury;  (5) 
taxation;  (6)  state;  (7)  public  works;  (8)  health;  (9) 
agriculture;  (10)  charities  and  corrections ;  (11)  banking; 
(12)  insurance,  (13)  labor  and  industry;  (14)  educa- 
tion; (15)  public  utilities;  (16)  conservation,  and  (17) 
civil  service.     The  heads  of  the  department  of  law  and 


146      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

of  the  department  of  finance  were  to  be  the  attorney 
general  and  the  comptroller  respectively,  who  were  to  be 
elected  at  the  same  time  and  for  the  same  term  as  the 
governor.  The  head  of  the  department  of  labor  and 
industry  was  to  be  an  industrial  commission  or  com- 
missioner to  be  provided  by  law,  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  The 
department  of  education  was  to  be  administered  by  the 
university  of  the  state  of  New  York,  the  chief  admin- 
istrative officer  of  which  was  to  be  appointed  by  the 
regents  of  the  university.  The  department  of  public 
utilities  was  to  consist  of  two  public  service  commissions, 
the  commissioners  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  The 
governor  might  remove  any  commissioner  for  cause  after 
an  opportunity  to  be  heard.  The  department  of  con- 
servation was  to  be  under  the  direction  of  the  conserva- 
tion commission  consisting  of  nine  commissioners  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  with  overlapping  terms  of  nine  years 
and  serving  without  compensation.  The  commission 
was  authorized  to  appoint  and  remove  a  superintendent 
and  also  to  appoint  his  subordinates.  The  department 
of  civil  service  was  to  be  under  the  direction  of  a  civil 
service  commission  consisting  of  three  members  appointed 
by  the  governor,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years.  The  re- 
maining ten  departments  were  to  have  single  heads  who 
were  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor  and  removable  by 
him  in  his  discretion.  The  reason  given  for  the  concur- 
rence of  the  Senate  in  the  appointment  of  heads  of  the 
departments  of  labor  and  industry,  public  utilities,  con- 
servation, and  civil  service  was  because  such  departments 
performed  both  legislative  and  administrative  functions. 
After  the  adoption  of  this  plan  no  new  departments  were 
to  be  created  by  the  legislature,  but  all  new  functions  were 


Earlier  Proposed  Plans  147 

to  be  assigned  to  one  of  the  existing  departments.  The 
internal  organization  of  the  departments  was  to  be  pro- 
vided for  by  legislation. 

Only  very  general  powers  were  prescribed  for  the 
several  departments.  In  some  cases  the  prescribing  of 
duties  was  left  entirely  to  subsequent  legislative  action. 
In  the  case  of  the  department  of  finance  it  was  stated  that 
the  comptroller  should  exercise  all  powers  and  duties  at 
that  time  devolving  upon  him  except  the  powers  of  ex- 
amination and  verification  of  accounts,  which  duties  were 
vested  in  the  department  of  accounts. 

This  plan  of  reorganization,  if  adopted,  would  have 
reduced  the  number  of  elective  state  officers  from  seven 
to  four,  leaving  only  the  governor,  lieutenant  governor, 
comptroller,  and  attorney  general  to  be  chosen  by  the 
voters.  The  secretary  of  state  and  the  treasurer  were 
to  become  appointive  by  the  governor,  and  the  office  of 
state  engineer  and  surveyor  was  to  be  abolished. 

Proposed  Reorganization  Defeated  at  the  Polls 

The  plan  of  administrative  reorganization  and  con- 
solidation proposed  by  the  Constitutional  Convention,  em- 
bodied in  the  proposed  constitution  and  submitted  to  the 
people  in  November,  19 15,  was  defeated  at  the  polls. 
Until  the  present  year,  when  the  state  reconstruction 
commission  began  its  work,  there  has  been  little  thought 
of  reviving  the  movement  in  New  York  for  administra- 
tive reorganization  and  consolidation.  The  work  of  this 
commission  will  be  taken  up  in  Chapter  XII. 


CHAPTER  X 

PLANS  FOR  THE  CENTRALIZATION  OF  EXECUTIVE  RESPON- 
SIBILITY   IN    OPERATION 

Three  states  have  recently  passed  and  put  into  opera- 
tion laws  which  reorganize  their  administrative  machinery 
in  such  a  manner  as  largely  to  centralize  executive  respon- 
sibility, viz.,  Illinois  in  1917;  Idaho  and  Nebraska  in  1919. 

ILLINOIS  PLAN 

The  legislature  of  19 13  provided  for  the  appointment 
of  a  committee  on  efficiency  and  economy  which  was 
composed  of  four  members  from  each  house  of  the  legis- 
lature. The  committee  was  given  full  power  to  investi- 
gate all  departments  and  agencies  of  the  state  govern- 
ment. Such  investigation  was  made  with  the  view  of 
combining  and  centralizing  the  work  of  the  various  state 
agencies  and  abolishing  those  that  were  found  useless. 
The  committee  was  given  the  power  to  employ  assistants 
and  was  provided  with  an  appropriation  of  $40,000. 

Work  of  the  Committee  on  Efficiency  and  Economy 

Upon  beginning  its  work  in  August,  19 13,  the  com- 
mittee employed  a  staff  of  investigators  which  was  placed 
under  the  direction  of  Professor  John  A.  Fairlie  of  the 
University  of  Illinois.  The  numerous  administrative 
agencies  of  the  state  were  arranged  in  twelve  groups 
according  to  their  general  functions,  and  each  one  of  these 
groups  was  assigned  to  a  trained  investigator  who  studied 
closely  the  conditions  and  made  a  report  to  the  committee. 

Tentative  plans  for  consolidation  were  drawn  up  and  for 

148 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility      149 

several  months  meetings  were  held  at  short  intervals. 
Later,  public  hearings  were  held  in  Chicago  and  Spring- 
field, at  which  many  state  officers  and  representatives  of 
associations  and  organizations  appeared  and  discussed  the 
proposed  plan  of  reorganization.  As  a  result,  much  addi- 
tional information  was  secured  and  some  changes  were 
made  in  the  tentative  proposals. 

Two  reports  were  issued  by  the  committee ;  a  prelimi- 
nary report  in  June,  19 14,  and  a  general  report  almost  a 
year  later.  The  latter  report,  a  volume  of  more  than  one 
thousand  pages,  contained  the  recommendations  of  the 
committee,  the  reports  of  the  special  investigators,  a 
comparative  statement  of  appropriations  covering  three 
legislative  periods,  and  charts  illustrating  both  the  exist- 
ing administration  and  the  proposed  reorganization. 

The  defects  of  the  existing  arrangement  of  the  Illinois 
administration,  as  pointed  out  by  the  committee,  were 
lack  of  correlation,  scattered  offices,  no  standards  of  com- 
pensation, overlapping  of  functions,  irregularity  of  re- 
ports, ineffective  supervision,  no  budget  system,  imper- 
fect accounts,  inadequate  advice  on  legislation,  and  irre- 
sponsible government. 

Committee's  Plan  of  Administrative  Reorganisation 

The  committee's  proposed  plan  of  reorganization  pro- 
vided for  the  consolidation  of  all  the  administrative 
agencies,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  general  offices, 
into  ten  departments  as  follows  :  ( 1 )  finance ;  (2)  charities 
and  corrections;  (3)  education;  (4)  public  works  and 
buildings;  (5)  agriculture;  (6)  public  health;  (7)  labor 
and  mining;  (8)  trade  and  commerce;  (9)  law,  and  (10) 
military  affairs.  The  agencies  left  outside  these  depart- 
ments were  the  secretary  of  state,  board  of  elections,  civil 
service  commission,  and  the  legislative  reference  bureau. 

The  proposed  departments  of  finance,  charities  and 
corrections,  education,  public  works  and  buildings,  trade 


150      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  commerce  were  to  be  under  the  control  of  commis- 
sions. The  departments  of  agriculture,  public  health, 
labor  and  mining  were  to  be  administered  by  single  heads 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate. 
The  department  of  law  was  to  be  under  the  control  of 
the  attorney  general,  a  constitutional  officer.  The  de- 
partment of  military  affairs  was  to  continue  as  previously 
organized. 

The  committee  accompanied  its  recommendations  to 
the  legislature  of  191 5  with  bills  designed  to  carry  into 
effect  its  recommendations,  but  with  the  exception  of  a 
bill  revising  the  law  relating  to  state  contracts,  none  of 
the  bills  passed  the  legislature. 

Governor  Lowden's  Role  in  the  Reorganisation 

Governor  Lowden  in  his  primary  campaign  during  the 
summer  of  19 16  made  numerous  speeches  in  which  he 
pointed  out  the  great  need  for  administrative  consolida- 
tion and  for  the  establishment  of  a  budget  system.  In 
his  inaugural  message  he  spoke  still  more  enthusiastically 
on  the  subject  of  administrative  reorganization  and  con- 
solidation. Immediately  following  his  inauguration  work 
was  commenced  upon  the  necessary  bills  to  carry  out  his 
ideas.  The  reports  of  the  efficiency  and  economy  com- 
mittee constituted  the  basis  for  the  preparation  of  these 
bills;  however,  "  the  specific  form  of  organization  recom- 
mended by  the  committee  was,  after  mature  deliberation, 
rejected  as  not  conducive  to  either  strength,  harmony,  or 
unity  of  administration." 

It  was  apparent  that  the  committee  had  not  only  been 
inconsistent  in  its  recommendations  for  the  overhead  or- 
ganization of  the  proposed  departments,  but  it  had  also 
compromised  principles  in  favor  of  expediency.  Some 
departments  were  to  be  administered  by  single  heads, 
others  were  to  be  under  the  control  of  boards.  For  ex- 
ample, the  committee  recommended  the  creation  of  a  de- 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility       151 

partment  of  finance  under  a  state  finance  commission  to 
consist  of  a  state  comptroller,  tax  commissioner,  and  rev- 
enue commissioner,  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the 
approval  of  the  Senate,  together  with  the  auditor  of  pub- 
lic accounts  and  the  state  treasurer,  both  serving  ex  officio. 
Each  of  these  officials  was  to  be  in  charge  of  a  particular 
division  having  specific  statutory  duties  to  perform.  The 
finance  commission  was  to  act  only  as  a  means  of  bring- 
ing together  these  independent  divisions.  Responsibility 
for  the  work  of  the  department  could  not,  therefore,  be 
definitely  located.  As  another  example,  the  commission 
recommended  the  establishment  of  a  department  of  public 
works  and  buildings  under  a  public  works  commission 
of  three  members ;  namely,  a  commissioner  of  highways, 
a  commissioner  of  waterways,  and  a  fish  and  game  com- 
missioner; with  a  bureau  for  each  of  these  services  and 
other  bureaus  under  the  superintendent  of  buildings  and 
grounds,  the  superintendent  of  state  parks,  and  state  art 
commission.  For  all  practical  purposes  the  several 
bureaus  and  divisions  would  have  been  independent  of 
each  other.  Statutory  duties  devolved  upon  subordinate 
officers  and  boards  within  the  department.  The  depart- 
ment had  no  one  responsible  head  having  control  of  all 
its  activities. 

After  having  carefully  considered  the  committee's  plan 
of  reorganization  in  the  light  of  the  facts  just  pointed 
out,  Governor  Lowden  came  to  the  conclusion  that  while 
the  general  recommendations  of  the  committee  were  valid 
and  ought  to  be  incorporated  in  law,  its  specific  recom- 
mendations for  the  overhead  organization  were  not  only 
"  inexpedient,  but  detrimental  to  administrative  effi- 
ciency." He  was  of  the  opinion  that  there  should  be  a 
consistent  and  uniform  plan  of  reorganization  which 
would  be  applicable  to  all  the  departments.  That  is,  he 
did  not  believe  that  part  of  them  should  be  under  a  single 
head  appointed  by  the  governor  and  others  should  be  con- 


152      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

trolled  by  one  or  more  commissions,  which  were  in  some 
cases  composed  of  both  appointive  and  ex  officio  officers. 
He  realized  that  it  was  inexpedient  for  the  time  being  to 
attempt  a  change  in  the  constitution,  but  he  determined 
that  the  plan  so  far  as  adopted  by  statutory  means  should 
be  a  uniform  one  and  therefore  a  proper  basis  upon  which 
to  build  up  the  complete  plan  of  reorganization  whenever 
the  time  came  to  amend  the  constitution.  He  also  thought 
that  a  single  bill  instead  of  a  number  of  bills,  as  proposed 
by  the  committee,  could  be  provided  which  would  embody 
the  necessary  legislation  to  put  the  plan  into  effect.  Ac- 
cordingly, an  act  was  drawn  and  passed  by  the  legisla- 
ture of  1917  called  the  Civil  Administrative  Code,  which 
abolished  more  than  one  hundred  independent  and  statu- 
tory offices,  departments,  boards,  commissions,  and  other 
agencies  and  consolidated  their  functions  and  duties  into 
nine  great  departments,  each  having  a  responsible  head 
known  as  the  director. 

Organization  Under  the  Civil  Administrative  Code 

The  Civil  Administrative  Code,  as  it  passed  the  legisla- 
ture, organized  all  the  civil  governmental  agencies  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  governor,  with  the  exception  of  a 
civil  service  commission  and  of  certain  minor  and  tempor- 
ary boards,  into  nine  great  administrative  departments  as 
follows:  (1)  department  of  finance;  (2)  department 
of  agriculture;  (3)  department  of  labor;  (4)  department 
of  mines  and  minerals;  (5)  department  of  public  works; 
(6)  department  of  public  welfare;  (7)  department  of 
public  health;  (8)  department  of  trade  and  commerce; 
(9)  department  of  registration  and  education. 

These  nine  departments  do  not  include  the  military 
functions,  the  general  governmental  functions  of  the  six 
elective  constitutional  officers :  namely,  the  lieutenant 
governor,  secretary  of  state,  auditor  of  public  accounts, 
state    treasurer,    attorney    general,    and    superintendent 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility      153 

of  public  instruction,  and  the  duties  of  the  trustees  of 
the  University  of  Illinois,  an  elective  body  of  nine  mem- 
bers. The  elective  state  board  of  equalization  was  not 
at  first  included,  but  it  has  since  been  abolished  by  the 
19 19  legislature  and  its  functions  placed  in  the  depart- 
ment of  finance  under  the  control  of  a  tax  commission  of 
three  members. 

Department  Heads 

Each  of  the  nine  departments  is  under  a  single  head 
called  a  director,  who  is  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  approval  of  the  Senate  for  a  term  of  four  years, 
beginning  on  the  second  Monday  in  January  next  after 
the  election  of  the  governor.  The  annual  salary  laid 
down  in  the  code  for  each  of  these  directors  is  as  follows : 
Director  of  finance,  $7,000 ;  director  of  agriculture, 
$6,000;  director  of  labor,  $5,000;  director  of  mines  and 
minerals,  $5,000;  director  of  public  works  and  buildings, 
$7,000;  director  of  public  welfare,  $7,000;  director  of 
public  health,  $6,000 ;  director  of  trade  and  commerce, 
$7,000;  director  of  registration  and  education,  $5,000. 

Subordinate  Administrative  Officers 

In  addition  to  the  director  of  the  departments  certain 
subordinate  officers  are  created  for  each  of  the  depart- 
ments and  their  annual  salaries  designated  as   follows : 

In  the  department  of  finance:  Assistant  director  of 
finance,  $4,200;  administrative  auditor,  $4,800;  superin- 
tendent of  budget,  $3,600;  superintendent  of  department 
reports,  $3,600. 

In  the  department  of  agriculture:  Assistant  director 
of  agriculture,  $3,600 ;  general  manager  of  the  state  fair, 
$3,600;  superintendent  of  foods  and  dairies,  $4,800; 
superintendent  of  animal  industry,  $3,600;  superintendent 
of  plant  industry,  $3,600;  chief  veterinarian,  $4,200; 
chief  game  and  fish  warden,  $3,600. 


154      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

In  the  department  of  labor:  Assistant  director  of 
labor,  $3,000;  chief  factory  inspector,  $3,000;  superin- 
tendent of  free  employment  offices,  $3,000;  chief  in- 
spector of  private  employment  agencies,  $3,000. 

In  the  department  of  mines  and  minerals:  Assistant 
director  of  mines  and  minerals,  $3,000. 

In  the  department  of  public  works:  Assistant  director 
of  public  works  and  buildings,  $4,000;  superintendent 
of  highways,  $5,000;  chief  engineer,  $5,000;  supervising 
architect,  $4,000;  supervising  engineer,  $4,000;  superin- 
tendent of  waterways,  $5,000;  superintendent  of  printing, 
$5,000;  superintendent  of  purchases  and  supplies,  $5,000; 
superintendent  of  parks,  $2,500. 

In  the  department  of  public  welfare:  Assistant  direc- 
tor of  public  welfare,  $4,000;  alienist,  $5,000;  criminolo- 
gist, $5,000;  fiscal  supervisor,  $5,000;  superintendent  of 
charities,  $5,000;  superintendent  of  prisons,  $5,000; 
superintendent  of  pardons  and  paroles,  $5,000. 

In  the  department  of  public  health:  Assistant  director 
of  public  health,  $3,600;  superintendent  of  lodging  house 
inspection,  $3,000. 

In  the  department  of  trade  and  commerce:  Assistant 
director  of  trade  and  commerce,  $4,000;  superintendent 
of  insurance,  $5,000;  fire  marshal,  $3,000;  superintendent 
of  standards,  $2,500;  chief  grain  inspector,  $5,000. 

In  the  department  of  registration  and  education:  As- 
sistant director  of  registration  and  education,  $3,600; 
superintendent  of  registration,  $4,200. 

The  above-named  subordinate  officers  are  under  the 
control  of  the  directors  of  their  respective  departments 
and  perform  such  duties  as  the  directors  prescribe.  The 
manner  of  their  appointment  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
directors. 

While  the  code  makes  no  specific  provisions  for  divi- 
sions or  bureaus  within  the  several  departments,  it  would 
seem  to  indicate  by  the  titles  of  the  subordinate  officers 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility       155 

that  such  divisions  or  bureaus  are  to  be  set  up ;  and  in 
practice  they  have  been  established,  as  may  be  seen  from 
an  examination  of  the  "  Report  of  the  Directors  Under 
the  Civil  Administrative  Code,  19 18." 

Quasi  Legislative  and  Quasi  Judicial  Boards 

The  survey  of  the  administrative  activities  of  the  state 
showed  that  there  were  certain  boards  or  commissions 
which  discharged  quasi-legislative  or  quasi-judicial  func- 
tions. In  the  framing  of  the  administrative  code,  the 
fundamental  principle  was  followed ;  namely,  that  one 
man  should  have  the  entire  responsibility  in  the  discharge 
of  functions  which  are  purely  executive,  consequently 
the  single-headed  departments.  However,  in  the  dis- 
charge of  functions  which  are  quasi-legislative  or  quasi- 
judicial  it  was  deemed  essential  that  the  opinion  of  a 
reasonable  number  of  men  acting  as  a  group  should  be 
procured.  Hence  the  code  provides  that  all  functions 
which  are  primarily  quasi-legislative  or  quasi-judicial 
are  to  be  vested  in  the  proper  boards  or  commissions. 
These  boards  or  commissions  and  the  annual  salaries  of 
the  several  members  are  provided  for  as  follows : 

( 1 )  The  food  standards  commission  in  the  department 
of  agriculture,  composed  of  the  superintendent  of  foods 
and  dairies  and  two  officers  designated  as  food  standard 
officers,  the  latter  receiving  $450  each ; 

(2)  The  industrial  commission  in  the  department  of 
labor,  composed  of  five  persons,  each  receiving  a  salary 
of  $5,000. 

(3)  The  mining  board  in  the  department  of  mines  and 
minerals,  consisting  of  the  director  of  the  department  of 
mines  and  minerals  and  four  persons  designated  as  mine 
officers,  at  a  salary  of  $500  each. 

(4)  The  miners'  examining  board  in  the  department 
of  mines  and  minerals,  consisting  of  four  persons  receiv- 
ing a  salary  of  $1,800  each. 


156      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

(5)  The  public  utilities  commission  in  the  department 
of  trade  and  commerce,  composed  of  five  members  desig- 
nated as  public  utility  commissioners  at  a  salary  of  $7,000 
each,  and  having  a  secretary  at  a  salary  of  $4,000. 

(6)  The  normal  school  board  in  the  department  of 
registration  and  education,  composed  of  the  director  of 
the  department,  the  superintendent  of  public  instruction, 
and  nine  other  persons. 

(7)  The  tax  commission  in  the  department  of  finance, 
composed  of  three  members  at  an  annual  salary  of  $6,000 
each. 

The  members  of  these  boards  are  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate.  All  serve 
for  a  term  of  four  years,  except  the  members  of  the 
tax  commission  and  the  normal  school  board,  which  are 
appointed  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years.  Each  of 
these  boards  acts  as  an  independent  entity.  While  the 
director  of  mines  and  minerals  is  a  member  of  the  mining 
board  and  the  director  of  registration  and  education  is 
a  member  of  the  normal  school  board,  each  board,  never- 
theless, exercises  its  functions  without  any  supervision 
or  control  by  the  director  of  the  department  to  which  it 
is  attached.  However,  each  of  these  boards  is,  from  the 
standpoint  of  organization  and  finance,  a  component  part 
of  the  department  to  which  it  belongs. 

Both  the  executive  officers  and  the  members  of  the 
quasi-legislative  and  quasi-judicial  boards,  excepting  the  I 
two  food  standard  officers,  the  members  of  the  mining 
board,  and  the  members  of  the  normal  school  board,  are 
required  to  devote  their  full  time  to  the  duties  of  their 
several  offices.  All  employees  of  the  departments  are 
under  the  civil  service  regulations  of  the  state.  The  or- 
ganization of  the  work  of  the  departments,  as  well  as  the 
assignment  of  duties  to  the  subordinate  officers,  is  left 
to  the  discretion  of  the  department  heads.  Subject  to 
the  chief  executive  each  director  is   free  within  a  cer- 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility       157 
tain  scope  to  organize  the  work  of  his  own  department. 

Advisory  Boards 

Since  questions  of  policy  and  expediency  are  con- 
tinually being  presented  for  solution  in  administrative  de- 
partments, it  was  deemed  wise  to  make  provisions  in  the 
code  for  advisory  boards  to  assist  and  advise  the  directors 
of  the  departments  and  the  governor  in  matters  of  policy 
and  administration.  Hence  the  following  advisory  boards 
are  created : 

In  the  Department  of  Agriculture:  A  board  of  agri- 
cultural advisers,  composed  of  fifteen  persons  and  a  board 
of  state  fair  advisers,  consisting  of  nine  persons,  not 
more  than  three  of  whom  are  to  be  appointed  from  any 
one  county. 

In  the  Department  of  Labor:  A  board  of  Illinois  free 
employment  office  advisers,  composed  of  five  persons;  a 
board  of  local  Illinois  free  employment  office  advisers 
for  each  free  employment  office,  composed  of  five  persons 
on  each  local  board. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Works:  A  board  of  art 
advisers,  composed  of  eight  persons ;  a  board  of  water 
resource  advisers,  a  board  of  highway  advisers,  and  a 
board  of  park  and  buildings  advisers,  each  composed  of 
five  persons. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Welfare:  A  board  of 
public  welfare  commissioners,  composed  of  five  persons. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Health:  A  board  of 
public  health  advisers,  composed  of  five  persons. 

In  the  Department  of  Registration  and  Education:  A 
board  of  natural  resources  and  conservation  advisers, 
composed  of  seven  persons ;  a  board  of  state  museum 
advisers,  composed  of  five  persons ;  and  an  immigrants' 
commission,  consisting  of  five  persons,  one  of  whom  is 
the  director  of  registration  and  education. 

Members  of  these  advisory  boards  are  chosen  because 


158      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

of  their  experience  or  professional  qualifications  in  their 
particular  lines  of  endeavor.  While  it  is  not  required 
that  they  devote  their  entire  time  and  attention  to  the 
business  of  the  state,  they  are  expected  as  a  matter  of 
public  duty  to  put  their  skill  and  professional  experience 
at  the  government's  disposal  whenever  needed.  The 
members  of  the  several  advisory  boards  receive  no  com- 
pensation. 

The  code  vests  each  advisory  board  with  the  power  to 
study  the  entire  field  to  which  it  is  related,  to  advise  the 
departmental  officers,  to  recommend  to  the  governor  and 
the  legislature,  and  to  investigate  the  conduct  and  the 
work  of  the  department  with  which  it  is  associated. 
Such  boards  are  also  permitted  to  adopt  rules  and  regula- 
tions not  inconsistent  with  law  and  are  required  to  hold 
meetings  and  keep  minutes  relating  thereto. 

Office  Tenures 

The  code  gives  the  governor  the  power,  immediately 
upon  his  taking  office,  to  appoint  all  of  his  administrative 
officers  with  the  advice  of  the  Senate  for  a  term  of  office 
coterminous  with  his  own;  that  is,  four  years.  The 
only  exceptions  are  the  tax  commission  and  the  normal 
school  board,  the  members  of  which,  other  than  the  direc- 
tor of  registration  and  education  on  the  normal  school 
board,  are  appointed  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years. 
A  possible  restriction  upon  the  power  of  the  governor  to 
constitute  the  personnel  of  his  administration  is  found 
in  the  fact  that  the  Senate  may  withhold  its  approval 
to  certain  of  the  appointments  which  he  may  wish  to 
make. 

Location  of  Offices 

Changes  are  also  made  by  the  provisions  of  the  code 
with  respect  to  the  location  of  offices.  Before  the  code 
was   adopted   some   offices  were   located   at    Springfield, 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility       159 

some  in  Chicago,  and  some  in  a  number  of  smaller  cities 
of  the  state.  Under  the  code  each  department  is  required 
to  maintain  a  central  office  at  the  capital,  but  for  the  dis- 
charge of  certain  activities  of  its  office  it  may  maintain 
branch  offices  in  other  parts  of  the  state.  This  plan  not 
only  makes  a  large  saving  to  the  state  in  office  rents,  but 
it  enables  the  citizens  of  the  state  to  know  at  once  where 
they  can  find  the  department  with  which  they  wish  to  do 
business. 

Functions  of  Departments 

The  department  of  finance  is  regarded  as  being  not 
only  the  most  important  of  the  code  departments,  but  as 
having  practically  a  new  field  of  work.  Outside  of  the 
function  of  the  governor's  auditor  and  the  compilation 
of  budget  estimates  by  the  legislative  reference  bureau  it 
took  over  no  work  performed  by  previously  existing  ad- 
ministrative agencies.  Briefly,  the  functions  of  this  de- 
partment are  to  examine  the  accuracy  and  legality  of  ac- 
counts and  expenditures  of  other  code  departments;  to 
prescribe  and  install  a  uniform  system  of  accounting  and 
reporting;  to  examine,  approve,  or  disapprove  all  bills, 
vouchers,  and  claims  against  the  other  departments;  to 
prepare  the  budget  for  submission  to  the  governor;  and 
to  formulate  plans  for  better  coordination  of  the  work 
of  the  departments.  Under  the  finance  code,  enacted  by 
the  1 919  legislature,  the  powers  of  this  department  are 
extended  in  a  large  measure  over  the  non-code  depart- 
ments and  agencies.  Through  his  power  to  alter  the 
estimates  in  the  preparation  of  the  budget,  the  director 
of  finance  next  to  the  governor  becomes  the  most  power- 
ful officer  in  the  code  administration. 

All  agricultural  and  related  activities,  as  well  as  food 
inspection,  are  included  under  the  department  of  agri- 
culture. This  department  promotes  horticulture,  live- 
stock  industry,    dairying,   poultry   raising,   bee   keeping, 


160      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

forestry,  fishing,  and  wool  production.  It  gathers  and 
disseminates  knowledge  pertaining  to  agricultural  in- 
terests. The  inspection  of  commercial  fertilizers  and  the 
conduct  of  state  fairs  are  under  its  control. 

The  functions  relating  to  the  regulation  of  labor,  the 
promotion  of  the  welfare  of  wage  earners,  and  the  im- 
provement of  working  conditions  are  performed  by  the 
department  of  labor.  This  department  collects,  system- 
atizes, and  reports  information  concerning  labor  and  em- 
ployment conditions  throughout  the  state.  The  industrial 
commission  under  this  department  administers  the  laws 
pertaining  to  arbitration  and  conciliation. 

The  department  of  mines  and  minerals  controls  the 
inspection  of  mines,  the  examination  of  persons  working 
in  mines,  and  the  fire-fighting  and  mine-rescue  stations. 

The  department  of  public  works  and  buildings,  next 
to  the  department  of  finance,  is  probably  the  most  im- 
portant. It  has  control  over  the  construction  of  high- 
ways and  canals,  supervision  of  waterways,  erection  of 
public  buildings  and  monuments,  upkeep  of  parks  and 
places  of  interest,  and  purchase  of  supplies  for  the  depart- 
ments and  charitable,  educational  and  penal  institutions. 
The  purchasing  division  of  the  department  amounts  prac- 
tically to  a  central  purchasing  agency  for  the  code  depart- 
ments. Leases  are  made  for  the  several  departments  by 
this  department. 

The  department  of  public  welfare  has  jurisdiction  over 
all  charitable,  penal,  and  reformatory  institutions  of  the 
state.  It  also  performs  the  functions  of  the  board  of 
pardons. 

The  department  of  public  health  exercises  general 
functions  relating  to  health  and  sanitation  except  the 
examination  and  registration  of  physicians  and  embalm- 
ers.  It  maintains  chemical,  bacteriological,  and  biolog- 
ical laboratories,  and  distributes  antitoxines,  vaccines,  and 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility       161 

prophylactics  for  the  prevention  and  treatment  of  com- 
municable diseases. 

The  department  of  trade  and  commerce  has  charge 
of  the  regulation  of  insurance,  grain  inspection,  inspection 
of  railway  safety  appliances,  fire  inspection,  and  the  regu- 
lation of  weights  and  measures.  The  public  utilities  com- 
mission operates  under  this  department. 

The  principal  work  of  the  department  of  registration 
and  education  is  the  examination  of  applicants  for  state 
licenses  in  the  trades  and  professions.  In  conducting 
such  examinations  the  department  has  the  assistance  of 
ten  examining  boards,  one  for  each  trade  or  profession, 
the  members  of  which  are  appointed  by  the  director.  The 
administration  of  the  state  normal  schools  is  placed  in 
this  department  under  the  direction  of  the  normal  school 
board.  The  department  acts  as  an  investigating  agency 
for  a  number  of  the  other  departments. 

Operation  of  the  Reorganisation  Plan 

In  his  message  to  the  19 19  legislature,  Governor  Low- 
den  said,  concerning  the  operation  of  the  Illinois  con- 
solidation plan: 

"  The  civil  administrative  code  went  into  effect  on 
July  1,  191 7.  It  amounted  to  a  revolution  in  govern- 
ment. Under  it  a  reorganization  of  more  than  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  boards,  commissions,  and  independ- 
ent agencies  was  affected.  Nine  departments,  with  ex- 
tensive and  real  power  vested  in  each  head,  have  taken 
the  place  of  those  bodies  which  were  abolished,  and  dis- 
charge, under  the  general  supervision  of  the  governor, 
the  details  of  government  for  which  the  governor  is  re- 
sponsible. At  the  time  the  bill  was  up  for  consideration 
it  was  claimed  that  it  would  result  in  both  efficiency  and 
economy. 

"  It  has  more  than  satisfied  all  the  expectations  that 


1 62      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

were  formed  concerning  it.  The  functions  of  the  gov- 
ernment are  discharged  at  the  capitol.  The  governor  is 
in  daily  contact  with  his  administration  in  all  its  activities. 
Unity  and  harmony  of  administration  have  been  attained, 
and  vigor  and  energy  of  administration  enhanced. 

"  It  seems  to  me  almost  providential  that  it  should 
have  been  enacted  into  law  before  war  actually  came.  A 
large  number  of  the  state's  most  expert  officials  and  em- 
ployees were  drawn  upon  by  the  government  at  Wash- 
ington because  of  the  exigencies  of  the  war.  The  same 
difficulties  arose  in  the  conduct  of  public  business,  which 
vexed  private  business  so  much.  There  was  necessarily 
much  confusion.  The  cost  of  all  supplies  rose  rapidly. 
Unless  the  more  than  one  hundred  scattered  agencies, 
which  had  existed  heretofore,  had  been  welded  by  the 
civil  administrative  code  into  a  compact  and  coordinate 
government,  anything  like  efficient  state  government, 
during  these  difficult  times,  would  have  been  impossible. 
Illinois,  through  the  greater  elasticity  and  efficiency  of  her 
new  form  of  government,  was  able  to  meet  every  emerg- 
ency of  the  war  without  an  extraordinary  session  of  her 
legislature." 

Criticisms  of  the  Code  Organization 

Three  objections  may  be  made  to  the  organization 
under  the  civil  administrative  code,  one  of  which  may  be 
regarded  as  a  defect  in  the  code  itself,  and  the  other 
two  as  omissions. 

In  the  first  place,  the  code  fails  to  give  the  governor 
full  and  unhampered  authority  in  the  appointment  of  his 
chief  administrative  officers  and  also  of  a  number  of 
subordinate  officers.  When  the  governor's  appointments 
require  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  it  may  be  a  very  easy 
matter,  in  case  of  political  or  other  disagreement  between 
the  governor  and  the  Senate,  for  the  Senate  to  block  his 
appointments  and  consequently  thwart  his  desires  in  the 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility      163 

administration  of  the  departments  or  to  insist  upon  com- 
promises in  legislation.  However,  there  is  a  great  deal 
of  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the  confirmation  of  appoint- 
ments of  the  leading  officers  by  the  Senate.  The  argu- 
ment is  made  that  generally  the  need  for  confirmation 
brings  about  greater  care  in  nominations  and  that  com- 
petent nominees  are  not  likely  to  fail  of  confirmation. 
It  is  undoubtedly  contrary  to  the  principle  of  responsi- 
bility to  have  a  number  of  subordinate  officers  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate.  Such 
appointments,  it  seems,  should  be  made  by  the  depart- 
ment heads  after  consultation,  if  necessary,  with  the 
governor. 

In  the  second  place,  the  code  does  not  attempt  to  codify 
the  existing  laws  relating  to  the  administration.  The 
old  laws  stand  as  they  were  before  the  adoption  of  the 
code.  Only  the  agencies  through  which  their  provisions 
are  enforced  have  been  changed.  If  the  provisions  of 
the  law  were  followed  to  the  letter,  there  would  be  much 
overlapping  and  duplication  of  work.  Fortunately,  how- 
ever, the  provisions  were  made  in  the  code  requiring  co- 
operation between  the  new  departments  whereby  much  of 
this  duplication  may  be  avoided  in  the  actual  administra- 
tion of  the  work. 

In  the  third  place,  the  code  is  not  as  comprehensive 
as  it  should  be.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  it  does  not  in- 
clude all  the  administrative  agencies  of  the  state  —  the 
constitutional  administrative  officers  other  than  the  gov- 
ernor; namely,  the  lieutenant  governor,  secretary  of  state, 
treasurer,  auditor  of  public  accounts,  attorney  general, 
and  superintendent  of  public  instruction,  all  of  which  are 
elective ;  one  statutory  and  elective  board  —  that  is,  the 
trustees  of  the  University  of  Illinois,  the  civil  service 
commission  and  a  few  minor  agencies  exist  independently 
of  the  code  departments.  It  was  found  impractical  and 
inexpedient  to  make  the  code,  at  the  time  it  was  enacted, 


164      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

include  these  agencies.  It  is  hoped  by  those  who  took 
leadership  in  the  administrative  reorganization,  however, 
that  the  Constitutional  Convention  which  is  to  be  held  be- 
ginning in  January,  1920,  will  complete  the  work  of  con- 
solidation so  far  as  the  constitutional  administrative 
agencies  are  concerned. 

Even  with  these  shortcomings,  the  Illinois  civil  ad- 
ministrative code  constitutes  the  first  comprehensive 
scheme  enacted  into  law  to  render  our  state  government 
stronger  and  more  efficient. 

IDAHO    PLAN 

Without  a  preliminary  survey  but  with  the  backing 
of  Governor  Davis,  the  19 19  legislature  of  Idaho  passed 
as  an  emergency  measure  under  the  constitution  an  "  ad- 
ministration consolidation  act,"  which  went  into  effect 
on  March  31st.  This  act  abolished  some  forty-six  offices, 
boards,  and  commissions,  and  consolidated  their  functions 
into  nine  departments.  The  state  administration,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  not  definitely  prescribed  by  the  constitution, 
was  completely  reorganized.  The  state  board  of  educa- 
tion is  the  only  previously  existing  statutory  board  that 
continues. 

The  purpose  and  scope  of  the  consolidation  act  are 
indicated  by  section  1,  which  says :  "  The  supreme  exec- 
utive power  of  the  state  is  vested  by  the  constitution  .  .  . 
in  the  governor,  who  is  expressly  charged  with  the  duty 
of  seeing  that  the  laws  are  faithfully  executed.  In  order 
that  he  may  exercise  the  portion  of  the  authority  so  vested 
and  in  addition  to  the  powers  now  conferred  upon  him  by 
law,  civil  administrative  departments  are  hereby  created, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  which  the  governor  is 
authorized  to  exercise  the  functions  in  this  chapter  as- 
signed to  each  department  respectively." 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility       165 

Organization    under    the    Administration    Consolidation 
Act 

As  in  the  case  of  Illinois,  the  Administration  Consoli- 
dation Act  of  Idaho  organizes  the  administrative  agencies 
of  the  government,  with  the  exception  of  the  constitu- 
tional offices  and  boards  and  board  of  education  into  nine 
departments.     These  departments  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Department  of  agriculture;  (2)  department  of 
commerce  and  industry;  (3)  department  of  finance;  (4) 
department  of  immigration,  labor  and  statistics;  (5) 
department  of  law  enforcement ;  (6)  department  of  public 
investment;  (7)  department  of  public  welfare;  (8)  de- 
partment of  public  works;  (9)  department  of  reclama- 
tion. 

The  six  constitutional  elective  offices  not  affected  by  the 
reorganization  are,  lieutenant  governor,  secretary  of  state, 
state  auditor,  state  treasurer,  attorney  general,  and  super- 
intendent of  public  instruction ;  there  are  also  the  five 
constitutional  boards,  which  are  not  changed  in  structure 
or  powers,  viz.,  the  state  board  of  equalization ;  state 
board  of  pardons;  state  board  of  prison  commissioners; 
state  board  of  land  commissioners,  and  directors  of  the 
asylum  for  the  insane.  These  boards,  however,  all  have 
ex  officio  membership  except  the  directors  of  the  asylum 
for  the  insane,  which  directors  are  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor with  the  approval  of  the  Senate. 

Single-headed  Departments 

Each  of  the  nine  departments  has  a  single  head,  called 
a  commissioner,  who  is  charged  with  the  execution  of  the 
powers  and  duties  vested  by  law  in  his  department. 
These  commissioners,  with  the  exception  of  the  commis- 
sioner of  immigration,  labor  and  statistics,  are  appointed 
by  the  governor  and  removable  by  him  in  his  discretion. 
The  commissioner  of  immigration,  labor,  and  statistics, 


1 66      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

who  acts  as  the  head  of  the  department  of  immigration, 
labor  and  statistics,  is  a  constitutional  officer,  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate  for  a  term 
of  two  years.  He  is  the  only  one  of  the  department  heads 
whose  tenure  of  office  is  fixed.  Certain  experience  re- 
quirements are  prescribed  for  certain  of  the  departmental 
heads  as  well  as  their  subordinate  officers.  For  example, 
the  commissioner  of  commerce  and  industry  and  any 
director  in  his  department  may  not  be  financially  inter- 
ested in  any  banking  or  insurance  corporation  subject 
to  the  supervision  of  the  department,  and  the  commis- 
sioner must  have  had  at  least  five  years'  practical  experi- 
ence in  the  banking  business.  The  annual  salary  of  each 
commissioner  is  fixed  at  $3,600.  All  other  salaries  under 
the  Administration  Consolidation  Act  are  fixed  by  the 
commissioner  of  the  department  concerned,  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  governor.  The  salaries,  however,  are  not 
to  exceed  the  amounts  fixed  by  the  legislature. 

Administrative  Officers 

In  addition  to  the  commissioners  of  the  departments, 
the  following  executive  and  administrative  officers,  enum- 
erated after  the  name  of  each  department  respectively,  are 
created : 

In  the  Department  of  Agriculture:  Director  of 
markets;  director  of  animal  industry;  director  of  plant 
industry;  director  of  fairs. 

In  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Industry:  Direc- 
tor of  insurance;  manager  of  state  industrial  insurance. 

In  the  Department  of  Land  Investigation:  Fish  and 
game  warden. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Welfare:  Public  health 
adviser. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Works:  Director  of 
highways. 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility       167 

In  the  Department  of  Reclamation:  Director  of  water 
resources. 

The  above-named  subordinate  officers  are  appointed 
by  the  governor  and  are  under  the  direct  supervision  and 
control  of  the  commissioner  of  the  respective  departments 
to  which  each  belongs  and  are  required  to  perform  such 
duties  as  the  commissioner  shall  prescribe.  The  initial 
organization  of  each  department  is,  however,  left  largely 
to  the  discretion  of  the  commissioner. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Illinois  Administrative  Code,  the 
Consolidation  Act  of  Idaho  does  not  lay  down  specific 
provisions  for  bureau  divisions  under  the  several  de- 
partments. However,  the  titles  of  the  subordinate  officers 
would  indicate  that  such  organization  into  divisions  or 
bureaus  is  to  be  made  at  the  discretion  of  the  department 
heads. 

Agricultural  Advisory  Board 

One  advisory  board  is  provided  for  by  the  Consolida- 
tion Act.  This  is  the  board  of  agricultural  advisers,  a 
non-executive  board,  created  in  the  department  of  agri- 
culture. It  is  composed  of  nine  persons  appointed  and 
removable  by  the  governor.  The  members  of  this  board 
receive  no  compensation.  They  are  required  to  be  repre- 
sentative citizens  of  the  state,  engaged  in  agricultural 
pursuits,  not  excluding  representatives  of  the  agricultural 
press  and  of  the  state  agricultural  experiment  station. 
This  board  is  given  the  power  to  consider  and  study  the 
entire  field  of  agriculture  and  advise  the  executive  officers 
of  the  department  upon  their  request ;  recommend  on  its 
own  initiative  policies  and  practices,  which  recommenda- 
tions the  executive  officers  of  the  department  shall  duly 
consider,  and  give  advice  or  make  recommendations  to 
the  governor  and  legislature  if  so  requested,  or  on  its 
own  initiative.  This  board  may  examine  the  books  and 
the  records  of  the  department  at  any  time.     It  is  required 


1 68      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  adopt  rules  and  regulations  not  inconsistent  with  law, 
also  to  hold  meetings,  and  to  keep  a  record  of  the  minutes 
of  such  meetings. 

General  Powers  of  Department  Heads 

The  commissioner  of  each  department  is  empowered 
to  prescribe  rules  and  regulations  for  his  department,  not 
inconsistent  with  law.  Each  department  must  maintain 
a  central  office  at  the  capitol  and  may,  with  the  approval 
of  the  governor,  establish  such  branch  offices  as  may  be 
necessary.  Each  department  is  empowered  to  employ 
necessary  employees  and  to  fix  the  rate  of  compensation. 
All  employees  are  required  to  render  not  less  than  seven 
hours  of  labor  during  each  regular  working  day  and  are 
allowed  fourteen  days'  leave  of  absence  in  each  year  with 
full  pay. 

Inasmuch  as  the  existing  laws  remain  unchanged  — 
the  Consolidation  Act  changing  only  the  agencies  through 
which  the  laws  are  enforced  —  provisions  are  made  in 
the  act  under  which  "  the  governor  shall  devise  a  practi- 
cal and  working  basis  for  cooperation  and  coordination 
of  work,  eliminating  duplication  and  overlapping  of  func- 
tions." The  departments  are  required  to  cooperate  with 
each  other  in  employment  of  services  and  the  use  of  their 
quarters  and  equipments.  The  commissioner  of  any  de- 
partment may  require  the  employee  of  any  department, 
subject  to  the  consent  of  the  superior  officer  of  the  em- 
ployee, to  perform  any  duty  he  may  require  of  his  own 
subordinates. 

Functions  of  Departments 

The  department  of  agriculture  exercises  the  power 
and  is  charged  with  the  general  duty  of  promoting  agri- 
culture throughout  the  state ;  and  with  introducing  meth- 
ods of  conducting  the  agricultural  industries  in  order  to 
increase  the  production  and  facilitate  the  distribution  of 


Plans  C entralicing  Executive  Responsibility       169 

products.  It  collects  and  publishes  statistics  relating  to 
production  and  marketing  of  crops,  cattle,  and  other  farm 
products.  It  assists,  encourages,  and  promotes  the  organ- 
ization of  farmer'  institutes,  horticultural  and  agricultural 
societies,  and  the  holding  of  live-stock  shows,  fairs,  and 
other  exhibits  of  farm  products.  It  has  authority  to 
maintain  a  market  news  service,  including  information 
as  to  crops,  freight  rates,  commission  rates,  and  other 
matters  of  service  to  producers  and  consumers.  Home 
seekers  in  the  state  of  Idaho  are  to  be  assisted  and  en- 
couraged in  every  way  possible  by  this  department.  The 
department  is  required  to  receive  applications  for  farm 
help,  also  applications  from  farm  laborers,  and  to  render 
service  in  placing  employees  without  expense  either  to 
the  employer  or  the  employee.  The  inspection  of  nursery 
stock  and  the  prevention  of  infectious  and  contagious 
plant  and  animal  diseases  are  duties  of  this  department. 

The  department  of  commerce  and  industry  is  vested 
with  the  powers  and  duties  formerly  exercised  by  the 
state  bank  department,  the  state  insurance  department,  the 
state  insurance  manager,  the  board  of  appeal  from  the 
decisions  of  the  banking  commissioner,  and  the  mine  in- 
spector. This  department  is  required  to  execute  all  laws 
relating  to  banks  and  banking  and  to  insurance  and  in- 
surance companies  doing  business  in  the  state.  It  is  also 
required  to  administer  the  state  industrial  insurance  fund. 

The  department  of  finance  exercises  the  rights,  powers, 
and  duties  vested  by  law  in  the  state  examiner  and  the 
state  depository  board.  This  department  prescribes 
forms  of  vouchers,  of  accounts  and  reports,  and  installs 
uniform  bookkeeping.  It  supervises  and  examines  state 
accounts  and  the  accounts  of  private  concerns  receiving 
state  money.  It  also  keeps  accounts  of  the  state's  chattel 
property  and  inspects  its  securities.  State  depositories 
are  designated  by  this  department  and  are  required  by  it 
to    furnish    proper    securities.     This    department    is    re- 


170      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

quired  to  demand  and  receive  reports  from  the  state 
treasurer,  state  auditor,  state  bank  examiner,  and  other 
officers.  It  may  inspect  any  state  office  or  any  state  de- 
pository. All  state  laws  relating  to  the  assessment  of 
property  and  the  levy,  collection,  apportionment,  and  dis- 
tribution of  taxes  are  supervised  and  enforced  by  this 
department.  The  state  board  of  equalization,  a  constitu- 
tional and  ex  officio  body,  is  associated  with  this  depart- 
ment. The  preparation  of  the  budget  data  for  the  gov- 
ernor is  assigned  to  this  department,  as  well  as  the  super- 
vision of  the  duplication  of  work  in  the  departments. 

The  department  of  immigration,  labor  and  statistics 
is  the  bureau  of  immigration,  labor  and  statistics,  form- 
erly established  by  the  constitution  (article  8,  section  1) 
and  laws.  It  is  empowered  to  promote  the  welfare  of 
workers,  their  commercial,  industrial,  social  condition  — 
and  to  protect  their  health.  It  collects  information  up- 
on the  subject  of  labor  in  its  relation  to  capital,  the  hours 
of  labor,  and  the  earnings  of  laboring  men  and  women. 
The  officials  of  this  department  are  required  to  visit 
shops,  factories,  mercantile  establishments,  and  other 
places  where  working  people  are  employed.  The  depart- 
ment may  determine  and  prescribe  what  safety  devices, 
safeguards,  and  other  means  or  methods  of  protection 
are  needed  to  safeguard  the  employees  of  factories  and 
workshops. 

The  department  of  law  enforcement  exercises  the 
rights,  powers,  and  duties  originally  vested  in  the  fish 
and  game  warden,  secretary  of  the  state  highway  com- 
mission (so  far  as  his  duties  relate  to  the  registration  of 
motor  vehicles),  state  board  of  medical  examiners,  state 
board  of  dental  examiners,  board  of  osteopathic  examina- 
tion, Idaho  state  board  of  examiners  in  optometry,  board 
of  pharmacy,  state  board  of  examination  and  registration 
of  graduate  nurses,  board  of  examining  surveyors,  state 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility       171 

engineer,  as  ex  officio  chairman  of  the  state  board  of 
examining  surveyors,  Idaho  state  board  of  veterinary 
medical  examiners,  state  board  of  accountancy,  state 
board  of  examiners  of  architects,  and  examining  com- 
mittee of  the  state  board  of  health  for  the  examination  of 
embalmers.  This  department  establishes  and  maintains 
fish  hatcheries  and  game  preserves  and  takes  all  necessary 
measures  for  the  preservation,  distribution,  introduction, 
and  restoration  of  fish  and  game.  It  supervises  the 
registration  and  licensing  of  automobiles,  motor  vehicles, 
and  motor-vehicle  manufacturers,  dealers,  and  chauffeurs ; 
also  enforces  all  the  penal  and  regulatory  laws  of  the 
state  in  the  same  manner  and  with  like  authority  as  the 
sheriffs  of  the  counties. 

In  order  to  assist  the  department  of  law  enforcement 
in  the  registration  of  occupations,  the  commissioner  may 
name  from  time  to  time  boards,  varying  from  three  to 
six  persons,  from  the  various  professions  to  conduct  the 
examinations  and  to  pass  upon  the  professional  attain- 
ments of  the  applicants  for  state  licenses.  All  profes- 
sional certificates  and  licenses  are  issued  by  the  depart- 
ment of  law  enforcement. 

The  department  of  public  investments  controls,  loans, 
and  invests  all  the  permanent  funds  of  the  state  in  such 
securities  as  are  designated  in  the  state  constitution.  It 
fixes  the  rate  of  interest  to  be  charged  upon  all  loans 
upon  real  estate ;  has  the  care  and  custody  of  all  certifi- 
cates and  contracts  for  the  sale  of  state  lands  and  timbers, 
all  leases  of  state  lands,  all  mortgages,  bonds,  and  other 
securities  in  which  the  permanent  funds  of  the  state  are 
invested,  and  collects  all  moneys  due  the  state  on  the  same. 

The  department  of  public  welfare  is  charged  with  the 
exercise  of  the  powers  and  duties  vested  in  the  board  of 
directors  of  the  Northern  Idaho  Sanitarium,  the  board 
of  directors  of  the  Idaho  State  Sanitarium,  the  board  of 


172       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

trustees  of  the  soldiers'  home,  the  state  board  of  health, 
the  bureau  of  vital  statistics,  the  dairy,  food,  and  sani- 
tary inspector,  and  the  state  chemist. 

The  department  of  public  works  exercises  the  powers 
and  duties  formerly  vested  in  the  state  highway  commis- 
sion, the  state  highway  engineer,  the  board  of  trustees  of 
the  capitol  building,  and  the  Heyburn  Park  board  of  con- 
trol. This  department  is  required  to  lay  out,  construct, 
and  maintain  state  highways ;  to  improve,  alter,  or  extend 
such  highways ;  and  to  purchase,  condemn,  or  otherwise 
supervise  the  necessary  lands  for  highway  rights  of  way. 
It  is  also  required  to  cooperate  with,  and  receive  aid  from, 
the  Federal  Government  for  the  construction  and  im- 
provement of  any  state  highway.  Cooperation  is  estab- 
lished between  the  county  and  highway  district  commis- 
sions and  this  department.  The  purchase  of  supplies  and 
materials  for  the  various  state  agencies  is  also  placed 
under  this  department. 

The  department  of  reclamation  exercises  the  powers 
and  duties  vested  in  the  state  engineer  and  the  state  board 
of  land  commissioners,  a  constitutional  body,  in  the 
administration  of  the  Carey  Act  and  chapter  241  of  the 
compiled  laws. 

What  the  Reorganization  Accomplishes 

While  the  organization  under  the  Administration  Con- 
solidation Act  does  not  include  the  functions  performed 
by  six  constitutional  administrative  officers  other  than  the 
governor,  and  by  five  constitutional  boards,  the  functions 
of  two  of  these  boards  are  amalgamated  with  the  work 
of  the  new  departments.  The  functions  performed  by 
the  state  board  of  equalization,  a  constitutional  board  of 
ex  officio  membership,  are  merged  into  the  department 
of  finance.  Likewise,  the  functions  of  the  state  board 
of  land  commissioners,  an  ex  officio  and  constitutional 
body,  are  taken  over  largely  by  the  department  of  reclama- 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility       173 

tion.  In  the  case  of  the  other  constitutional  boards; 
namely,  the  state  board  of  pardons,  the  state  board  of 
prison  commissioners,  and  the  directors  of  asylums  for 
the  insane,  no  definite  provisions  are  made  in  the  Con- 
solidation Act  for  their  association  with  the  new  depart- 
ments. One  statutory  board  performing  educational 
functions  still  exists,  since  the  code  does  not  take  into 
account  the  educational  activities  of  the  state. 

The  Idaho  Act  does  not  attempt  to  codify  the  existing 
laws  relating  to  administration,  but  it  makes  provisions, 
as  does  the  Illinois  code,  to  avoid  overlapping  and  dupli- 
cation of  work  by  requiring  cooperation  between  the  new 
departments. 

The  Idaho  Consolidation  Act  has  accomplished  as 
thorough  a  reorganization  of  the  state  administration  as 
is  possible  without  changing  the  constitution.  It  con- 
tains the  basis  of  a  well-ordered  and  consistent  plan. 
However,  as  in  the  case  of  Illinois,  constitutional  changes 
are  necessary  in  order  to  make  the  plan  complete. 

NEBRASKA    PLAN 

The  19 1 3  legislature  of  Nebraska  authorized  a  joint 
committee  of  the  two  houses  to  make  a  study  of  the  ad- 
ministrative organization  of  the  state.  The  report  of 
this  committee,  which  was  made  the  following  year, 
showed  the  need  for  reorganization  and  recommended 
that  the  legislature  provided  for  a  survey  as  a  means  of 
working  out  a  consolidation  plan.  The  legislature  took 
no  immediate  action,  but  both  Governors  Moreland  and 
Neville  in  their  messages  to  that  body  recommended  the 
adoption  of  a  plan  of  administrative  consolidation  and 
the  establishment  of  an  effective  budget  system.  The 
platform  upon  which  the  present  governor  was  elected 
pledged  the  party  to  the  realization  of  a  consolidation 
plan  and  budget  .system.     Accordingly,  the  19 19  legisla- 


174      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ture  under  the  leadership  of  Governor  McKelvie  passed 
a  law,  known  as  the  "  civil  administrative  code,"  which 
provides  for  the  consolidation  of  most  of  the  statutory 
administrative  agencies  of  the  state. 

Organization  Under  the  Civil  Administrative  Code 

The  Civil  Administrative  Code  creates  and  establishes 
the  following  administrative  departments : 

Department  of  finance;  department  of  agriculture;  de- 
partment of  labor;  department  of  trade  and  commerce; 
department  of  public  welfare ;  department  of  public  works. 

This  reorganization  comprehends  practically  all  the 
changes  in  the  administrative  organization  of  the  state 
which  can  be  made  without  constitutional  amendment. 
Excepting  the  governor,  there  are  seven  constitutional 
officers;  namely,  lieutenant  governor,  secretary  of  state, 
treasurer,  auditor  of  public  accounts,  attorney  general, 
commissioner  of  lands  and  buildings,  and  superintendent 
of  public  instruction.  There  are  also  four  constitutional 
boards  —  the  state  railway  commission,  composed  of 
three  members  elected  for  terms  of  six  years ;  the  board 
of  regents,  composed  of  six  members  elected  for  terms 
of  six  years;  the  board  of  commissioners  of  state  institu- 
tions, composed  of  three  members  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor with  the  consent  of  the  Senate  for  terms  of  six 
years,  and  the  board  of  educational  lands  and  funds, 
composed  of  ex  officio  membership.  Two  statutory 
boards  —  namely,  the  state  board  of  equalization  and  the 
state  board  of  agriculture  —  continue  in  existence  and  are 
attached  to  the  department  of  finance  and  the  department 
of  agriculture  respectively. 

Department  Heads  and  Subordinates 

Each  of  the  six  departments  has  a  single  head  known 
as  a  secretary,  who  is  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the 
approval  of  the  Senate  for  a  term  of  two  years  from  the 


Plans  Centralizing  Executive  Responsibility      175 

first  Tuesday  after  the  first  Monday  in  January  following 
the  election  of  the  governor.  The  code  prescribes  an 
annual  salary  of  $5,000  for  each  of  these  secretaries, 
which  is  twice  that  received  by  the  governor. 

Under  the  code  the  governor  is  required  to  confer  with 
the  department  heads  relative  to  appointments  and  to  ap- 
point such  deputies,  assistants,  employees,  and  clerical 
help  as  shall  be  necessary  or  essential  to  the  proper  man- 
agement of  the  departments.  Each  secretary  and  ap- 
pointee in  each  department  is  required  to  devote  his  en- 
tire time  to  the  duties  of  his  office  and  to  render  not  less 
than  eight  hours'  service  during  each  regular  working 
day. 

The  secretary  of  each  department  is  empowered  to  pre- 
scribe regulations  not  inconsistent  with  law  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  his  department,  conduct  of  his  employees, 
and  the  performance  of  the  business  of  his  department. 
Each  department  is  required  to  maintain  a  central  office 
at  the  capitol  of  the  state  and  may  establish  branch  offices 
upon  the  approval  of  the  governor. 

The  secretaries  of  the  departments  are  required  to  de- 
vise a  practical  and  working  basis  for  cooperation  and 
coordination  of  work,  eliminating  duplication  and  over- 
lapping functions.  They  are  required  to  cooperate  with 
each  other  in  the  employment  of  help  and  in  the  use  of 
quarters  and  equipment. 

Each  department  created  by  the  code  is  given  the  power 
through  its  secretary  to  make  a  thorough  investigation 
of  all  books  and  records  of  any  person,  firm,  or  corpora- 
tion under  the  control  of,  doing  business  with,  or  being 
regulated  by  the  state. 

Functions  of  Departments 

The  department  of  finance  prescribes  and  installs  uni- 
form accounting  in  the  other  departments.  It  super- 
vises and  examines  the  accounts  and  financial  reports  of 


176      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  other  departments  and  keeps  summary  and  control- 
ling accounts  of  the  expenditures  of  these  departments. 
It  approves  or  disapproves  all  vouchers,  bills,  and  claims 
of  the  other  departments.  The  adjustment  of  duplica- 
tion of  work  among  the  departments,  as  well  as  the  publi- 
cation of  information  with  reference  to  the  administra- 
tion, is  a  function  of  the  department  of  finance.  This 
department  also  acts  as  a  staff  agency  to  the  governor  in 
the  preparation  of  the  budget;  it  prescribes  uniform  rules 
governing  the  specifications  for  the  purchase  of  supplies; 
it  is  given  supervisory  powers  over  taxation,  the  work 
of  the  state  board  of  equalization  being  merged  into  the 
department.  The  work  of  this  department  consists 
mainly  of  new  functions.  Only  the  functions  of  one 
previously  existing  office  —  that  is,  the  state  printer  — 
have  been  taken  over  by  this  department. 

The  department  of  agriculture  exercises  the  powers 
and  duties  originally  performed  by  the  food,  drug,  dairy, 
and  hotel  commission,  the  live-stock  sanitary  board,  the 
board  of  survey  and  public  welfare,  and  deputy  game 
warden.  The  state  board  of  agriculture,  which  is  a 
statutory  board,  was  not  abolished  by  the  code,  but  was 
made  advisory  to  this  department.  In  addition  to  the 
functions  performed  by  these  boards  and  officers  a  new 
function  of  markets  and  marketing  has  been  added  to 
the  department  of  agriculture. 

The  department  of  trade  and  commerce  exercises  the 
powers  formerly  vested  in  the  state  banking  board ;  the 
state  insurance  board,  and  deputy  fire  commissioner. 
The  state  railway  commission,  a  constitutional  and  elec- 
tive board,  cooperates  with  this  department  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  functions.  This  department  also  administers 
the  "  blue  sky  "  law  with  reference  to  corporations. 

The  department  of  labor  assumes  the  powers  and  duties 
formerly  vested  in  the  compensation  commission  and 
deputy   labor  commissioner.     It   administers   the   work- 


Plans  Centralising  Executive  Responsibility       177 

men's  compensation  law,  prepares  industrial  statistics, 
and  maintains  a  free  employment  bureau.  It  is  also 
charged  with  the  administration  of  the  child  labor  law, 
the  health  and  sanitary  inspection,  and  the  safety  regula- 
tion of  factories  and  other  places  of  employment  in  the 
state.  A  state  board  of  mediation  and  investigation  is 
created  in  connection  with  the  department  of  labor,  which 
consists  of  the  governor  and  the  secretaries  of  the  six 
code  departments.  This  board  is  charged  with  the  media- 
tion and  adjustment  of  disputes  arising  between  em- 
ployers and  employees  within  the  state. 

The  department  of  public  works  discharges  the  func- 
tions vested  by  law  in  the  state  board  of  highways,  irri- 
gation, and  drainage.  It  also  takes  over  the  licensing 
of  motor  vehicles  from  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state. 
The  construction  of  all  highways,  irrigation  works,  and 
drainage  within  the  state  is  under  the  supervision  of  this 
department. 

The  department  of  public  welfare  performs  the  func- 
tions of  the  state  board  of  health,  the  child  welfare 
commission,  and  the  board  of  pardons  and  parole.  It 
is  charged  with  the  execution  and  enforcement  of  all 
laws  relating  to  food  inspection,  sanitation,  and  the  pre- 
vention of  contagious  and  communicable  diseases.  The 
department  conducts  examinations  for  the  licensing  of 
physicians,  surgeons,  chiropractitioners,  dentists,  nurses, 
pharmacists,  optometrists,  embalmers,  and  veterinary 
surgeons.  It  has  the  enforcement  of  laws  relating  to 
weights  and  measures.  It  supervises  the  registration  of 
vital  statistics.  The  regulation  of  maternity  homes  and 
the  placing  of  dependent  and  delinquent  children  are  un- 
der the  supervision  of  this  department.  The  state  sys- 
tem of  public  charities  and  corrections  is  also  under  the 
direction  and  control  of  the  department  of  public  wel- 
fare. 


178       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

What  the  Code  Accomplishes 

The  code  eliminates  eight  boards  and  commissions  and 
consolidates  ten  departments  that  have  similar  functions 
into  six  main  departments,  the  heads  of  which  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate. 
The  plan  thus  distinctly  locates  accountability,  coordinates 
administrative  effort,  and  gives  the  governor  authority 
over  nearly  all  the  administrative  functions  which  are  not 
vested  in  constitutional  agencies.  It  gives  the  governor 
no  power  that  is  not  provided  by  the  constitution  or  the 
law.  He  makes  fewer  major  appointments  under  the 
code  than  he  made  under  the  old  laws. 

Unlike  the  codes  of  Illinois  and  Idaho,  the  Nebraska 
code  brings  together  and  codifies  the  administrative  law 
of  the  state.  In  this  way  the  overlapping  functions  be- 
tween the  newly  created  departments  have  been  eliminated 
by  revision  and  numerous  new  duties  essential  to  the  suc- 
cessful operation  of  the  several  departments  have  been 
added. 

Nebraska  has  followed  the  same  general  plan  in  the 
adoption  of  her  code  as  those  of  Illinois  and  Idaho.  As 
in  the  other  two  states  a  thoroughgoing  centralization 
of  the  administration  is  impossible  without  constitutional 
amendment. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    PLAN    OF   ADMINISTRATIVE    REORGANIZATION 
IN    MASSACHUSETTS 

Preliminary  Surveys 

The  Massachusetts  legislature  of  1912  created  a  com- 
mission on  economy  and  efficiency  consisting  of  three 
members.  At  first  the  state  auditor  was  ex  officio  a  mem- 
ber and  the  other  two  members  were  appointed  by  the 
governor.  Later  (1914)  all  members  were  appointed  by 
the  governor  with  overlapping  terms  of  three  years  each. 
Among  other  things  this  commission  made  a  study  of  the 
administrative  organization  and  submitted  to  the  governor 
in  November,  19 14,  a  comprehensive  report  on  "the 
functions,  organization,  and  administration  of  the  depart- 
ments in  the  executive  branch  of  the  state  government." 
This  report  contained  no  constructive  proposals  for  re- 
organization and  consolidation.  Later,  however,  the 
commission  made  recommendations  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  administration  of  the  militia,  the  state  normal 
schools,  and  the  transfer  of  certain  functions  among  the 
existing  departments.  In  19 16  the  commission  was 
abolished  by  the  legislature  and  its  functions  given  to  the 
newly  created  supervisor  of  administration. 

The  19 1 7  legislature  created  a  joint  special  committee 
on  finances  and  budget  procedure  and  authorized  it  to 
"  investigate  and  consider  the  matter  of  the  consolidation 
and  abolition  of  commissions."  This  committee  made  a 
report  to  the  19 19  legislature  in  which  it  stated  that  the 
administrative  work  of  the  state  was  performed  by  two 
hundred  and  sixteen  more  or  less  independent  agencies  — 

179 


180      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

one  hundred  and  ten  of  which  had  a  single  official  in 
charge;  three  of  which  had  a  single  official  with  an  ad- 
visory council;  and  one  hundred  and  three  of  which  were 
headed  by  boards  or  commissions.  The  committee  pro- 
posed a  tentative  plan  of  consolidation  which  did  not  af- 
fect the  constitutional  administrative  officers,  but  grouped 
the  remaining  administrative  agencies  under  eleven  de- 
partments, the  heads  of  which  were  to  be  appointed  by 
the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  council. 

Constitutional  Amendment  Providing  for  Consolidation 

The  Constitutional  Convention  of  Massachusetts, 
which  held  its  final  sessions  during  the  summer  of  1918, 
took  up  the  subject  of  administrative  consolidation.  Al- 
though no  further  detailed  study  had  yet  been  made  of 
the  administrative  agencies  of  the  state,  the  Convention 
agreed  upon  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  constitution 
designed  to  bring  about  more  efficient  administration  of 
the  business  of  the  state.  This  amendment  was  sub- 
mitted to  a  vote  of  the  people  on  November  5,  1918,  and 
was  ratified.  The  amendment  reads  as  follows :  "  On 
or  before  January  1,  192 1,  the  executive  and  administra- 
tive work  of  the  commonwealth  shall  be  organized  in  not 
more  than  twenty  departments,  in  one  of  which  every 
executive  and  administrative  office,  board,  and  commis- 
sion, except  those  officers  serving  directly  under  the  gov- 
ernor or  the  council,  shall  be  placed.  Such  departments 
shall  be  under  such  supervision  and  regulation  as  the  gen- 
eral court  may  from  time  to  time  prescribe  by  law." 
(Amendment  No.  19.) 

While  the  economy  and  efficiency  commission  of  191 2 
had  made  an  investigation  similar  to  those  made  in  Illi- 
nois and  New  York  some  years  prior  to  the  adoption  of 
this  amendment,  there  was,  nevertheless,  at  the  time  the 
amendment  was  discussed,  no  definite  plan  of  reorganiza- 
tion before  the  convention.     The  subject  of  reorganiza- 


Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachusetts      181 

tion  was  therefore  considered  as  a  broad  question  upon 
its  merits  and  was  not  hindered  by  the  rivalry  and  jeal- 
ousy of  the  existing  officers  in  the  departments  or  by  po- 
litical bickering  over  the  details  of  the  plan.  No  one  in 
the  convention  knew  definitely  what  administrative  agen- 
cies were  to  be  created  or  abolished.  For  this  reason  the 
opposition  was  unable  to  offer  concrete  objections  to  the 
general  proposal. 

Reorganization  Proposed  by  Supervisor  of  Administra- 
tion 

Preceding  the  beginning  of  the  1919  session  of  the 
legislature,  the  supervisor  of  administration  made  a  re- 
survey  of  the  administrative  agencies  of  the  state  as  re- 
sult of  which  he  proposed  a  plan  of  consolidation  which 
was  submitted  to  the  19 19  legislature  together  with  a 
number  of  bills  designed  to  carry  the  plan  into  effect. 
This  plan  proposed  no  changes  in  the  offices  of  the 
elective  constitutional  officers  except  the  addition  of  a 
few  new  functions.  Five  of  the  departments  proposed 
were  to  be  headed  by  constitutional  officers,  namely : 
( 1)  Governor  and  council;  (2)  secretary  of  the  common- 
wealth; (3)  treasurer  and  receiver  general;  (4)  auditor 
of  the  commonwealth;  (5)  attorney  general.  The  office 
of  supervisor  of  administration  was  placed  under  the 
governor  and  the  council.  The  remaining  administra- 
tive agencies  of  the  state  were  grouped  under  fourteen 
departments,  as  follows :  ( 1 )  Department  of  tax  com- 
missioner and  commissioner  of  corporations;  (2)  depart- 
ment of  public  utilities;  (3)  department  of  public  health; 

(4)  department  of  accounting,  banking  and  insurance; 

(5)  department  of  industrial  accidents;  (6)  department 
of  labor  and  industry;  (7)  department  of  education  and 
registration;  (8)  department  of  public  works;  (9)  de- 
partment of  agriculture;  (10)  department  of  institutions; 
r  1 1 )  department  of  public  welfare;  (12)  department  of 


1 82      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

public  safety;  (13)  department  of  civil  service;  (14) 
department  of  metropolitan  districts.  Thus  all  the  ad- 
ministrative agencies  of  the  state  were  grouped  by  the 
supervisor  under  nineteen  proposed  departments. 

In  the  bills  which  the  supervisor  of  administration  sub- 
mitted to  the  legislature  and  which  were  designed  to  set 
up  his  proposed  reorganization,  political  expediency  rather 
than  a  consistent  plan  seems  to  have  been  followed  in 
working  out  the  overhead  organization  of  the  several  pro- 
posed departments.  Some  of  the  departments  were  to 
be  administered  by  single  heads  and  others  by  commis- 
sions. The  proposed  departments  of  registration  and 
education,  public  works,  agriculture,  accounting,  banking 
and  insurance,  institutions,  welfare  and  public  safety 
were  to  be  headed  by  directors  appointed  by  the  governor 
with  the  approval  of  the  council  for  terms  varying  from 
three  to  five  years,  the  term  of  the  governor  being  two 
years.  Some  of  these  departments  were  to  have  advisory 
boards  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the 
council,  consisting  of  from  five  to  eight  members  with 
overlapping  terms  varying  from  three  to  five  years.  The 
departments  of  public  utilities,  metropolitan  district,  and 
civil  service  were  to  be  headed  by  commissions  composed 
of  three  members,  each  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  consent  of  the  council  for  overlapping  terms  varying 
from  three  to  five  years.  The  department  of  labor  and 
industry  was  to  have  a  director  as  administrative  head 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  council 
for  a  term  of  four  years,  and  three  commissioners  to  act 
as  a  board  of  arbitration  and  concilation  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  consent  of  the  council  for  overlapping 
terms  of  three  years. 

In  addition  to  the  proposals  for  reorganization  submit- 
ted by  the  supervisor  of  administration,  several  other 
proposals  were  submitted  by  members  of  the  legislature 
in  the  191 9  session. 


Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachusetts      183 

After  rather  lengthy  consideration  of  the  proposed 
plans  as  embodied  in  the  separate  bills  before  the  legisla- 
ture, it  was  decided  to  frame  a  single  bill  which  would 
contain  the  entire  consolidated  organization.  Accord- 
ingly, this  bill  was  prepared  by  the  legislative  committee 
on  administration  and  commissions  to  which  had  been 
referred  Governor  Coolidge's  recommendations  and  all 
bills  pertaining  to  administrative  reorganization.  This 
bill  was  introduced  in  the  legislature  on  June  6,  passed 
with  a  few  minor  changes,  and  received  the  approval  of 
the  governor  on  July  23d.  Its  provisions  became  effec- 
tive on  December  1,  19 19. 

Organisation  under  the  Consolidation  Plan 

The  Administrative  Consolidation  Act  of  Massachusetts 
groups  the  executive  and  administrative  functions  of  the 
state,  "except  such  as  pertain  to  the  governor  and  the 
council,  and  such  as  are  exercised  and  performed  by  offi- 
cers serving  directly  under  the  governor  or  the  governor 
and  council,"  into  the  departments  of  the  secretary  of 
the  commonwealth,  the  treasurer  and  receiver  general,  the 
auditor  of  the  commonwealth,  and  the  attorney  general, 
headed  by  constitutional  elective  officers,  and  the  follow- 
ing departments  created  by  the  act :  agriculture,  conser- 
vation, banking  and  insurance,  corporations  and  taxation, 
education,  civil  service  and  registration,  industrial  acci- 
dents, labor  and  industries,  mental  diseases,  correction, 
public  welfare,  public  health,  public  safety,  public  works, 
public  utilities,  and  a  metropolitan  district  commission. 
The  plan,  therefore,  establishes  twenty  departments,  ex- 
cluding the  governor  and  council  —  the  maximum  number 
permitted  under  the  constitutional  amendment. 

Complicated  and  Involved  Scheme 

The  general  scheme  of  organization,  as  will  be  seen 
later,  is  very  complicated  and  involved.     Practically  all 


184      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  officials  connected  with  the  existing  administrative 
agencies  have  been  retained,  their  offices  being  continued 
in  existence  and  placed  under  the  several  departments 
without  alteration  either  in  personnel  or  duties.  Seven 
boards,  which  apparently  did  not  fit  into  the  scheme  else- 
where, are  placed  under  the  governor  and  council.  The 
military  and  naval  functions,  the  office  of  supervisor  of 
administration,  and  the  newly  created  superintendent  of 
buildings  are  also  placed  under  the  governor  and  council. 
The  superintendent  of  buildings  cares  for  the  state- 
house  and  manages  the  purchasing  of  supplies  for  the  de- 
partments. All  appointments  made  by  the  governor  must 
have  the  approval  of  the  council,  an  independent  elective 
body  of  nine  members.  The  administrative  officers  are 
appointed  in  nearly  all  cases  for  terms  of  three  or  five 
years,  and  the  members  of  the  administrative  and  other 
boards  are  usually  appointed  for  overlapping  terms  vary- 
ing from  three  to  six  years.  In  all  cases,  except  those  of 
the  elective  constitutional  officers,  the  terms  of  the  prin- 
cipal administrative  officers  are  longer  than  that  of  the 
governor,  his  term  being  fixed  by  the  constitution  at  two 
years. 

Status  of  Constitutional  Officers 

Few  changes  have  been  made  by  the  Consolidation  Act 
in  the  work  of  departments  which  are  headed  by  the 
four  constitutional  officers.  To  the  department  of  the 
secretary  of  the  commonwealth  have  been  added  the  func- 
tions performed  by  the  commissioner  of  public  records 
and  the  bureau  of  statistics,  both  of  which  are  abolished. 
The  existing  board  of  retirement  and  the  commissioners 
on  firemen's  relief  are  placed  under  the  department  of  the 
treasurer  and  receiver  general,  where  they  continue  to 
exist  and  to  perform  their  present  functions.  The  de- 
partments of  the  auditor  of  the  commonwealth  and  of 
the  attorney  general  continue  as  previously  organized. 


Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachusetts      185 

Administrative  Machinery  of  the  Statutory  Departments 

The  department  of  agriculture  is  under  the  super- 
vision and  control  of  a  commissioner  assisted  by  an  ad- 
visory board  of  six  members,  all  of  whom  are  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  council.  The 
commissioner  will  serve  for  a  term  of  three  years  and  the 
members  of  the  advisory  board  for  overlapping  terms  of 
three  years,  two  being  appointed  each  year.  The  annual 
salary  of  the  commissioner  is  not  to  exceed  $5,000  and 
the  members  of  the  advisory  board  are  to  receive  $10  per 
diem  and  traveling  expenses.  The  commissioner  must 
organize  the  department  into  at  least  five  divisions :  dairy- 
ing and  animal  husbandry,  plant  pest  control,  ornithology, 
markets  and  reclamation,  soil  survey  and  fairs,  and  may 
add  other  divisions.  He  may  appoint  and  remove  the 
director  of  each  division. 

The  department  of  conservation  is  under  the  con- 
trol of  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  approval  of  the  council  for  a  term  of  three  years  at 
an  annual  salary  not  to  exceed  $5,000.  He  is  desig- 
nated by  the  governor  as  director  of  one  of  the  three 
divisions  into  which  the  department  is  divided,  namely : 
forestry,  fisheries  and  game,  and  animal  industry.  How- 
ever, provision  is  made  for  the  retention  of  the  old  com- 
missioner of  animal  industry  in  the  capacity  of  director 
of  the  division  of  animal  industry,  his  appointment  to 
office  being  made  hereafter  as  formerly  provided  by  law. 
The  director  of  the  remaining  division  is  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  approval  of  the  council  for  a  term  of 
three  years,  and  should  he  serve  as  head  of  the  division 
of  fisheries  and  game,  he  will  receive  a  salary  not  to  ex- 
ceed $4,000  per  year.  The  directors  act  as  an  advisory 
council  to  the  commissioner. 

The  department  of  banking  and  insurance  is  organ- 
ized into  three  divisions,  a  division  of  banks  and  loan 


1 86      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

agencies,  a  division  of  insurance,  and  a  division  of  sav- 
ings-bank life  insurance.  Each  division  is  under  the 
control  of  a  commissioner,  the  commissioner  of  banks 
and  the  commissioner  of  insurance  are  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  council's  approval  for  terms  of  three 
years  at  annual  salaries  not  to  exceed  $5,000  each. 
The  commissioner  of  savings-bank  life  insurance  is  one 
of  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  corporation  known  as  the 
general  insurance  guaranty  fund,  his  term  of  office  to  be 
that  of  his  appointment  as  trustee.  Since  it  is  obvious 
that  this  department  has  triple  heads,  the  act  provides 
that  the  commissioners  "shall  act  as  a  board  in  all  mat- 
ters concerning  the  department  as  a  whole."  The  three 
divisions  are  really  independent  agencies  nominally 
brought  together.  The  existing  boards  of  bank  incorpo- 
ration and  of  appeal  on  fire-insurance  rates  are  continued 
under  the  division  of  banks  and  loan  agencies  and  the 
division  of  insurance,  respectively. 

The  department  of  corporations  and  taxation  consists 
of  the  office  of  tax  commissioner  and  commissioner  of 
corporations  as  formerly  organized.  The  old  tax  com- 
missioner and  commissioner  of  corporations  is  the  com- 
missioner of  the  department  at  a  salary  not  to  exceed 
$7,500  per  year.  The  department  is  organized  into  an 
income-tax  division,  a  division  of  corporations,  a  division 
of  inheritance  taxes,  a  division  of  local  taxation,  and  a 
division  of  accounts.  The  commissioner  appoints,  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council,  a  director 
at  the  head  of  each  division  and  also  fixes  the  salaries  of 
such  directors. 

The  department  of  education  is  under  the  control  of 
a  commissioner  and  an  advisory  board  of  six  members 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  coun- 
cil. The  commissioner's  term  of  office  is  fixed  at  five 
years  with  an  annual  salary  not  to  exceed  $7,500.  The 
members  of  the  advisory  board  will  serve  for  overlapping 


Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachusetts      187 

terms  of  three  years,  two  being  appointed  each  year.  At 
least  two  members  of  this  board  must  be  women,  one  of 
whom  shall  be  a  teacher.  The  department  will  be  organ- 
ized into  such  divisions  as  the  commissioner  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  governor  and  council  may  determine,  but 
must  include  a  division  of  public  libraries,  a  division  of 
education  of  aliens,  and  a  division  of  the  blind.  The  di- 
vision of  public  libraries  consists  of  the  board  of  free 
public  libraries  as  formerly  organized,  the  chairman  act- 
ing as  director  of  the  division.  The  division  of  educa- 
tion of  aliens  consists  of  a  director,  who  may  be  a  woman, 
and  an  advisory  board  of  six  members  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  approval  of  the  council,  the  director 
for  a  term  of  five  years,  and  the  board  members  for  over- 
lapping terms  of  three  years.  The  division  of  the  blind 
consists  of  the  commission  for  the  blind  as  formerly  or- 
ganized, the  head  of  the  commission  acting  as  director  of 
the  division.  Such  other  divisions  as  may  be  organized 
will  have  a  director  in  charge  appointed  by  the  commis- 
sioner with  the  approval  of  the  advisory  board.  Hence 
the  department  of  education  consists  of  three  divisions, 
administratively  independent  of  each  other,  and  a  possible 
group  of  divisions  with  heads  appointed  by  the  commis- 
sioner. The  old  boards  of  trustees  of  five  schools  and  the 
teachers'  retirement  board  are  continued  in  existence  and 
are  placed  in  the  department. 

The  department  of  civil  service  and  registration  is 
organized  in  two  divisions,  a  division  of  civil  service  and 
a  division  of  registration.  The  division  of  civil  service 
is  under  the  control  of  a  commissioner  and  two  as- 
sociate commissioners  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  council's  approval  for  overlapping  terms  of  three 
years,  the  commissioner  to  receive  not  more  than  $5,000 
annually  and  the  associate  commissioners  not  exceeding 
$2,000  each.  The  three  constitute  a  board  for  the  prep- 
aration of  rules  and  regulations  and  the  holding  of  hear- 


1 88       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ings  on  civil  service  matters.  The  division  of  registra- 
tion is  under  the  supervision  of  a  director  appointed  by 
the  governor  and  council  for  a  term  not  to  exceed  two 
years  at  an  annual  salary  of  $1,500.  As  a  possible  means 
of  coordinating  the  work  of  the  department,  the  act  pro- 
vides that  the  commissioner  of  civil  service  and  the  di- 
rector of  registration  "shall  act  as  a  board  in  all  matters 
affecting  the  department  as  a  whole."  Ten  state  regis- 
tration boards  are  continued  in  existence  and  are  placed 
under  the  division  of  registration. 

The  department  of  industrial  accidents  consists  of  the 
old  industrial  accident  board  as  formerly  organized  with 
its  duties  and  functions  unchanged. 

The  department  of  labor  and  industries  is  under  a 
commissioner,  an  assistant  commissioner,  who  may  be  a 
woman,  and  three  associate  commissioners,  among  whom 
must  be  a  representative  each  of  labor  and  employers. 
All  are  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  council's  ap- 
proval for  terms  of  three  years,  the  associate  commis- 
sioners' terms  being  overlapping.  The  commissioner 
receives  $5,000  annually  and  the  assistant  and  associate 
commissioners,  $4,000  each.  The  associate  commission- 
ers constitute  a  board  of  conciliation  and  arbitration. 

The  department  of  mental  diseases  consists  of  the  pres- 
ent Massachusetts  commission  on  mental  diseases.  The 
commissioner  of  mental  diseases  is  the  administrative 
head  of  the  department. 

The  department  of  correction  is  under  a  commissioner 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  council's  approval  for 
a  three  years'  term  at  an  annual  salary  not  to  exceed 
$6,000.  The  commissioner,  with  the  approval  of  the 
governor  and  council,  may  appoint,  remove,  and  fix  the 
salary  of  two  deputy  commissioners. 

The  department  of  public  welfare  is  under  the  super- 
vision of  a  commissioner  and  an  advisory  board  of 
six  members,   two   of   whom   must   be   women,   all   ap- 


Administrative  Reorganisation  in  Massachusetts      189 

pointed  by  the  governor  with  the  council's  approval. 
The  commissioner's  term  is  five  years,  and  the  members 
of  the  advisory  board  are  appointed  for  overlapping 
terms  of  three  years,  two  each  year.  The  commissioner 
is  ex  officio  a  member  of  the  advisory  board  and  receives 
an  annual  salary  not  to  exceed  $6,000.  The  department 
is  organized  into  three  divisions,  namely :  aid  and  relief, 
child  guardianship,  and  juvenile  training.  Each  division 
has  a  director,  the  directors  of  aid  and  relief  and  of  child 
guardianship  being  appointed,  removed,  and  salaries  fixed 
by  the  commissioner  with  the  consent  of  the  governor  and 
council.  The  director  of  juvenile  training  is  a  member 
of  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  Massachusetts  training 
schools,  designated  by  the  governor,  and  serves  without 
compensation.  This  officer  is,  therefore,  practically  inde- 
pendent of  the  commissioner.  The  commissioner  pre- 
pares and  presents  for  the  consideration  of  the  advisory 
board  rules  and  regulations  governing  the  conduct  of  his 
department  which  become  effective  upon  approval  by  a 
majority  of  the  members  of  this  board.  Several  previ- 
ously existing  boards  are  continued  and  placed  in  this 
department. 

The  department  of  health  is  the  old  department  of 
health  as  now  organized  and  the  head  of  the  old  depart- 
ment becomes  its  commissioner. 

The  department  of  public  safety  is  under  the  super- 
vision of  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  approval  of  the  council  for  a  term  of  five  years  at  an 
annual  salary  not  exceeding  $5,000.  The  department  is 
organized  into  three  divisions  —  a  division  of  state  police, 
headed  by  the  commissioner,  a  division  of  inspection, 
under  a  director  known  as  chief  of  inspections,  a  division 
of  fire  prevention,  under  a  director  known  as  state  fire 
marshal.  The  two  directors  are  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor and  council  for  terms  of  three  years  at  annual  sal- 
aries not  to  exceed  $4,000. 


190      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

The  department  of  public  works  is  under  the  control 
of  a  commissioner  and  four  associate  commissioners,  all 
appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  coun- 
cil. The  commissioner  serves  for  a  term  of  three  years, 
and  the  associate  commissioners  for  overlapping  terms  of 
two  years.  The  department  is  divided  into  a  division 
of  highways  and  a  division  of  waterways  and  public  lands. 
The  governor  designates  two  of  the  associate  commission- 
ers to  have  charge  of  each  of  these  divisions,  thus  making 
a  dual-headed  administration  of  the  divisions.  The  com- 
missioner appoints,  with  the  approval  of  the  governor  and 
council,  a  registrar  of  motor  vehicles. 

The  department  of  public  utilities  is  under  the  manage- 
ment of  a  commission  of  five  members  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  consent  of  the  council  for  overlapping 
terms  of  five  years.  The  governor  designates  one  of  the 
commissioners  chairman,  who  receives  an  annual  salary 
of  $9,000.  Each  of  the  other  commissioners  receives  an 
annual  salary  of  $8,000. 

The  metropolitan  district  commission  is  composed  of 
a  commissioner  and  four  associate  commissioners,  all  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  council. 
The  commissioner  serves  for  a  term  of  five  years  at  an 
annual  salary  of  $6,000,  and  the  associate  commissioners 
for  overlapping  terms  of  four  years  at  $1,000  each  per 
year. 

Plan  Violates  Principles  Establishing  Executive  Respon- 
sibility 

In  summing  up,  it  can  be  said  that  the  Massachusetts 
plan  of  consolidation  and  reorganization  is  inconsistent 
with  the  principle  of  making  one  person  fully  responsible 
for  the  administrative  work  of  each  department.  As  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  it  proposes  single  heads,  either 
elective  or  appointive  by  the  governor  and  council,  for 
the  administration  of  some  departments,  and  for  the  ad- 


Administrative  Reorganization  in  Massachusetts      191 

ministration  of  other  departments  it  sets  up  boards  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  and  council.  Two  departments 
—  department  of  banking  and  insurance,  and  department 
of  civil  service  and  registration  —  are  headless;  however, 
each  is  nominally  unified  by  a  provision  requiring  the  in- 
dependent division  heads  to  "  act  as  a  board  in  all  matters 
concerning  the  department  as  a  whole." 

The  Massachusetts  plan  also  departs  from  the  principle 
that  department  heads  and  other  chief  administrative 
officers  should  not  be  given  a  longer  term  of  office  than 
that  of  the  governor.  It  provides  that  practically  all 
administrative  officers  shall  serve  for  terms  of  three  or 
five  years,  and  the  members  of  all  administrative  boards 
shall  be  appointed  for  overlapping  terms  of  from  three  to 
six  years.  Since  the  constitution  fixes  the  governor's 
term  of  office  at  two  years,  he  will  never  be  able  to  control 
his  administration  by  appointment,  even  if  he  is  not  blocked 
by  action  of  the  council,  except  he  hold  office  for  at  least 
two  successive  terms,  and  perhaps  then  he  will  not  have 
gained  control  until  it  is  too  late  for  him  to  accomplish 
anything. 

Finally,  the  governor  can  exercise  practically  no  con- 
trol over  the  expenditure  of  appropriations  under  the 
plan  of  administrative  organization  set  up  by  the  Massa- 
chusetts Consolidation  Act.  The  governors  of  Illinois, 
Idaho,  and  Nebraska  have  the  power  through  the  general 
control  vested  in  their  departments  of  finance  and  by 
reason  of  the  greater  authority  which  they  exercise  over 
the  administration  because  of  the  organization  under  con- 
solidation plans  to  enforce  the  proper  execution  of  the 
appropriations. 

There  is  in  Massachusetts,  as  in  the  other  states  having 
administrative  codes  in  operation,  great  need  for  constitu- 
tional revision.  A  comprehensive  and  consistent  plan 
of  administrative  consolidation  —  one  that  establishes  ex- 
ecutive responsibility  —  cannot  be  adopted  until  the  peo- 


192       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

pie  decide  in  their  own  minds  whether  they  want  a 
responsible  executive  at  the  head  of  the  state.  They  seem 
to  have  decided  this  in  the  affirmative  but  have  not  been 
willing  to  trust  their  ability  to  enforce  responsibility,  and 
therefore  have  retained  all  of  the  trappings  of  an  irre- 
sponsible party  system,  irresponsible  bosses,  and  irrespon- 
sible government.  If  they  really  want  responsible  gov- 
ernment, this  end  cannot  be  attained  until  ( 1 )  a  number 
of  administrative  officers  have  been  removed  from  the  list 
of  the  elected  and  made  appointive  by  the  governor,  (2) 
the  existing  council  of  nine  elective  members  which  share 
to  a  large  degree  the  governor's  responsibility  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  state  has  been  abolished,  and  (3)  a 
procedure  has  been  provided  for  which  will  bring  the 
head  of  the  administration  before  the  representative  ap- 
propriating body  each  year  to  give  an  account  of  himself 
and  stand  or  fall  on  his  ability  to  command  the  support  of 
a  majority  —  with  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  voters  of  the 
state. 


CHAPTER    XII 

PLANS  FOR  CENTRALIZATION  OF  EXECUTIVE  RESPONSIBIL- 
ITY UNDER  CONSIDERATION 

Oregon,  Delaware,  California,  and  New  York  have 
recently  had  under  consideration,  or  in  the  process  of 
evolution,  plans  for  the  centralization  of  executive  re- 
sponsibility. Several  other  states  have  given  serious 
thought  to  the  subject. 

PROPOSED   OREGON    PLAN 

People's  Power  League 

In  1909  and  again  in  191 1  the  People's  Power  League 
of  Oregon  proposed  a  plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
state  government,  which  concentrated  executive  power  in 
the  hands  of  the  governor  —  checked  only  by  an  elective 
auditor  —  and  established  close  relations  between  the  gov- 
ernor and  the  legislature.  In  19 12  and  19 13  the  League 
submitted  parts  of  its  plan  to  the  voters,  which  were  de- 
feated. Later  it  proposed  to  abolish  one  house  of  the 
legislature,  to  give  the  governor  a  seat  in  that  body,  to 
destroy  "  logrolling  "  by  giving  him  the  power  to  initiate 
the  budget  with  only  power  to  decrease  in  the  legislature, 
and  to  centralize  administrative  authority  in  the  governor. 
These  proposals,  however,  did  not  meet  with  success. 

Commissions  to  Investigate  Administration 

At  length  the  legislature  became  interested  in  the  re- 
organization of  the  state  government.  During  the  191 5 
session  a  joint  committee  was  appointed  by  the  legisla- 

193 


194      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tu-re  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating  and  consolidating  of- 
fices, boards,  and  commissions,  but  this  committee  did 
not  accomplish  anything.  The  19 17  session,  however, 
provided  for  a  "  commission  of  seven  business  men  "  to 
study  the  state  administration  with  a  view  to  the  consoli- 
dation and  elimination  of  useless  administrative  agencies. 
This  commission  was  duly  appointed  by  the  governor  and 
became  known  as  the  consolidation  commission.  It  was 
instructed  to  report  to  the  1919  legislature.  After  its 
organization  it  secured  the  assistance  of  three  of  the  state 
colleges  in  making  a  survey  of  the  state  administrative 
agencies.  Later  it  engaged  Professor  John  M.  Mathews 
of  the  University  of  Illinois  and  Mr.  Fred  Topkins  of 
Portland  to  put  the  report  in  final  shape. 

Report  of  Consolidation  Commission 

The  report  of  the  consolidation  commission,  as  submit- 
ted to  the  19 1 9  legislature,  gives  in  the  space  of  forty- 
four  pages  a  concise  statement  of  the  present  adminis- 
trative conditions  and  lays  down  specific  recommendations 
for  a  plan  of  consolidation.  It  points  out  that  under 
existing  statutes  there  are  three  principal  ways  of  choos- 
ing state  officials:  (1)  By  election  of  the  people;  (2)  by 
appointment  of  the  governor;  (3)  by  appointment  of  the 
governor,  secretary  of  state,  and  state  treasurer;  in  addi- 
tion, many  appointments  are  made  by  sundry  boards  and 
commissions.  It  states  that  "  no  efficient,  businesslike 
administration  of  state  affairs  in  Oregon  can  be  expected 
unless  some  one  officer  who  is  fully  responsible  to  the 
people  can  control  all  the  important  departments  of  the 
administration,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  auditing 
and  treasury  departments.  The  governor  does  not  do  so 
at  present,  however,  for  three  main  reasons :  ( 1 )  Because 
there  are  too  many  elective  officers;  (2)  because  the  ad- 
ministration is  split  up  into  too  many  departments  for  the 
governor  to  exercise  adequate  control  over  them;    (3) 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  195 

because  the  appointing  power  is  too  often  shared  with 
other  officials,  boards,  and  commissions."  It  further  as- 
serts that  "  It  is  commonly  supposed  that  the  state  of  Ore- 
gon has  only  one  governor,  just  as  there  is  but  one  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  This  supposition,  however,  is 
a  mistake  .  .  .  instead  of  one  governor,  Oregon  has  a 
multitude  of  governors."  In  commenting  upon  this  con- 
dition, the  report  says :  "  All  of  the  elective  officers  derive 
their  authority  from  the  same  source  that  the  governor 
himself  does,  and  he,  therefore,  has  no  real  power  of 
control  over  them.  The  election  of  so  many  heads  of 
administrative  departments  exerts  a  subtle  influence  in 
dividing  the  administration,  developing  friction,  and 
causing  a  lack  of  harmony  and  cooperation  between  the 
various  departments.  It  also  causes  the  injection  of  po- 
litical considerations  and  ambition  into  the  management 
of  elective  offices  which  are  not  conducive  to  efficiency 
and  economy.  There  is  no  logical  reason  inherent  in  the 
character  of  the  position  or  the  nature  of  the  duties  why 
some  offices  should  be  elective  and  others  appointive.  .  .  . 
The  sharing  of  the  governor's  appointing  power  with 
other  state  officials,  if  anything,  exerts  a  still  more  subtle 
influence  in  producing  friction  and  causing  lack  of  har- 
mony and  cooperation.  Most  frequently  it  results  in  a 
division  and  shifting  of  responsibility  both  among  those 
having  the  joint  appointing  power  as  well  as  with  the 
one  appointed." 

The  following  general  principles  are  laid  down  by  the 
report  as  a  guide  in  the  preparation  and  consideration 
of  the  plan  of  reorganization :  ( 1 )  That  the  governor 
should  appoint  all  heads  of  administrative  departments 
under  the  reorganized  and  consolidated  administration; 
(2)  that  in  making  appointments  the  governor  should 
be  privileged  to  act  in  all  cases  without  confirmation  by 
the  Senate  and  should  have  unhampered  power  of  re- 
moval;   (3)    that   all   minor  officers   of  the   department 


196      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

should  be  chosen  under  the  civil  service  regulations. 
The  consolidation  commission  proposes  to  consolidate 
all  existing  administrative  agencies  of  Oregon  into  ten 
departments,  which  consolidation  will  involve  both  con- 
stitutional and  statutory  changes.  The  proposed  depart- 
ments are  as  follows:  (1)  finance  department;  (2)  law 
department;  (3)  tax  department.  (4)  department  of 
education;  (5)  department  of  labor;  (6)  department 
of  health;  (7)  department  of  agriculture;  (8)  depart- 
ment of  trade  and  commerce;  (9)  department  of  public 
welfare  (institutions);  (10)  department  of  public 
works.  The  two  hundred  and  fifty  officials  under  the 
present  scheme  of  administration  would,  it  is  claimed,  be 
reduced  by  this  consolidation  to  forty  officials. 

Departmental  Organization 

The  proposed  finance  department  is  to  include  the 
present  functions  of  the  secretary  of  state,  state  treas- 
urer, state  printer,  and  six  ex  officio  boards.  The 
secretary  of  state  now  acts  as  state  auditor.  The  report 
recommends  that  the  function  of  auditing  be  separated 
from  the  office  of  secretary  of  state  and  that  the  office 
of  state  auditor  of  public  accounts  be  created  to  be  either 
appointed  by  the  legislature  or  elected  by  the  people. 
The  report  is  not  very  clear  as  to  the  overhead  organiza- 
tion of  the  department.  A  chart  of  the  proposed  organ- 
ization indicates  that  this  department  is  to  be  under  the 
control  of  a  finance  commission,  composed  of  the  gov- 
ernor, secretary  of  state,  and  state  treasurer.  The  finance 
department  is  to  be  charged  with  the  preparation  of  the 
budget  for  the  governor,  the  assessment  and  collection 
of  taxes,  the  custody  of  funds,  the  registration  of  motor 
vehicles,  and  the  purchasing  of  supplies. 

The  department  of  law  is  to  remain  as  at  present 
constituted  except  that  the  attorney  general  is  to  be  made 
appointive  by  the  governor  instead  of   elective  by  the 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  197 

people.  This  change  is  recommended  because  he  is  an 
administrative  rather  than  a  judicial  officer,  his  important 
function  being  in  the  capacity  of  legal  adviser  to  the 
governor  and  various  state  administrative  departments. 

The  present  state  tax  commission,  composed  of  three 
ex  officio  members  (governor,  secretary  of  state,  and 
state  treasurer)  and  the  state  tax  commissioner  appointed 
by  the  governor,  is  to  be  reorganized  by  eliminating  the 
ex  officio  members  and  will  then  constitute  the  proposed 
tax  department.  The  head  of  this  department  is  to  have 
the  assistance  of  two  deputies  appointed  by  himself. 

The  proposed  department  of  education  is  to  be  headed 
by  the  superintendent  of  public  instruction  appointed  by 
the  governor.  He  is  to  have  the  advice  and  assistance  of 
a  board  of  education  consisting  of  seven  members,  of 
which  he  is  to  be  an  ex  officio  member  and  chairman. 
The  members  of  this  board  are  to  be  appointed  by  the 
governor  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years  each.  The 
six  existing  educational  boards  are  to  be  abolished. 

The  proposed  department  of  labor  is  to  assume  the 
functions  of  all  the  existing  labor  agencies  which  will 
be  abolished.  The  head  of  this  department  is  to  be 
the  director  of  labor  appointed  by  the  governor.  He  will 
appoint,  with  the  approval  of  the  governor,  two  deputy 
directors.  The  three  will  constitute  a  board  to  handle 
all  deliberative  or  quasi-judicial  functions  of  the  depart- 
ment. 

The  proposed  department  of  public  health  is  to  be 
under  the  control  of  a  director  of  public  health  appointed 
by  the  governor.  There  is  to  be  created  an  advisory 
health  council  of  seven  members  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  whom  the  director  of  public  health  is  to  be  ex 
officio  a  member  and  chairman.  The  examination  and 
registration  of  physicians,  surgeons,  chiropractors,  opto- 
metrists, pharmacists,  nurses,  dentists,  and  barbers  is 
to  be  under  the  administration  of  this  department. 


198       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

The  agricultural  and  related  functions,  such  as  the 
management  of  fairs  and  the  licensing  of  veterinary 
surgeons,  are  to  be  brought  together  under  the  proposed 
department  of  agriculture.  This  department  is  to  have 
a  director  appointed  by  the  governor.  Attached  to  the 
department  is  to  be  an  unpaid  advisory  council  of  agri- 
culture composed  of  five  practical  farmers  in  the  state 
at  large,  appointed  by  the  governor,  representing  dif- 
ferent agricultural  interests,  and  not  excluding  the  direc- 
tor of  the  agricultural  experiment  station. 

The  proposed  department  of  trade  and  commerce  is 
to  include  the  insurance,  banking,  and  public  service 
functions  as  well  as  the  regulation  of  pilots  and  weights 
and  measures.  This  department  is  to  be  administered  by 
a  director  appointed  by  the  governor.  He  would  have  the 
assistance  of  four  deputies  who  would  act  as  heads  of 
bureaus  within  the  department.  A  public  utilities  com- 
mission is  to  be  composed  of  the  director  of  the  depart- 
ment and  two  deputies  appointed  by  him,  or  two  technical 
experts  now  serving  under  the  public  service  commission 
designated  by  the  director.  This  commission  will  per- 
form the  quasi-judicial  work  in  connection  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  public  utilities. 

The  department  of  public  welfare  is  to  have  at  its 
head  a  director  of  public  welfare  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor. Attached  to  the  department  is  to  be  an  advisory 
unpaid  board  of  five  members  appointed  by  the  governor, 
at  least  one  of  whom  is  to  be  a  woman. 

The  proposed  department  of  public  works  is  to  be 
placed  under  the  administration  of  a  director  of  public 
works  appointed  by  the  governor.  This  director  is  to 
appoint  six  deputy  commissioners  to  head  the  proposed 
bureaus.  Associated  with  the  department  is  to  be  an 
advisory  unpaid  board  of  three  highway  commissioners 
to  be  appointed  by  the  governor  to  advise  the  state  high- 
way   department    engineer    in   the   performance    of    his 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  199 

duties.  The  conservation  agencies  of  the  state  will  be 
included  in  this  department. 

The  commission  estimates  that  a  saving  to  the  state  will 
be  made  by  the  adoption  of  its  plan  of  consolidation 
amounting  to  from  $500,000  to  $800,000  annually. 

No  definite  action  was  taken  by  the  1919  legislature 
upon  the  plan  proposed  by  the  consolidation  commission. 


PROPOSED    DELAWARE    PLAN 

During  the  summer  of  19 18  the  Delaware  State  Coun- 
cil of  Defense  engaged  the  New  York  Bureau  of  Munic- 
ipal Research  to  make  a  complete  survey  of  the  state 
administration,  as  well  as  the  governments  of  the  three 
counties  of  the  state  and  the  city  of  Wilmington.  This 
survey  was  completed  by  the  end  of  the  year  and  a  report 
was  submitted  to  the  council  for  its  approval  and  presenta- 
tion to  the  legislature. 

Findings  of  Survey  Report 

It  was  found  in  making  this  survey  that  the  admin- 
istrative branch  of  the  state  government  includes  one 
hundred  and  seventeen  separate  agencies,  which  are  in 
most  cases  independent  of  each  other  and  without  any 
direct  and  effective  overhead  supervision.  Of  these 
agencies,  the  heads  of  six  are  elected  by  the  voters,  eighty- 
three  are  appointed  by  the  governor  (in  most  cases  with 
the  Senate's  approval),  two  are  appointed  by  judges  of 
the  superior  court  of  the  state,  twelve  are  appointed  by 
boards  and  administrative  officers  other  than  the  gov- 
ernor, and  fourteen  are  ex  officio  bodies.  Fifty  four  of 
the  total  number  of  agencies  are  headed  by  boards  or 
commissions.  Much  duplication  of  work  a,s  well  as 
scattering  of  functions  exists. 

It  is  pointed  out  in  the  report  that  Delaware  has  fifty- 
four  boards  and  commissions  that  exercise  administrative 


200      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

powers  of  which  forty-two  are  appointed  by  the  governor 
with  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  two  by  the  judges  of  the 
superior  court,  and  eight  are  composed  of  ex  officio  mem- 
bers. The  board  system  of  administration,  the  report 
maintains,  is  not  only  unbusinesslike  but  irresponsible. 
The  reasons  for  this  statement,  as  set  forth  in  the  report, 
are  as  follows: 

( i )  Boards  seldom  show  any  real  initiative  and,  there- 
fore, businesslike  leadership  in  improving  services  is  not 
to  be  expected  from  them.  They  are  a  check  on  good 
work,  not  a  spur  to  invention  and  activity. 

(2)  In  addition  to  being  a  drag  upon  administration, 
the  boards  and  commissions  are  so  constructed  that  def- 
inite responsibility  for  action  or  inaction  cannot  be  located. 
In  fact,  board  government  in  general  may  be  regarded 
as  a  clever  means  of  escaping  accountability  and  con- 
sequently criticism  or  blame.  Hence  the  board  system 
appeals  particularly  to  a  certain  class  of  administrative 
officials  who  wish  to  shift  responsibility  from  themselves. 

(3)  The  board  system  tends  to  delay  and  to  inefficiency. 
Boards,  meeting  as  they  do  only  periodically,  cannot 
exercise  effective  supervision  and  control.  They  must 
fail  as  administrative  agents  because  they  are  not  "  on 
the  job  "  all  the  time. 

(4)  In  addition  to  its  inherent  defects,  the  board 
system  of  Delaware  is  so  organized  as  to  deprive  the 
governor  of  the  control  which  he  must  have  if  he  is  to 
be  responsible  for  the  state's  business.  The  board  mem- 
bers usually  have  overlapping  terms,  hence  each  governor 
may  appoint  only  a  minority.  Each  board  is,  therefore, 
a  government  within  itself. 

The  report  further  points  out  that  Delaware's  present 
administrative  system  is  not  adapted  to  unified  financial 
planning  and  financial  control.  It  says :  "  The  existence 
of  a  hundred  or  more  separate  and  distinct  agencies,  un- 
controlled and  competing  with  one  another  for  public 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  201 

support  and  public  funds,  militates  against  the  develop- 
ment of  a  businesslike  planning  for  appropriations  to  sup- 
port the  functions  of  the  state  government  —  against 
a  budget  system  .  .  .  Even  if  the  governor  should  be 
empowered  to  prepare  the  budget  of  the  state  for  legis- 
lative consideration,  he  could  not  do  the  work  effectively 
if  he  had  to  deal  with  one  hundred  different  agencies. 
That  number  of  men  could  not  sit  around  a  council  table 
and  discuss  in  a  matter-of-fact  way  the  merits  of  their 
respective  demands  upon  the  treasury  of  the  state.  A 
cabinet  of  one  hundred  members  is  unthinkable  and  a 
cabinet  is  necessary  to  financial  planning." 

General  Recommendations 

Among  the  general  recommendations  are  the  following : 

(1)  The  governor  should  be  the  only  elective  admin- 
istrative officer  in  the  state  government.  Election  of 
other  administrative  officers  produces  decentralized  hide 
and  seek  in  which  responsibility  for  the  work  of  the  state 
cannot  be  fixed.  It  places  each  officer  on  an  independent 
footing  subject  to  little  or  no  severe  administrative  con- 
trol. In  the  popular  election  of  administrative  officers 
other  than  the  governor,  the  people  do  not,  as  a  rule, 
choose,  but  merely  vote  for  the  names  that  follow  the 
governor's  on  the  ballot.  Officers  so  chosen  usually  lack 
the  necessary  qualifications  for  good  administration. 
Such  officers  usually  belong  to  the  same  political  party  as 
the  governor,  hence  from  the  political  point  of  view  it 
makes  little  difference  whether  they  are  elected  or  ap- 
pointed. .  .  . 

(2)  The  governor  should  have  the  sole  power  to 
appoint  and  remove  all  executive  officers.  To  require 
the  consent  of  the  senate  is  to  make  this  power  con- 
ditional and  to  permit  responsibility  to  be  shifted.  It 
allows  the  governor  to  avoid  public  criticism  by  laying 
the  blame  of  inefficient  and  unworthy  officers  upon  mem- 


202      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

bers  of  the  Senate  who  are  responsible  to  their  respective 
constituencies  and  not  to  the  people  of  the  whole  state. 

(3)  The  responsibility  for  preparing  the  budget  of  the 
state  should  be  placed  squarely  upon  the  governor. 

(4)  The  office  of  lieutenant  governor  should  be  abol- 
ished. The  duties  of  this  office  are  so  slight  that  the 
state  might  as  well  save  the  $6.00  a  day  which  it  pays 
him  as  the  President  of  the  Senate  and  the  $100  per 
annum  which  it  grants  him  as  a  member  of  the  board 
of  pardons.  Except  in  the  case  of  succession  to  the 
governorship  on  the  death,  resignation,  or  inability  of 
the  governor,  the  lieutenant  governor  plays  an  insignificant 
role  in  Delaware.  The  Senate  should  choose  its  own 
presiding  officer  .  .  .  The  secretary  of  state  might  well 
be  designated  governor  in  case  that  office  should  become 
vacant.  This  is  now  the  practice  in  several  states. 
Moreover,  the  elimination  of  the  lieutenant  governor  is 
no  radical  innovation,  for  a  number  of  states  have  already 
dispensed   with   that   officer. 

(5)  It  is  proposed  that  the  present  organization  of 
the  central  authority  in  the  state  militia  should  remain 
unchanged.  The  state  constitution  quite  properly  makes 
the  governor  commander  in  chief  of  the  militia  and  re- 
quires him  to  select  the  staff,  of  which  the  adjutant  general 
is  the  principal  officer. 

In  recommending  the  reorganization  and  consolidation 
of  the  administration  of  Delaware,  the  report  says:  "  In 
order  to  avoid  duplication  of  effort,  to  eliminate  waste, 
to  draw  clear  and  positive  lines  of  authority  connecting 
all  work  of  the  state  in  one  unified  plan,  to  establish 
the  responsibility  of  the  governor  and  the  chief  officers 
to  the  people,  it  is  recommended  that  the  work  of  all 
the  existing  officers,  boards,  commissions,  and  other 
agencies  should  be  distributed  among  the  following  nine 
departments,  each  to  be  headed  by  an  officer  appointed  by 
the  governor  and  responsible  to  him : 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  203 

"  Department  of  state ;  department  of  finance ;  depart- 
ment of  labor  and  industry;  department  of  health;  de- 
partment of  public  welfare;  department  of  agriculture; 
department  of  highways  and  drainage;  department  of 
education;  department  of  law." 

With  reference  to  the  creation  of  new  administrative 
agencies  in  the  future,  the  report  recommends  "  that  a 
constitutional  provision  be  adopted  requiring  the  legis- 
lature to  assign  all  newly  created  administrative  functions 
to  one  or  more  of  the  departments  enumerated.  Failure 
to  establish  this  constitutional  principle  would  leave  the 
legislature  free  to  continue  in  the  future  as  in  the  past; 
to  establish  new  agencies  and  undertake  new  functions 
without  any  reference  to  agencies  and  work  already  in 
existence." 

The  existing  administrative  agencies  of  the  state  are 
grouped  under  the  departments  into  which  it  is  proposed  to 
consolidate  them;  and  considerable  space  is  given  in  the 
report  to  a  discussion  of  their  organization  and  functions. 
The  general  organization  of  each  of  the  proposed  depart- 
ments is  outlined  and  a  chart  of  such  proposed  organiza- 
tion is  included.  Charts  are  also  included  in  the  report 
showing  the  present  organization  as  well  as  the  proposed 
organization  of  the  entire  state  administration. 

Departmental  Organiza tio n 

As  already  pointed  out,  the  report  recommends  for 
each  of  the  nine  proposed  departments  single  heads, 
called  commissioners,  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor 
without  let  or  hindrance  by  the  Senate;  it  recommends 
that  the  subordinate  officers  of  each  department  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  department  head.  In  the  case,  however, 
of  the  department  of  finance,  the  governor  is  to  act  as 
head  ex  officio  of  the  department  and  the  four  bureau 
heads  are  to  be  appointed  by  him.  In  the  case  of  the 
department  of  labor  and  industry  the  commissioner  and 


204      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

his  two  bureau  heads  are  to  sit  as  an  industrial  board 
for  the  exercise  of  quasi-judicial  powers.  The  depart- 
ments of  public  health,  public  welfare,  and  agriculture 
are  each  to  have  advisory  councils  composed  of  six  mem- 
bers, appointed  by  the  governor,  and  the  commissioner  of 
the  department  ex  officio.  These  councils  are  to  have  no 
administrative  duties  but  are  to  advise  with  the  depart- 
ment head  with  reference  to  the  work  of  the  departments. 
While  the  1919  legislature  did  not  take  any  definite 
action  upon  the  plan  as  a  whole,  it  authorized  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  commission  of  five  members  to  study  the 
proposed  reorganization  and  to  report  to  the  next  legis- 
lature. This  commission,  known  as  the  state  survey 
commission,  has  been  appointed  by  the  governor  and  is 
working  upon  the  plan  of  consolidation. 


PROPOSED    CALIFORNIA    PLANS 

Plan  of  the  Taxpayers'  Association 

During  19 18  the  Taxpayers'  Association  of  California 
prepared  a  plan  of  reorganization  for  the  state  admin- 
istration. This  plan,  as  published  in  the  California 
Taxpayers'  Journal  for  January,  191 9,  does  not  involve 
the  elimination  of  any  function  now  performed  by  the 
state  government ;  does  not  eliminate  any  constitutional 
officer  or  board  (although  constitutional  amendment  is 
recommended  for  later  consideration)  ;  and  can  be  adopted 
in  its  entirety  by  statutory  enactment.  In  grouping  the 
existing  administrative  agencies  under  the  proposed  plan 
the  functional  unit  has  been  used  as  a  basis  for  coordi- 
nation. The  administrative  functions  are  grouped  under 
two  main  heads ;  namely,  protective  and  constructive. 
"  Protective  "  is  subdivided  into  administrative,  preventa- 
tive, curative,  conservative,  and  defensive;  and  "con- 
structive "  into  developmental,  reclamatory,  and  educa- 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  205 

tional.  These  subheads  are  divided  and  redivided.  It 
is  claimed  that  the  methods  used  elsewhere  in  the  re- 
grouping of  administrative  agencies  for  the  purpose  of 
consolidation  have  largely  overlooked  functional  lines. 
In  this  report  is  printed  an  elaborate  functional  analysis 
of  the  work  of  the  present  administrative  agencies  along- 
side which  is  the  proposed  reorganizational  grouping. 

The  consolidation  plan  of  the  Taxpayers'  Association 
proposes  the  setting  up  of  twelve  administrative  depart- 
ments in  addition  to  the  offices  of  governor,  lieutenant 
governor,  and  secretary  of  state.  These  departments  are 
finance,  law,  sanitation  and  hygiene,  commerce  and  labor, 
charities  and  welfare,  corrections,  care  of  defectives,  con- 
servation, defense,  public  works,  natural  resources,  and  ed- 
ucation. The  departments  of  law,  charities  and  welfare, 
care  of  defectives,  defense,  and  public  works  are  to  be  ad- 
ministered by  single  heads  appointed  by  the  governor  and 
directly  responsible  to  him.  The  other  departments  are 
to  be  administered  by  boards,  the  members  of  which  are 
appointed  by  the  governor.  However,  in  the  departments 
of  finance,  natural  resources,  and  education  certain 
elective  officials  are  to  be  members  of  the  administrative 
boards.  In  most  cases  where  the  departments  are  headed 
by  boards  the  members  will  serve  as  division  chiefs. 

Plan  of  the  Committee  on  Efficiency  and  Economy 

In  November,  1918,  Governor  Stephens  appointed  a 
committee  on  efficiency  and  economy,  consisting  of  eleven 
persons,  some  of  whom  were  state  officers.  This  com- 
mittee made  a  report  on  administrative  consolidation 
which  the  governor  submitted  to  the  legislature  on  March 
20th.  Its  report  sets  down  certain  principles  which  it 
deems  essential  to  efficient  governmental  management : 
Centralization  of  responsibility;  cooperation  of  the  larger 
organization  units ;  and  cooperation  of  agencies  which  per- 
form similar  or  allied  functions.     These  principles  have 


206      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

been  carried  into  the  proposed  plan  by  creating  a  gov- 
ernor's cabinet,  composed  of  departmental  executives  ap- 
pointed by  him ;  by  insuring  cooperation  of  various  depart- 
ments by  bringing  their  administrative  officers  together  in 
an  executive  council ;  and  by  placing  in  departments, 
under  one  executive  head,  those  agencies  which  perform 
similar  or  allied  functions.  The  report  holds  that  be- 
cause of  the  great  diversity  in  the  nature  of  the  state's 
activities  it  is  impracticable  to  correlate  all  administrative 
agencies  into  larger  administrative  units.  Therefore, 
nine  elective  officers  and  agencies  and  thirty  other  admin- 
istrative agencies,  the  latter  dealing  with  registration  of 
trades  and  professions,  regulation  of  financial  corpora- 
tions, local  problems,  military  affairs,  pardons  and  re- 
prieves, civil  service,  and  minor  affairs  are  not  included 
in  the  plan  of  consolidation.  The  remaining  seventy 
administrative  agencies  are  grouped  under  ten  depart- 
ments as  follows :  Finance,  trade  and  corporations,  public 
works,  agriculture,  natural  resources,  labor,  education, 
public  health,  institutions,  and  social  service.  The  depart- 
ments of  public  works,  agriculture,  natural  resources, 
labor,  and  institutions  are  to  be  under  the  administrative 
control  of  directors  appointed  by  the  governor  and  hold- 
ing office  at  his  pleasure.  The  department  of  finance 
is  to  have  a  director  of  accounts  and  expenditures  and 
a  director  of  receipts  and  supplies,  both  appointed  by 
and  serving  at  the  pleasure  of  the  governor,  and  a  board 
of  finance  composed  of  the  two  directors  and  the  state 
comptroller.  The  president  of  the  railroad  commission 
is  to  be  the  director  of  the  department  of  trade  and  cor- 
porations. The  department  of  education  is  to  be  under 
the  control  of  a  board,  consisting  of  five  lay  members, 
and  the  superintendent  of  public  instruction  as  chief 
executive  officer.  The  department  of  public  health  is 
to  be  under  the  control  of  a  board  of  five  licensed  and 
practicing   physicians,    appointed    by    the   governor    for 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  207 

overlapping  terms  of  four  years.  The  department  of 
social  service  is  to  be  administered  by  an  unpaid  board 
of  seven  members  appointed  by  the  governor  for  over- 
lapping terms  of  four  years.  The  governor's  cabinet  is 
to  be  composed  of  the  directors  of  seven  departments  and 
the  chairmen  of  the  administrative  boards  of  three  de- 
partments. 

Upon  submitting  this  report  to  the  legislature,  Governor 
Stephens  declined  to  give  it  his  full  indorsement,  conse- 
quently no  action  was  taken  upon  it  by  the  legislature. 

On  March  27th,  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  legislature 
embodying  the  consolidation  plan  proposed  by  the  Tax- 
payers' Association.  Since  the  end  of  the  legislative 
session  was  near,  the  bill  failed  to  receive  any  very  serious 
consideration.  It  is  understood  that  the  association  will 
continue  to  emphasize  the  need  for  administrative  con- 
solidation and  will  make  an  early  attempt  to  bring  its 
plan  before  the  voters  by  means  of  the  initiative  process. 

NEW    YORK    PLAN    OF    I919 

Report  of  Reconstruction  Commission 

Soon  after  his  inauguration  in  January,  1919,  Governor 
Smith  appointed  a  reconstruction  commission,  consisting 
of  thirty-five  members,  which  was  organized  into  a 
number  of  committees,  each  charged  with  the  investigation 
of  an  urgent  need  or  immediate  problem  in  connection 
with  the  administration  of  the  state's  affairs.  The  com- 
mittee on  retrenchment  of  this  commission,  with  the 
assistance  of  a  staff,  conducted  a  study  of  the  organization 
of  the  entire  state  administration  and  published  in  Octo- 
ber, 1919,  a  four-hundred-page  "  Report  on  Retrench- 
ment and  Reorganization  in  the  State  Government." 

This  report  maintains  that  administrative  consolidation 
is  one  of  the  most  effective  means  of  retrenchment.  It, 
therefore,  outlines  a  comprehensive  plan  of  administrative 


208      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

reorganization  for  the  state  of  New  York.  Briefly,  the 
principles  upon  which  the  report  bases  the  plan  of  con- 
solidation are  as  follows  :  Grouping  of  all  administrative 
agencies  into  a  small  number  of  departments,  each  headed 
by  a  single  officer  except  where  quasi-legislative,  quasi- 
judicial,  inspectional,  or  advisory  functions  require  a 
board;  giving  the  governor  the  power  to  choose  with 
the  Senate's  approval  the  department  heads  who  are  to 
constitute  his  cabinet;  extending  the  governor's  term  to 
four  years  and  making  the  terms  of  department  heads 
coterminous  with  his ;  making  appropriate  subdivisions 
of  departmental  work;  and  establishing  an  executive 
budget  system. 

Departmental  Organization 

The  report  proposes  to  consolidate  the  one  hundred 
and  eighty  or  more  administrative  agencies  of  the  state 
into  sixteen  groups,  composed  of  eighteen  departments 
and  two  public  service  commissions.  The  departments 
are  executive,  audit  and  control,  taxation  and  finance, 
attorney  general,  state,  public  works,  conservation,  agri- 
culture and  markets,  labor,  education,  health,  mental 
hygiene,  charities,  correction,  banking,  insurance,  military 
and  naval  affairs,  and  civil  service.  The  plan  involves 
constitutional  changes ;  it  recommends  that  only  the  gov- 
ernor, lieutenant  governor,  and  comptroller  shall  remain 
elective.  The  comptroller  would  be  head  of  the  depart- 
ment of  audit  and  control  and  his  department  will  exercise 
only  strictly  auditing  functions.  Under  the  executive 
department  would  be  a  bureau  of  administration  charged 
mainly  with  the  preparation  of  the  budget  and  the  con- 
ducting of  special  investigations  for  the  governor.  The 
departments  of  taxation  and  finance,  attorney  general, 
state,  public  works,  conservation,  banking,  insurance,  and 
health  would  be  under  the  control  of  single  heads  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate. 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  209 

Attached  to  the  department  of  public  health  would  be  an 
advisory  council  of  six  members,  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years,  and  the  depart- 
ment head  ex  officio.  The  department  of  military  and 
naval  affairs  would  be  headed  by  the  governor,  who 
would  appoint  as  his  deputy  an  adjutant  general.  A  com- 
mission of  five  and  ultimately  of  three  members,  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  with  the  Senate's  approval  for 
five  years,  would  be  head  of  the  department  of  labor. 
The  department  of  agriculture  and  markets  would  be 
under  the  control  of  a  council  composed  of  one  repre- 
sentative from  each  of  the  nine  judicial  districts  of  the 
state,  one  representative  at  large,  and  the  commissioner 
of  markets  of  New  York  City  ex  officio ;  the  ten  members 
would  be  elected  by  the  legislature  for  terms  of  ten 
years.  This  council  would  select  a  commissioner  to  be 
administrative  head  of  the  department.  The  depart- 
ment of  education  would  be  under  the  control  of  the 
board  of  regents  of  the  University  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  composed  of  twelve  members,  one  from  each 
judicial  district  and  three  at  large,  appointed  by  the 
legislature  for  overlapping  terms  of  twelve  years.  The 
regents  would  appoint  a  commissioner  as  executive  head 
of  the  department.  The  department  of  hygiene  would 
be  under  the  direction  of  a  commission  of  three  members 
appointed  by  the  governor,  two  for  terms  of  six  years 
and  the  other  to  serve  during  good  behavior.  The  de- 
partment of  charities  would  be  under  the  control  of  a 
board  of  twelve  members,  one  from  each  judicial  district 
and  three  additional  from  New  York  City,  appointed 
by  the  governor  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years,  two 
to  be  appointed  each  year.  The  department  of  correction 
would  be  headed  by  a  single  commissioner  appointed  by 
the  governor  with  the  Senate's  approval.  Attached  to 
this  department  would  be  an  advisory  council  of  five  mem- 
bers appointed  by  the  governor  for  overlapping  terms  of 


210      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

five  years,  and  a  board  of  parole  and  probation  of  three 
members  would  in  turn  be  appointed  by  the  advisory  coun- 
cil and  serve  at  its  pleasure.  The  three  departments  of 
mental  hygiene,  charities,  and  correction  would  be  co- 
ordinated in  their  work  by  a  council  of  public  welfare 
composed  of  the  chairmen  of  the  controlling  boards,  of 
two  of  the  departments  and  the  head  of  the  other  depart- 
ment, also  the  commissioners  of  health  and  education. 
The  department  of  civil  service  would  be  directed  by  the 
chairman  of  a  board  of  three  appointive  members.  There 
would  be  two  public  service  commissions,  one  for  New 
York  City  and  one  for  the  remainder  of  the  state,  each 
composed  of  a  single  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
governor  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate. 

The  proposals  for  administrative  reorganization  are 
clearly  a  compromise  between  those  humanitarian  forces 
that  would  retain  government  by  commission  and  those 
who  would  centralize  responsibility  in  the  governor  and 
provide  the  means  of  popular  control. 

Recommendations  are  made  in  the  report  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  executive  budget  system,  for  centralized 
purchasing  of  materials  and  supplies,  for  better  control 
of  state  printing,  and  for  the  standardization  and  grading 
of  the  personal  service  of  the  state.  It  is  expected  that 
this  report  will  be  used  by  Governor  Smith  as  a  basis  for 
executive  recommendations  to  the  1920  legislature. 

TENDENCIES    IN    OTHER    STATES 

In  addition  to  the  states  noted  above,  which  are  giving 
serious  consideration  to  the  adoption  of  administrative 
consolidation  plans,  the  legislatures  of  about  a  dozen 
more  states  have  had  the  subject  of  administrative  re- 
organization brought  before  them.  During  the  present 
year  much  emphasis  has  been  laid  upon  the  need  for  ad- 
ministrative reorganization,  it  being  recognized  that  this 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  211 

is  necessary  to  effective  planning  of  work  and  finances 
and  that  budget  making  and  administration  must  go  hand 
in  hand. 

Ohio 

The  1 91 9  legislature  of  Ohio  authorized  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  joint  committee  to  conduct  investigations  and 
to  prepare  a  plan  of  administrative  reorganization  for 
consideration  by  the  next  legislature.  An  appropriation 
of  $30,000  was  made  to  carry  on  the  study. 

Indiana 

Governor  Goodrich  of  Indiana  in  his  message  to  the 
legislature  of  1919  recommended  the  abolishing  of  the 
elective  offices  of  state  superintendent  of  public  instruc- 
tion, clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court,  state  statistician  and 
state  geologist,  and  the  combining  of  their  present  func- 
tions under  suitable  departmental  agencies.  He  also 
recommended  that  the  attorney  general  be  no  longer  an 
elective  officer,  but  that  he  be  made  appointive  by  the 
governor.     In  defense  of  this  proposal  he  said : 

;'  There  is  little  force  in  the  argument  that  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  attorney  general  by  the  governor  is  dangerous 
because  of  the  centralization  of  power  involved.  The 
attorney  general  is  now  possessed  of  no  material  power 
which  might  be  misused  or  abused  by  any  executive, 
except,  possibly,  that  of  bringing  unjust  prosecutions 
under  the  criminal  statutes,  which  misuse  or  abuse  is 
quite  as  likely  to  happen  whether  the  attorney  general  is 
elected  or  appointed.  The  appointment  of  the  attorney 
general  by  the  governor  adds  little  to  the  power  exercised 
by  my  last  two  predecessors  in  the  appointment  of  the 
legal  clerk,  attorneys  for  the  various  commissions  and 
boards  of  the  state,  but  it  will  result  in  saving  large  sums 
of  money  and  make  this  office  a  more  efficient  instrument 
of  public  service." 


212      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Vermont 

Governor  Clement  of  Vermont  in  his  inaugural  mes- 
sage to  the  1 919  legislature  recommended  a  reorganiza- 
tion and  centralization  of  practically  all  the  present  admin- 
istrative agencies.  The  reasons  for  his  recommendation 
are  very  striking. 

He  said:  "  In  1901,  as  shown  by  the  auditor's  com- 
parative statement,  state  activities  were  less  than  thirty 
in  number,  and  the  grand  total  of  state  expense  was  less 
than  $800,000.  To-day  state  activities  have  reached  a 
total  of  over  fifty  and  the  expense  has  risen  to  $2,250,000 
per  year.  So  within  the  knowledge  of  every  member  of 
this  assembly,  we  have  nearly  doubled  our  state  activities 
and  trebled  our  state  expense.  The  state  has  not  in- 
creased in  population.  There  is  no  more  taxable  prop- 
erty now  than  in  1900,  although  the  valuation  for  tax- 
ation purposes  has  been  increased.  In  fact,  the  reduction 
in  tilled  areas  of  farm  land  would  indicate  that  the  farm 
property  as  a  whole  has  deteriorated  in  value.  How, 
then,  have  these  additional  sums  been  raised?  The 
answer  is  by  the  taxation  of  banks,  railroads,  corporations, 
and  other  indirect  forms  of  taxation,  the  sources  of  which 
have  now  been  thoroughly  exploited. 

"  We  have  reached  our  taxing  limit  in  this  direction  and 
your  predecessors,  the  legislature  of  191 7,  found  it  nec- 
essary to  impose  a  state  tax  of  twenty  cents  on  the  dollar 
of  the  grand  list  in  order  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  war 
and  the  increased  cost  of  doing  public  business.  The  war 
is  over,  but  the  expenses  of  it  are  not  paid,  and  you  are 
not  only  faced  by  the  same  conditions,  but  the  report  of 
the  budget  committee  —  which  you  have  before  you  — 
indicates  that  the  continuation  of  this  direct  tax  of  twenty 
cents  is  not  only  necessary,  but  if  this  legislature  passes 
any  special  appropriations  of  any  kind,  an  increase  in  that 
state  tax  will  be  necessary. 


Proposed  Plans  of  Centralization  213 

"  Every  administration  for  the  past  twenty  years  has 
been  confronted  by  this  problem  of  increased  state  ex- 
pense, and  various  attempts  have  been  made  to  consol- 
idate state  institutions,  departments,  and  activities.  Your 
predecessors  and  mine  have  made  some  important  prog- 
ress in  that  direction,  but  the  net  result  has  always  been 
that  we  have  had  every  year  more  state  activities  and 
greater  expense,  with  no  proportionate  gain  in  the  public 
convenience,  or  the  public  benefit  therefrom,  or  the  public 
ability  to  pay  therefor." 

North  Carolina,  Nezv  Mexico  and  Others 

Governor  Bickett  of  North  Carolina  recommended  to 
the  191 7  legislature  the  reorganization  of  the  state  ad- 
ministration, which  recommendations  he  reiterated  in 
his  message  to  the  1919  legislature.  In  his  later  message 
he  said : 

"  There  is  something  attractive  to  the  popular  mind 
in  the  theory  that  all  the  people  select  (administrative) 
officials,  but  the  truth  is  that  the  people  do  no  such  thing. 
A  few  men,  an  average  of  not  more  than  three,  select 
themselves  as  candidates  and  then  the  people  are  accorded 
the  privilege  of  saying  in  the  primaries  which  of  these 
three  is  least  objectionable.  There  never  was  a  more 
tragic  delusion  than  the  one  that  the  people  select  these 
officials. 

"  But  if  the  people  should  be  actually  consulted  it  is 
plain  that  all  the  people  cannot  secure  sufficient  infor- 
mation about  the  qualifications  of  a  man  for  these  admin- 
istrative offices  to  enable  them  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion 
satisfactory  to  themselves. 

"  There  is  no  more  reason  for  electing  the  governor's 
council  than  there  is  for  electing  the  President's  cabinet. 
I  take  it  that  no  one  would  favor  electing  the  president 
of  the  university  by  a  vote  of  all  the  people,  and  yet  people 


214      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

can  pass  upon  his  qualifications  quite  as  well  as  they  can 
upon  those  of  the  state  superintendent  of  public  instruc- 
tion. .  .  . 

"  I  have  supreme  faith  in  the  judgment  of  all  the 
people  when  they  know  the  facts.  They  can  know  the 
facts  about  a  few  men  on  the  ticket.  They  should  vote 
for  these  few,  and  then  hold  them  responsible  for  results. 

"  Only  the  governor  and  the  lieutenant  governor  should 
be  elected,  but  a  complete  change  would  require  a  consti- 
tutional amendment,  and  hence  as  a  start  in  the  right 
direction  I  urge  this  General  Assembly  to  enact  a  law  that 
all  state  administrative  officers  whose  election  by  the 
people  is  not  required  by  the  constitution  shall  hereafter 
be  appointed  by  the  governor." 

Governor  Lindsey  of  New  Mexico  is  a  member  and 
chairman  of  a  committee  of  five  appointed  by  the  Tax- 
payers' Association  to  formulate  a  plan  for  the  reorgan- 
ization of  the  state  government  and  report  the  same  to 
the  association  for  its  adoption  and  advocacy  to  the  192 1 
legislature. 

The  governors  of  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Nevada,  and 
North  Dakota  made  recommendations  upon  the  reorgan- 
ization and  centralization  of  administrative  agencies  to 
their  1919  legislature. 


PART    III.     DETAILED    ACCOUNTS    OF    THE 
CHARACTERISTICS   AND   OPERATION   OF 
RECENT    STATE    ENACTMENTS    PRO- 
VIDING FOR  A  BUDGET  PROCEDURE 


CHAPTER  XIII 

MASSACHUSETTS  CONSTITUTIONAL  AND  STATUTORY 
BUDGET  PROVISIONS A  PRODUCT  OF  MIXED  POLITI- 
CAL EMOTIONS 

Legislative  Organisation  and  Procedure 

As  in  other  states,  the  representative  branch  of  the 
government,  here  called  the  general  court,  is  composed 
of  two  coordinate  deliberative  bodies,  the  concurrence  of 
which  is  required  to  reach  a  decision  on  any  matter 
brought  before  them.  The  Senate  has  40  members;  the 
House  has  240.  The  organization  differs  from  that  of 
the  representative  branch  of  the  government  of  many 
other  states  in  this :  From  the  very  earliest  days,  the 
practice  in  Massachusetts  has  been  to  have  the  member- 
ship of  both  houses  parceled  out  or  appointed  to  joint 
standing  committees  for  the  initial  consideration  of  mat- 
ters coming  before  either  house;  whereas  the  more  usual 
practice  is  to  organize  standing  committees  in  each  house 
for  the  initial  consideration  of  matters  presented  there 
—  and  it  is  only  after  action  taken  in  one  house  that 
it  goes  to  the  other  house  to  be  taken  up  de  novo  in  a 
corresponding  standing  committee  of  its  own.  In  19 19 
there  were  thirty-two  of  these  joint  committees.  There 
are  but  three  committees  of  significance  which  are  not 
joint  committees;  each  house  has  its  committee  on  ways 
and  means,  rules,  and  judiciary.  In  practice  these  cor- 
responding committees  of  the  two  houses  are  often  fused 
for  more  prompt  and  effective  action. 

The  fact  that  in  Massachusetts  the  membership  of  both 
houses  is  combined  in  joint  committees,  instead  of  each 
house  having  its  own  separate  standing  committee,  has 
not  given  to  Massachusetts  a  characteristically  different 

217 


218      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

result.  The  machinery  may  have  been  a  little  more  pro- 
ductive ;  there  may  have  been  a  little  less  friction  between 
the  houses,  and  a  little  less  delay  in  making  deliveries; 
but  the  product  delivered  has  been  the  same.  The  added 
facilities  afforded  have  been  for  something  that  the 
people  did  not  want  —  more  legislation.  Instead  of 
demanding  more  legislation  the  popular  demand  has  been 
for  less  legislation,  better  considered  and  understood.  In 
fact,  the  citizenry  of  the  states  have  been  so  much  dis- 
satisfied with  these  enlarged  facilities  for  production  that 
they  have  tried  sabotage  in  every  form  to  slow  down  and 
reduce  the  output  without  actually  putting  their  law  mills 
out  of  commission.  They  have  limited  the  periods  during 
which  the  legislatures  could  sit ;  they  have  given  to  them 
biennial  instead  of  annual  sessions;  they  have  required 
the  grist  to  be  ground  over  by  two  mills ;  and  then,  in  case 
the  governor  did  not  approve,  required  it  to  be  ground 
again  by  both  mills.  A  form  of  organization  within 
these  law-making  mills  which  had  the  effect  only  of  per- 
mitting them  to  speed  up  could  not  prove  effective  to  cure 
the  cause  of  popular  dissatisfaction.  The  net  effect  of 
creating  thirty-two  joint  committees  is  to  provide  thirty- 
two  hoppers  and  thirty-two  sets  of  burrs  where  the  grist 
could  be  ground  once  instead  of  twice  —  the  function 
of  the  regular  session  in  each  house  being  to  give  the 
members  a  chance  to  audit  the  toll  and  approve  the  grist 
on  the  statements  made  by  the  foremen  and  crews  ap- 
pointed to  take  charge  of  the  operation  of  the  thirty-two 
jointly  operated  mills. 

By  reason  of  the  fact  that  a  large  part  of  the  legislation 
of  to-day  is  to  provide  for  public  service  of  one  kind 
or  another  each  of  these  thirty-two  streams  of  legislation 
involves  expenditures.  With  the  initiative  in  the  hands 
of  so  many  legislative  leaders,  none  of  whom  is  re- 
sponsible for  administration,  it  is  necessary  to  provide 
some  means  of  coordination.     In  so  far  as  there  may  be 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  219 

said  to  be  a  common  plan  or  central  management,  this 
comes  through  the  majority  "  party  "  caucus,  and  through 
the  rules  committees  and  the  committees  on  ways  and  means. 
The  "  party  "  caucus  rises  superior  to  the  committees, 
in  that  it  is  through  this  agency  that  the  committees  are 
organized;  but  the  "  party,"  as  in  all  other  states,  is  irre- 
sponsible. The  rules  committees  are  the  adjusters  used 
for  keeping  the  machinery  in  condition  to  execute  the 
orders  of  the  "  party  "  leadership  —  the  presiding  officer 
of  each  house  being  chairman  of  the  rules  committee. 
The  ways  and  means  committees  operate  as  a  sieve. 
Neither  of  the  houses  makes  use  of  a  committee-of-the- 
whole  procedure,  as  it  is  quite  foreign  to  the  system  of 
inquest,  discussion,  and  determination  of  matters  of 
policy. 

This  in  general  is  the  organization  and  procedure  devel- 
oped in  past  years  for  the  conduct  of  the  duly  constituted 
forum  of  the  people  —  the  representative  reviewing  and 
appropriating  body  of  Massachusetts.  It  is  mentioned  in 
passing  not  because  it  is  essentially  different  from  that  of 
the  other  states  and  the  National  Government,  but  to  get 
it  clearly  in  mind  before  taking  up  the  recent  enactments 
for  a  budget  procedure.  The  steps  taken  for  revision  of 
procedure  for  the  exercise  of  control  over  the  House  in 
no  material  way  affected  the  organization  or  the  methods 
of  the  legislature;  it  did  not  undertake  to  develop  respon- 
sible leadership;  it  was  not  devised  to  establish  an  open- 
forum  practice. 

Constitutional  and  Statutory  Budget  Provisions 

The  essential  features  of  the  budget  system  as  enacted 
into  law  by  constitutional  amendment  and  statute  in  191 8 
are  in  substance  as  follows  :x 

1  The  sections  in  italics  are  constitutional  provisions ;  those  not 
in  italics  are  provisions  of  statute  law.  Constitutional  Amendments, 
Art.  LXIII :  General  Acts,  1918,  Ch.  244. 


220      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Preparation  of  Estimates: 

( i )  Estimates  for  the  ordinary  maintenance  of  depart- 
ments, institutions,  and  undertakings  receiving  annual 
appropriations  from  the  commonwealth  shall  be  prepared 
by  the  officer  or  board  in  charge  and  submitted  to  the 
supervisor  of  administration  by  October  15th.  These 
estimates  "  shall  not  include  any  estimate  for  any  new  or 
special  purposes  or  objects  not  authorized  by  statute." 

(2)  Estimates  for  all  other  financial  needs  of  the 
departments  and  institutions  shall  be  submitted  by  the 
department  head  to  the  supervisor  by  October  15th,  sep- 
arate from  the  above. 

(3)  Estimates  of  requirements  for  interest  and  debt 
service  for  deficiencies  and  for  all  claims  and  other  such 
expenditures  authorized  by  the  statutes  shall  be  prepared 
by  the  auditor  submitted  to  the  supervisor  and  to  the 
clerk  of  the  House  by  December  26th. 

(4)  Estimates  of  receipts  from  ordinary  and  other 
revenues,  of  unencumbered  balances,  and  of  all  other  re- 
sources available  for  appropriation  shall  be  prepared  by 
the  auditor  and  submitted  to  the  supervisor  and  the  clerk 
of  the  House  by  December  26th. 

(5)  A  tabulated  itemized  statement  of  estimates  sub- 
mitted under  ( 1 )  above,  together  with  the  comparative 
appropriations  of  the  previous  year  and  the  expenditures 
of  the  three  previous  years,  shall  be  submitted  by  the 
auditor  to  the  supervisor  and  the  clerk  of  the  House 
by  December  26th. 

Revision  of  Estimates  and  Preparation  of  Budget: 

(1)  The  supervisor  of  administration  shall  revise  all 
estimates  and  prepare  for  the  governor  a  budget  "  setting 
forth  such  recommendations  as  the  governor  shall  de- 
termine." No  date  is  fixed  for  the  completion  of  the 
supervisor's  work.     The  supervisor  is  required  to  "  make 


Massachusetts  Budget  Proznsions  221 

such  investigations  as  may  be  necessary,"  and  under  his 
general  powers  is  authorized  to  make  any  investigations 
authorized  by  the  governor  and  council,  and  to  compel  the 
production  of  books  and  papers  and  the  giving  of  tes- 
timony. 

(2)  "For  the  purpose  of  preparing  his  budget,  the 
governor  shall  have  power  to  require  any  board,  com- 
mission, officer,  or  department  to  furnish  him  zvith  any 
information  which  he  may  deem  necessary."  He  may 
call  on  the  auditor  for  information  and  assistance  in  pre- 
paring the  budget. 

Contents  and  Form  of  Budget: 

( 1 )  The  budget  shall  contain  "  a  statement  of  all  pro- 
posed expenditures  of  the  commonzvealth  for  the  fiscal 
year,  including  those  already  authorized  by  lazv,  and  of 
all  taxes,  revenues,  loans,  and  other  means  by  which  such 
expenditures  shall  be  defrayed."  It  shall  include  also 
"  definite  recommendations  of  the  governor  as  to  the 
financing  of  the  expenditures  recommended  and  the  rel- 
ative amounts  to  be  raised  from  ordinary  revenue,  direct 
taxes,  or  loans." 

(2)  The  budget  shall  be  classified  to  show  separately 
estimates  and  recommendations  for:  (a)  expenses  of 
administration,  operation,  and  maintenance ;  (b)  deficien- 
cies or  overdrafts  in  former  appropriations;  (c)  new 
construction,  additions,  improvements,  and  capital  out- 
lays; (d)  interest  on  the  public  debt  and  debt  require- 
ments; (e)  all  new  and  other  requests  for  expenditures. 

(3)  Except  for  the  requirements  of  (2)  above,  the 
governor  is  left  to  determine  the  form  and  arrangement 
of  the  budget. 

Submission  of  Budget  to  Legislature: 

(1)  "Within  three  weeks  after  the  convening  of  the 
general  court,"  the  governor  shall  submit  his  budget  to 


222       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  legislature.  The  time  within  this  period  is  fixed,  by 
law,  as  on  or  before  the  second  Wednesday  in  January, 
or  within  one  week  of  the  convening  of  the  general  court. 
This  is  the  only  point  at  which  the  two  budget  provisions, 
one  of  law  and  one  of  the  constitution,  conflict,  if  indeed 
these  are  to  be  considered  contradictory.1 

(2)  With  the  budget  the  governor  shall  submit  such 
messages  and  supplemental  data  as  he  deems  necessary. 

Supplementary  Budgets: 

The  governor  may  at  any  time  submit  to  the  general 
court  supplementary  budgets.  He  shall  recommend  the 
term  for  which  any  loan  shall  be  contracted.2 

Restrictions  on  Legislative  Procedure: 

( 1 )  "  All  appropriations  based  upon  the  budget  to  be 
paid  from  taxes  or  revenues  shall  be  incorporated  in  a 
single  bill  which  shall  be  called  the  general  appropriation 
bill." 

(2)  "  The  general  court  may  provide  for  its  salaries, 
mileage,  and  expenses,  and  for  the  necessary  expenditures 
in  anticipation  of  appropriations,  but  before  final  action 
on  the  general  appropriation  bill  it  shall  not  enact  any 
appropriation  bill  except  on  recommendation  of  the  gov- 
ernor." 

(3)  "  The  general  court  may  increase,  add,  decrease, 
or  omit  items  in  the  budget." 

(4)  The  commonwealth  may  borrow  money  to  repel 
invasion,  suppress  insurrection,  defend  the  commonwealth , 
assist  the  United  States  in  case  of  war,  and  in  anticipation 
of  receipts  from  taxes  or  other  sources.  For  other  pur- 
poses the  commonwealth  may  borrow  money  only  by  a 

1  General  Acts  of  19 19,  Ch.  52,  brought  the  two  into  agreement 

2  Constitutional  Amendments,  Art.  LXII. 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  223 

vote  taken  by  yeas  and  nays,  of  two  thirds  of  each  house 
present  and  voting.1 

(5)  "After  final  action  on  the  general  appropriation 
bill,  or  on  recommendation  of  the  governor,  special  appro- 
priation bills  may  be  enacted.  Such  bills  shall  provide 
the  specific  means  for  defraying  the  appropriations  therein 
contained." 

Veto  of  Items: 

( 1 )  "  The  governor  may  disapprove  or  reduce  items 
or  parts  of  items  in  any  bill  appropriating  money.  So 
much  of  such  bill  as  he  approves  shall  upon  his  signing 
the  same  become  law." 

(2)  "  As  to  each  item  disapproved  or  reduced,  he  shall 
transmit  to  the  house  in  which  the  bill  originated  his 
reason  for  such  disapproval  or  reduction,  and  the  pro- 
cedure shall  then  be  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a  bill 
disapproved  as  a  whole." 

Fiscal  Year: 

(1)  The  fiscal  year  begins  on  December  1st.2 

Votes  on  Account: 

( 1 )  "  Boards,  commissions,  officers,  and  officials  hav- 
ing charge  of  expenditures  in  behalf  of  the  commonwealth 
may  continue  expenditures  in  each  year  at  the  rate  of 
the  appropriation  authorized  for  the  preceding  year  until 
the  general  court  makes  an  appropriation  therefor  or 
otherwise  provides."  3 

Treasury  Receipts  and  Payments: 

(1)   "All  money  received  on  account  of  the  common- 

1  Constitutional  Amendments,  Art.  LXII. 

2  Acts  of  1905,  Ch.  211. 

3  Chapter  20,  General  Laws  of  1919,  passed  on  March  5,  1919. 


224      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

zvealth  from  any  source  whatsoever  shall  be  paid  into  the 
treasury  thereof." 

(2)  "No  moneys  shall  be  issued  out  of  the  treasury 
of  this  commonwealth  and  disposed  of  (except  such  sums 
as  may  be  appropriated  for  the  redemption  of  bills  of 
credit  or  treasury  notes,  or  for  the  payment  of  interest 
arising  thereon)  but  by  warrant  under  the  hand  of  the 
governor  for  the  time  being,  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  council,  for  the  necessary  defense  and  support 
of  the  commonwealth;  and  for  the  protection  and  preser- 
vation of  the  inhabitants  thereof,  agreeably  to  the  acts 
and  resolves  of  the  general  court."  l 

(3)  "  No  public  functionary  shall  make  any  purchases 
or  incur  any  liabilities  in  the  name  of  the  commonwealth 
for  a  larger  amount  than  that  which  has  been  appropriated 
by  law  for  the  service  or  object."  2 

Transfers: 

(1)  Transfers  between  appropriation  items  are  illegal. 

(2)  The  governor's  emergency  fund  of  $100,000  may 
be  used,  among  other  things,  as  a  fund  from  which  trans- 
fers may  be  made  to  cover  deficiencies  in  other  appropri- 
ations, on  approval  of  the  governor  and  council,  after 
certification  by  the  auditor  of  the  necessity.3 

(3)  There  is  placed  at  the  auditor's  disposal  annually 
an  appropriation  of  $1,000  "  For  small  items  of  expendi- 
ture for  which  no  appropriations  have  been  made,  and 
for  cases  in  which  appropriations  have  been  exhausted 
or  have  reverted  to  the  treasury  in  previous  years."  4 

Position  of  the  Governor  in  the  Administration 

The  discussion  leading  up  to  the  administrative  reor- 

1  Constitution,  Ch.  II,  Sec.  1,  Art  XI 

2  Acts  of  1858,  Ch.  71. 

3  Acts  of  1908,  Ch.  549. 

4  Acts  of  1916,  Ch.  222. 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  225 

ganization  described  in  a  foregoing  chapter,  and  the 
budget  discussion  and  enactment,  hold  out  the  view  that 
executive  responsibility  should  be  made  more  definite  and 
certain  through  the  governor.  But  this  view  was  not 
carried  out  either  in  law  or  in  fact.  The  governor  is  not 
the  responsible  head  of  the  administration ;  he  is  not  placed 
in  a  position  to  exercise  leadership.  In  practice,  under 
the  new  budget  law,  he  did  not  undertake  to  perform  the 
function  of  leader.  Both  an  elected  executive  council  and 
the  legislative  organization  and  procedure  stand  in  the 
way  if  this  were  attempted;  and  the  supervisor  of  admin- 
istration who  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  preparing  the 
estimates  is  responsible  to  a  ten-headed  executive,  the 
"  governor  and  council." 

Filing  of  Estimates  with  Supervisor  of  Administration 

Estimate  blanks  issued  to  the  departments  and  insti- 
tutions in  19 1 8  for  the  19 19  budget  were  prepared  by 
the  supervisor  of  administration.  In  conformity  with 
sections  1  and  2  of  the  budget  law,  one  set  of  estimate 
sheets  is  prepared  for  the  maintenance  and  other  ordinary 
expenses  already  authorized  by  law  and  another  set  for 
extraordinary  expenses,  for  capital  outlays,  and  for  ob- 
jects not  already  authorized  by  law.  Because  of  the 
essential  difference  between  information  required  from 
departments  and  from  institutions,  separate  maintenance 
estimate  blanks  are  used  for  the  two.  In  the  case  of 
normal  schools,  still  another  set  of  blanks  is  furnished  to 
allow  for  the  boarding  hall. 

Estimates  Reviewed  and  Budget  Prepared  by  Office  of 
Supervisor  of  Administration 

The  deputy  supervisor  of  administration  took  personal 
charge  of  the  revision  of  estimates  and  the  preparation 
of  the  1919  budget.  He  followed  in  the  main  the  pro- 
cedure he  had  worked  out  in  1918,  and  called  the  depart- 


226      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ment  heads  in  to  go  over  with  him  the  estimates  they 
had  submitted.  A  stenographic  record  was  kept  of  some 
of  these  conferences,  while  of  others  a  memorandum 
only  was  kept  covering  the  main  questions  involved.  In 
each  case  the  deputy  dictated  a  brief  statement  of  his 
tentative  decisions  with  regard  to  the  estimates  involved. 
All  of  the  memoranda,  with  such  other  material  as  was 
pertinent,  were  bound  with  the  related  departmental  or 
institutional  estimates  in  a  large  loose-leaf  binder.  All 
of  the  estimates  filled  three  such  volumes.  These  were 
the  deputy's  private  files  and  contained  many  pencil  no- 
tations and  references  on  the  estimate  sheets. 

The  deputy  supervisor  received  altogether  depart- 
mental and  institutional  estimates  amounting  to  $40,577,- 
481.27.  Of  this  amount  he  eliminated  $4,847,546.62 
or  1 1.9  per  cent,  and  recommended  for  appropriation  a 
total  of  $35,739,934.45.  A  large  part  of  the  depart- 
mental estimates  for  special  purposes  was  filed  too  late 
to  allow  for  the  necessary  study  before  the  supervisor 
made  recommendations  for  the  governor's  budget.  Over 
$2,000,000  of  the  amount  listed  here  as  budget  cuts  is 
made  up  of  this  item. 

The  tentative  bufdget  for  191 9  was  submitted  to  the 
governor  on  January  3,  191 9.  Governor  Coolidge  had 
the  document  in  his  possession  from  that  time  till  its  sub- 
mission to  the  general  court  on  January  8th.  A  Saturday 
and  a  Sunday  intervened  to  reduce  the  time  still  further. 
No  conferences  were  held,  so  far  as  could  be  ascertained, 
either  with  officials  or  with  the  public. 

The  19 19  budget  as  submitted  to  the  legislature  by 
the  governor  was  the  identical  document  handed  to  him 
by  the  supervisor  a  few  days  before.  It  was  prefaced 
by  a  four-and-a-half  page  letter  of  transmittal  signed  by 
the  governor.  A  careful  examination  of  this  letter  does 
not  disclose  a  single  phrase  which  might  even  be  con- 
strued as  committing  the  governor  to  any  definite  recom- 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  227 

mendation  contained  in  the  budget.  He  did  not  even 
mention  the  total  amount  recommended  by  the  deputy 
supervisor,  though  he  mentioned  the  total  of  amounts 
requested  by  the  departments.  The  governor  contented 
himself  with  saying :  "  The  estimates  for  expenditures 
have  been  studied  by  the  supervisor  of  administration, 
and  his  recommendations  are  embodied  in  the  summary 
of  financial  statements  submitted  with  this  budget."1  In 
the  part  of  the  letter  dealing  with  the  subject  of  capital 
outlays,  he  again  refers  to  the  "  recommendations  of 
the  supervisor  of  the  administration,"  assuming  no  re- 
sponsibility therefor,  though  the  budget  law  requires  the 
supervisor  to  prepare  a  budget  for  the  governor  "  setting 
forth  such  recommendations  as  the  governor  shall  de- 
termine." 

The  governor's  refusal  to  take  any  of  the  responsibility 
for  the  19 19  budget  is  all  the  more  significant  in  the 
light  of  the  recommendations  of  his  inaugural  address, 
delivered  the  week  previous  to  the  submission  of  the 
budget.  In  that  address  there  are  no  less  than  thirteen 
major  recommendations  which  either  be'longed  in  the 
1919  budget  or  deserved  mention  there.  Take  for 
example  the  recommendations  for  the  welcome  of  return- 
ing troops,  for  the  subventions  to  public  schools,  for  the 
instruction  of  aliens  in  English,  for  a  survey  of  the 
street-railway  situation,  for  the  improvement  of  the  port 
of  Boston,  for  the  Plymouth  exposition,  and  for  the 
creation  of  a  loan  fund  to  encourage  home  owning. 
These  were  not  dealt  with  at  all  in  the  letter  of  trans- 
mittal nor  were  they  among  the  estimated  financial  re- 
quirements of  the  fiscal  year.  This  gives  further  evidence 
of  the  fact  that  the  budget  submitted  was  not  the  plan  of 
the  governor. 

The  policy  of  the  governor  appears  to  have  been  cal- 

1  The  italics  are  the  author's. 


228      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

culated  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  arousing  prejudice  in 
the  minds  of  the  members  of  the  legislature  against  him 
and  against  the  new  budget  system.  Such  a  breach  was 
foreshadowed  in  the  remarks  of  more  than  one  legislator 
and  was  successfully  avoided  by  the  governor's  tact  and 
the  leadership  of  Representative  Benjamin  Loring  Young, 
chairman  of  the  House  committee  on  ways  and  means. 

Form  and  Content  of  the  ipip  Budget 

Eliminating  the  governor's  letter  of  transmittal,  the 
1919  budget  is  composed  of: 

( 1 )  A  seven-page  statement  by  the  supervisor  explain- 
ing in  detail  the  recommendations  for  capital  outlays 
contained  in  the  subsequent  pages. 

(2)  The  estimated  revenues  for  1919,  as  furnished  by 
the  auditor. 

(3)  A  summary  of  general  fund  treasury  transactions 
for  1918. 

(4)  A  statement  of  the  condition  of  state  debt,  show- 
ing the  direct  and  contingent  debts  separately. 

(5)  A  six-page  statement  of  the  recommended  appro- 
priations for  1919  by  spending  units,  classified  as  for 
salaries,  for  expenses,  and  for  capital  outlays,  and  show- 
ing the  source  from  which  the  appropriations  are  to  be 
financed. 

(6)  A  general  summary  of  estimated  receipts  by 
sources,  showing  the  amounts  to  be  credited  to  general 
fund,  special  funds,  and  the  total. 

(7)  A  balance  sheet  as  of  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year 
for  which  the  19 19  budget  provides. 

(8)  A  detailed  estimate  of  proposed  expenditures  for 
1 9 19  for  the  state  government,  including  the  legislative 
and  judicial  departments.  (This  statement  covers  eighty- 
five  pages,  and  contains  507  enumerated  items  many  of 
which  are  further  subclassified.  While  this  is  as  detailed 
material  as  is  printed,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  229 

supervisor's  private  file  of  departmental  and  institutional 
estimates  goes  into  much  greater  detail.) 
(9)   An  index  of  the  entire  document. 

House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  Remake  Budget 

The  1919  budget  was  referred  immediately  to  the  House 
committee  on  ways  and  means  when  received  from  the 
governor  on  January  8th.  Representative  Benjamin 
Loring  Young  was  chairman  of  this  committee,  and  the 
budget  when  it  came  out  was  virtually  his  measure. 

Said  Mr.  Young  to  the  House  in  his  budget  speech: 
"  Immediately  on  receipt  of  the  budget,  the  committee 
sent  a  notice  to  each  state  department,  setting  aside  two 
weeks  for  public  hearings  and  inviting  all  persons  inter- 
ested to  appear.  The  committee  also  requested  that 
statements  in  writing  be  filed.  Open  hearings  continued 
for  two  weeks  and  a  further  week  was  devoted  to  exec- 
utive sessions." 

During  the  time  that  the  estimates  were  before  the 
committee  the  deputy  supervisor  of  administration,  who 
had  prepared  the  budget  sent  in  by  the  governor,  and  the 
first  deputy  auditor  were  in  constant  attendance.  The 
deputy  supervisor  had  with  him  his  personal  estimate  files, 
both  for  his  own  information  and  for  the  use  of  the 
committee. 

After  the  hearings  and  the  executive  sessions,  the  com- 
mittee arrived  at  its  revisions,  and  the  deputy  supervisor, 
acting  under  the  guidance  of  Mr.  Young,  drew  up  the 
general  appropriation  bill.  The  bill  contained  provisions 
for  appropriations  amounting  to  $34,944,664.22,  or 
$795,360.23  less  than  recommended  in  the  budget ; 
$400,000  of  this  amount  represented  cuts  by  the  committee 
in  the  maintenance  recommendations  of  the  governor. 
This  large  decrease  was  made  possible  partly  because  of 
the  fact  that  the  estimates  upon  which  the  budget  was 
based  were  drawn  in  the  main  before  the  signing  of  the 


230      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

armistice,  and  represented  guesses  based  on  a  rising  com- 
modity market. 

On  February  10th,  Mr.  Young  reported  out  of  the  ways 
and  means  committee  the  general  appropriation  bill.  It 
contained  appropriations  for  maintenance  and  capital 
outlays,  both  for  the  state  and  for  the  metropolitan  dis- 
tricts. The  515  numbered  items  were  grouped  by  spend- 
ing units,  except  in  the  case  of  interest,  debt  service,  and 
deficiencies. 

In  presenting  the  budget  bill,  Mr.  Young  delivered  one 
of  the  most  significant  addresses  that  had  ever  been  heard 
in  the  Massachusetts  legislature  on  the  finances  of  the 
state  and  the  fiscal  program  for  the  following  year.  Mr. 
Young  gave  this  outline  of  his  speech  as  an  introduction: 

"  My  remarks  will  naturally  divide  themselves  under 
four  heads  — 

"  I.  An  explanation  of  the  constitutional  amendment 
for  a  state  budget  recently  adopted  by  the  people,  and  a 
brief  statement  of  the  various  modifications  in  the  finan- 
cial procedure  of  the  House  and  of  the  general  court 
which  would  seem  to  be  made  necessary  or  advisable  by 
its  adoption. 

"  II.  An  explanation  of  the  appropriation  bill  now 
reported  to  the  House  by  the  committee  on  ways  and 
means,  and  a  brief  discussion  of  several  of  its  more  impor- 
tant features.  This  discussion  may  serve  to  point  out 
to  the  members  of  the  House  some  of  the  more  difficult 
problems  which  confronted  the  committee,  those  in  which 
the  members  will  probably  be  most  interested,  and  with 
regard  to  which  they  have  a  right  to  demand  complete, 
detailed,  and  satisfactory  information.  It  is  my  hope 
that  before  this  bill  is  passed  to  be  engrossed  every  ques- 
tion of  doubt  in  the  mind  of  any  member  may  be  satis- 
factorily answered  by  the  committee,  and  that  no  member 
can  justly  say  that  he  has  not  been  given  an  opportunity 
to  know  and  understand  every  detail  thereof. 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  231 

"  III.  An  explanation  of  the  general  financial  policy 
outlined  by  his  excellency  the  governor  in  his  budget 
recommendations  (House  Document,  No.  185),  and  the 
manner  in  which  the  bill  now  under  consideration  carries 
out  that  policy  in  part,  together  with  a  brief  survey  of 
the  additional  appropriation  bills  as  may  reasonably  be 
expected  to  come  before  the  general  court  after  final 
action  on  the  present  bill  either  through  submission  of 
supplementary  budgets  by  the  governor  or  otherwise. 

"  IV.  A  statement  of  work  accomplished  by  the  com- 
mittee on  ways  and  means,  and  of  the  methods  adopted 
by  it  during  its  consideration  of  the  budget." 

In  the  course  pf  discussion  on  the  first  point,  Mr.  Young 
outlined  no  unusual  changes  in  the  legislative  procedure, 
except  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  bills  based  on  the 
budget  or  on  supplementary  budgets  have  the  right  of 
way  over  all  other  appropriations  in  the  legislature.  He 
reproved  the  departments  which  had  failed  to  submit  their 
estimates  in  time  for  the  budget  and  had  then  attempted 
to  secure  their  appropriations  through  private  petitions. 
Of  these  departments,  he  said :  "  They  have  refused  to 
enter  the  open  door  of  the  budget,  and  now  seek  to  obtain 
entrance  to  the  treasury  through  the  back  door  of  special 
legislation.  If  the  budget  system  is  to  stand,  these  special 
bills  should  receive  no  consideration  at  this  time." 

Mr.  Young  placed  great  emphasis  on  the  responsibility 
of  the  governor  for  the  budget.     He  said  in  part : 

"  The  statute  and  the  constitutional  amendment  taken 
together  make  the  governor,  so  far  as  finances  are  con- 
cerned, the  actual  executive  head  of  the  state  in  practice 
as  well  as  theory.  In  place  of  an  irresponsible  govern- 
ment by  boards  and  commissions,  each  anxious  to  aug- 
ment its  own  importance  and  its  own  financial  needs,  we 
have  lodged  full  responsibility  with  the  governor,  whose 
viewpoint  is  not  limited  to  a  particular  department  or 
to  a  particular  locality,  but  extends  to  the  entire  state 


232      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

government    of    which    he    is    the    responsible    head." 

That  Mr.  Young  has  a  full  appreciation  of  the  func- 
tion and  significance  of  the  budget  is  evident  from  the 
following  paragraph  of  his  budget  speech: 

"  The  budget  is  not  a  mere  document ;  it  is  not  a  mere 
appropriation  bill.  The  budget  is  the  plan  for  financing 
the  state  government  for  the  current  year,  which  has  been 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  governor  and  has  been 
submitted  by  him  to  the  general  court  for  its  consid- 
eration. The  budget  contains  an  appropriation  program, 
a  social  program,  a  revenue  program.  It  is  a  complete 
plan  for  the  government  of  the  commonwealth." 

In  disposing  of  his  remaining  three  points,  Mr.  Young  is 
equally  clear  and  forceful.  His  discussion  of  the  main 
issues  involved  in  the  general  appropriation  bill  is  partic- 
ularly valuable.  When  Mr.  Young  told  the  House  that  he 
hoped  that  debate  on  the  budget  bill  would  result  in 
"  thorough,  frank,  and  pertinent  discussion  of  the  budget 
proposals,"  he  seemed  to  be  thoroughly  in  earnest. 

In  addition  to  the  general  appropriation  bill,  there  was 
presented  with  the  budget  speech  a  balance  sheet  as  of 
the  end  of  the  fiscal  year,  a  table  showing  the  individual 
cuts  and  increases  made  by  the  committee  on  ways  and 
means,  a  table  showing  the  recommended  appropriations 
compared  with  those  of  1918,  and  a  table  of  the  per 
capita  weekly  costs  for  maintenance  of  the  state  insti- 
tutions. 

Chairman  of  House  Committee  Gives  News  Value  to 
Budget  Issues 

When  Governor  Coolidge  presented  the  19 19  budget 
to  the  legislature  early  in  January,  there  was  no  dramatic 
incident.  There  was  no  "  news  "  to  attract  attention. 
The  document  went  to  the  clerk  of  the  House,  the  clerk 
read  the  title  with  the  drone  of  routine  business,  the 
document  was  referred  to  the  ways  and  means  committee 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  233 

and  thus  for  the  time  being  was  lost  from  sight.  A  few 
of  the  papers  mentioned  the  fact,  but  even  these  missed 
the  meat  of  the  matter.  The  Boston  Herald,  for 
example,  ran  the  headline  on  the  seventh  page,  "  Budget 
of  $11,000,000,"  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  budget 
carried  $35,739,934.44. 

The  situation  was  quite  different  when  the  appropri- 
ation bill  was  reported  and  sponsored  by  Mr.  Young. 
His  personal  presentation  of  the  bill,  together  with  his 
concise  and  straightforward  discussion  of  the  issues  in- 
volved, before  an  open  session  of  the  House,  introduced 
enough  of  the  dramatic  element  to  carry  the  budget  into 
almost  every  paper  of  the  state.  The  Christian  Science 
Monitor,  the  policy  of  which  is  to  exclude  matters  of 
sectional  interest,  devoted  almost  a  column  to  Mr.  Young's 
budget  speech,  quoting  liberally  from  him,  and  stressing 
the  four  major  issues  he  had  raised.  The  Boston  Globe 
of  February  10th  and  the  Springfield  Republican  of  the 
nth  cover  the  incident  in  their  news  columns.  The 
Boston  Transcript  not  only  covered  the  event  as  news, 
but  devoted  an  editorial  to  a  commendation  of  Repre- 
sentative Young  and  his  budget  speech.  The  editorial 
was  headed,  "  Loring  Young's  Contribution,"  and  among 
other  observations  said :  "  He  has  associated  with  his 
comprehensive  view  of  the  state's  proposed  expenditures 
a  comprehensive  view  of  the  state's  whole  legislative 
program,  thus  equating,  as  it  were,  problems  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  cash  with  problems  in  the  distribution  of 
the  general  court's  energies  as  a  state-governing  and 
state-building  body." 

Following  the  presentation  of  the  budget  bill  and  the 
budget  speech,  the  better  part  of  a  week  was  devoted  to 
the  debate  on  the  bill.  During  this  time  Mr.  Young  was 
continually  on  his  feet  explaining  items,  answering  ques- 
tions, and  defending  the  budget.  As  a  result  of  this  dis- 
cussion, and  as  the  result  of  later  information,  the  ways 


234       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  means  committee  itself  put  forward  a  number  of 
amendments.  Three  of  these  were  textual,  one  decreased, 
while  five  increased  the  bill.  Nine  private  members' 
amendments  were  offered  to  strike  out  or  reduce,  and 
two  to  increase  the  appropriation  for  band  concerts  in 
Boston.  All  the  amendments  put  forward  by  the  com- 
mittee were  adopted  by  the  House;  Mr.  Young  accepted 
the  private  amendments  to  reduce,  and  they  were  adopted 
by  the  House;  Mr.  Young,  however,  refused  to  accept  the 
two  amendments  to  increase  the  budget  and  they  were 
defeated. 

The  general  appropriation  bill  was  received  in  the 
Senate  on  March  5th.  It  was  immediately  referred  to 
the  Senate  committee  on  ways  and  means.  Here  it  was 
held  till  March  28th,  when  it  was  reported  with  twenty 
amendments.  Of  these  five  were  textual,  one  segregat- 
ing an  item  by  splitting  it  in  two,  two  decreasing  items 
in  the  bill,  and  the  remaining  twelve  making  increases. 
On  April  2d,  all  of  these  amendments  were  adopted,  and 
at  the  same  stage  three  private  members'  amendments  to 
increase  items  were  adopted.  Two  of  these  restored  items 
were  cut  out  in  the  house,  and  the  third  increased  the 
appropriation  for  band  concerts  in  Boston  by  $5,000. 
The  net  result  of  the  Senate's  seventeen  amendments  was 
a  decrease  of  $230. 

Action  of  Senate  Calls  Forth  Conference  Committee 

The  House,  under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Young,  refused 
to  accept  five  of  the  amendments  made  in  the  Senate.  A 
conference  committee,  however,  worked  out  a  compromise 
eliminating  two  of  the  Senate  amendments  to  increase, 
and  the  two  houses  agreed  on  the  measure,  enacted  it, 
and  sent  it  to  the  governor  for  his  approval,  which  it  re- 
ceived on  April  23d  and  became  Chapter  153  of  the  Spe- 
cial Acts  of  1919.  As  the  bill  finally  passed  it  contained 
but  one  amendment  to  increase  which  had  not  been  put 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  235 

forward  by  the  House  or  the  Senate  ways  and  means  com- 
mittee. It  carried  but  $115,711.25  more  than  the  budget 
as  drawn  by  the  House  ways  and  means  committee,  al- 
most all  of  which  represented  items  amended  on  recom- 
mendation of  the  committee  subsequent  to  its  reporting 
of  the  bill. 

Form  of  General  Appropriation  Bill 

The  general  appropriation  bill  based  on  the  budget  is  a 
document  of  thirty-five  pages.  It  contains  515  numbered 
items,  15  lettered  sub-items,  and  a  score  or  so  unlettered 
sub-items.  The  general  principle  of  lump-sum  appropri- 
ation is  followed,  though  in  certain  cases,  where  a  greater 
control  is  wanted,  some  segregation  is  made.  The  aver- 
age item  is  over  $60,000,  while  five  of  the  items  are  for 
over  $1,000,000  and  sixty-seven  items  are  of  $100,000  or 
more.  The  item  numbers  follow  the  item  numbers  of 
the  budget  throughout,  and  the  same  classification  by 
spending  units  is  followed.  All  amounts  appropriated 
are  from  the  general  fund  except  where  specified. 

Two  Supplementary  Budgets  Submitted  by  Governor 

The  budget  amendment  to  the  constitution  provides: 
"The  governor  may  at  any  time  recommend  to  the  gen- 
eral court  supplementary  budgets  which  shall  be  subject  to 
the  same  procedure  as  the  original  budget."  In  accord- 
ance with  this  provision,  Governor  Coolidge  submitted 
two  supplementary  budgets  to  the  legislature  in  191 9. 

The  first  supplementary  budget  carried  $2,932,865.10, 
almost  all  of  which  was  for  capital  outlay.  It  disposed 
of  the  items  which  had  been  received  too  late  for  consid- 
eration in  the  budget,  and  added  a  number  of  others  in 
accordance  with  the  governor's  recommendation  that  an 
extended  public  works  program  be  initiated  as  a  means  of 
lessening  unemployment.     The  governor's  letter  trans- 


236      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

mitting  the  first  supplementary  budget  is  more  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law.  The  success  of  the  original  budget 
seems  to  have  made  the  governor  more  ready  to  admit 
his  legal  responsibilities,  and  we  find  him  saying: 

"In  the  general  appropriation  act  based  on  my  original 
budget  recommendations,  approximately  $1,600,000  was 
appropriated  for  capital  outlay.  To  this  sum  I  now 
recommend  an  addition  of  $2,479,285.50." 

The  second  supplementary  budget  carried  $1,019,013.18. 
It  provided  for  the  needs  created  by  the  new  laws  of  the 
1 919  session  —  the  salary  increases,  the  various  investiga- 
tions, the  enlarged  services,  and  the  capital  outlays  au- 
thorized since  the  preparation  of  the  previous  supplemen- 
tary budget.  It  is  dated  July  14th,  ten  days  before  the 
prorogation  of  the  general  court.  A  large  part  of  this 
supplementary  budget  may  be  said  to  be  made  up  of  non- 
administration  measures,  or  measures  accepted  by  the 
governor  because  there  was  no  other  way  out.  The 
largest  single  item  is  for  $120,500  to  meet  the  increase 
in  legislative  pay  in  accordance  with  Chapter  239  of  the 
General  Acts  of  19 19,  which  was  passed  over  the  gov- 
ernor's veto.  The  next  largest  item  is  for  $100,000 
recommended  by  the  supervisor  "in  connection  with  sev- 
eral bills  pending  for  special  highway  improvements." 
These  are  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  traditional 
"private  road  bills"  and  were  opposed  by  the  governor 
though  he  did  not  veto  the  acts  authorizing  them  nor  ex- 
clude them  from  his  last  supplementary  budget.  No  har- 
bor bills  got  through  in  191 9. 

The  supplementary  budgets  were  prepared  by  the  dep- 
uty supervisor  of  administration  as  had  been  the  case  with 
the  original  budget.  They  seem  not  to  contain  anything 
which  Mr.  Young  had  not  already  approved.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  budget,  the  governor  made  no  alterations  in 
the  substance  of  the  supplementary  budgets.  The  entire 
initiative  was  left  with  the  deputy  supervisor  and  Mr. 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  237 

Young,  the  governor  assuming  the  position  of  recipient 
and  not  of  leader. 

Additional  and  Special  Claims  Appropriations 

In  addition  to  the  budget  and  the  two  supplementary 
budgets,  the  Massachusetts  legislature  was  called  upon  to 
make  appropriations : 

1.  Through  special  messages  from  the  governor,  and 

2.  Through   petitions   filed    by    private    citizens,    by 
public  officials,  and  by  members  of  the  legislature. 

Governor  Coolidge  addressed  a  number  of  special  mes- 
sages to  the  legislature  asking  that  immediate  appropria- 
tions be  made  for  the  following  emergencies : 

Purpose  Appropriated  By  Chapter 

Welcome  of  soldiers   $  10,000  1 

Soldiers  and  sailors  commission 10,000  112 

Parade  of  26th  Division 300,000  119 

Influenza  epidemic    5,000  1 

Suppression  of  corn  borer  30,000  135 

Total $355,ooo 

There  was  no  marked  decrease  in  191 9  in  the  number 
of  private  petitions  filed  with  the  general  court  asking 
for  appropriations  of  one  kind  or  another.  As  has  been 
common  heretofore,  a  dozen  or  more  departments  at- 
tempted to  secure  through  private  petition  appropriations 
which  they  had  deliberately  or  accidentally  failed  to  file 
with  their  departmental  estimates.  This  was  severely 
dealt  with  by  Mr.  Young  and  the  committee  on  ways  and 
means,  and  will  probably  not  be  repeated.  Not  allowing 
for  duplications,  the  number  of  private  petitions  filed  in- 
volving a  charge  on  the  treasury  in  1919  was  212;  they 
carried  requests  for  appropriations  aggregating  $36,491,- 
865.21,  not  to  mention  those  which  carried  indefinite 
amounts. 

While  some  of  these  were  finally  carried  through  to 


238       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

enactment,  it  was  only  by  being  taken  up  in  the  gov- 
ernor's supplementary  budgets,  or  by  being  inserted  by 
the  legislature  in  the  bills  used  on  his  budgets.  Inser- 
tions of  this  kind  took  place  only  with  the  last  budget, 
where  an  18.6  per  cent,  increase  was  made.  Neverthe- 
less, almost  the  entire  amount  of  this  increase  is  due  not 
to  insertions  but  to  the  $150,000  increase  in  the  item 
recommended  by  the  budget  for  the  administration  of 
the  bounty  for  soldiers. 

Total  Appropriations  Carried  in  Seven  Acts 

During  the  1919  session  of  the  Massachusetts  General 
Court  total  appropriations  amounting  to  $39,337,913.63 
were  passed  by  the  legislature  and  signed  by  the  governor. 
These  appropriations  are  contained  in  seven  separate 
acts,  three  of  which  were  based  on  the  governor's  three 
budgets;  and  four  on  his  special  messages.  The  follow- 
ing table  indicates  the  basis  of  the  various  appropriations 
and  the  amounts  carried  by  each. 

APPROPRIATIONS  OF  1919  SESSION 

Per  Cent,  of 
Basis  Amount        Total  Appropriation 

Budget   $35,060,375.47  89.2 

First  Supplemental    ....     2,713,802.15  6.9 

Second  Supplemental    .  .     1,208,736.01  3.0 

Special   Messages    355,000.00  .9 

Total    $39,337,9i3.63  100.0 

Summary  of  Facts 

The  significant  facts  with  regard  to  the  191 9  Massa- 
chusetts budget  procedure  are : 

1.  All  appropriations  were  based  on  budgets  as  con- 
templated in  the  law  or  on  executive  messages.  Not  a 
dollar  was  otherwise  appropriated  in  191 9.  There  were 
no  "private  appropriation  bills."  This  must  not  be  taken, 
however,   as  meaning  that  there  were  no  private  bills 


Massachusetts  Budget  Provisions  239 

which  found  their  way  into  the  treasury.  It  simply 
means  that  the  only  channel  of  entry  they  were  able  to 
find  was  through  the  budget  bills. 

2.  The  general  appropriation  bill  carried  almost  ninety 
per  cent,  of  the  total  appropriations  of  the  session. 

3.  Ninety-seven  per  cent,  of  the  total  appropriations 
were  disposed  of  a  month  before  the  end  of  the  session. 
The  appropriations  of  the  last  week  were  but  three  per 
cent,  of  the  total  appropriations,  and  these  represented 
almost  entirely  matters  which  had  been  authorized  by  act 
or  resolve  earlier  in  the  session.  Ninety  per  cent,  of  the 
appropriations  were  passed  soon  after  the  middle  of  the 
session. 

4.  The  general  appropriation  bill  includes  the  appro- 
priations for  the  legislative  and  judicial  departments. 

5.  The  total  appropriations  passed  differ  from  the 
totals  recommended  by  the  House  committee  on  ways 
and  means  by  less  than  $20,000.  They  are,  however, 
some  $300,000  lower  than  the  governor's  recommenda- 
tions. 

6.  The  governor  did  not  exercise  his  right  to  veto 
items  in  appropriation  bills  or  to  reduce  items.  He  ac- 
cepted every  change  made  by  the  legislature. 

7.  The  maintenance  appropriations  were  not  passed 
until  almost  five  months  after  the  beginning  of  the  fiscal 
year  to  which  they  relate.  In  the  interim  the  government 
was  run  on  credit,  at  the  rate  authorized  the  previous 
year.  This  provision  enables  the  budget  makers  and  the 
legislature  to  have  before  them,  when  considering  the 
budget,  a  full  statement  of  the  actual  expenses  for  the 
immediately  preceding  fiscal  period. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

THE   "  EXECUTIVE    BUDGET  "    IDEA   AS   EXEMPLIFIED   IN 
ILLINOIS ITS    ACCOMPLISHED    RESULTS 

The  state  in  which  the  operation  of  the  "  executive 
budget  "  idea  has  been  most  fully  exemplified  in  American 
law  and  practice  to  date  is  Illinois.  It  has  operated  more 
fully  here  than  in  the  other  twenty-two  states  which  have 
declared  in  favor  of  the  principle  and  passed  laws  for  its 
adoption  :  ( i )  because  it  fitted  best  —  was  better  adapted 
and  adjusted  to  the  state  governmental  machine;  (2)  be- 
cause the  public  opinion  of  the  state  was  better  informed 
as  to  what  the  executive  budget  was  expected  to  do. 

Recent  Administrative   Reorganization  Makes  Possible 
Operation  of  Executive  Budget 

The  better  adaptation  and  adjustment  of  the  state  ma- 
chine on  which  the  executive  budget  was  fitted  as  a  means 
of  control  came  about  through  the  adoption  of  the  new 
administrative  code,  described  above  (Chapter  X).  Many 
other  states  that  have  adopted  the  executive  budget  as  an 
instrument  or  mechanism  of  control  have  old  types  of 
administrative  machinery  on  which  the  new  controlling 
device  does  not  fit  and  into  which  it  cannot  be  geared  to 
make  it  function  effectively. 

The  better  information  and  more  favorable  public 
opinion  of  the  state  was  the  direct  result  of  a  campaign 
of  education  conducted  by  Governor  Lowden  and  his 
party  organization  in  seeking  the  votes  which  brought  him 
into  office.  His  party  was  pledged  to  a  thoroughgoing 
reorganization  of   the   administration  around   executive 

240 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  241 

leadership,  and  to  the  adoption  of  an  executive  budget  as 
a  means  of  controlling  leadership.  The  installation  there- 
fore as  made  in  19 17  was  more  nearly  complete,  and  was 
better  understood,  than  other  plans  were  in  states  where 
a  new  budget  procedure  was  talked  about  and  adopted  as 
if  it  were  a  specific  for  all  political  ills  —  the  thought  be- 
ing that  any  budget,  which  had  been  recommended  and 
that  had  the  trade  name  "  executive  "  on  it,  would  fit  any 
administrative  system. 

Legislative  Organisation  and  Procedure  Unchanged 

While  Illinois  had  a  brand-new  administrative  machine, 
it  had  an  old  form  of  legislative  organization  and  pro- 
cedure. As  in  other  states,  the  legislature  had  a  set  of 
rules  governing  its  action  which  had  been  developed  when 
the  state  was  using  the  old  administrative  machine.  It 
was  very  much  like  a  company  adopting  steam  tugs  for 
canal  transport,  and  retaining  the  rules  governing  the  use 
of  the  canal  and  the  control  of  its  pilots  which  had  been 
worked  out  when  mules  were  used  as  the  motor  power. 

The  legislative  organization  and  practice  in  Illinois 
was  similar  to  that  of  Massachusetts,  described  above,  in 
this :  Its  grist  was  actually  ground  by  a  multitude  of 
standing  committees,  each  of  which  had  a  separate  hop- 
per, and  special  burrs  and  bolts,  for  handling  different 
kinds  of  material  and  products.  It  differed,  in  that  each 
house  had  similar  or  corresponding  committees,  and  con- 
templated that  the  same  grist  should  be  put  through  the 
committee  mill  twice  :  first  in  one  house,  then  in  the  other ; 
then  if  there  was  failure  to  agree  on  the  grist  a  joint  com- 
mittee came  together  to  put  the  stamp  of  approval  on  a 
mix  that  would  be  acceptable  to  the  "  party  "  steering  com- 
mittee which  determined  in  the  main  what  would  be  sent 
to  the  governor  to  have  the  trade-mark  of  the  state  affixed 
to  it. 

This  was  the  more  usual  practice  developed  in  state 


242      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

legislatures  under  the  operation  of  the  bicameral,  stand- 
ing-committee type  of  organization.  Illinois,  however, 
differed  in  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  membership  was 
on  the  appropriation  or  finance  committees,  the  Senate 
appropriation  committee  being  composed  of  forty-four 
out  of  forty-nine  members  (one  member  having  died). 
Why  the  other  five  were  left  off  does  not  appear  to  the 
uninitiated.  Of  these,  thirty  were  Republicans  and  four- 
teen were  Democrats  —  about  two  of  the  majority  to  one 
of  the  minority  party.  The  House  committee  was  com- 
posed of  forty-three  members  out  of  a  total  of  153.  This 
made  a  very  large  committee,  although  a  much  smaller 
percentage  of  the  whole  than  in  the  Senate.  Of  these, 
2j  were  Republican  and  16  were  Democrats.  When  a 
matter  was  taken  before  the  Senate  committee  in  charge 
of  appropriations  therefor,  it  was  like  taking  it  up  in 
"  committee  of  the  whole,''  without  provision  being  made, 
however,  for  the  drama  of  contest  between  party  leaders 
as  is  the  case  where  inquest  in  the  "  committee  of  the 
whole  "  is  made  an  essential  part  of  a  budget  procedure. 


Legislative  Reference  Bureau 

The  Illinois  General  Assembly  of  191 3  passed  a  meas- 
ure, taking  effect  on  July  1st  of  that  year,  which  created 
a  joint  legislative  reference  bureau,  composed  of  the 
governor  and  the  chairmen  of  the  committees  on  "  appro- 
priations "  and  "  judiciary  "  of  the  Senate  and  House.  It 
was  made  the  duty  of  this  bureau  to  prepare,  print,  and 
distribute  for  the  use  of  the  members  of  the  legislature  a 
compilation  of  the  estimates  as  submitted  to  it  by  the 
various  spending  agencies,  together  with  a  comparative 
statement  of  the  sums  appropriated  by  the  succeeding 
legislature  for  the  same  purposes.  The  work  of  this 
oureau  proved  unsatisfactory  on  account  of  the  lack  of 
executive  control,  the  multiplicity  of  detail,  and  the  fail- 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  243 

ure  to  provide  the  proper  authority  for  amendment  or 
revision. 


Department  of  Finance 

The  legal  provisions  of  the  present  Illinois  budget  are 
a  part  of  the  civil  administrative  code  adopted  in  191 7. 
This  code,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  consolidated  practi- 
cally all  statutory  administrative  agencies  into  nine  de- 
partments with  a  director  at  the  head  of  each  depart- 
ment. One  of  these  is  the  department  of  finance,  the 
duties  of  which  are  described  in  Chapter  X.  This  de- 
partment is  not  only  regarded  as  the  most  important  of 
the  new  departments,  but  it  is  in  American  practice  a 
new  conception  since  it  took  over  very  little  work  per- 
formed by  previously  existing  administrative  agencies. 
In  brief,  the  functions  of  this  department  are:  (1)  To 
prescribe  and  install  a  uniform  system  of  bookkeeping, 
accounting,  and  reporting;  (2)  to  examine  into  the  ac- 
curacy and  legality  of  accounts  and  expenditures  of  other 
departments;  (3)  to  examine  and  approve  or  disapprove 
all  bills,  vouchers,  and  claims  against  the  other  depart- 
ments; (4)  to  prepare  a  budget  for  submission  to  the 
governor;  and  (5)  to  formulate  plans  for  better  co- 
ordination of  the  departmental  work.  In  addition  to 
these  departmental  functions,  the  director  of  finance  acts 
as  the  financial  adviser  for  the  governor  and  all  the  de- 
partments directly  under  the  governor's  control.  Prac- 
tically all  powers  of  the  department  are  vested  in  the 
director,  who  by  rules  and  regulations  provides  how  such 
powers  shall  be  administered. 

Through  the  department  of  finance  a  centralized  con- 
trol of  the  expenditures  made  by  the  agencies  responsible 
to  the  governor  is  effected.  While  this  department  has 
no  direct  control  over  the  expenditures  made  by  any  de- 
partment other  than  those  created  by  the  code,  yet  it  is 


244      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

authorized  and  required  to  study  the  entire  field  of  gov- 
ernmental needs  in  order  to  prepare  the  budget. 

Statutory  Budget  Provisions 

The  provisions  of  the  civil  administrative  code  with 
reference  to  budgetary  procedure  are  as  follows : 

The  director  of  finance  is  required  by  September  15th 
of  the  even-numbered  years  to  distribute  to  all  spending 
agencies,  including  the  elective  officers,  University  of  Illi- 
nois, and  judicial  department  estimate  blanks  in  such  form 
as  he  may  prescribe.  He  must  procure  information  of 
the  revenues  and  expenditures  for  the  two  preceding  fiscal 
years,  the  appropriations  made  by  the  previous  legisla- 
ture, the  expenditures  therefrom,  the  encumbrances  there- 
on, amounts  unencumbered  and  unexpended,  estimates  of 
the  revenues  and  expenditures  for  the  current  fiscal  year, 
and  estimates  of  revenues  and  amounts  needed  by  several 
spending  agencies  for  the  succeeding  biennium.  All 
spending  agencies,  not  later  than  November  1st,  must  file 
with  the  director  of  finance  their  estimate  of  receipts  and 
expenditures  for  the  succeeding  biennium.  Such  esti- 
mates must  be  accompanied  by  written  explanations. 

The  director  of  finance  may  approve,  disapprove,  or 
alter  the  estimates.  He  may  at  his  discretion  make  in- 
quiries and  investigations.  He  is  required  by  January 
1st  to  submit  to  the  governor  in  writing  his  estimates  of 
revenues  and  appropriations  for  the  next  biennium. 

The  governor  has,  by  the  code,  imposed  on  him  the 
duty  of  submitting  to  the  legislature  a  budget  for  the  bi- 
ennial period.  The  budget  so  submitted  must  contain  the 
amounts  recommended  by  the  governor  to  be  appropri- 
ated to  the  several  spending  agencies ;  the  estimated  reve- 
nues from  taxation  and  from  sources  other  than  taxa- 
tion, and  the  estimated  amount  required  to  be  raised  by 
taxation.  Together  with  the  budget,  the  governor  is  re- 
quired to  transmit  the  estimates  of  receipts  and  expendi- 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  245 

tures  received  by  the  director  of  finance  from  the  elective 
officers  in  the  executive  and  judicial  departments  and 
from  the  University  of  Illinois.  These  submissions  are 
to  be  made  to  the  General  Assembly  not  later  than  four 
weeks  after  its  organization. 

An  important  feature,  not  to  be  overlooked,  is  this: 
Each  department  is  required,  before  an  appropriation 
for  such  department  becomes  available  for  expenditure, 
to  prepare  and  submit  to  the  department  of  finance  an 
estimate  of  the  amount  required  for  each  activity  to  be 
carried  on,  and  accounts  shall  be  kept  and  reports  ren- 
dered showing  the  expenditures  for  each  such  purpose. 
This  permits  the  director  of  finance,  and,  through  him, 
the  governor,  to  exercise  continuing  supervision  over  ex- 
penditures; and  in  practice  the  departments,  so  far  as 
practicable,  are  required  to  submit  monthly  requisitions 
to  be  approved. 

Budget  Staff  in  Department  of  Finance 

In  the  department  of  finance,  under  the  supervision  of 
the  director  of  finance,  is  a  superintendent  of  budget. 
Both  of  these  officers  are  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  approval  of  the  Senate  for  terms  of  four  years,  be- 
ginning on  the  second  Monday  in  January  following  the 
election  of  the  governor.  The  superintendent  of  budget 
receives  $3,600  per  annum.  The  present  incumbent  of 
the  office  was  for  several  years  a  statistician  in  the  old 
department  of  charities  which  existed  before  the  creation 
of  code  departments.  He  is  assisted  in  his  work  by  one 
accountant  and  one  stenographer,  and  may  call  on  other 
employees  of  the  department  of  finance  for  help  when 
necessary. 

The  work  of  preparing  the  first  state  budget,  which 
was  presented  to  the  19 19  legislature,  was  begun  in  the 
summer  of  1917.  An  analysis  of  the  cost  of  operating 
the  several  departments  and  their  respective  divisions  was 


246      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

made.  Standard  accounts,  as  provided  by  the  action  of 
the  preceding  legislature,  were  installed  and  controlling 
ledgers  were  set  up  and  kept  by  the  department  of  finance 
upon  this  basis.  The  appropriations  made  by  the  two 
preceding  legislatures  were  classified  and  tabulated.  This 
work  not  only  simplified  but  aided  greatly  the  preparation 
of  the  budget. 

Estimates  and  Other  Information  Gathered  by  Depart- 
ment of  Finance. 

Estimate  forms  were  prepared  by  the  department  of 
finance,  which  classified  the  past  and  proposed  expendi- 
ture according  to  the  ten  standard  accounts  already 
adopted.  These  forms  were  submitted  to  the  depart- 
ments and  other  spending  agencies  about  August  1,  1918, 
although  the  law  does  not  require  the  department  of 
finance  to  send  them  out  until  September  15th.  Being 
the  initial  operation,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  send  them 
out  at  an  earlier  date  so  as  to  give  ample  time  to  assemble 
the  required  data  and  to  prepare  the  estimates.  Three 
copies  of  the  estimates  were  required,  two  of  which  were 
filed  with  the  department  of  finance  and  the  third  copy  re- 
tained by  the  agency  making  the  estimates.  No  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  getting  the  estimates  filed  in  the  time 
required  by  the  law  —  November  1st. 

During  a  period  of  about  six  months  prior  to  the  time 
of  sending  out  the  estimate  forms,  the  superintendent  of 
budget  visited  all  institutions  and  studied  their  needs  and 
the  per  capita  cost  of  their  maintenance.  In  addition,  a 
person  employed  and  supervised  by  the  architect  of  the 
department  of  public  works  and  buildings  visited  all  in- 
stitutions and  looked  over  the  condition  of  the  build- 
ings, making  written  recommendations  to  the  department 
of  finance  as  to  the  amounts  needed  for  repairs.  The 
supervising  engineer  also  took  an  inventory  of  the  ma- 
chinery and  estimated  the  amounts  needed  for  repairs  and 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  247 

replacements.  The  director  of  finance  has  announced 
his  intention,  in  the  near  future,  to  work  out  a  building 
program,  and  also  a  plan  of  standardization  of  personal 
service. 

Review  and  Revision  of  Estimates  by  Director  of  Finance 

The  estimates,  as  filed  with  the  department  of  finance, 
together  with  all  other  budget  data,  are  submitted  by  the 
superintendent  of  budget  to  the  director  of  finance,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  review  and  revise  the  estimates  before  sub- 
mitting them  to  the  governor  for  his  recommendations 
thereon  to  the  legislature.  As  a  matter  of  actual  practice, 
the  director  of  finance  and  the  superintendent  of  budget 
checked  up  all  the  estimates  and  then  called  into  confer- 
ence the  department  heads  and  bureau  chiefs  of  the  code 
departments  and  the  independent  state  officers  at  which 
time  the  estimates  were  reviewed  carefully  and  revised 
by  the  director  of  finance  in  his  discretion.  This  period 
of  review  and  revision  occupied  the  time  between  Novem- 
ber 1st  and  January  1st.  The  revised  estimates  were  then 
submitted  to  the  governor,  who  went  over  them  carefully 
for  his  own  information,  called  further  conferences,  and 
made  whatever  changes  he  deemed  necessary.  The  esti- 
mates as  approved  by  the  governor  are  printed  as  the 
budget  —  all  the  estimates  and  data  received  up  to  that 
time  being  considered  as  preliminary  and  not  official. 

Budget  Speeches  Delivered  to  Legislature 

The  Illinois  legislature  of  1919  met  about  January 
10th,  and  under  the  provisions  of  the  code,  the  governor's 
budget  recommendations  must  be  presented  to  the  legis- 
lature not  later  than  four  weeks  after  its  organization. 
Accordingly,  the  budget  was  printed  and  submitted  to  the 
legislature  about  February  10th.  Besides  the  letter  of 
transmittal  which  the  budget  carried,  explaining  briefly 
the  needs  of  the  state,  the  governor  and  the  director  of 


248      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

finance  both  appeared  before  a  joint  session  of  the  two 
houses  of  the  legislature  at  the  time  the  budget  was  pre- 
sented and  made  short  speeches  relative  to  the  budget  pro- 
gram. Immediately  upon  its  presentation  to  the  legisla- 
ture, the  governor's  budget  was  referred  to  the  appropri- 
ation committees  of  the  two  houses.  Each  member  of 
the  legislature  was  furnished  with  a  copy  of  the  govern- 
or's budget. 

The  Budget  and  Budget  Supplements 

The  budget,  as  submitted,  was  summary  in  form.  The 
amounts  appropriated  for  the  biennium,  1917-1919,  the 
actual  expenditures  for  the  fiscal  year  191 7  and  the  esti- 
mated requirements  for  the  next  biennium,  1919-1921, 
were  given ;  also  the  actual  and  estimated  revenues  for 
the  same  periods  were  stated.  These,  however,  were  not 
recapitulated  as  a  balanced  statement  by  years  or  for  the 
two  bienniums;  neither  were  the  summaries  of  expendi- 
tures and  estimates  supported  by  an  exhibit  of  detailed 
information  showing  how  the  totals  were  arrived  at  by 
the  governor  when  his  budget  was  prepared.  While  the 
annual  report  of  the  auditor,  an  independent  elective  con- 
stitutional officer,  was  printed  and  before  the  legislature, 
it  was  of  little  value,  since  the  auditor's  office  has  not 
been  developed  as  a  critical  agent  of  the  legislature.  Very 
soon  a  number  of  the  legislators  asked  for  more  detailed 
information;  and  in  response  to  this  request  a  detailed 
supplement  to  the  budget,  called  the  "Book  of  Estimates," 
was  printed.  This  supplemental  document  contained  the 
detailed  information  (1)  of  the  estimates  as  submitted  by 
the  various  non-code  spending  agencies  to  the  department 
of  finance,  and  (2)  the  details  as  finally  agreed  to  by  the 
governor  in  conference  with  the  code  departments.  The 
estimates  of  the  code  departments  as  prepared  by  the  de- 
partment heads  under  the  governor  were  not  sent  to  the 
legislature,  as  the  governor  took  the  stand  that  these  were 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  249 

merely  preliminary,  and  to  serve  the  purposes  of  data  to 
assist  the  governor  in  coming  to  a  conclusion  as  to  what 
amounts  would  finally  be  considered  adequate  after  con- 
ference^— the  theory  being  that  it  is  against  public  policy 
to  require  the  governor  to  go  over  with  the  legislature 
any  controversies  which  might  have  arisen  between  him 
and  his  subordinates. 

At  the  time  the  budget  was  prepared,  which  was  di- 
rectly after  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  it  was  thought 
that  prices  for  supplies  would  drop  soon,  but  on  the  con- 
trary they  actually  advanced  in  some  instances.  There- 
fore, before  the  budget  was  finally  acted  on  in  June  by 
the  legislature,  the  code  department  heads  were  obliged 
to  ask  the  governor,  through  the  department  of  finance,  to 
request  larger  appropriations  than  had  been  planned.  In 
such  cases  as  appeared  to  the  governor  meritorious  this 
was  done  in  the  form  of  a  typewritten  supplement  to  the 
budget  submitted  to  the  chairmen  of  the  appropriation 
committees.  This  accounts  for  many  of  the  changes 
made  in  the  governor's  first  budget  recommendations  and 
for  most  of  the  increases  while  before  the  committees. 
The  non-code  departments  also  submitted  requests  for 
revision  to  the  department  of  finance,  which  were  sent  to 
the  legislature  with  the  recommendations  of  the  governor. 

Legislative  Procedure  and  Action  on  the  Budget 

During  the  consideration  of  the  proposed  appropria- 
tions the  House  committee  was  divided  into  small  sub- 
committees, known  as  visiting  committees,  which  made 
trips  to  the  charitable  and  penal  institutions  of  the  state. 
The  Senate  committee  did  no  visiting.  The  committees, 
mainly  the  House  committee,  held  a  number  of  hearings. 
A  few  of  the  hearings  were  conducted  by  the  Senate  and 
House  committees  sitting  jointly.  The  hearings  before 
the  committees  ended  about  May  15th.  These  hearings 
were  conducted  under  the  usual  rules  which  obtain  in  the 


250      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

American  states  for  the  conduct  of  hearings  in  the  con- 
sideration of  measures  by  standing  committees;  that  is, 
they  were  considered  as  closed  meetings.  They  differed, 
however,  from  those  held  by  previous  legislatures  in  that 
a  representative  of  the  governor,  the  superintendent  of 
budget  of  the  department  of  finance,  was  present. 

After  the  hearings  were  completed  the  work  of  bill 
drafting  was  begun.  The  secretary  of  the  legislative  ref- 
erence bureau,  the  regular  bill-drafting  agency,  assisted 
by  the  superintendent  of  budget,  drafted  the  appropria- 
tion bills  for  the  appropriation  committees.  In  fact,  the 
superintendent  of  budget  worked  with  the  appropriation 
committees  while  they  were  considering  the  proposed  ap- 
propriations. It  is  stated  that  this  cooperation  helped 
greatly  to  coordinate  the  work  of  the  department  of 
finance  with  that  of  the  legislative  committees  in  making 
the  appropriations. 

Many  Emergency  Appropriation  Measures  Passed 

Before  the  regular  appropriation  bills  were  submitted, 
nineteen  emergency  appropriation  measures  had  been 
passed  by  the  legislature.  Eleven  of  these  were  for  ex- 
penditures other  than  by  code  departments,  and  eight  were 
for  expenditures  of  code  departments  under  the  gov- 
ernor. Of  the  former,  six  were  for  legislature  expendi- 
tures, one  for  the  Constitutional  Convention,  and  four 
were  for  constitutional  offices  which  went  directly  to  the 
legislature.  Of  the  latter  (the  emergency  appropriations 
to  code  departments)  all  of  them  were  for  deficiencies 
except  two,  one  for  Federal-aid  roads,  and  another  for  a 
free  employment  bureau  growing  out  of  the  conditions  of 
war.  Two  of  these  were  recommended  by  the  governor 
in  his  budget,  and  the  other  six  were  submitted  with  his 
knowledge  and  consent. 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  251 

General  Appropriation  Bills 

Illinois  does  not  have  a  single  appropriation  bill  cover- 
ing the  proposals  of  the  governor's  budget,  but  a  number 
of  appropriation  bills,  the  drafting  of  which  is  left  to  the 
legislature  with  the  assistance  of  the  legislative  reference 
bureau  and  the  superintendent  of  budget.  In  fact,  even 
if  it  were  desirable  under  an  executive  budget  plan,  it  is 
impossible  under  the  present  constitutional  provisions  for 
Illinois  to  have  a  single  appropriation  bill.  The  most 
important  of  these  bills  are :  ( 1 )  the  omnibus  bill,  con- 
taining the  appropriations  made  for  the  departments  and 
other  administrative  agencies  (not  included  in  other 
bills)  and  the  courts;  (2)  the  officer's  bill,  which,  under 
the  provision  of  the  constitution,  contains  appropriations 
for  the  pay  of  members  and  officers  of  the  General  As- 
sembly and  for  salaries  of  the  officers  of  government, 
and  being  further  provided  that  it  shall  contain  "  no  pro- 
visions on  any  other  subject";  (3)  the  charitable  and 
penal  appropriation  bill;  (4)  the  normal  school  bill;  and 
(5)  the  University  of  Illinois  bill.  Usually  there  are 
separate  bills  providing  for  the  legislature,  for  roads,  and 
for  the  national  guard.  These  may  be  regarded  as  the 
regular  appropriation  bills.  In  addition  there  are  nu- 
merous other  bills  covering  reappropriations,  claims,  spe- 
cial and  miscellaneous  appropriations  besides  emergencies. 
There  were  seventy-nine  appropriation  measures  passed 
in  the  1919  legislature.  Seven  of  these  were  vetoed  by 
the  governor,  leaving  a  total  of  seventy-two  to  become 
laws. 

The  history  of  the  omnibus  appropriation  bill  in  the 
legislature  may  be  noted  briefly.  This  bill  (H.  B.  No. 
754)  was  introduced  in  the  House  on  June  6th,  at  which 
time  it  had  its  first  reading,  and  was  ordered  printed  for 
a  second  reading.  It  was  printed  and  on  the  desks  of 
the  members   on  June   9th.     On   June    nth,    thirty-six 


252      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

amendments  were  offered  by  the  chairman  of  the  House 
appropriations  committee,  mostly  affecting  salaries,  all 
save  one  of  which  were  adopted;  whereupon  the  bill 
passed  the  House.  It  then  went  to  the  Senate  and  was 
read  a  second  time  on  June  13th,  when  seventy-nine 
amendments  were  reported  from  the  Senate  committee  on 
appropriations  affecting  salaries,  all  except  one  of  which 
were  adopted.  Two  amendments  were  offered  by  mem- 
bers of  the  Senate  which  were  rejected.  Immediately 
the  bill  passed  the  Senate  as  amended.  On  June  16th 
the  bill  was  reported  to  the  House  as  amended,  and  the 
House  refused  to  concur  in  the  Senate  amendments.  A 
conference  committee,  consisting  of  five  members  from 
each  house,  was  then  appointed.  This  committee  re- 
ported to  the  legislature  on  June  20th,  recommending 
that  the  House  concur  with  the  Senate  in  forty-five  of  the 
Senate  amendments  and  that  the  Senate  recede  from  the 
remaining  thirty-three  of  its  amendments.  The  confer- 
ence committee  also  offered  ninety-one  new  amendments 
largely  affecting  salaries.  Some  of  these  amendments 
amounted  to  rewriting  whole  schedules  of  the  appropria- 
tion act.  Both  houses  adopted  the  conference  committee's 
report  on  June  20th  and  recessed  until  June  30th,  in 
which  time  the  governor  was  required,  under  the  consti- 
tution, to  act  on  the  bill.  On  June  30th,  Governor  Low- 
den  approved  the  bill,  except  six  items  totaling  $116,800; 
$6,600  of  which  was  for  salaries  due  to  failure  in  the 
passage  of  supporting  legislature,  $50,000  was  for  the 
purchase  of  submerged  lands,  and  the  remainder  for  ar- 
mories and  armory  sites.  During  the  passage  of  this 
bill  through  the  legislature  there  was  a  little  debate  on 
the  floor  of  the  House  occasioned  by  one  or  two  amend- 
ments, but  no  debate  occurred  in  the  Senate. 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  253 

Effect  of  Legislative  Action  on  Governor's  Proposals 

In  the  action  of  the  legislature  upon  the  governor's 
budget  recommendations  it  is  stated  that  one  decrease  was 
made  against  numerous  increases,  most  of  which  were 
for  personal  service.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that 
there  was  much  pressure  brought  for  increasing  salaries 
between  the  time  the  budget  was  prepared  and  the  time 
the  appropriation  bills  were  passed  both  in  the  governor's 
departments  and  in  those  not  under  his  direction  and  con- 
trol— practically  all  the  changes  proposed  in  committee 
being  of  this  sort.  Nevertheless,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that 
all  of  those  affecting  the  code  departments  were  with  the 
governor's  knowledge  and  consent,  as  these  departments 
were  given  to  understand  that  there  should  be  no  pro- 
posals for  increases  except  through  executive  channels. 

Control  by  Department  of  Finance  Over  Expenditures 

Before  the  appropriations  become  available  for  expen- 
diture, each  department  is  required  to  prepare  and  submit 
to  the  department  of  finance  an  estimate  of  the  amount 
required  for  each  activity  to  be  carried  on,  and  accounts 
are  set  up  and  reports  rendered  showing  the  expenditures 
for  each  such  purpose.  The  finance  code,  passed  by  the 
1 9 19  legislature,  enlarges  these  powers  of  the  department 
of  finance. 

Conclusions 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  Governor  Lowden  was 
the  dominating  force  in  the  preparation  of  the  budget 
and  in  following  it  through  the  legislature.  Under  the 
administrative  code  he  has  absolute  control  over  the  code 
departments.  For  example,  the  amount  requested  and 
appropriated  ($50,000)  for  submerged  lands  was  placed 
in  the  omnibus  appropriation  bill  by  the  legislative  com- 
mittees, without  consulting  the  governor,  to  be  expended 


254      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

under  the  control  of  the  director  of  one  of  the  code  de- 
partments. This  amount  was  vetoed  by  the  governor 
when  he  approved  the  bill.  The  governor's  power,  how- 
ever, is  advisory  in  the  preparation  and  submission  of  esti- 
mates and  requests  by  independent  elective  officers.  They 
may  and  do  go  over  the  governor's  head  to  the  legislature 
for  appropriations. 

The  cooperation  between  the  departments,  which  is 
brought  about  by  the  code  administration  and  consolida- 
tion, is  a  great  help  in  budget  making  and  effects  a  great 
saving  in  the  operation  of  the  state's  functions.  For  ex- 
ample, the  superintendent  of  purchases  in  the  department 
of  public  works  cooperated  with  the  department  of  finance 
in  making  the  budget  recommendations  for  supplies  for 
the  various  departments  and  institutions  of  the  state. 

The  handling  of  the  budget  by  the  legislature  is  the 
part  of  the  procedure  that  is  most  open  to  criticism.  The 
governor's  budget  goes  to  separate  appropriation  com- 
mittees in  the  two  houses,  which  work  independently  of 
each  other  in  the  preparation  of  the  appropriation  bills, 
and  they  are  not  inquired  into  initially  in  such  manner  as 
to  make  the  consideration  of  the  budget  an  open- forum 
procedure.  The  result  is  that  no  opportunity  is  given  to 
sound  out  the  membership  by  taking  an  informal  vote  de- 
partment by  department.  The  open-forum  discussion  on 
appropriation  measures  is  delayed  until  the  closing  days 
of  the  legislative  session  when  usually  there  is  too  little 
time  left  for  discussion.  In  case  of  disagreement  be- 
tween the  two  houses  over  proposed  amendments  and 
adjustment,  the  only  way  open  is  by  reference  to  a  con- 
ference committee.  In  other  states  as  New  Jersey,  New 
York,  and  Wisconsin,  the  claim  is  made  that  it  is  more 
satisfactory  to  have  the  appropriation  committees  of  the 
two  houses  cooperate  and  work  together  as  a  joint  com- 
mittee in  the  consideration  of  the  budget.  It  is  urged 
that  this  saves  duplication  of  work  and  obviates  the  ne- 


Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Illinois  255 

cessity  of  the  undesirable  conference  committee.  But 
whatever  the  procedure  is  in  standing  committees,  this 
does  not  serve  the  purpose  of  giving  publicity  to  discus- 
sion. 


CHAPTER   XV 

THE    "  COMMISSION    BUDGET  "    IDEA   AS   EXEMPLIFIED   IN 

WISCONSIN 

As  has  been  pointed  out  in  Chapter  VIII,  the  controll- 
ing thought  in  Wisconsin  in  bringing  about  the  changes  in 
its  public  law  has  not  been  a  desire  to  strengthen  and 
make  vital  the  processes  of  popular  control  over  the  gov- 
ernment, or  even  to  seek  to  establish  executive  responsi- 
bility. Rather,  it  has  been  to  promote  the  operation  of 
the  various  decentralized  boards  and  commissions  in 
charge  of  state  administration,  and  to  protect  them  from 
domination  or  interference  either  by  the  governor  or  the 
legislature. 

"  Government  by  Commission  "  Seriously  Limits  Power 
of  Governor 

The  board  form  of  government,  as  it  is  being  developed 
in  Wisconsin,  has  been  in  the  direction  of  removing  from 
the  governor  his  power  and  control  over  the  state  admin- 
istration. The  members  of  these  boards  have  in  prac- 
tically all  cases  overlapping  terms  which  are  very  much 
longer  than  the  two-year  term  of  the  governor.  The  re- 
sult is  that  the  governor  can  never  control  the  boards, 
because  he  cannot  appoint  a  majority  of  the  members 
during  his  short  term  of  office.  More  than  this,  all  ap- 
pointments made  by  the  governor  must  be  approved  by 
the  Senate.  Since  the  legislature,  under  the  Wisconsin 
plan,  is  the  controlling  factor  in  matters  of  administra- 
tion, in  so  far  as  control  may  be  exercised  at  all,  and  the 
board  of  public  affairs  is  the  controlling  body  in  budget 

256 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        257 

making,  the  governor  can  do  nothing  more  than  nominate 
to  office  those  persons  who  stand  well  in  the  favor  of  the 
Senate  and  exert  an  influence  in  the  preparation  of  an 
administrative  and  financial  program  for  the  state.  Had 
the  bill  recently  passed  by  the  legislature  which  gave  that 
body  the  power  to  vote  a  "  lack  of  confidence  "  in  any  pub- 
lic official  whereupon  his  office  would  become  vacant  and 
a  new  appointment  would  have  to  be  made  —  had  this  bill 
not  been  vetoed  by  the  governor,  the  executive  power 
would  have  been  still  farther  curtailed.  In  that  event  the 
real  head  of  the  administration  would  have  been  the  leader 
of  the  majority  in  the  legislature. 

In  financial  matters  the  governor  has  very  little  power. 
He  may  concur  with  or  dissent  from  the  proposals  of 
other  members  of  the  board  of  public  affairs  (all  except- 
ing three  of  which  are  elective  like  himself)  in  preparing 
budget  recommendations  which  are  made  to  the  legisla- 
ture. Even  then  the  legislature  may  disregard  his  recom- 
mendations altogether  and  not  even  discuss  them.  He 
may  then  send  special  messages  to  the  legislature,  as  Gov- 
ernor Philipp  did  last  year  (1919),  calling  attention  to 
the  mounting  appropriations  and  urging  the  legislature  to 
curb  its  action.  Finally  he  has  the  power  of  veto,  which, 
however,  under  the  system  of  continuing  appropriations 
may  amount  to  little. 

The  State  Board  of  Public  Affairs 

Reform  of  procedure  in  preparation  of  estimate  dates 
back  to  1909,  when  the  legislature  authorized  the  tax 
commission  to  make  an  investigation  of  state  finances. 
This  was  done  in  a  rather  lengthy  report  which  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  legislature  of  191 1.  Among  other  things, 
this  report  recommended  that  the  state-spending  agencies 
prepare  estimates  in  advance  of  the  legislative  session  to 
be  submitted  to  a  committee  of  both  houses  of  the  legis- 
lature and  possibly  the  presiding  officers  of  the  Senate  and 


258      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

House.     This  body  was  to  prepare  the  budget  and  submit 
it  to  the  legislature. 

By  act  of  191 1  the  state  board  of  public  affairs  was  cre- 
ated consisting  of  the  governor  as  chairman,  the  secretary 
of  state,  the  president  pro  tern,  of  the  Senate,  the  speaker 
of  the  House,  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  and  House 
committees  on  finance,  and  three  members  appointed  by 
the  governor  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate,  subject  to  re- 
moval by  the  governor.  Provisions  were  made  for  the 
employment  of  a  secretary  and  such  experts  and  other 
employees  as  might  be  necessary.  This  was  an  experi- 
mental organization,  as  it  was  to  expire  by  limitation  on 
June  30,  19 1 3.  But  the  temporary  device  has  been  con- 
tinued with  little  change  except  in  personnel.  The  19 13 
legislature  provided  that  the  board  should  continue  in 
office  for  a  term  of  two  years  and  a  second  term  of  one 
year.  In  19 15  the  board  was  further  continued  in  office, 
this  time  for  one  term  of  two  years  and  a  second  term  of 
one  and  a  half  years. 

Statutory  Provisions  for  Budget  Procedure 

A  definite  budgetary  procedure  was  adopted  in  1913 
(Chap.  728,  Laws  of  1913)  ;  this,  as  revised  in  1915  and 
191 7,  provides: 

1.  That  the  state  board  of  public  affairs  shall  furnish 
estimate  blanks  to  each  public  body  not  later  than  July  1st, 
which  in  turn,  not  later  than  September  1st,  shall  present 
to  the  board  its  estimates  for  the  ensuing  biennium. 

2.  That  the  board  shall  cause  the  estimates  to  be 
compiled  forthwith  and  reviewed  through  such  field  ex- 
aminations, interviews,  or  correspondence  as  may  be  nec- 
essary to  obtain  full  information. 

3.  That  the  board,  as  a  whole,  between  November 
10th  and  December  1st  shall  consider  and  review  the  re- 
sults of  the  preliminary  examinations,  together  with  the 
estimates  and  explanations. 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        259 

4.  That  the  governor  elect  shall  have  the  right  to  at- 
tend the  review  meetings,  personally  or  through  a  repre- 
sentative, and  to  receive  all  reports  and  information  sent 
to  members  of  the  board. 

5.  That  the  budget  shall  show  comparisons  of  esti- 
mates for  the  ensuing  biennium  with  each  year  of  the  cur- 
rent biennium  and  each  of  the  three  years  next  preceding; 
the  amount  of  each  item  recommended;  whether  the 
amounts  recommended  are  equal  to  above  or  below  the 
amounts  requested  and  the  amounts  for  the  first  year  of 
the  preceding  biennium ;  reasons  for  recommended  allow- 
ances or  disallowances ;  a  record  of  the  vote  on  each  rec- 
ommendation that  is  not  unanimous ;  and  any  recommen- 
dation which  a  minority  of  the  board  or  the  governor 
elect  may  wish  to  have  included. 

6.  That  the  board  shall  accompany  the  conclusions  or 
recommendations  of  all  its  reports  with  a  summary  of  the 
facts  upon  which  its  conclusions  or  findings  are  based,  the 
names  of  the  members  approving  the  report,  and  the  sum- 
mary of  the  investigation  pursued  to  obtain  the  facts. 

7.  That  the  board  shall  recommend  a  budget  to  the 
legislature  not  later  than  December  15th,  and  not  later 
than  January  1st  shall  distribute  copies  of  the  estimates 
with  its  recommendations  thereon  to  the  members  of  the 
legislature. 

8.  That  the  board  shall  have  such  supervision  over 
every  public  body  as  is  necessary  to  secure  uniformity 
and  accuracy  of  accounts,  and  it  may  devise  uniform  sys- 
tems of  accounts  and  uniform  accounting  procedure  for 
all  such  public  bodies. 

9.  That  the  board  shall  also  investigate  duplication  of 
work,  inefficiency  of  organization  and  administration,  and 
shall  formulate  plans  for  better  coordination  and  the  im- 
provement of  administration  in  general. 


260      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Budget  Staff 

The  present  secretary  of  the  state  board  of  public  af- 
fairs has  been  with  the  board  since  19 12.  His  salary  is 
$4,500  per  annum.  He  is  by  profession  an  accountant, 
having  received  his  training  at  the  University  of  Wiscon- 
sin. A  special  examiner  is  employed  by  the  board  at  a 
salary  of  $4,500  per  year.  He  has  been  four  years  with 
the  work.  Four  permanent  accountants  are  employed  by 
the  board  at  salaries  ranging  from  $1,000  to  $2,700. 
During  the  preparation  of  the  last  budget  three  extra  ac- 
countants were  employed.  From  two  to  four  stenog- 
raphers are  engaged  in  the  office  of  the  board. 

Preparation,  Filing,  and  Review  of  Estimates 

Mimeographed  estimate  sheets  are  prepared  by  the 
staff  of  the  board,  which  are  sent  out  to  various  spending 
agencies  about  the  middle  of  August  of  the  even-num- 
bered years.  Before  these  forms  are  sent  out  the  actual 
and  itemized  expenditures  of  the  agency,  as  shown  by 
the  controlling  accounts  of  the  board,  are  inserted  for 
each  of  the  three  years  preceding  the  year  then  current. 
Each  spending  agency  upon  receipt  of  these  forms  is  re- 
quired to  insert  the  estimated  allotment  of  appropriations 
for  the  current  year  and  its  requests  for  each  year  of  the 
succeeding  biennium.  The  estimates  are  usually  returned 
to  the  board  by  September  1 5th. 

The  estimates  are  reviewed  by  the  staff  directly  upon 
being  filed.  Then  field  examinations  are  made ;  usually 
each  institution  and  department  is  visited  by  a  member  of 
the  staff,  the  secretary  of  the  board  directing  the  examina- 
tions. Conferences  are  held  with  the  institutional  heads 
and  other  officers.  The  information  thus  obtained  is  re- 
corded for  later  use  by  the  board  and  for  presentation  to 
the  legislature.  These  investigations  are  usually  finished 
in  about  one  month. 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        261 

Public  Hearings  on  Estimates 

The  board  of  public  affairs  usually  begins  to  hold  pub- 
lic hearings  upon  the  estimates  about  the  fifteenth  of 
November  and  continues  for  some  three  or  four  weeks. 
About  fifty  hearings  were  held  in  19 18.  The  time 
the  hearings  are  to  be  held  is  announced  in  the  newspa- 
pers and  occasionally  a  reporter  is  present.  The  heads 
of  the  departments  and  institutions  appear  at  these  hear- 
ings and  present  the  facts  upon  which  their  estimates  are 
based.  The  members  of  the  board  have  presented  to 
them  at  the  same  time  the  information  collected  by  their 
own  staff.  This  procedure  supplies  facts  both  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  agency  seeking  an  appropriation  and 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  trained  and  independent  in- 
vestigator. Having  both  sides  of  the  question  before  it, 
the  board  goes  into  executive  session  after  the  hearing  is 
concluded  and  determines  upon  the  amount  of  its  recom- 
mendations to  the  legislature. 

The  Compilation  of  Estimates 

The  hearings  are  usually  finished  by  about  December 
15th.  The  estimates  are  then  brought  together  and  com- 
piled by  the  staff  of  the  state  board  of  public  affairs. 
Mimeographed  copies  are  produced  and  bound  in  a  vol- 
ume about  fifteen  by  eighteen  inches  in  size.  This  vol- 
ume is  usually  ready  for  distribution  to  the  members  of 
the  legislature  by  January  1st. 

The  compilation,  as  presented  to  the  19 19  legislature, 
contained  the  following  information:  (1)  a  report  of 
actual  receipts  and  expenditures  for  the  three  fiscal  years 
prior  to  July  1,  1918;  (2)  departmental  estimates  of  re- 
ceipts and  expenditures  for  the  current  year,  1918-1919; 
(3)  estimated  treasury  balances  as  of  July  1,  1919;  (4) 
departmental  estimated  receipts  and  expenditures  for  the 
biennial  period  beginning  July  1,  1919;  (5)  appropria- 


262      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tions  available  beginning  July  1,  19 16,  and  (6)  appro- 
priations requested  by  state  departments,  boards,  institu- 
tions, and  commissions  for  the  biennium,  July  1,  19 19, 
through  June  30,  1921.  It  was  expressly  stated  that  the 
appropriations  requested  in  this  document  were  not  those 
recommended  or  approved  by  the  state  board  of  public 
affairs,  but  that  its  recommendations  were  contained  in  a 
separate  report  attached  to  the  compilation. 

The  purpose  of  this  compilation  of  estimates  (called  a 
budget),  it  is  stated,  is  to  give  the  legislature  full  and 
complete  information  relative  to  financial  facts;  also  to 
help  that  body  in  determining  policies,  in  working  out  a 
definite  fiscal  program,  and  in  drafting  the  necessary  ap- 
propriation measures.  Furthermore,  it  is  intended  to 
show  the  legislature  clearly  the  limitations  within  which 
appropriations  must  be  kept  to  avoid  a  general  purpose 
tax  levy. 

Budget  Recommendations  of  Board  of  Public  Affairs 

Prior  to  1917  the  state  board  of  public  affairs  made  no 
budget  recommendations,  as  it  believed  its  duty  to  be  the 
gathering  of  estimates  and  of  facts  relating  thereto  in 
advance  of  each  legislative  session  and  the  submission  of 
this  data,  organized  in  a  systematic  manner,  to  the  legis- 
lature. In  191 7  the  board  reviewed  each  request  and 
made  recommendations  thereon,  with  the  exception  of  the 
requests  relating  to  educational  institutions  which  were 
examined  and  passed  upon  by  the  state  board  of  educa- 
tion. In  19 19  the  board  considered  not  only  the  depart- 
mental but  institutional  requests  as  well. 

The  recommendations  of  the  board,  as  has  already  been 
stated,  were  included  in  a  mimeographed  pamphlet  of 
about  twenty  pages,  which  was  inserted  in  an  envelope 
attached  to  the  back  cover  of  the  compilation  of  estimates. 
An  introductory  statement  to  this  document  asserts  that 
"  the  board  in  no  wise  takes  unto  itself  any  of  the  legis- 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        263 

lative  functions,  but  has  gathered  this  information  in  the 
hopes  of  being  of  greatest  possible  assistance  to  the  legis- 
lature." A  statement  then  follows  in  which  the  requests 
for  appropriations  and  the  anticipated  revenues  are  bal- 
anced, showing  a  deficit  of  almost  two  million  dollars  for 
each  year  of  the  biennium.  The  recommendations  of  the 
board,  it  is  stated,  reduce  the  requests  until  they  come 
within  the  estimated  income  of  the  state  for  the  biennium. 
The  legislature  is  cautioned  against  appropriating  in  ex- 
cess of  the  total  amount  recommended  by  the  board  of 
public  affairs,  since  such  action  will  necessitate  the  levy- 
ing of  a  direct  tax  for  general  purposes.  Most  of  the 
recommendations  of  the  board  are  for  the  continuation 
of  the  present  appropriations,  a  large  number  of  which 
are  by  law  continuous  in  their  operation  until  the  statute 
is  repealed.  In  conclusion,  the  board  offered  the  use  of 
all  its  files  and  budget  information  to  the  joint  committee 
on  finance  of  the  legislature. 

Organisation  and  Work  of  Joint  Committee  on  Finance 

The  finance  committees  of  the  two  houses  of  the  legis- 
lature act  jointly,  a  procedure  similar  to  that  of  New  Jer- 
sey. This  joint  committee  on  finance  is  composed  of  nine 
members  from  the  House  of  one  hundred  members  and 
five  members  from  the  Senate  of  thirty-three  members. 
Of  the  fourteen  members  composing  this  committee  all 
were  Republicans  except  two  —  a  Democrat  and  a  So- 
cialist. 

The  board  of  public  affairs  has  cooperated  with  the 
joint  committee  on  finance  since  1913.  Its  staff,  assisted 
by  the  legislative  reference  bureau,  has  drafted  appropria- 
tion measures  for  the  committee  since  191 5.  It  has  been 
the  practice  for  the  secretary  of  the  board  to  work  with 
the  joint  committee  upon  all  matters  relating  to  state 
finances. 

The  joint  committee  on  finance  is  usually  organized 


264      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

about  ten  days  after  the  beginning  of  the  legislative  ses- 
sion. Immediately  thereafter  the  budget  is  presented  to 
the  committee  by  the  secretary  of  the  state  board  of  pub- 
lic affairs.  Very  soon  the  committee  begins  to  hold  pub- 
lic hearings,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  bring  out  any  in- 
formation that  may  be  used  to  check  up  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  board  of  public  affairs.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  public  hearings  are  of  little  interest  except  to  those 
who  are  interested  in  increasing  appropriations  and  im- 
proving the  service  of  the  particular  department  under 
consideration.  More  than  one  hundred  such  hearings 
were  conducted  by  the  committee  during  the  past  session 
of  the  legislature.  Members  of  the  committee  also  vis- 
ited the  charitable  and  penal  institutions  of  the  state,  using 
the  week-ends  for  five  or  six  weeks  for  this  purpose. 

The  Appropriation  Bills 

Usually  there  are  from  fifteen  to  twenty  regular  appro- 
priation bills  passed  each  session  of  the  legislature.  These 
include  the  appropriation  bill  for  the  University  of  Wis- 
consin, the  bill  making  appropriations  for  the  normal 
schools,  the  bill  for  the  charitable  and  penal  institutions 
of  the  state,  and  from  twelve  to  fifteen  departmental  and 
miscellaneous  bills.  An  attempt  to  require  a  single  bill 
has  been  made,  it  being  thought  that  this  is  the  only  way 
to  get  the  whole  plan  before  the  membership  and  keep  it 
before  the  people  while  appropriations  are  under  discus- 
sion —  and  with  such  a  plan  as  Wisconsin  has  there  is 
much  force  in  the  contention. 

The  regular  appropriation  bills  are  usually  introduced 
by  the  joint  committee  on  finance  and  may  go  to  either 
house  for  introduction.  These  bills  are  prepared  by  a 
committee  as  rapidly  as  it  can  take  action  on  the  esti- 
mates and  the  information  placed  before  it  by  the  state 
board  of  public  affairs.  For  example,  the  appropriation 
bill  for  the  University  of  Wisconsin  was  prepared  and 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        265 

introduced  into  the  Senate  on  March  14th,  the  normal 
school  appropriation  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  on 
March  18th,  and  the  bill  for  charitable  and  penal  institu- 
tions was  introduced  in  the  House  on  April  10th.  The 
legislature  did  not  adjourn  until  almost  the  close  of  July. 

The  Wisconsin  System  of  "  Continuing  Appropriations  " 

It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  since  Wisconsin  has  a 
system  of  continuing  appropriations,  all  appropriation 
measures,  except  those  making  appropriations  to  newly 
created  agencies,  must  be  in  the  form  of  amendments  to 
various  sections  of  statute  law  previously  passed.  Only 
where  changes  are  made  in  the  appropriations  as  pre- 
viously authorized  is  any  action  taken  by  the  legislature. 
While  the  estimates  are  presented  in  detail,  the  appropri- 
ation bills  propose  action  only  on  certain  items  and  totals. 

Expenditures  are  classified  under  three  heads ;  namely, 
operation,  maintenance,  and  capital.  Operation  appro- 
priations are  those  authorized  for  meeting  the  ordinary 
running  expenses  and  upkeep  of  the  state  departments, 
boards,  commissions,  and  institutions.  Maintenance  ap- 
propriations are  those  authorized  for  repair  and  upkeep 
of  permanent  property,  including  lands,  buildings,  ma- 
chinery, and  equipment.  Separate  appropriations  are 
made  for  operation,  maintenance,  and  capital  expendi- 
tures. Under  the  system  of  continuing  appropriations, 
those  for  operation  recur  annually  for  the  departments 
and  institutions  of  the  state  which  are  considered  per- 
manent and  integral  parts  of  the  state  government.  Ap- 
propriations for  maintenance  and  capital  purposes  are 
made  for  the  ensuing  two  years  only.  Practically  all  of 
the  appropriations  are  non-lapsible.  Only  positive  ac- 
tion of  the  legislature  can  affect  or  modify  an  appropria- 
tion when  once  it  is  made.  That  is,  a  majority  of  both 
houses  of  the  legislature  and  the  approval  of  the  gov- 
ernor, or  two  thirds  of  the  members  of  the  legislature  in 


266      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

case  of  executive  veto,  are  necessary  to  modify  or  abolish 
these  appropriations.  Thus  it  is  asserted  "  the  burden  of 
proof  for  changes  in  established  law  or  organization  has 
shifted  from  the  administration  to  the  legislature,  and 
changes  can  be  effected  only  by  positive  action  of  the  law- 
making agencies."  Thus,  it  is  contended,  the  administra- 
tor is  made  to  feel  reasonably  safe  and  he  may  continue 
to  perform  his  administrative  duties  instead  of  "  cajoling 
and  jollying  legislators  in  the  lobby  of  the  hotels  of  the 
capital  city  or  in  the  lobby  of  the  legislature."  More- 
over, it  is  contended  that  "  legislative  pressure  is  not 
likely  to  be  so  effective  because  the  source  of  its  momen- 
tum is  gone  and  particularly  minority  control  is  ineffec- 
tive." 


The  Result  of  "  Government  by  Commission  " 

The  Wisconsin  budget  procedure  is  based  upon  the 
principle  "  that  the  function  of  the  administration,  includ- 
ing the  executive,  in  budget  making  is  preliminary,  pre- 
paratory, advisory,  and  the  function  of  the  legislature  is 
determining  and  conclusive."  l  The  governor,  as  has  al- 
ready been  explained,  is  practically  without  power  over 
the  state  administration  because  of  the  board  system  of 
organization.  Whatever  financial  recommendations  he 
makes  to  the  legislature  are  made  through  the  board  of 
public  affairs.  In  the  final  analysis  all  recommendations 
of  this  board  are  merely  advisory  to  the  action  of  the 
legislature.  The  joint  finance  committee  of  the  legisla- 
ture formulates  the  expenditure  program  after  it  has  ex- 
amined the  data  submitted  by  the  board  of  public  affairs 
and  the  various  state  spending  agencies.  In  the  mean- 
time, the  several  state  agencies  may  go  directly  to  the  leg- 

1  For  defense  of  the  Wisconsin  practice,  see  "  Budget  Making  in 
a  Democracy,"  by  E.  A.  Fitzpatrick.  This  is  the  best  treatise  extant 
on  the  commission  budget  idea. 


Commission  Budget  Idea  in  Wisconsin        267 

islature  and  use  whatever  influence  they  may  have  to  se- 
cure additional  appropriations. 

When  once  the  functions  of  an  agency  have  been 
classed  as  a  permanent  service  and  the  agency  has  been 
put  on  the  basis  of  a  continuing  appropriation,  it  need 
have  little  fear  of  its  appropriation  being  reduced  by  the 
legislature.  The  governor  cannot  reduce  the  appropria- 
tion even  if  he  finds  the  service  incompetently  managed, 
or  its  needs  are  much  below  its  former  requirements. 
He  may  recommend  a  decrease,  but  that  is  all.  In  case 
the  legislature  takes  no  positive  action  —  that  is,  makes 
neither  an  increase  nor  a  decrease  in  the  continuing  appro- 
priation of  an  agency  —  the  governor's  veto  is  absolutely 
useless.  The  whole  financial  administration  of  the  state 
is,  therefore,  practically  out  of  the  hands  of  the  elected 
representatives  of  the  people. 

"  Government  by  commission  "  is  thereby  rendered  safe 
both  by  establishment  in  the  public  law,  and  by  vesting 
the  budget-making  power  in  a  super-commission ;  but  the 
people  are  at  the  same  time  removed  one  step  farther  from 
control  over  the  administration.  In  operation  the  service 
results  have  been  favorable,  as  is  the  case  also  in  Massa- 
chusetts —  as  favorable  as  in  any  of  the  states.  But  the 
extent  to  which  the  people  will  rest  content  with  this  form 
of  government  must  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  they 
are  willing  to  accept  anything  short  of  responsible  lead- 
ership. The  system  is  one  which  adopts  the  autocratic 
principle  for  purposes  of  commission  management,  and 
the  decentralized,  independent,  specialized  soviet  prin- 
ciple for  purposes  of  control.  The  mind  of  the  people 
must  operate,  if  at  all,  through  private  agencies  of  pub- 
licity and  discussion,  too  often  the  tools  of  special  inter- 
ests. The  method  of  inquest  and  determination  is  that 
of  class  rule,  not  the  method  of  democracy. 


CHAPTER    XVI 

THE    "  LEGISLATIVE    BUDGET  "    IDEA    AS    EXEMPLIFIED    II ; 
NEW  YORK 

While  in  New  York  the  humanitarian  civic  forces 
(those  which  sought  to  express  their  souls  through  "  gov- 
ernment by  commission")  and  the  boss  (hoping  to  keep 
up  the  fences  of  his  political  preserves)  combined  to  de- 
feat the  proposals  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  in 
191 5  —  as  soon  as  the  matter  of  vote  getting  was  settled 
in  their  favor,  they  separated  like  oil  and  vinegar  from 
an  emulsion.  They  were  only  temporarily  held  together 
by  adhesion,  not  by  chemical  affinity.  The  civic  secre- 
tary and  his  committee  or  board  returned  to  their  special- 
ized field  of  service;  the  boss  and  his  plutocratic  oligarchy 
returned  to  their  political  preserves  to  plan  campaigns  for 
"  big  game  "  or  to  turn  to  "  head-hunting." 

Vacillating  Party  Positions  on  New  York's  Budget  Issue 

As  matters  turned  the  campaign  of  education  which 
had  been  carried  on  in  favor  of  centralization  of  author- 
ity as  a  means  of  locating  responsibility,  but  without  any 
thought  being  given  to  processes  by  which  the  popular  will 
could  be  ascertained  and  be  made  to  function,  all  the  high 
educational  value  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  was 
turned  to  account  by  the  managers  of  the  majority  politi- 
cal "  party."  The  history  of  the  legislative  budget  in 
New  York  is  of  interest  not  alone  as  a  political  experi- 
ment, but  as  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  budget  issue, 
the  question  as  to  whether  one  form  or  another  of  budget 
procedure  is  advocated  or  adopted,  is  not  a  matter  on 

268 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         269 

which  our  irresponsible  political  parties  have  taken  sides 
or  have  any  friendly  interest  except  in  so  far  as  advocacy 
may  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  "  party  "  in  power  on  the 
one  hand,  or  to  the  advantage  of  a  "  party  "  in  opposition 
on  the  other. 

To  illustrate  this  point:  when  in  1912  President  Taft 
proposed  an  "  executive  budget  "  for  the  national  govern- 
ment it  was  not  put  forward  as  a  "party"  measure;  it 
was  in  support  of  recommendations  of  the  President's 
commission  on  economy  and  efficiency,  three  of  whom 
were  Democrats,  two  of  whom  were  Independents,  only 
one  of  whom  was  a  Republican.  But  President  Taft 
was  a  candidate  for  renomination  on  the  Republican 
ticket;  and  there  was  a  strong  hostile  Democratic  major- 
ity in  Congress  which  for  party  reasons  would  be  against 
anything  coming  from  the  President  which  would  re- 
dound to  his  credit.  There  was  also  another  reason  why 
members  of  Congress  might  be  opposed,  viz. :  the  out- 
working of  an  "  executive  budget,"  if  effective,  would 
threaten  the  supremacy  of  the  standing  committee  system. 
Through  the  leadership  of  the  Democratic  party  in  Con- 
gress, a  "  legislative  budget  "  was  urged  in  opposition  to 
President  Taft's  "  executive  budget  "  proposal.  But  note 
what  happened  in  New  York.  When,  in  19 16,  Governor 
Whitman  sought  to  capitalize  public  opinion  favoring  an 
"  executive  budget,"  and  for  partisan  reasons  the  leaders 
of  his  party  jockeyed  this  proposal  around  so  that  in  the 
race  the  "  executive  budget  "  went  lame  and  quit  at  the 
half-mile  post,  giving  a  favorable  decision  to  the  "  legis- 
lative budget  "  by  default  in  the  councils  of  the  governor's 
party  —  when  this,  the  identical  proposal  urged  by  the 
Democrats  in  Congress  against  Mr.  Taft,  came  before  the 
legislature  as  a  Republican  measure,  the  leaders  of  the 
Democratic  party  just  as  lustily  shouted  for  a  decision 
favorable  to  the  "  executive  budget  "  as  they  had  shouted  it 
down  at  Washington.     Thus,  in  19 16,  we  have  this  spec- 


270      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tacle :  the  Republican  national  party  managers  entered 
the  race  for  votes  on  a  platform,  one  plank  of  which  was 
the  "  executive  budget  "  ;  and  in  New  York  the  Republican 
managers  went  before  the  legislature  standing  on  a  plat- 
form in  which  this  plank  had  been  slyly  taken  out  in  the 
secrecy  of  the  committee  room,  and  a  legislative  budget 
law  was  slipped  into  its  place.  The  same  year  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  "  pointing  with  pride,"  went  before  the  na- 
tional electorate  and  won  standing  on  a  platform  with  a 
"legislative  budget"  plank  in  it;  and  in  New  York  State 
when  the  Republican  party  organization  proclaimed  its 
intention  to  make  this  a  part  of  the  permanent  law,  the 
Democrats  damned  the  idea  as  a  device  suitable  only 
to  the  uses  and  purposes  of  "  invisible  government." 

Need  for  Administrative  Reorganization 

The  administrative  machinery  of  the  New  York  State 
government  contains  a  miscellaneous  collection  of  more 
than  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  offices,  boards,  com- 
missions, and  other  agencies  —  nearly  all  of  them  are  in- 
dependent of  each  other  and  most  of  them  subject  to  no 
direct  or  effective  supervision  by  the  governor.  In  a  few 
cases  the  governor  has  the  power  of  appointment  and  re- 
moval; but  the  whole  subject  and  method  of  appointment 
and  removal  was  peculiarly  designed  to  confuse  and  de- 
feat executive  responsibility  and  power.  The  governor 
is  free  to  appoint  only  about  ten  minor  and  temporary 
agencies  out  of  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  making 
up  the  state  administration.  There  are  in  the  state  thir- 
teen methods  of  appointment  and  six  methods  of  removal. 
Most  of  the  administrative  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  governor  with  the  "  advice  and  consent "  of  the  Sen- 
ate. There  are  more  than  a  dozen  boards  and  commis- 
sions which  are  composed  partly  of  members  appointed 
by  the  governor  and  of  members  serving  in  an  ex  officio 
capacity.     About  an  equal  number  of  boards  and  com- 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         271 

missions  is  made  up  entirely  of  ex  officio  members.  The 
legislature  appoints  and  has  full  control  over  several  im- 
portant administrative  agencies.  Some  offices  are  filled 
by  bringing  in  the  courts ;  others  require  the  cooperation 
of  unofficial  agencies.  While  there  are  several  single- 
headed  departments  among  the  administrative  agencies 
of  New  York  State,  there  are  also  a  large  number  of 
boards  and  commissions.  Members  of  most  of  these 
boards  and  commissions  are  appointed  for  long  over- 
lapping terms.  Quite  a  few  of  them  duplicate  functions 
performed  by  others.  Similar  groups  of  functions  are 
usually  split  up  between  a  large  number  of  agencies. 
There  are  no  direct  lines  of  responsibility,  either  to  the 
governor  or  to  the  legislature. 

Governor  not  a  Chief  Executive 

The  governor  of  New  York,  because  of  his  short  term 
of  office  and  the  various  indirect  methods  of  appointing 
and  removing  administrative  officials,  has  little  power 
over  the  state  administration.  In  fact,  the  state  comp- 
troller, especially  from  the  standpoint  of  political  pat- 
ronage, exerts  greater  power  and  control  than  the  gov- 
ernor. Several  of  the  other  independent  and  elective 
administrative  officers  exercise  power  almost  equal  to  that 
of  the  governor. 

Not  only  is  the  governor  of  New  York  not  a  chief 
executive,  but,  in  the  formulation  of  the  financial  pro- 
gram of  the  state,  he  has  practically  nothing  to  say. 
Governor  Whitman  submitted  a  budget  in  191 6  which 
met  with  the  same  fate  in  the  legislature  at  the  hands  of 
the  managers  for  his  own  party  that  President  Taft's 
budget,  submitted  to  Congress  in  the  early  days  of  1913, 
did  at  the  hands  of  the  opposition.  In  New  York  the 
governor  may  recommend  appropriations  to  the  legisla- 
ture, but  the  legislature  was  not  compelled  to  act  upon  his 
recommendations  either  before  or  since  the  enactment  of 


2J2      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  new  "  legislative  budget  "  procedure.  The  legislature, 
therefore,  generally  disregards  the  governor's  proposal 
as  gratuitous  advice.  The  general  procedure  is  similar 
to  that  which  has  been  in  vogue  for  years  in  Congress. 
The  estimates  are  collected  and  transmitted  by  the  comp- 
troller. The  governor  is  permitted  to  submit  recommen- 
dations. The  finance  measures  are  prepared  by  the 
standing  committee  of  the  legislature.  They  receive  their 
main  consideration  and  discussion  in  the  committee  room ; 
are  brought  out  on  the  floor  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  be 
voted  by  the  legislature;  and  go  to  the  governor  for  his 
approval.  In  New  York  there  is  a  joint  committee,  and 
the  legislature  usually  remains  in  session  so  as  to  over- 
ride the  governor's  vetoes,  in  case  he  should  veto  items 
of  the  general  appropriations.  In  the  control  of  the 
expenditure  of  the  appropriations,  the  comptroller  is 
given  almost  complete  power  to  construe  the  laws,  and 
he  operates  independently  of  the  governor. 

Efforts  of  Governors  Hughes  and  Sulzer 

Governor  Hughes'  effort  in  1910  did  not  have  the  bud- 
get vision ;  his  was  simply  a  proposal  to  secure  a  more 
orderly  handling  of  public  business.  A  law  was  passed 
which  required  all  requests  for  appropriations  to  be  filed 
with  the  comptroller  and  tabulated  by  him  in  advance  of 
the  legislative  session  for  the  use  of  the  governor  and  the 
legislature.  The  effort  of  Governor  Sulzer  was  clearly 
one  to  strengthen  public  confidence  in  him  when  he  ap- 
pointed, in  19 1 3,  a  committee  of  inquiry  to  investigate 
into  the  management  of  state  departments  and  institutions. 
This  committee  gave  special  attention  to  the  method 
of  making  appropriations  and  submitted  recommenda- 
tions designed  to  improve  the  existing  procedure.  The 
background  for  the  recommendations  of  the  committee 
was  partly  the  New  York  City  practice  and  partly  the 
proposals  of  the  Taft  Commission.     These  recommen- 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York        273 

dations  provided,  among  other  things,  for  the  creation 
of  a  state  board  of  estimate,  consisting  of  state  officials 
whose  duty  it  was  to  prepare  the  appropriation  bill;  also 
the  establishment  of  a  department  of  efficiency  and  econ- 
omy, charged  with  the  power  to  examine  into  all  expendi- 
tures of  the  state  and  to  make  recommendations  along  the 
lines  of  efficiency  and  economy.  The  legislature  of  1913 
enacted  laws  creating  the  agencies  thus  recommended. 
By  191 5  the  work  of  both  the  board  of  estimate  and 
the  department  of  efficiency  and  economy  had  come  to  be 
considered  a  failure  because  neither  of  them  could  find  a 
place  in  the  then  existing  political  system;  and  the  laws 
creating  these  agencies  were  repealed. 

Budget  Provisions  of  Proposed  Constitution  of  1915 

As  has  been  said,  the  proposed  constitution  of  191 5 
contained  provisions  for  the  establishment  of  a  budget 
system  of  the  "  executive  "  type.  And  this  was  to  be 
put  on  an  administrative  machine  of  an  "  executive " 
type  —  it  being  assumed  that  the  legislative  practice  would 
be  adjusted  to  the  exercise  of  control  through  the  budget 
over  the  executive  —  thereby  controlling  all  questions  of 
public  policy  of  an  administrative  or  financial  character. 
All  public  service,  i.e.,  administrative  departments  of  the 
state  were  to  be  reorganized  under  the  governor,  and  as 
a  measure  of  preserving  executive  discipline  were  to  be 
required  to  submit  to  the  governor  itemized  estimates 
of  their  financial  needs.  Responsibility  of  the  executive 
to  the  people  was  to  be  enforced  through  the  legislature. 
After  public  hearings  upon  the  estimates  the  governor 
could  revise  them  according  to  his  judgment  thereby 
making  the  administrative  program  the  governor's.  The 
estimates  of  the  legislature  and  the  judiciary  were  to  be 
included  in  the  budget  without  revision,  although  he 
could  make  recommendations  relating  to  these.  This,  it 
is  to  be  observed,  was  the  plan  which  was  later  made  law 


274      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

in  Illinois.  By  February  ist  the  governor  was  to  submit 
to  the  legislature  an  itemized  budget  containing  all  pro- 
posed expenditures  and  estimated  revenues,  together  with 
appropriation  bills,  proposed  taxation  measures,  and  other 
data  relating  to  the  fiscal  year  and  the  two  years  preceding. 
The  budget  and  the  administrative  appropriation  bills 
were  to  be  presented,  explained,  and  defended  by  the  gov- 
ernor or  his  representative  to  the  whole  membership  of 
the  legislature  and  for  this  purpose  a  committee-of-the 
whole  procedure  was  provided  for.  The  procedure  was 
to  be  provided  by  the  statutes,  but  the  constitution  laid 
down  the  principle  that  the  governor  and  the  heads  of 
departments  were  given  the  right  and  it  was  made  their 
duty  to  appear  before  the  legislature.  In  order  not  to 
confuse  responsibility  for  administration  proposals  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature  might  propose  to  amend  by  striking 
out  or  reducing  items  but  might  not  introduce  new  pro- 
visions or  propose  measures  except  for  legislative  func- 
tions or  for  the  judiciary.  Not  until  the  appropriation 
bills  proposed  by  the  governor  had  been  acted  upon  by 
both  houses  could  the  legislature  consider  any  further 
or  added  provisions  of  organic  law  involving  appropria- 
tion and  then  only  in  the  form  of  separate  bills,  each 
for  a  single  object  and  subject  to  the  governor's  veto. 
Such  were  the  proposed  constitutional  provisions  defeated 
at  the  polls  in  November,  191 5. 

Governor  Whitman's  Budget  Conference  and  Recom- 
mendations 
At  the  preceding  election  Mr.  Whitman  was  chosen 
governor.  He  immediately  won  state-wide  applause  by 
the  statement  that  there  was  one  proposal  that  he  would 
put  through  as  governor;  budget  procedure  could  be  es- 
tablished without  constitutional  amendment,  and  he  pro- 
posed to  devote  himself  to  this  cause.  And  after  he  was 
fairly  seated  he  set  about  proposing  a  budget.     For  this 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         275 

purpose  he  requested  estimates  from  all  the  spending 
agencies  and  in  November  following  his  inauguration  he 
appointed  a  conference  committee  of  the  chief  executive 
officers  of  the  state  for  the  revision  of  these  estimates. 
The  result  of  the  work  was  that  on  the  first  day  of 
January  he  sent  to  the  legislature  a  volume  of  tabulated 
estimates,  together  with  a  draft  of  an  appropriation  bill 
containing  the  governor's  recommendations  in  itemized 
form,  based  upon  his  conference  review  and  revision  of 
the  estimates.  The  budget  bill  as  proposed  by  the  gov- 
ernor, if  it  had  contained  nothing  but  the  proposed  items 
of  appropriation,  would  have  been  a  measure  of  a  few 
pages  made  up  of  authorizations  of  total  sums  to  be  made 
available  to  each  department  or  service,  subdivided  by 
items;  one  for  salaries  and  wages,  one  for  supplies,  etc., 
making  from  two  to  six  items  under  each  administrative 
unit.  But  the  bill  was  not  so  written ;  to  each  item  was 
subjoined  a  large  number  of  minor  details  making  up  the 
total  that  were  to  operate  as  schedules  binding  upon  the 
department  head  but  which  could  be  changed  or  shifted 
from  time  to  time  as  circumstances  might  require  with 
the  approval  of  the  governor.  This  proposal  was  made 
to  enable  the  legislature  to  have  before  them  every  detail 
making  up  the  amounts  asked  for,  and  at  the  same  time 
leaving  to  the  executive  the  exercise  of  discretion  where 
this  could  be  used  to  advantage  in  the  conduct  of  public 
business  —  the  governor  to  be  made  responsible  for  ap- 
proving changes  requested,  and  accountable  to  the  next 
legislature.  For  example :  a  total  amount  would  be  ap- 
propriated for  salaries  and  wages  for  a  department,  to 
which  a  complete  schedule  of  positions  and  salaries  au- 
thorized was  attached ;  in  case  it  were  found  desirable  to 
use  more  employees  of  a  class  at  a  lower  salary  rate,  or 
in  case  certain  employees  were  to  be  promoted  or  other 
changes  seemed  desirable,  with  the  approval  of  the  Civil 
Service  Commission  and  under  its  rules,  this  could  be 


276      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

done  on  application  to  the  head  of  the  department  subject 
to  review  and  approval  by  the  governor. 

When,  however,  this  bill  came  out  of  the  standing  com- 
mittee to  which  it  was  referred,  by  the  change  of  a  few 
words  of  the  text  not  noticed  even  by  many  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature  itself,  every  item  of  the  supporting 
schedules  was  made  items  of  appropriation,  thereby 
making  the  act  itself  a  document  of  several  hundred 
pages  with  thousands  of  detailed  items  of  appropriation. 
But  the  importance  of  the  change  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  whole  civil  service,  every  position  and  salary  in 
it,  was  made  the  subject  of  legislative  committee  deter- 
mination. The  whole  subject  of  administrative  personnel 
was  shifted  to  a  basis  of  committee-room  bargaining. 
In  this  revised  form  the  bill  was  submitted  to  the  legis- 
lature with  the  statement  that  it  was  the  governor's 
measure  "  somewhat  improved  "  as  a  result  of  committee 
inquiry.  And  in  this  form  it  was  passed  and  was  ap- 
proved by  the  governor  —  the  governor  coming  forward 
in  a  statement  defending  it  and  claiming  it  as  among 
his  political  successes.  The  governor  had  completely 
surrendered  every  principle  involved,  and  rested  his 
laurels  on  a  bill  passed  which  was  so  similar  in  textual 
form  that  by  the  casual  reader  it  was  not  recognized  as 
an  entirely  new  and  an  essentially  different  creature  of 
law. 

The  Present  Budget  Law  and  Its  Provisions 

At  the  same  time  the  standing-committee  leaders  made 
sure  of  their  victory  by  passing  a  law  for  the  institution 
of  a  "  legislative  budget."  The  bill  by  means  of  which 
this  was  accomplished  was  sponsored  by  Senator  Sage. 
This  was  simultaneously  introduced  into  the  assembly  by 
Mr.  Maier  —  hence  called  the  Sage-Maier  Budget  Bill. 
It  passed  the  legislature  and  received  the  signature  of 
Governor  Whitman.    By  this  law,  three  agencies  :  namely, 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         277 

the  governor,  Senate  finance  committee,  and  the  Assembly 
ways  and  means  committee  were  designated  to  be  con- 
cerned with  the  preparation  of  the  budget.  The  1910  law 
requiring  the  comptroller  to  receive  and  compile  estimates 
was  not  repealed.  Hence,  altogether  as  the  statutes  of 
the  state  now  stand  there  are  four  agencies.  However, 
the  two  legislative  committees,  under  a  provision  of  the 
budget  law,  very  soon  combined  as  a  joint  legislative 
budget  committee  and  began  with  a  joint  staff  ignoring 
the  governor's  and  comptroller's  functions  to  work  to- 
gether in  the  preparation  of  the  budget.  As  will  be  seen 
from  the  provisions  of  the  budget  law,  a  summary  of 
which  follows,  the  budget  recommendations  of  the  gov- 
ernor and  comptroller  are  considered  as  merely  advisory 
to  the  joint  legislative  budget  committee. 

The  chairman  of  the  finance  and  ways  and  means  com- 
mittees may  each  appoint  a  clerk,  also  an  accountant  and 
a  stenographer  to  assist  each  clerk.  The  clerks  receive 
an  annual  salary  of  $4000,  together  with  traveling  and 
other  necessary  expenses.  They  are  engaged  at  the 
work  throughout  the  year.  Other  provisions  of  the  bud- 
get law  are : 

(1)  That  the  state  spending  agencies  shall  through 
their  proper  officers  or  deputies  furnish  such  data,  infor- 
mation, or  statements  as  may  be  necessary  for  carrying 
into  effect  the  provisions  of  this  article. 

(2)  By  November  15th  of  each  year  all  state  spending 
agencies  shall  file  with  the  comptroller  a  detailed  state- 
ment of  all  requests  for  appropriations  to  be  made  at 
the  next  legislative  session.  (State  Finance  Law,  Sec. 
48-49,  or  Chap.  149,  Laws  of  1910.) 

(3)  The  comptroller  shall  prepare  a  report  of  expendi- 
tures for  the  first  six  months  of  the  fiscal  year.  (State 
Finance  Law,  Sec.  4,  Sub.  Sec.  6,  or  Chap.  118,  Laws  of 
1916.) 

(4)  The  chairman  of  the  joint  legislative  budget  com- 


278      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

mittee  may  name  subcommittees  to  perform  such  duties 
as  they  may  prescribe  in  gathering  information  relating 
to  the  financial  needs  of  the  several  state  spending 
agencies. 

(5)  The  clerks  of  the  joint  legislative  budget  com- 
mittee shall  (a)  compile  information  and  financial  data 
relating  to  the  state  spending  agencies;  (b)  prepare 
tables  of  appropriations  previously  made  by  the  legislature 
for  the  use  of  the  joint  budget  committee;  (c)  procure 
statistics  relating  to  the  revenues  of  the  states;  (d)  make 
a  record  of  all  information  and  correspondence  con- 
cerning the  budget;  (e)  investigate  and  report  on  requests 
for  appropriations;  (f)  aid  the  committee  and  the  legis- 
lature in  making  investigations  pertaining  to  expenditures 
of  state  funds ;  (g)  assist  in  the  preparation  of  the  annual 
budget;  (h)  have  access  to  the  offices  of  all  spending 
agencies  for  the  purposes  of  obtaining  information  as  to 
their  operation  and  their  financial  needs. 

(6)  The  comptroller  shall  tabulate  the  estimates,  to- 
gether with  itemized  statement  of  the  actual  expenditures 
made  during  the  preceding  year,  the  appropriations  made 
for  the  preceding  year,  the  appropriations  desired  for 
the  coming  year,  and  the  estimated  income  of  the  state. 
(State  Finance  Law,  Sees.  48-49,  or  Chap.  149,  Laws 
of  1910.) 

(7)  The  Senate  finance  committee  and  the  Assembly 
ways  and  means  committee,  acting  jointly  or  separately, 
shall  annually  prepare  a  budget.  (In  practice  they  act 
jointly.) 

(8)  The  budget  shall  specify  the  unit  of  organization 
under  whose  control  or  supervision  the  moneys  appro- 
priated shall  be  expended  for  which  appropriations  are 
made.  It  shall  contain  a  detailed  estimate  of  the  probable 
revenues  of  the  state  and  an  estimate  of  the  amounts 
which  it  shall  be  necessary  to  raise  by  direct  tax;  also  a 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         279 

statement  containing  such  information  as  the  committees 
may  deem  advisable  to  submit. 

(9)  The  comptroller  shall  transmit  the  consolidated 
tabulation  of  estimates  to  the  governor  by  December  15th 
and  to  the  legislature  on  the  opening  day  of  the  session 
(in  January  of  each  year).  (State  Finance  Law,  Sees. 
48-49,  or  Chap.  149,  Laws  of  1910.) 

(10)  The  governor  shall  annually  within  one  week 
after  the  convening  of  the  legislature  submit  to  the 
Senate  and  Assembly  a  statement  of  the  total  amount  of 
appropriations  desired  by  each  state  spending  agency, 
and  may  at  the  same  time  make  such  suggestions  for 
reductions  or  additions  thereto  as  he  deems  proper.  As 
a  part  of  such  statement  he  may  also  submit  an  estimate 
of  the  probable  revenues  of  the  state. 

(11)  The  comptroller  shall  present  to  the  legislature 
by  February  1st  of  each  year  a  report  of  expenditures 
for  the  first  six  months  of  the  current  fiscal  year.  (State 
Finance  Law,  Sec.  4,  Sub.  Sec.  6,  or  Chap.  118,  Laws 
of  1916.) 

(•12)  The  legislative  budget  committee  shall,  not  later 
than  March  15th,  present  to  their  respective  houses  with 
the  budget  a  single  bill  providing  the  appropriations  con- 
tained in  the  budget. 

(13)  The  appropriation  bill  when  reported  shall  be 
referred  to  the  committee  of  the  whole  of  the  Senate  and 
advanced  to  the  order  of  second  reading  in  the  Assembly, 
and  shall  thus  remain  five  full  legislative  days,  on  each 
of  which  it  shall  be  the  special  order  of  the  day.  While 
the  bill  is  being  thus  considered  the  head  of  any  spending 
agency  may,  and  upon  request  by  the  majority  vote  of 
either  house,  shall  appear  and  shall  be  heard  and  answer 
questions  pertaining  to  the  bill.  All  meetings  of  either 
house  for  the  consideration  of  the  appropriation  bill  shall 
be  open  to  the  public. 


280      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

(14)  While  the  appropriation  bill  is  before  the  com- 
mittee of  the  whole  of  the  Senate  or  on  the  order  of 
second  reading  of  the  House  it  may  be  amended  by  intro- 
ducing additional  items  or  by  increasing,  reducing,  or 
eliminating  the  items ;  but  on  third  reading  no  amendment 
except  to  reduce  or  eliminate  an  item  shall  be  in  order 
except  by  unanimous  consent.  When  advanced  to  the 
order  of  third  reading  in  either  house  the  appropriation 
bill  shall  be  a  special  order  of  the  day  for  at  least  three 
full  legislative  days. 

The  Joint  Legislative  Budget  Committee 

The  joint  legislative  budget  committee  is  the  chief 
budget-making  agency  of  New  York.  This  committee 
is  formed  by  union  of  the  Senate  finance  and  the  Assembly 
ways  and  means  committees.  In  19 19  the  Senate  finance 
committee  was  composed  of  sixteen  members  and  the 
Assembly  ways  and  means  committee  of  fifteen  members, 
making  a  total  of  thirty-one  members.  In  the  Senate 
committee  there  were  twelve  Republicans  and  three  Dem- 
ocrats, giving  a  total  of  twenty-four  members  of  the 
joint  committee  to  the  majority  party  and  seven  members 
to  the  minority  party. 

Most  of  the  minority  members  of  the  joint  legislative 
budget  commission  were  absent  from  the  discussion  of 
the  estimates  and  took  no  part  in  the  drafting  of  the 
appropriation  bill.  In  fact,  the  majority  members  gave 
little  attention  to  the  making  up  of  the  appropriations, 
the  work  being  done  mainly  by  the  chairmen  of  the  com- 
mittees and  their  budget  clerks. 

Form  and  Preparation  of  Estimates 

In  collecting  the  data  for  the  19 17  budget,  each  of 
the  three  budget  agencies  —  the  comptroller,  the  gov- 
ernor, and  the  joint  legislative  budget  committee  —  used 
a  separate  set  of  estimate  forms.     The  preparation  of 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         281 

so  many  forms,  twenty-one  in  all,  created  a  great  deal  of 
confusion  among  the  various  state  agencies,  and  the  infor- 
mation thus  submitted  was  without  uniformity.  A  set 
of  estimate  forms  was  jointly  prepared  and  agreed  upon 
by  the  three  budget  agencies  for  the  preparation  of  the 
191 8  budget.  These  forms  have  since  been  used  with 
some  slight  modifications. 

The  estimate  forms  are  usually  sent  out  in  September. 
The  spending  agencies  are  required  to  prepare  six  copies 
of  the  estimates  and  transmit  them  to  the  budget  agencies 
—  two  copies  to  the  governor's  budget  bureau,  three 
copies  to  the  joint  legislative  committee,  and  one  copy 
to  the  comptroller  —  not  later  than  October  15th.  The 
majority  of  the  estimates  were  usually  completed  and  filed 
promptly  with  the  budget  officials.  Each  year  a  few  of 
the  spending  agencies  do  not  submit  their  requests  for 
appropriations  until  it  is  too  late  to  tabulate  them  in  the 
proper  classification  of  the  volume  of  requests  for  appro- 
priations as  compiled  by  the  joint  legislative  budget  com- 
mittee and  submitted  to  the  legislature.  These  belated 
estimates  are  printed  as  an  appendix  to  the  volume.  A 
number  of  deficiency  estimates  are  usually  filed  with  the 
legislative  budget  committee  during  the  month  of  January 
and  February  and  are  incorporated  in  the  emergency  bills. 

Budget  Staffs 

Both  the  governor  and  the  joint  legislative  budget 
committee  have  staffs  to  assist  them  in  their  duties.  The 
governor's  budget  staff  was  organized  by  Governor  Whit- 
man in  19 16  and  is  composed  of  a  budget  secretary,  sten- 
ographers, and  other  clerical  help.  In  addition  the  gov- 
ernor's private  secretary  usually  directs  the  work.  This 
bureau  tabulates  the  governor's  compilation  of  estimates 
and  makes  up  his  tentative  appropriation  act.  Governor 
Smith,  who  came  into  office  January   1,    19 19,  did  not 


282      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

get  his  bureau  organized  in  time  to  perform  the  work 
that  is  usually  accomplished. 

The  staff  of  the  legislative  budget  committee,  as  pro- 
vided for  under  the  budget  law,  consists  of  two  clerks,  two 
accountants,  two  stenographers,  and  some  additional  help. 
This  is  a  permanent  staff  and  works  throughout  the 
year. 

Three  Compilations  of  Estimates 

The  compilation  produced  by  the  legislative  budget 
committee  is  a  volume  of  more  than  a  thousand  pages. 
The  compilation  of  the  comptroller  is  more  summary  in 
form  and  usually  about  a  hundred  pages.  Until  the 
past  year,  the  governor  has  had  the  estimates  compiled 
into  a  volume  which  he  presented  to  the  legislature  on 
the  opening  day  of  the  session.  This  year,  however, 
Governor  Smith  did  not  assume  the  duties  of  his  office 
in  time  to  direct  the  preparation  of  such  a  volume,  but 
he  presented  a  summary  compilation  prepared  by  the 
comptroller.  All  three  of  these  compilations  are  pre- 
sented at  the  beginning  of  the  session,  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  copies  being  printed  to  supply  one  to  each  member. 
During  the  three  years  that  the  budget  has  been  in  opera- 
tion, the  cost  of  printing  these  three  compilations  of 
estimates  has  ranged  between  five  and  ten  thousand  dollars 
annually.  The  compilations  are  of  little  value  for  com- 
parison purposes  because  they  do  not  follow  uniform 
classifications  in  setting  up  their  information. 

Review  of  Estimates — Hearings 

The  comptroller  does  not  hold  hearings  in  the  review 
of  the  estimates.  In  fact,  he  only  makes  very  general 
recommendations  and  his  work  is  done  merely  to  comply 
with  the  19 10  law.  Practically  the  only  service  of  any 
value  which  he  renders  in  making  up  the  budget  is  his 
estimate  of  the  anticipated  revenues  of  the  state.     This 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         283 

statement  he  furnishes  to  both  the  governor  and  the  legis- 
lative budget  committee,  besides  publishing  it  in  his  digest 
of  the  estimates. 

Each  year,  hearings  on  the  estimates  are  conducted  by 
the  governor's  budget  bureau.  These  hearings  usually 
continue  for  a  month,  beginning  the  latter  part  of  Novem- 
ber. The  representatives  of  the  various  standing  agencies 
of  the  state  are  called  to  appear  before  the  governor's 
budget  staff.  In  this  manner  the  information  contained 
in  the  estimates  is  supplemented  and  the  relative  impor- 
tance of  the  various  requests  is  determined.  Sometimes 
members  of  the  governor's  budget  staff  go  into  the  field 
and  make  examinations.  During  the  past  year,  however, 
owing  to  a  change  in  the  administration,  very  little  was 
done  by  the  governor's  budget  staff  and  Governor  Smith 
did  not  submit  any  budget  recommendations  to  the  legis- 
lature. Previously  Governor  Whitman  had  made  recom- 
mendations in  the  form  of  a  tentative  appropriation  act, 
which  he  presented  to  the  legislature  along  with  his  com- 
pilation of  the  estimates  and  a  small  document  called  the 
governor's  budget  estimate. 

The  most  effective  work  of  reviewing  the  estimates 
was  done  by  the  budget  staff  of  the  joint  appropriation 
budget  committee.  During  the  summer  and  fall  of  each 
year  the  clerks  and  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  finance  com- 
mittee and  the  chairman  of  the  House  ways  and  means 
committee  visit  all  the  institutions  and  departments  of 
the  state.  In  this  way  they  gather  first  hand  information 
as  to  the  needs  of  the  various  spending  agencies.  This 
information  is  used  to  supplement  the  data  contained  on 
the  estimates.  Beginning  in  January  and  continuing 
until  the  first  week  in  March,  the  joint  legislative  budget 
committee  holds  hearings  upon  the  estimates.  Besides 
the  representatives  of  the  spending  agencies  in  question, 
usually  only  the  chairmen  of  the  joint  committee  and  the 
two  clerks  are  present.     These  hearings  are  not  public. 


284      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

It  is  stated  by  those  in  charge  that  the  technical  work  of 
budget  making  —  that  is,  the  preparation  of  a  financial 
plan,  which  is  later  submitted  to  the  people  for  criticism 
and  approval  through  their  representatives  in  the  legis- 
lature —  can  gain  nothing  by  public  hearings  by  the  staff 
or  committee  —  instead,  the  progress  of  the  work  may 
be  greatly  impeded.  But  under  a  "  legislative  budget  " 
plan  or  a  "  commission  budget  "  plan  there  is  no  other 
way  of  giving  the  semblance  of  publicity. 

The  General  Appropriation  Bill 

When  the  joint  legislative  budget  committee  has  fin- 
ished its  hearings  on  the  estimates,  the  clerks  of  the  com- 
mittee proceed  to  prepare  the  general  appropriation  bill. 
Following  the  precedent  set  by  the  legislature,  and  con- 
tinuing the  enlargement  on  this  practice  in  converting 
Governor  Whitman's  "  schedules  "  into  items,  this  bill  is 
highly  and  rigidly  itemized.  The  first  fifty  pages  attached 
to  this  bill  constitute  the  nearest  approach  to  a  budget 
of  any  of  the  documents  produced  by  the  three  budget 
agencies.  It  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  proposed  expen- 
ditures in  comparison  with  previous  expenditures,  to- 
gether with  an  attempt  to  balance  the  anticipated  revenues 
and  proposed  expenditures  for  the  period  to  be  financed. 
The  general  appropriation  bill  is  required  by  the  budget 
law  to  be  introduced  in  the  legislature  on  or  before  March 
15th.  Usually  ten  days  or  two  weeks  elapse  after  the 
introduction  of  the  bill  before  its  passage.  While  a 
committee-of-the-whole  procedure  for  the  consideration 
of  the  bill  in  the  Senate  has  been  provided  for,  such 
procedure  is  rarely  ever  used,  and  by  its  very  conditions 
must  prove  a  dead  letter.  Usually  the  bill  passes  to 
third  reading  before  there  is  any  debate  upon  its  contents 
by  either  house.  The  debate  usually  lasts  little  more 
than  an  hour  in  each  house  and  ordinarily  is  of  the  most 
perfunctory  character.     The  criticisms  of  the  minority 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York         285 

are  uninformed  and  ineffective.  The  newspapers  give 
little  space  to  reporting  the  discussion  on  the  appropriation 
bill.  When  the  bill  comes  to  the  governor  for  his  ap- 
proval, the  joint  legislative  committee  may  have  drafted 
its  sections  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  impossible  for  him 
to  exercise  his  veto  should  he  think  it  advisable  to  reduce 
the  appropriations.  Furthermore,  the  legislature  always 
remains  in  session  in  order  to  consider  the  governor's 
vetoes  in  case  he  does  not  approve  of  the  bill  in  its 
entirety. 

Scores  of  Special  Appropriation  Bills 

No  restrictions  are  placed  upon  the  introduction  and 
passage  of  special  appropriation  bills  by  the  New  York 
budget  law.  Such  bills  are  passed  throughout  the  session  • 
the  majority  of  them,  however,  are  usually  passed  after 
the  final  consideration  of  the  general  appropriation  bill, 
or  budget  so-called.  The  general  appropriation  bill 
usually  goes  to  the  governor  about  the  last  week  in  March 
and  the  legislature  remains  in  session  until  about  the 
middle  of  April.  It  is  during  the  last  week  of  the  session, 
and  even  the  last  day,  that  the  majority  of  the  special 
appropriation  bills  are  rushed  through,  and  consequently 
go  to  the  governor  as  "  thirty-day  "  bills.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  passage  of  special  appropriation  bills  has 
increased  rather  than  decreased  since  the  budget  law' began 
to  operate  in  19 17.  In  1916,  thirty-nine  such  bills  were 
passed  and  became  laws;  in  1917,  the  first  year  under  the 
budget  law,  there  were  eighty-one;  in  1918  there  were 
eighty-nine;  and  in  1919  there  were  eighty-seven.  Each 
one  of  these  bills  was  reported,  considered,  enacted,  and 
signed  by  the  governor  separately. 

The  general,  or  annual,  appropriation  bill  of  1919 
carried  only  $59,390,811.95  of  the  $95,538,303  appropri- 
ated by  the  legislature  and  approved  by  Governor  Smith. 
The  difference  between  these  two  amounts,  or  a  total  of 


286       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

$36,147,492.05,  was  scattered  through  eighty-seven  other 
appropriation  bills.  By  deducting  the  amount  of  the 
debt  service,  or  $13,341,678.42,  from  this  amount  there 
remains  $22,805,713.63  carried  by  special  appropriation 
bills,  most  of  which  were  passed  during  the  rush  and 
confusion  of  the  last  week  of  the  legislative  session. 

No  Definite  Revenue  Plan 

Since  the  total  amount  actually  appropriated  by  the 
legislature  is  not  known  until  at  least  thirty  days  after 
the  legislature  has  adjourned,  when  the  governor  has 
acted  upon  all  the  "  thirty-day  "  bills,  it  is  impossible  for 
the  committees  on  taxation  and  retrenchment  of  the  legis- 
lature to  measure  accurately  the  proposed  expenditures 
and  to  provide  revenues  for  meeting  them.  Under  the 
present  budgetary  procedure,  these  committees  work 
blindly  in  their  efforts  to  provide  revenue  for  a  budget,  the 
total  expenditures  of  which  they  can  only  roughly  approx- 
imate. For  example,  an  income  tax  was  laid  upon  the 
people  of  the  state  by  the  19 19  legislature  without  know- 
ing, in  the  first  place,  what  the  state  would  expend  for 
the  next  fiscal  year,  and  consequently  how  much  additional 
revenue  was  needed ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  how  much 
revenue  such  a  tax  would  produce. 

Responsibility  for  Budget  Scattered 

Under  New  York's  budget  procedure  the  joint  legis- 
lative budget  committee,  or,  to  make  it  more  definite, 
the  chairmen  of  the  finance  and  ways  and  means  com- 
mittees and  their  budget  clerks,  control  the  formulation 
of  the  budget.  Of  course  they  receive  budget  recom- 
mendations from  the  governor,  but  they  are  at  liberty 
to  disregard  them  if  they  choose,  and  they  usually  do 
so.  The  only  recourse  left  to  the  governor  is  to  exercise 
his  constitutional  right  of  veto;  but  since  the  legislature 
manages  to  pass  the  more   important  appropriations  a 


Legislative  Budget  Idea  in  New  York        287 

sufficient  length  of  time  before  its  adjournment  to  repass 
them  in  case  of  the  governor's  disapproval  there  remain 
only  the  "  thirty-day  "  appropriation  bills  upon  which  the 
executive  veto  may  be  effective. 

Both  houses  pass  the  budget  practically  as  submitted  to 
them  by  the  chairmen  of  the  joint  legislative  budget  com- 
mittee. But  the  budget  is  not  final,  as  no  one  knows 
what  it  will  be  till  the  governor  gets  through  with  it. 

When  it  comes  to  the  execution  of  the  budget,  or  the 
carrying  out  of  the  provisions  attached  to  the  appro- 
priations, complete  control  is  centered  in  the  comptroller's 
office,  which  acts  on  departmental  matters  independently 
of  the  governor.  The  budget  law  prescribes  no  pro- 
cedure for  the  execution  of  the  budget.  Provisions  that, 
in  practice,  govern  this  stage  of  budgetary  procedure  are 
to  be  found  in  the  state  finance  law  which  is  evolved  out 
of  the  legal  regulations  applicable  to  the  expenditure  of 
appropriations  during  more  than  a  century  prior  to  the 
time  of  the  adoption  of  the  budget  law.  Under  the 
finance  law  the  comptroller  is  authorized,  among  other 
things,  to  "  superintend  the  fiscal  concerns  of  the  state," 
to  settle  accounts,  to  liquidate  claims,  to  approve  all 
contracts  above  $1000,  and  to  receive  an  invoice  of  all 
supplies  and  materials  furnished  to  state  agencies.  His 
power  is  further  increased  by  a  section  of  the  general 
appropriation  acts  of  the  past  three  years  authorizing  him 
to  promulgate  definitions  of  the  expense  classification  by 
totals,  "  defining  the  purpose  for  which  moneys  appro- 
priated under  each  title  may  be  expended,"  and  giving  him 
the  further  power  "  to  amend  such  definitions  from  time 
to  time  as  in  his  judgment  becomes  necessary  for  the 
proper  conduct  of  the  fiscal  affairs  of  the  state."  The 
comptroller  is  elective  and  the  organization  of  his  office 
is  independent  of  both  the  governor  and  the  legislature. 

The  payment  of  state  obligations  is  made  by  the  treas- 
urer, who  has  the  custody  of  the  state  funds.     All  his 


288      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

disbursements,  however,  are  both  authorized  and  audited 
by  the  comptroller.  Although  an  elective  officer,  the 
treasurer  may  be  suspended  by  the  governor. 

In  brief,  under  the  financial  system  of  New  York  State, 
the  budget  is  both  prepared  and  enacted  by  the  legislature, 
a  body  without  responsibility  for  the  expenditure  of  the 
appropriations  and  is  then  reenacted  by  way  of  revision 
downward  by  the  governor.  The  execution  of  the  budget 
is  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  comptroller,  an  independent 
elective  officer,  who  has  the  power  to  authorize  expendi- 
tures and  to  reclassify  appropriations.  The  governor 
performs  no  definite  function  in  the  budgetary  procedure 
other  than  that  of  revision  downward,  approval  or  veto  of 
appropriations. 

The  New  York  System  Resembles  the  Present  National 
Plan 

The  legislative  procedure  and  appropriative  practice 
of  New  York  State  bear  a  striking  resemblance  to  that 
of  the  National  Government.  In  its  essential  features 
it  is  a  formulation  into  statute  law  of  standing-committee 
domination  over  both  the  administrative  branch  and  mem- 
bers of  the  representative  deliberative  branch  of  the 
government.  The  New  York  plan  is  an  exemplification 
in  practice  of  the  proposals  of  Congressmen  Fitzgerald 
of  New  York  and  Sherley  of  Kentucky,  who  as  leaders 
of  their  party  in  Congress,  proposed,  the  one  a  single 
standing  appropriation  committee,  the  other  a  super- 
committee  to  prepare  a  budget  for  the  National  Govern- 
ment. These  were  the  proposals  offered  in  opposition 
to  President  Taft's  recommendation.  Out  of  the  forty- 
four  other  states  which  have  passed  budget  laws  since 
191 1,  only  one,  Arkansas,  has  adopted  the  plan  of  New 
York. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   OHIO,    MARYLAND,    AND    NEW    JERSEY    BUDGET 
PLANS 

In  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  New  York  are  seen  the 
three  best  American  examples  of  three  essentially  different 
kinds  of  representative  government.  Illinois,  as  re- 
organized in  191 7,  is  a  type  which  seeks  to  develop  an 
efficient  public  service  and  at  the  same  time  makes  pro- 
vision for  a  strong,  responsible  executive  leadership1. 
While  it  has  provided  for  giving  strength  to  administrative 
leadership  accountable  through  a  representative  body 
devoted  to  inquest,  open  discussion,  and  initial  decision, 
it  has  not  taken  the  steps  necessary  to  make  this  account- 
ability reach  to  the  people.  Wisconsin  has  adopted  a 
method  which  is  suited  to  the  development  of  efficient 
service,  but  it  has  frankly  abandoned  the  principle  of 
representative  and  electoral  control,  the  legislature  having 
placed  the  control  of  the  purse  in  the  hands  of  an  oligarchy 
whose  decisions  the  representative  body  and  the  people 
are  asked  to  accept  largely  on  faith.  This  has  been  in 
defense  of  the  status  quo  as  it  has  come  to  find  expression 
in  the  erection  of  a  multitude  of  boards  and  commissions 
—  a  device  adopted  to  defeat  boss  rule.  New  York  has 
incorporated  and  fortified  the  irresponsible  standing- 
committee  domination  under  which  has  grown  up  the 
worst  features  of  boss  rule,  pork-barrel  politics,  patron- 
age, and  spoils. 

The  new  budget  plans  of  Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New 
Jersey  are  examples  of  attempts  to  put  a  new  and  foreign 
device  on  a  machine  to  which  it  is  not  and  cannot  be 

289 


290       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

adapted  without  material  and  radical  change  both  of 
structure  and  fundamental  design.  An  executive  budget 
assumes  executive  leadership  and  a  means  of  making  this 
leadership  accountable  and  responsible  both  for  past  acts 
of  the  whole  administrative  service  and  for  future  pro- 
posals. In  none  of  these  states  was  the  executive  in  a 
position  to  take  leadership;  in  none  of  them  was  there  a 
procedure  for  holding  him  to  account;  in  none  of  them 
were  steps  taken  to  readjust  the  organism  of  government 
with  these  ends  in  view.  Maryland  proceeded  by  consti- 
tutional amendment,  Ohio  and  New  Jersey  proceeded  by 
change  in  statute  law.  The  changes  were  made  to  satisfy 
a  demand  of  the  people  for  visible  and  responsible  gov- 
ernment. They  were  majority  party  measures  taken  by 
the  leaders  to  secure  or  maintain  popular  support,  due 
care  being  taken,  however,  not  in  any  manner  to  disturb 
the  status  quo. 

OHIO 

Disintegrated  Administrative  System 

The  Ohio  state  administration,  like  that  of  many  other 
states,  is  made  up  of  numerous  independent  officers  and 
agencies.  Several  of  these  officers  and  agencies  are  con- 
stitutional ;  the  majority  of  them,  however,  -have  been 
created  from  time  to  time  by  the  legislature  without  any 
conception  whatever  of  a  well  coordinated  administrative 
plan.  The  result  is  a  multitude  of  offices,  boards,  and 
commissions  over  which  no  responsible  or  effective  au- 
thority can  be  exercised.  However,  as  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  the  19 19  legislature  authorized  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  joint  committee  to  investigate  all  administrative 
agencies  of  the  state  with  a  view  to  reorganization  and 
consolidation. 

The  constitution  provides  that  the  following  officers 
shall  be  elected  by  the  people :  governor,  lieutenant  gov- 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      291 

ernor,  secretary  of  state,  auditor  of  state,  treasurer  of 
state,  and  attorney  general.  All  these  officers  serve  for 
a  term  of  two  years  except  the  auditor,  whose  term  is 
four  years.  In  addition  to  these  officers,  the  constitution 
provides  that  there  shall  be  a  superintendent  of  public 
instruction  and  a  superintendent  of  public  works,  each 
appointed  by  the  governor,  the  former  serving  for  a 
term  of  four  years  and  the  latter  for  one  year.  Pro- 
visions are  made  in  the  constitution  for  the  appointment 
by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  of  a 
board  of  trustees  for  the  state  institution;  also  for  the 
establishment  of  an  ex  officio  board  composed  of  the 
auditor,  secretary  of  state,  and  attorney  general,  called 
the  commissioners  of  the  sinking  fund. 

Ohio  has  about  one  hundred  statutory  administrative 
officers,  boards,  commissions,  and  other  agencies.  The 
majority  of  these  are  independent  of  each  other.  The 
more  important  ones,  however,  are  the  boards  and  com- 
missions. They  usually  consist  of  from  three  to  ten 
members,  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  approval 
of  the  Senate  for  overlapping  terms  varying  from  three 
to  seven  years.  Sometimes  the  membership  is  entirely 
ex  officio,  as,  for  example,  the  commissioners  of  public 
printing  and  the  emergency  board.  Practically  all  of 
the  administrative  officers,  who  are  appointed  by  the 
governor,  must  have  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  and  in 
nearly  every  case  they  serve  longer  terms  than  that  of  the 
governor. 

Limited  Power  of  the  Governor 

While  the  governor  is  given  the  power  to  name  the 
department  heads  and  the  members  of  numerous  boards 
and  commissions,  he  must  in  practically  every  case  secure 
the  approval  of  the  Senate  before  such  appointments 
become  valid.  His  power  of  control  over  such  officers 
is  further  reduced  by  the  fact  that  their  terms  are  fixed 


292      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  are  in  nearly  every  case  much  longer  than  the  two- 
year  term  of  the  governor.  Furthermore,  such  officers 
may  be  removed  only  for  cause,  and  consequently  the 
governor's  hands  are  tied  in  that  he  cannot  impress 
executive  leadership  on  the  departments. 

The  governor  is  required  by  statute  to  present  a  budget 
to  the  legislature,  but  he  has  no  power  to  put  his  recom- 
mendation into  the  form  of  an  appropriation  bill  for  the 
consideration  of  the  legislature.  He  is  given  the  power 
of  vetoing  items  in  appropriation  bills  even  after  the  legis- 
lature has  adjourned,  but  he  is  not  given  the  power  offset- 
ting any  limit  above  which  his  budget  recommendations 
cannot  be  raised  by  the  legislature. 

Organization  and  Procedure  of  the  Legislature 

The  constitution  requires  the  state  legislature  to  meet 
on  the  first  Monday  of  January  in  the  odd-numbered 
years.  It  also  provides  that  the  legislature  shall  be  or- 
ganized on  the  bicameral  plan,  having  a  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives composed  at  present  of  128  members  and  a 
Senate  of  thirty-six  members.  Each  house  has  forty- 
one  standing  committees  and  two  joint  committees.  In 
the  Senate  the  committees  are  elected  by  the  members  and 
in  the  House  they  are  appointed  by  the  Speaker.  The 
lieutenant  governor  is  the  presiding  officer  of  the  Senate, 
and  the  Speaker  chosen  by  the  House  is  the  presiding 
officer  of  that  body.  The  power  of  confirming  appoint- 
ments is  vested  in  the  Senate. 

In  the  matter  of  handling  appropriation  measures,  it 
is  customary  for  the  general  appropriation  bill  to  be  intro- 
duced in  the  House;  however,  other  appropriation  bills 
are  introduced  in  the  Senate  as  frequently  as  in  the 
House.  The  general  appropriation  bill  is  usually  drafted 
in  committee  and  is  brought  forth  and  introduced  at  the 
discretion  of  the  committee.  In  general  the  procedure 
of  the  Ohio  legislature  in  passing  money  bills  does  not 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      293 

differ  from  its  procedure  in  passing  other  bills.  The 
budget  law  makes  no  provisions  for  legislative  procedure, 
hence  practically  the  same  procedure  is  followed  at  the 
present  time  as  was  practiced  before  the  passage  of  the 
budget  law  in  1913.  The  appropriation  committees  of 
the  two  houses  continue  to  work  separately.  As  a  result 
the  houses  frequently  disagree  on  the  contents  of  appro- 
priation bills  and  have  to  resort  to  conference  committees 
as  a  means  of  adjustment. 

Provisions  of  the  Budget  Law 

In  191 3  Ohio  adopted  a  budget  system  which  displaced 
the  compilation  of  departmental  estimates  by  the  auditor 
of  the  state  and  made  the  governor  the  chief  budget 
officer  with  authority  to  appoint  competent  assistants 
to  serve  under  his  direction  and  control.  The  procedure 
laid  down  by  this  law  (S.B.  No.  127,  Laws  of  19 13)  is 
as  follows : 

1.  The  governor  is  required  to  furnish  blanks  on  which 
the  various  chief  officers  of  the  government  shall  present 
requests  for  appropriation. 

2.  Every  spending  agency  is  required  to  prepare  esti- 
mates and  submit  them  on  or  before  November  15th  in  the 
even  years. 

3.  The  auditor  is  required  to  submit  a  report  to  the  gov- 
ernor on  or  before  November  15th  in  the  even  years, 
showing:  (a)  Balance  to  the  credit  of  the  several  spend- 
ing agencies  at  the  end  of  the  last  fiscal  year;  (b)  monthly 
revenues  and  expenditures  from  each  appropriation  ac- 
count in  the  twelve  months  of  the  last  fiscal  year;  (c) 
annual  revenues  and  expenditures  for  each  of  the  last 
fiscal  years;  (d)  monthly  average  of  expenditures  from 
each  of  the  several  appropriation  accounts  for  the  last 
fiscal  year. 

4.  The  governor  is  authorized,  through  his  assistants, 
(budget  commissioner  and  staff)  to  examine  without  no- 


294       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tice  the  affairs  of  any  branch  of  the  state  government  and 
to  call  witnesses  and  require  the  production  of  books  and 
papers  and  to  present  findings  and  recommendations  rel- 
ative to  the  promotion  of  economy  and  efficiency. 

5.  The  governor  is  required  to  submit  to  the  General 
Assembly  at  the  beginning  of  each  regular  session  his 
budget  of  current  expenses  of  the  state  for  the  ensuing 
biennium,  together  with  the  estimates  of  the  several 
branches  of  the  state  government. 

The  Budget  Commissioner  and  Staff 

The  first  budget  document  prepared  under  the  Ohio 
budget  law  was  produced  in  191 3  and  was  the  basis  for 
an  appropriation  bill  covering  the  fiscal  year  from  Feb- 
ruary 1 6th,  1 914,  to  February  14,  19 15.  At  the  next 
session  (1915)  of  the  legislature  the  fiscal  year  was 
changed  to  begin  on  July  1st  and  the  budget  was  prepared 
covering  the  biennium  following  that  date.  Since  then 
two  budgets  have  been  prepared. 

The  provisions  of  the  budget  law  would  suggest  a 
board  of  examiners  with  certain  auditing  functions,  rather 
than  a  single  officer  or  budget  commissioner,  with  special 
power  to  compile  the  estimates  and  to  produce  the  budget. 
However,  immediately  following  the  passage  of  the  law, 
the  governor  determined  upon  the  appointment  of  a  budget 
commissioner  with  a  staff  under  his  control.  Since  1913 
there  have  been  four  budget  commissioners.  The  present 
commissioner  was  appointed  by  Governor  Cox  in  19 19. 
His  staff  consists  of  an  assistant  budget  commissioner, 
one  secretary,  and  a  stenographer  during  the  period  of 
the  budget  preparation.  The  budget  commissioner  re- 
ceives a  salary  of  $4000  per  year.  The  assistant  budget 
commissioner  receives  a  salary  of  $1800  a  year.  The 
commissioner  as  well  as  the  assistant  commissioner,  are 
appointees  of  the  governor  and  are  exempt  from  civil 
service  regulation. 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      295 

Filing  and  Review  of  Estimates 

The  estimate  forms  are  prepared  by  the  budget  com- 
missioner and  are  usually  sent  out  about  August  1st  of 
the  even-numbered  years.  The  forms  are  printed  on 
heavy  calendar  paper  and  are  somewhat  unwieldy  in 
size.  Under  the  budget  law  the  estimates  are  required 
to  be  filed  by  November  15th;  however,  the  spending 
agencies  usually  begin  returning  them  in  October  and 
continue  until  the  latter  part  of  November.  The  state 
auditor  is  required  to  furnish  the  budget  commissioner 
with  a  statement  of  the  anticipated  revenues  of  the  state, 
which  he  usually  produces  about  November  15th. 

Beginning  in  August  and  continuing  until  the  latter 
part  of  November,  the  budget  commissioner  and  his 
assistant  visit  the  various  institutions  and  departments 
of  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  their  equip- 
ment, facilities,  and  general  needs.  During  November 
and  December  the  budget  commissioner  holds  informal 
conferences  with  the  heads  and  superior  officers  of  the 
several  departments  and  institutions  requesting  appro- 
priations from  the  state.  These  conferences  are  in  the 
nature  of  hearings  but  are  not  public.  In  fact  the  com- 
missioner states  that  he  is  inclined  to  discourage  publicity 
at  this  time.  It  is  only  when  one  of  the  institutions  de- 
cides to  make  its  demands  public  that  any  information 
concerning  the  estimates  gets  into  the  newspapers.  As 
a  rule  the  governor  is  never  present  at  these  conferences 
or  hearings  before  the  budget  commissioner.  However, 
in  case  a  dispute  arises  between  the  commissioner  and  a 
spending  agency,  the  governor  may  take  the  matter  up 
and  settle  it  so  far  as  the  budget  to  be  submitted  is  con- 
cerned. 

Upon  the  basis  of  the  data  gathered  by  visits  and  con- 
ferences and  the  information  furnished  by  the  estimates, 
the  budget  commissioner  makes  up  tentative  recommenda- 


296      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

tions  for  appropriations  which  he  presents  to  the  governor 
for  his  approval.  In  making  up  these  recommendations, 
the  commissioner  does  not  attempt  to  balance  the  pro- 
posed expenditures  with  the  anticipated  revenues.  For 
example,  in  the  budget  submitted  to  the  19 19  legislature, 
the  recommendations  for  appropriations  far  exceed  the 
estimated  revenues  of  the  state. 

Budget  Commissioner  Prepares  Budget  Document 

While  the  law  requires  the  budget  to  be  presented 
to  the  legislature  at  the  opening  of  the  regular  sessions, 
it  was  not  submitted  until  March  1st,  in  19 19.  The  legis- 
lature had  been  in  session  for  about  two  months  before 
the  commissioner  succeeded  in  getting  the  document 
printed  and  puting  it  into  the  hands  of  the  members  of 
each  house  of  the  legislature.  This  tardiness  in  its  presen- 
tation to  the  legislature  greatly  reduced  the  usefulness  of 
the  document,  since  the  information  contained  in  the  bud- 
get was  not  available  to  the  members  of  the  legislature  and 
to  the  public  until  the  financial  program  of  the  appropri- 
ation committees  had  begun  to  assume  definite  shape. 
There  were  also  similar  delays  in  the  presentation  of  the 
budget  document  to  the  legislature  during  the  191 5  and 
19 1 7  sessions  of  the  legislature.  When  submitted,  the 
budget  is  in  practice  referred  to  the  appropriation  or 
finance  committees  of  the  two  houses.  Very  little  atten- 
tion is  given  to  the  budget  document  by  the  members  of 
the  legislature,  inasmuch  as  they  have  learned  to  look  to 
the  appropriation  committees  and  not  to  the  governor 
for  the  definite  appropriation  proposals. 

In  practice  the  governor  relies  almost  wholly  upon  the 
commissioner's  judgment  as  to  budget  recommendations. 
The  recommendations  contained  in  the  budget,  as  pre- 
sented to  the  legislature,  are  therefore  largely  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  budget  commissioner.  The  budget 
document  contains  a  summary  statement  of  actual  and 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      297 

estimated  revenues  for  the  biennium  to  be  financed  and 
for  the  four  years  prior  thereto.  It  also  contains  a  sum- 
mary of  the  expenditures  for  the  same  period.  No  new 
sources  of  revenue  are  suggested  in  case  a  deficit  is  shown 
between  the  proposed  expenditures  and  the  anticipated 
revenues  for  the  biennium,  as  was  the  case  in  the  budget 
prepared  for  1919-1921.  The  budget,  as  presented  to 
the  legislature  of  19 19,  showed  a  deficit  for  the  biennium 
of  more  than  three  and  a  half  million  dollars.  It  contains 
a  graphic  presentation  of  the  revenues  and  of  the  expendi- 
tures for  the  fiscal  year  just  ended.  Most  of  the  document 
is  taken  up  with  an  abbreviated  transcription  of  the 
estimate  sheet,  showing  the  amounts  requested,  the  recom- 
mendations and  the  decreases.  The  estimates  of  each 
organization  unit  are  printed  separately  for  each  year 
of  the  biennium,  when  they  might  easily  be  combined  and 
reduce  the  size  of  the  budget  document  by  practically 
half. 

The  Appropriation  Committees  and  Their  Work 

The  Senate  finance  committee  is  composed  of  twelve 
members,  eight  of  whom  for  the  1919  session  were 
Republicans  and  four  were  Democrats.  The  House 
appropriation  and  finance  committee,  consisting  of  fifteen 
members,  was  made  up  of  ten  Republicans  and  five 
Democrats.  It  is  stated  that  the  Democratic  members 
of  the  two  committees  were  rarely  ever  present  at  the 
hearings  conducted  by  the  committees  and  took  little  part 
in  the  appropriation  procedure.  The  result  was  that  the 
minority  was  unable  to  offer  any  effective  criticism  or 
constructive  suggestions  at  the  passage  of  the  general 
appropriation  bill. 

It  is  the  custom  for  the  appropriation  committee  of  the 
House  to  lead  in  the  procedure  for  handling  the  general 
appropriation  bill.  However,  the  Senate  appropriation 
committee  never  cooperates  or  works  jointly  with  the 


298       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

House  committee.  All  hearings,  sessions,  and  junkets 
of  the  committees  are  conducted  separately.  This  results 
in  a  duplication  of  work  between  the  two  committees, 
as  well  as  a  repetition  of  most  of  the  work  done  by  the 
budget  commissioner  and  his  staff. 

During  February  and  March  the  appropriation  com- 
mittees of  each  house  conducted  hearings  on  the  estimates 
independently  of  each  other.  It  is  stated  that  about 
seventy-five  hearings  were  held  by  each  committee. 
These  hearings  were  always  held  behind  closed  doors, 
only  the  members  of  the  committee,  the  budget  commis- 
sioner or  his  assistant,  and  the  representatives  of  the 
spending  agency  in  question  being  present.  Immediately 
upon  the  conclusion  of  each  hearing  the  committee  decided 
upon  the  amount  of  the  several  items  of  appropriation 
to  be  allowed  the  spending  agency,  and  the  budget  com- 
missioner, or  his  assistant,  recorded  the  recommendations 
of  the  committee  on  the  estimate  sheets  or  in  a  copy  of 
of  the  budget.  During  the  1919  session  of  the  legislature 
the  budget  commissioner  worked  principally  with  the 
Senate  finance  committee,  while  his  assistant  worked  with 
the  House  appropriation  committee. 

During  about  two  months  of  the  19 19  legislative 
session,  the  appropriation  committee  of  each  house  spent 
its  week-ends  from  Friday  until  Monday  visiting  the 
institutions  of  the  state.  The  committees  never  made 
joint  visits  to  the  institutions.  It  is  the  usual  procedure 
for  each  committee  to  make  a  round  of  the  state  institu- 
tions every  legislative  session.  So  far  as  could  be  learned, 
the  information  which  is  gathered  as  a  result  of  these 
visits  is  superficial  and  adds  little  to  the  data  already  in 
the  office  of  the  budget  commissioner. 

The  staff  of  the  budget  commissioner,  it  is  stated,  does 
practically  all  of  the  work  in  connection  with  the  drafting 
of  the  general  appropriation  bill.  The  staff  also  does 
the  proof  reading  and  comparison  in  connection  with  the 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      299 

printing  of  the  bill.  This  cooperation  increases  to  some 
degree  the  influence  of  the  budget  commissioner's  judg- 
ment over  the  recommendations  for  appropriations  as 
made  by  the  appropriation  committees. 

Legislative  Handling  of  General  Appropriation  Bill 

The  general  appropriation  bill  for  the  biennium, 
1919-21,  following  the  usual  procedure,  was  first  intro- 
duced into  the  House.  This  was  on  May  5,  19 19.  The 
bill  had  its  first  and  second  readings,  was  ordered 
engrossed  and  placed  on  the  calendar  on  the  same  date. 
On  May  9th  the  bill  was  printed  and  laid  on  the  desk 
of  each  member  of  the  House,  and  three  or  four  hours 
later  went  to  a  third  reading  and  was  passed  with  prac- 
tically no  discussion.  On  the  same  day,  May  9th,  it 
was  sent  to  the  Senate,  where  it  immediately  went  to 
a  second  reading  and  was  referred  to  the  finance  com- 
mittee of  the  Senate.  This  committee  had  already  framed 
up  a  set  of  proposed  amendments,  and  on  May  10th  the 
bill  was  reported  out  with  these  amendments.  It  imme- 
diately went  to  a  third  reading  as  amended  and  was 
sent  to  the  Senate.  When  the  bill  was  returned  to  the 
house  for  concurrence  in  the  Senate  amendments,  the 
House  refused  to  concur  and  upon  request  of  the  Senate 
a  conference  committee  was  appointed  consisting  of  three 
members  from  the  appropriation  committee  of  each  house. 
The  conference  committee  spent  its  time  from  May  10th 
to  May  28th  modifying  the  proposed  amendments  and 
agreeing  upon  new  amendments.  On  the  latter  date  the 
bill  was  reported  with  amendments  to  the  Senate  and  was 
accepted.  On  the  same  day  the  report  of  the  conference 
committee  was  adopted  by  the  House. 

Immediately  upon  its  passage  by  the  legislature  the 
general  appropriation  bill  went  to  Governor  Cox,  who 
refused  to  sign  it  because  of  the  numerous  changes  which 
had  been  made  in  it  by  the  conference  committee.     Since 


300      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  legislature  continued  in  session  the  bill  became  a 
law  in  ten  days  without  the  governor's  signature.  The 
governor's  veto  messages  on  appropriation  bills  are 
usually  prepared  by  the  budget  commissioner. 

Prior  to  19 19,  the  general  appropriation  bill  has  usually 
been  acted  upon  the  last  week  or  even  the  last  day  of 
the  legislative  sessipn.  The  present  year,  however,  the 
legislature  refused  to  adjourn.  In  order  to  thwart  the 
desires  of  the  governor,  it  decided  to  recess  from  time 
to  time  with  the  intention  of  meeting  again  in  December. 

As  a  result  of  the  numerous  changes  made  by  the 
House  committee,  the  Senate  committee,  and  the  con- 
ference committee,  the  governor's  recommendations  for 
appropriations  for  the  biennium  were  decreased  between 
two  and  three  million  dollars.  Most  of  the  changes  were 
made  in  the  personal  service  schedules.  About  half  a 
million  dollars  was  added  to  the  governor's  recommenda- 
tions for  permanent  improvements. 

Such  provisions  as  were  made  for  additional  revenue 
were  framed  without  reference  to  the  total  amount  that 
had  been  appropriated  by  the  legislature.  In  fact,  the 
total  amount  of  appropriations  could  not  be  ascertained 
until  the  governor  had  finally  acted  upon  all  the  appro- 
priation measures  passed  by  the  legislature. 

Numerous  Special  Appropriation  Bills  Passed 

More  than  fifty  bills  carrying  special  appropriations, 
other  than  those  included  in  the  general  appropriation 
bill,  were  introduced  in  the  legislature  during  the  191 9 
session  and  more  than  a  dozen  of  these  bills  passed 
and  became  laws.  The  total  appropriated  by  these  special 
bills  is  not  known  at  the  time  of  this  writing.  Some  of 
the  bills  were  enacted  early  in  the  session,  even  before  the 
governor's  budget  had  been  received  by  the  legislature. 
One  such  measure  was  a  deficiency  appropriation  bill 
amounting  to  several  million  dollars. 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      301 

Using  the  report  of  the  sundry  claims  board  as  a  basis, 
a  sundry  appropriation  bill  was  prepared  and  introduced 
in  the  legislature  following  the  enactment  of  the  general 
appropriation  bill.  The  two  houses  of  the  legislature, 
however,  failed  to  agree  upon  the  appropriations  included 
in  this  bill  and  as  a  result  it  was  not  acted  upon  before 
the  legislature  recessed  to  meet  again  .in  December,  when 
it  was  taken  up  and  passed  after  considerable  wrangling 
between  the  two  houses.  For  the  past  two  or  three  regu- 
lar sessions  of  the  legislature,  the  sundry  claims  bill  has 
been  the  cause  of  a  deadlock  in  the  legislature. 

Provisions  for  Transfers  and  Emergencies 

In  order  to  provide  for  some  flexibility  in  the  expendi- 
ture of  appropriations,  section  four  of  the  general  appro- 
priation act  constitutes  a  controlling  board,  consisting 
of  the  governor  or  the  budget  commissioner  (in  practice 
always  the  budget  commissioner),  the  chairmen  of  the 
two  appropriation  committees,  the  attorney  general,  and 
state  auditor.  This  board  is  empowered  to  authorize 
transfers  within  the  appropriation  accounts  of  any  or- 
ganization unit  upon  application. 

An  emergency  board,  created  by  statute,  consisting  of 
the  governor,  auditor,  attorney  general,  and  chairmen 
of  the  finance  committees  of  the  legislature,  is  empowered 
to  authorize  the  expenditure  of  money  for  emergency 
purposes,  which  has  not  already  been  appropriated  by  the 
legislature. 

Under  a  law  passed  in  1917  (Vol.  107,  p.  639)  the 
budget  commissioner  is  authorized  to  receive  statements 
from  the  spending  agencies  of  proposed  expenditures 
preceding  the  month  in  which  such  expenditures  are  to 
be  made.  These  statements,  when  approved  by  the  com- 
missioner, permit  expenditures  to  be  made  from  the 
authorized  appropriations.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
effective  provisions  of  the  law,  since  by  this  means,  in 


302      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

a  well-organized  administration,  the  commissioner  would 
be  able  to  veto  a  part  of  an  appropriation  item  and  it 
would  permit  the  governor,  through  the  commissioner, 
to  be  effective  in  the  supervision  of  departmental  expen- 
ditures. But  because  of  lack  of  authority  of  the  gover- 
nor over  the  department  heads  and  lack  of  cooperation 
on  the  part  of  the  state  auditor  this  plan  does  not  seem 
to  work  very  effectively. 

Governor  Cox  Condemns  Present  Budget  Procedure 

In  his  message  to  the  19 19  legislature,  Governor  Cox 
stated  that  the  budget  procedure  of  Ohio  was  ineffective 
as  a  means  of  checking  the  injudicious  appropriation  of 
money  by  the  legislature.  He  asserted  that  the  executive 
proposals  for  the  appropriations  had  always  been  in- 
creased rather  than  decreased  by  action  of  the  legislature. 
He  recommended  that  provisions  for  a  budget  system 
should  be  written  into  the  constitution,  which  would  set 
limitations  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  increase 
the  governor's  proposals  or  to  enact  special  and  supple- 
mentary appropriations,  similar  to  those  of  the  Maryland 
budget  amendment.  A  joint  resolution  ( H.J. R. No. 62) 
was  introduced  into  the  19 19  legislature,  proposing  an 
amendment  to  the  constitution  and  providing  for  the 
adoption  of  a  budget  system.  Its  provisions  were  in  ac- 
cord with  the  recommendations  of  Governor  Cox,  but  it 
failed  of  any  consideration  on  the  part  of  the  legislature. 

The  Ohio  System  Fails  to  Fix  Responsibility  or  to  Provide 
Publicity 

The  governor's  budget  recommendations,  or  rather 
those  of  the  budget  commissioner,  are  usually  mutilated 
beyond  recognition  in  their  passage  through  the  legis- 
lative committees.  As  a  result,  no  one  knows  whose 
judgment  the  appropriation  act  represents;  the  governor 
cannot  be  charged  with  responsibility  —  responsibility  is 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      303 

dissipated.  During  the  recent  legislative  session  the  gov- 
ernor and  the  legislature  were  at  loggerheads  most  of  the 
time,  the  result  being  that  the  legislature  practically  had 
its  way  in  financial  matters. 

Under  the  present  procedure  the  financial  program, 
indefinite  as  it  is,  gets  practically  no  consideration  by  the 
legislature  as  a  whole.  The  consideration  is  by  com- 
mittees behind  closed  doors.  Furthermore,  these  com- 
mittees do  not  work  jointly.  This  results  in  frequent 
disagreements,  whereupon  resort  is  made  to  conference 
committees  for  adjustment. 

The  advantages  of  executive  control  over  the  budget 
are  destroyed  when  the  legislature  is  permitted  promis- 
cuously to  pass  supplementary  appropriation  bills,  as  under 
the  Ohio  procedure.  A  number  of  such  bills  are  passed 
every  session  of  the  legislature. 

In  brief,  the  budgetary  procedure  of  Ohio  fails  in  the 
first  place  to  establish  definite  executive  responsibility, 
and  in  the  second  place  to  provide  publicity  in  the  legis- 
lative action  on  money  measures. 

MARYLAND 

Scattered  and  Uncontrolled  Administrative  Agencies 

The  administrative  branch  of  the  state  government  of 
Maryland  includes  about  eighty  separate  offices,  depart- 
ments, commissions,  and  other  agencies,  most  of  which 
are  independent  of  one  another  and  subject  to  no  direct 
and  effective  control  by  the  governor.  While  the  gov- 
ernor has  in  several  instances  the  power  of  appointment 
and  removal,  most  of  his  important  appointments  are 
made  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  which  thus  shares 
with  him  the  conduct  of  the  administration.  Several  of 
the  constitutional  officers,  as  well  as  many  of  the  officers 
created  by  statute,  are  not  even  brought  under  this  nom- 
inal executive  control. 

There  are  nine  administrative  officers  or  agencies  pro- 


304      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

vided  for  in  the  constitution ;  namely,  governor,  secretary 
of  state,  attorney  general,  comptroller,  treasurer,  state 
librarian,  commissioner  of  the  land  office,  adjutant  gen- 
eral»  and  board  of  public  works.  The  governor  and 
attorney  general  are  each  elected  for  a  term  of  four 
years.  The  comptroller  is  elected  for  a  two-year  term, 
and  the  treasurer  is  appointed  by  the  two  houses  of  the 
legislature  for  a  like  term.  The  secretary  of  state,  the 
state  librarian,  and  the  commissioner  of  the  land  office 
are  appointed  by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the 
Senate  for  terms  equal  to  that  of  the  governor.  The 
governor  appoints,  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  the 
adjutant  general.  The  board  of  public  works  is  composed 
of  the  governor,  the  comptroller,  and  the  treasurer  acting 
in  an  ex  officio  capacity. 

The  board  type  seems  to  predominate  among  the  statu- 
tory administrative  agencies  of  Maryland.  Usually  the 
members  of  the  boards  are  appointed  for  overlapping 
terms  longer  than  that  of  the  governor.  In  some  cases 
these  boards  are  made  up  entirely  of  appointive  members, 
and  in  other  cases  of  both  appointive  and  ex  officio 
members.  A  few  examples  may  be  pointed  out.  The 
public  service  commission,  the  state  tax  commission,  and 
the  state  industrial  accident  commission  are  each  com- 
posed of  three  members  which  are  appointed  by  the 
governor  for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years.  The  state 
board  of  prison  control,  having  charge  of  the  penal  insti- 
tutions of  the  state,  consists  of  three  members  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  for  over- 
lapping terms  of  six  years.  The  three  members  of  the 
conservation  commission  are  appointed  by  the  governor 
for  overlapping  terms  of  four  years.  The  motion- 
pictures  censors,  consisting  of  three  persons,  are  appointed 
by  the  governor,  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  for 
overlapping  terms  of  three  years.  The  governor  ap- 
points six  members,  composing  the  board  of  state  aid 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      305 

and  charities,  each  having  an  overlapping  term  of  four 
years.  The  state  board  of  health  consists  of  the  attorney 
general,  health  commissioner  of  Baltimore,  and  four  per- 
sons appointed  by  the  governor,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Senate.  The  state  lunacy  commission  is  made  up  of 
the  attorney  general  and  four  members  appointed  by  the 
governor  for  overlapping  terms  of  four  years.  The  state 
board  of  forestry  consists  of  the  governor,  comptroller, 
president  of  Johns  Hopkins  University,  president  of 
Maryland  Agricultural  College,  state  geologist,  and  two 
members  appointed  by  the  governor  for  a  term  of  two 
years. 

The  statutory  administrative  officers  are  appointed  in 
some  instances  by  the  governor,  in  others  by  the  governor 
with  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  and  in  others  by  the 
board  of  public  works.  The  superintendent  of  public 
buildings  and  grounds  is  appointed  by  the  governor.  The 
board  of  public  works  appoints  the  state  auditor,  the 
bank  commissioner,  and  the  insurance  commissioner  — 
the  first  two  for  terms  of  two  years  each  and  the  last  for 
a  term  of  four  years. 

Maryland  has  approximately  120  independent  agencies, 
such  as  institutions,  associations,  and  societies,  receiving 
appropriations  from  the  state.  These  appropriations 
range  from  $500  to  $75,000  and  aggregate  an  annual 
expenditure  of  approximately  $850,000,  or  nearly  one- 
fourth  of  the  general  funds  annually  available  in  the 
state  treasury. 

Governor  Without  Assistance  to  Prepare  or  Power  to 
Execute  the  Budget 

Under  the  present  disintegrated  organization  of  the 
Maryland  state  administration  the  governor  has  no  cab- 
inet assistance  in  the  formulation  of  his  financial  program, 
and  lacks  the  full  control  necessary  to  enforce  cooperation 
in  the  expenditure  of  appropriations.     The  budget  amend- 


306      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ment  seeks  to  bring  the  numerous  and  widely  scattered 
administrative  agencies  under  the  control  of  the  gov- 
ernor by  compelling  them  to  submit  to  him  estimates  of 
their  needs,  and  by  authorizing  him  to  recommend  to  the 
legislature  the  maximum  amounts  which  they  may  expend. 
While  this  may  be  effective  as  a  means  of  preventing  a 
deficit  in  the  state  treasury,  it  does  not  seem  likely  that 
it  will  secure  coordination  of  work  and  cooperation  of 
administration. 

Furthermore,  the  governor  is  not  provided  with  any 
permanent  staff  assistance  in  the  preparation  of  his  bud- 
get. He  must  rely  almost  wholly  upon  independent 
administrative  officers  and  agencies  to  gather  the  budget 
data.  He  has  no  department  or  staff  working  directly 
under  him,  which  is  continuously  engaged  in  gathering 
the  information  upon  which  he  may  base  his  budget 
recommendations  to  the  legislature. 

Budget  Amendment  and  Its  Provisions 

The  uncontrolled  action  of  the  Maryland  legislature 
in  the  passage  of  appropriation  measures  had  created 
by  191 5  a  deficit  in  the  state  funds  of  more  than  one 
million  dollars.  This  aroused  the  people  of  the  state  to 
the  need  for  an  effective  budget  system.  In  the  campaign 
of  19 1 5  budget  planks  appeared  in  the  platforms  of  the 
two  leading  parties  —  the  Democratic  party  pledging 
itself  to  the  appointment  of  a  commission  to  prepare 
a  report  with  definite  budget  recommendations.  Upon 
the  election  of  Governor  Harrington  a  citizen  commission 
was  appointed,  with  Dr.  Frank  J.  Goodnow  (former 
member  of  President  Taft's  commission  on  economy 
and  efficiency)  as  chairman.  This  commission  made  a 
report,  with  a  proposed  constitutional  amendment  to 
establish  an  executive  budget  system,  which  was  laid 
before  the  legislature  in  191 6.  The  amendment  was  ap- 
proved by  the  legislature  after  the  defeat  of  a  proposal 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      307 

to  substitute  for  the  governor  the  board  of  public  works 
(consisting  of  the  governor,  the  comptroller,  and  the 
state  treasurer,  the  last  being  elected  by  the  legislature.) 
It  was  ratified  by  the  voters  November  7th.  1916,  and 
became  section  fifty-two  of  article  three  of  the  consti- 
tution. 

The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  provisions  of  the 
amendment : 

1.  Estimates  are  required  to  be  made  by  all  spending 
agencies  and  submitted  to  the  governor  at  such  time  and 
in  such  form  as  he  may  prescribe.  The  estimates  of  the 
legislature  are  certified  by  the  presiding  officer  of  each 
house  and  those  of  judiciary  by  the  comptroller. 

2.  The  governor  may  review  by  public  hearings  all 
estimates  and  may  revise  all  estimates,  except  those  of 
the  legislative  and  judiciary  departments  and  those  re- 
lating to  public  schools. 

3.  The  governor  is  required  to  prepare  two  budgets, 
one  for  each  of  the  ensuing  fiscal  years. 

4.  Each  budget  must  be  divided  into  two  parts :  I. 
"  Governmental  appropriations  "  for  ( 1 )  General  Assem- 
bly, (2)  executive  department,  (3)  judiciary  department, 
(4)  to  pay  and  discharge  principal  and  interest  of  state 
debt,  (5)  salaries  payable  by  state  under  constitution 
and  laws,  (6)  public  schools,  (7)  other  purposes  set  forth 
in  constitution.  II.  "  General  appropriations,"  including 
all  other  estimates. 

5.  Each  budget  is  required  to  contain  a  complete  plan 
of  proposed  expenditures  and  estimated  revenues,  and 
to  set  forth  the  estimated  surplus  or  deficit  of  revenues. 
An  accompanying  statement  must  show :  ( 1 )  Revenues 
and  expenditures  for  each  of  two  fiscal  years  next  pre- 
ceding, (2)  balance  sheet,  (3)  debts  and  funds,  (4) 
estimate  of  state's  financial  condition  at  the  ends  of  the 
fiscal  years  covered  by  budgets,  (5)  explanations  by  the 
governor. 


308      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

6.  The  governor  is  required  to  deliver  the  budgets 
and  a  bill  of  proposed  appropriations,  clearly  itemized 
and  classified,  to  the  presiding  officer  of  each  house  within 
twenty  days  (if  newly  elected,  thirty  days)  after  the 
convening  of  the  legislature. 

7.  The  budget  bill,  or  appropriation  bill,  must  be  intro- 
duced into  each  house  immediately  upon  its  receipt  by 
the  presiding  officer.  The  governor  may  amend  or  sup- 
plement the  bill  while  in  the  legislature. 

8.  The  governor  and  administrative  officers  designated 
by  him  have  the  right,  and  when  requested  by  the  legis- 
lature are  required,  to  appear  before  the  legislature  to 
defend  the  budget  bill. 

9.  The  legislature  may  not  amend  the  budget  bill  to 
change  the  public  school  funds,  or  salaries  and  obligations 
required  by  the  constitution ;  it  may  increase  or  decrease 
items  relating  to  the  general  assembly,  or  increase  those 
relating  to  the  judiciary,  but  can  only  reduce  or  strike 
out  others. 

10.  The  legislature  may  not  consider  other  appro- 
priations until  the  budget  bill  has  been  finally  acted  upon. 

11.  If  the  budget  bill  is  not  enacted  three  days  before 
the  expiration  of  the  regular  session,  the  governor  may 
by  proclamation  extend  the  session. 

12.  The  budget  bill  becomes  law  upon  passage  by  the 
legislature  without  signature  of  governor. 

13.  Every  supplementary  appropriation  (1)  must  be 
embodied  in  a  separate  bill,  limited  to  a  single  purpose, 
(2)  must  provide  the  revenues  necessary  to  pay  the  appro- 
priation by  a  tax,  direct  or  indirect,  to  be  laid  and  col- 
lected as  directed  in  the  bill,  (3)  must  receive  the  ma- 
jority vote  of  the  elected  members  of  each  house,  (4) 
must  be  presented  to  the  governor  and  be  subject  to  his 
veto. 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      309 

Form,  Preparation  and  Filing  of  Estimates 

The  actual  work  of  preparing  the  first  Maryland  state 
budget  was  begun  in  November,  191 7.  The  estimate 
forms  were  prepared  by  the  department  of  legislative 
reference  and  approved  by  the  governor.  The  budget 
classification,  as  adopted,  followed  objects  of  expendi- 
tures; namely,  (1)  salaries  and  wages,  (2)  expenses  — 
maintenance  other  than  personal  service,  (3)  purchase  of 
land,  (4)  buildings,  (5)  equipment,  and  (6)  new  con- 
struction. The  amounts  appropriated  and  expended  for 
the  fiscal  year  just  ended,  also  the  amounts  appropriated 
for  the  current  fiscal  year,  were  required  to  be  given  in 
detail  upon  the  estimates.  The  appropriations  for  each 
of  the  fiscal  years  of  the  next  biennium  were  required  to 
be  clearly  itemized.  A  few  of  the  spending  agencies  at 
first  hesitated  to.  make  itemization,  since  they  had  been 
so  long  accustomed  to  request  lump-sum  appropriations 
from  the  legislature.  Each  estimate  sheet  provided  space 
for  the  governor's  allowance  and  necessary  explanatory 
remarks. 

The  estimates  were  required  to  be  filed  with  the  gov- 
ernor by  December  10th,  but  many  of  the  spending 
agencies  were  late  in  filing  their  requests,  owing  to  the 
novelty  of  the  system  and  to  insufficient  and  inadequate 
data  at  hand  for  preparing  their  estimates.  Many  of  the 
estimates  were  incorrect  when  submitted  and  had  to  be 
returned  and  made  up  the  second  time.  Had  the  forms 
been  prepared  and  sent  out  earlier,  the  estimates  might 
easily  have  been  submitted  to  the  governor  a  month  before 
they  were,  since  the  fiscal  year  of  Maryland  ends  on 
September  30th.  This  would  have  allowed  the  spending 
agencies  a  month's  time  after  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year 
for  the  preparation  of  their  estimates,  and  at  the  same 
time  would  have  given  the  governor  more  time,  which 
proved  to  be  much  needed,  for  review  of  the  estimates 
and  preparation  of  the  budget. 


310      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Public  Hearings  and  Revision  of  Estimates 

Early  in  December  Governor  Harrington  secured  the 
services  of  a  budget  specialist  from  the  New  York  Bureau 
of  Municipal  Research,  who,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
executive  office  force,  compiled  the  estimates  and  other 
data  for  the  budget  and  drafted  the  budget  bill.  About 
the  middle  of  December  the  governor  began  to  hold  public 
hearings  upon  the  estimates  and  continued  almost  daily 
until  the  end  of  the  month,  in  which  time  he  had  heard 
more  than  eighty  of  the  state's  spending  agencies.  He 
required  a  number  of  agencies  to  appear  before  him;  to 
others  he  granted  hearings  upon  request. 

After  the  hearings  were  concluded,  the  governor  set 
to  work  to  review  all  the  estimates  and  make  his  allowance 
for  the  budget.  The  total  of  the  requests  for  appropria- 
tions far  exceeded  the  total  estimated  revenues  as  calcu- 
lated by  the  state  comptroller.  In  order  to  make  the 
expenditures  of  the  first  state  budget  commensurate  with 
the  anticipated  revenues,  the  governor  asked  the  admin- 
istrative heads  of  the  large  departments  and  institutions 
to  collaborate  with  him  in  the  revision  of  the  estimates. 
Acting  upon  the  governor's  advice,  they  reduced  their 
estimates  at  those  points  where  they  judged  reductions 
would  least  hamper  the  normal  growth  of  their  work. 
The  governor,  under  the  provision  of  the  budget  amend- 
ment, included  the  legislative,  judicial,  and  educational 
estimates  in  the  budget  without  revision ;  but  he  had,  nev- 
ertheless, been  consulted  as  to  their  probable  totals  while 
they  were  in  preparation  and  reserved  to  himself  the  right 
to  make  suggestions  with  regard  to  the  amounts  requested. 

Budget  Submitted  to  Legislature 

Governor  Harrington  was  unable  to  deliver  his  budget 
to  the  legislature  within  the  time  limit  fixed  in  the  budget 
amendment  (twenty  days  after  the  convening  of  the  leg- 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      3 1 1 

islature,  which  met  on  January  2d),  owing  to  delay  in 
printing  the  budget  and  to  other  contingent  circumstances. 
The  legislature,  however,  agreed  to  extend  the  time  one 
week,  and  on  January  29th  the  governor  transmitted  his 
budget  and  budget  bill  in  printed  form  to  the  presiding 
officer  of  each  house.  At  the  same  time  each  member 
of  the  legislature  was  supplied  with  a  copy  of  the  budget. 
The  budget  was  immediately  introduced  by  both  the  pres- 
ident of  the  Senate  and  the  speaker  of  the  House  in  their 
respective  houses. 


Form  and  Content  of  Budget 

The  general  form  of  the  budget  is  prescribed  in  the 
amendment.  As  actually  made  up,  it  contained  in  con- 
secutive order  the  following  statements  and  data  : 

1.  The  actual  and  estimated  revenues  and  expendi- 
tures for  the  fiscal  years  of  191 7  and  1918,  showing  the 
balance  at  the  end  of  each  fiscal  period. 

2.  A  balance  sheet  of  the  current  assets  and  liabili- 
ties of  the  state. 

3.  A  statement  of  the  condition  of  state  debt  and 
sinking  funds. 

4.  A  statement  of  the  estimated  revenues  for  the  pe- 
riod to  be  financed,  i.e.,  the  fiscal  years  of  1919  and  1920. 

5.  A  general  summary  to  the  financial  requirements 
and  estimates  of  the  state's  financial  condition  at  the  end 
of  each  of  the  years  to  be  financed. 

6.  A  statement  from  the  governor  relative  to  a  pos- 
sible decrease  of  the  state  tax  rates. 

7.  A  general  summary  of  all  the  estimates  for  appro- 
priations. 

8.  A  complete  and  itemized  tabulation  of  all  estimates 
with  the  governor's  allowances. 

An  appendix  to  the  budget  contained  certain  important 
statistics  relating  to  the  expenditures,  receipts,  per  capita 


312      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

cost,   etc.,  of   more  than  one  hundred  institutions  and 
agencies  receiving  state  aid. 

The  estimates  were  classified  in  the  budget  by  organi- 
zation units,  and,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
budget  amendment,  were  grouped  under  two  heads:  I, 
"  Governmental  appropriations,"  and  II,  "  General  appro- 
priations." Included  under  Part  I  were  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judiciary  departments,  the  various  state 
departments,  boards  and  commissions,  the  public  schools, 
and  the  public  debt.  Under  Part  II  were  grouped  the 
remaining  estimates,  namely :  those  of  state  institutions, 
state-aided  institutions,  and  for  miscellaneous  purposes. 


Form  and  Provisions  of  Budget  Bill 

The  appropriations  carried  in  the  budget  bill  were  ar- 
ranged by  organization  units,  following  the  arrangement 
in  the  budget.  The  appropriations  to  the  various  organ- 
ization units  were  made  in  lump  sums  for  salaries  and 
wages  and  for  expenses  with  itemized  schedules  follow- 
ing each  sum  so  appropriated  whenever  more  than  one 
item  was  included.  These  schedules  "  represent  the  initial 
plan  of  distribution  and  apportionment  of  the  appropria- 
tions." Each  lump-sum  appropriation  must  be  paid  out 
in  accordance  with  the  schedule  which  relates  to  it,  unless 
and  until  such  schedule  is  amended.  In  order  to  give 
flexibility  to  the  expenditure  of  the  appropriations  and 
to  provide,  at  the  same  time,  for  executive  control  over 
spending  agencies,  the  governor  is  empowered  to  author- 
ize transfers  between  items  within  any  schedule,  thus 
amending  the  schedule.  Whenever  a  schedule  is  amended 
by  the  governor  it  must  be  transmitted  with  his  ap- 
proval to  the  comptroller,  who  thereafter  is  required  to 
pay  out  the  appropriation,  or  whatever  balance  may  re- 
main, in  accordance  with  the  amended  schedule.  All 
transfers  and  changes  in  the  schedules  of  the  original 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      313 

budget  bill  made  by  the  governor  must  be  reported  by  him 
to  the  next  session  of  the  legislature. 


Standing  Committee  Consideration  of  Budget  Unsatis- 
factory 

While  the  budget  amendment  places  certain  definite 
limitations  upon  the  action  of  the  legislature  when  con- 
sidering the  budget,  it  prescribes  no  definite  procedure. 
The  budget  and  budget  bill,  as  has  been  stated,  were  sub- 
mitted simultaneously  in  each  house  of  the  legislature  on 
January  29th,  and  were  immediately  referred  to  the 
finance  committee  of  the  Senate  and  to  the  ways  and 
means  committee  of  the  House.  The  governor  did  not 
make  any  oral  statement  to  the  legislature  at  the  time  of 
presenting  the  budget.  It  is  stated  that  neither  commit- 
tee, especially  the  House  committee,  gave  sufficient  time 
to  the  consideration  of  the  budget  to  act  upon  it  properly 
and  intelligently.  The  work  that  had  taken  the  governor 
three  months  for  preparation,  after  an  intimate  acquaint- 
ance of  four  years  with  the  state's  business,  the  ways  and 
means  committee  passed  upon  in  practically  two  or  three 
sittings,  each  of  very  short  duration.  The  Senate  com- 
mittee, however,  considered  the  budget  somewhat  more 
seriously.  No  public  hearings  were  held  by  either  com- 
mittee on  the  budget  bill,  since  it  was  not  necessary,  as 
formerly,  for  the  spending  agencies  to  appear  before  the 
committee  urging  their  requests  for  appropriations.  The 
only  matter  that  now  concerned  the  state  agencies  was  to 
see  that  the  allowances  made  to  them  by  the  governor 
were  not  reduced  or  eliminated  by  the  action  of  the  com- 
mittees or  the  legislature.  The  Senate  finance  commit- 
tee, however,  found  occasion  to  call  before  it  a  few  of  the 
department  heads,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  some  of 
the  budget  allowances,  and  in  one  or  two  instances  the 
committee  desired  to  find  out  if  subordinates  gave  full 


314      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

time  to  state  work.     The  governor  also  explained  to  the 
finance  committee  certain  of  the  appropriations. 

Legislative  Action  on  the  Budget  Bill 

On  March  20th,  the  governor  submitted  to  the  Senate 
his  first  supplemental  budget,  which,  under  the  provisions 
of  the  budget  amendment,  became  part  of  the  budget  bill 
as  amendments  or  supplements  to  the  appropriations  and 
items  contained  in  it.  On  March  22d  the  finance  commit- 
tee reported  the  budget  bill  and  supplement  favorably  to 
the  Senate.  A  motion  to  defer  action  on  the  bill  was 
voted  down,  and  the  committee's  favorable  report  was 
adopted.  Immediately  the  president  of  the  Senate  sub- 
mitted a  second  supplement  to  the  budget  by  the  governor, 
who  asked  that  it  might  also  be  made  a  part  of  the  budget 
bill.  Upon  a  motion  the  additional  supplement  was  ac- 
cepted. The  budget  bill  was  then  read  the  second  time 
and  ordered  to  be  printed  after  a  third  reading.  It  passed 
the  Senate  without  amendment  on  March  26th,  and  was 
sent  to  the  House,  where  it  had  its  first  reading  on  March 
27th.  It  was  reported  out  of  the  House  committee  on 
March  28th  and  read  a  second  time.  Among  the  several 
amendments  proposed  in  the  House,  two  were  adopted, 
one  eliminating  the  salary  of  the  assistant  chairman  of 
the  roads  commission,  amounting  to  $2,000  (the  governor 
having  reduced  it  from  $3,000  by  his  first  supplemental 
budget),  and  the  other  striking  out  an  appropriation  for 
the  director  of  farm  products  amounting  to  $12,000.  The 
elimination  of  the  latter  item  would  have  followed  as  a 
matter  of  course,  since  the  bill  creating  the  office  had 
been  defeated  in  the  legislature,  so  that  only  $2,000  was 
really  eliminated  from  the  governor's  budget  for  each  of 
the  two  years.  When  this  amount  is  compared  with  the 
total  budget  of  each  year,  aggregating  about  $12,000,000, 
the  House,  although  the  majority  was  politically  opposed 
to  the  governor,  may  nevertheless  be  regarded  as  approv- 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      315 

ing  the  governor's  budget  practically  as  he  submitted  it. 
The  rules  of  the  House  were  suspended  and  the  budget  bill 
was  passed  the  same  day  it  was  amended.  The  Senate, 
being  of  the  same  political  faith  as  the  governor,  refused 
to  accede  to  the  amendments  of  the  House,  and  a  confer- 
ence committee  was  appointed.  The  first  conference  com- 
mittee disagreed  and  another  was  appointed;  this  com- 
mittee made  its  report  on  March  30th,  when  the  Senate 
concurred  in  the  amendments  of  the  House  and  finally 
passed  the  budget  bill  as  thus  amended.  Since  the  gov- 
ernor had  the  assurance  that  the  budget  bill  would  be 
passed  within  three  legislative  days  before  the  end  of  the 
session  (April  1st),  he  did  not  issue  a  proclamation  ex- 
tending the  session,  as  provided  for  in  the  budget  amend- 
ment. 


No  Supplementary  Appropriation  Bills  Enacted 

During  the  191 6  session  of  the  legislature  between 
thirty-five  and  forty  bills,  appropriating  money  out  of  the 
state  treasury,  were  enacted  into  law.  The  legislature 
of  1918,  acting  under  the  provisions  of  the  budget  amend- 
ment, passed  only  seven  bills  making  appropriations  out 
of  the  state  treasury,  two  of  which  were  duplicates  of 
two  others  and  were  for  that  reason  vetoed  by  the  gov- 
ernor. Another  was  also  vetoed,  and  still  another  was 
reduced  by  half.  The  four  bills  approved  by  the  gov- 
ernor carried  appropriations  totaling  $19,000.  The  seven 
appropriation  bills  which  were  passed  by  the  legislature 
appropriated  unexpended  funds  then  in  the  state  treasury 
and,  upon  a  ruling  of  the  attorney  general,  were  not  in 
conflict  with  the  budget  amendment  which  requires  such 
bills  to  make  provisions  for  their  own  revenue,  since  the 
budget  bill  which  was  passed  in  compliance  with  the 
budget  amendment  did  not  go  into  effect  until  October  1, 
1918.     There  was  not,  therefore,  a  single  supplementary 


316      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

appropriation  bill  passed  for  the  fiscal  years  19 19  and 
1920. 

The  Serious  Weaknesses  of  the  Maryland  System 

The  serious  weaknesses  of  the  Maryland  budget  sys- 
tem seem  to  be  the  unfortunate  position  of  the  governor 
with  respect  to  the  administrative  departments  and  the 
lack  of  adequate  procedure  for  legislative  consideration 
of  the  budget.  There  was  little  review  and  criticism  of 
the  governor's  financial  program.  Most  of  the  review 
work  was  done  by  the  two  committees,  which  worked  sep- 
arately and  did  not  cooperate  at  any  time  because  of  po- 
litical hostility.  The  intent  of  the  budget  amendment 
seems  to  be  that  more  consideration  should  be  given  to 
the  budget  upon  the  floors  of  the  legislature  than  it  actu- 
ally received  in  19 18.  While  it  is  true  that  every  member 
of  the  legislature  was  supplied  with  a  copy  of  the  gov- 
ernor's budget,  and  knew  at  once  from  the  printed  journal 
of  each  house  just  what  supplements  the  governor  had 
made,  still  it  is  not  probable  that  many  of  the  members 
scrutinized  the  budget  very  closely.  Practically  no  at- 
tention was  given  by  the  legislature  to  the  subject  of 
revenues. 

The  fact  cannot  be  too  much  emphasized  that  the  gov- 
ernor of  Maryland  is  not  free  and  unhampered  in  making 
his  budget  recommendations  to  the  legislature,  since  au- 
thority and  responsibility  for  a  large  part  of  the  executive 
and  administrative  acts  are  not  centered  in  him.  As  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  there  are  several  administrative 
agencies  of  the  state  which  are  independent  of  the  gov- 
ernor by  reason  of  the  methods  by  which  they  obtain  of- 
fice, some  being  elective  and  others  being  appointive  by 
the  legislature.  Furthermore,  there  are  entirely  too  many 
separate  administrative  agencies  for  the  governor  to  keep 
a  close  watch  upon  all  expenditures  without  the  interposi- 
tion of  coordinating  heads  responsible  to  the  governor 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      317 

and  an  executive  staff  for  the  current  review  and  revision 
of  requisitions  for  funds  under  a  system  of  executive  con- 
trol which  would  bring  matters  of  administrative  policy 
to  the  executive  attention,  before  it  was  too  late  to  correct 
abuses  or  misuses  of  discretion.  The  consolidation  of 
the  administrative  agencies  of  Maryland  into  a  few  inte- 
grated departments  directly  under  the  governor  is  needed 
in  order  to  fix  executive  responsibility  before  an  executive 
budget  can  be  made  an  effective  part  of  the  government. 

NEW    JERSEY 

A  Short  Ballot  Which  Does  Not  Centralize  Executive 
Responsibility 

Although  New  Jersey  has  a  short  ballot,  the  governor 
being  the  only  elective  administrative  officer  (term,  three 
years),  responsibility  for  administration  is  not  centered 
in  the  chief  executive  because  of  the  numerous  independ- 
ent administrative  officers,  boards,  and  agencies  over 
which  the  governor  exercises  only  nominal  control. 

Beginning  in  191 5,  the  legislature  enacted  several  laws 
providing  for  the  consolidation  into  integrated  depart- 
ments of  a  number  of  independent  administrative  agen- 
cies. The  191 5  legislature,  following  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  economy  and  efficiency  commission  of  19 12, 
enacted  laws  establishing  the  departments  of  conserva- 
tion and  development,  commerce  and  navigation,  taxes 
and  assessments,  and  shell  fisheries.  The  19 16  legisla- 
ture provided  for  the  reorganization  of  the  departments 
of  labor  and  agriculture.  More  than  twenty  separate  de- 
partments, bureaus,  and  agencies  were  merged  into  these 
six  consolidated  departments.  The  19 18  legislature 
enacted  a  law  creating  a  department  of  charities  and  cor- 
rections, which  exercises  control  over  the  charitable,  cor- 
rectional, reformatory,  and  penal  institutions  of  the  state. 
All  of  these  departments,  except  the  department  of  labor, 


31 8       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

are  administered  by  boards,  the  members  of  which  are 
appointed  by  the  governor,  with  the  approval  of  the  Sen- 
ate, for  overlapping  terms,  in  most  cases  very  much  longer 
than  the  term  of  the  governor.  For  example,  the  state 
board  of  charities  and  corrections  is  composed  of  eight 
members  appointed  for  overlapping  terms  of  eight  years, 
the  governor  being  an  ex  officio  member  of  the  board. 
The  commissioner,  or  chief  executive  officer,  is  appointed 
by  this  board  and  serves  at  its  pleasure. 

Even  under  the  partial  consolidation  which  has  been 
effected  more  than  fifty  independent  administrative  offi- 
cers and  agencies  still  remain.  A  few  of  these,  notably 
the  state  treasurer  and  state  comptroller,  are  appointed  by 
the  two  houses  of  the  legislature  in  joint  session.  The 
majority,  however,  are  appointed  by  the  governor  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  A  few  minor  offi- 
cers and  boards  are  appointed  by  the  governor  without 
let  or  hindrance.  Hence  it  may  be  seen  that  the  legisla- 
ture, particularly  the  Senate,  shares  with  the  governor  the 
responsibility  of  administration.    * 

In  financial  administration  and  budget  making  the  gov- 
ernor does  not  act  alone.  Such  matters  come  before  an  ex 
officio  board  —  the  state  house  commission,  composed  of 
the  governor,  the  state  comptroller,  and  the  state  treasurer 
(the  last  two  being  appointed  by  the  legislature).  This 
commission  exercises  control  over  the  various  funds  of 
the  state,  such  as  the  revolving  and  supplemental  fund. 
It  also  has  control  over  the  transfer  of  items  within  the 
appropriations  granted  to  organization  units  by  the  legis- 
lature. The  budget  recommendations  of  the  governor  to 
the  legislature  are  in  reality  the  recommendations  of  this 
board  and  the  two  budget  assistants. 

The  Edge  Budget  Law  —  Its  Provisions 

As  early  as  1895  the  New  Jersey  legislature  took  steps 
to  improve  its  appropriation  procedure  by  providing  that 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      319 

no  money  should  be  paid  out  of  the  state  treasury  unless 
appropriated  by  the  annual  appropriation  act,  but  the 
initiative  was  allowed  to  remain  with  the  joint  appropria- 
tion committee.  In  1907  and  1914,  measures  were  en- 
acted which  were  designed  to  give  the  comptroller  better 
control  over  the  receipts  and  disbursements  of  the  state. 
However,  in  191 5,  the  comptroller  made  a  recommendation 
in  favor  of  the  establishment  of  a  budget  board.  At  the 
1916  session  of  the  legislature  a  bill  was  introduced  to 
create  a  state  board  of  estimate  to  consist  of  the  gov- 
ernor as  chairman,  the  comptroller  as  secretary,  the  state 
treasurer,  and  two  members  to  be  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor for  overlapping  terms  of  six  years.  The  weight  of 
opinion  in  the  legislature,  however,  favored  placing  upon 
the  governor  the  responsibility  for  the  formulation  of  a 
financial  plan  to  be  submitted  to  the  legislature.  Support 
was  therefore  given  to  another  bill,  sponsored  by  Senator 
Edge,  which  became  a  law.  This  law,  Chap.  15,  Laws 
of  1916,  provides  for  the  following  procedure: 

1.  The  estimates  are  prepared  by  all  spending  agencies 
on  prescribed  blanks,  giving  itemized  requests  and  trial 
balance,  and  presented  to  the  governor  on  October  15th. 
(As  amended  by  Chaps.  221  and  144,  Laws  of  1918.) 

2.  Rules  1-8  appended  to  law,  contain  a  budget  classi- 
fication and  prescribe  the  form  of  the  estimate  sheets  in 
detail. 

3.  Each  estimate  must  be  sworn  to  by  the  administra- 
tive head  or  other  designated  officer  of  spending  agency 
making  same. 

4.  The  estimated  revenues  are  furnished  the  governor 
by  the  comptroller  and  treasurer  jointly. 

5.  The  governor  must  review  all  estimates  and  deter- 
mine the  necessity  of  appropriations.  He  may  conduct 
hearings,  summon  witnesses,  and  make  investigations. 
For  this  purpose  he  is  allowed  to  name  two  special  assist- 
ants and  to  call  upon  administrative  officers. 


320      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

6.  The  governor  is  required  to  prepare  a  summary  of 
the  estimates  and  make  recommendations  thereon,  the  to- 
tal of  which  must  not  exceed  the  anticipated  revenues  of 
the  state. 

7.  The  budget  must  be  in  the  form  of  a  separate  mes- 
sage to  the  legislature,  containing  a  summary  of  the 
estimates  and  reports  with  recommendations  thereon. 
The  mandate  of  the  law  is  that  the  budget  must  be  in  a 
form  to  be  easily  understood. 

8.  The  governor  is  required  to  submit  his  budget  to 
the  legislature  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  January. 

9.  The  law  prescribes  that  the  budget  shall  be  given 
such  publicity  as  is  deemed  wise. 

10.  The  governor  may  transmit  special  messages  to 
the  legislature  requesting  additional  appropriations  after 
the  budget  has  been  submitted. 

11.  It  is  the  evident  intent  of  the  budget  law  that  there 
shall  be  no  supplemental,  deficiency,  or  incidental  bills. 

12.  No  money  may  be  drawn  from  the  state  treasury 
except  by  the  general  appropriation  act. 

13.  Transfers  within  the  appropriation  of  any  organi- 
zation unit  may  be  secured  by  application  to  the  state 
house  commission,  composed  of  the  governor,  comptrol- 
ler, and  treasurer.  (As  amended  by  Chap.  290,  Laws  of 
1918.) 

14.  The  governor  has  the  power  to  investigate  the 
revenues  and  income  of  spending  agencies,  which  are  not 
derived  directly  from  the  state  treasury. 

Form  and  Preparation  of  Estimates 

The  estimate  blanks  employed  in  preparation  of  the 
first  budget  ( 1917)  were  modeled  directly  after  the  forms 
suggested  in  the  rules  appended  to  the  budget  law.  These 
blanks  were  found  in  practice  to  be  indefinite  and  confus- 
ing in  their  classification ;  they  did  not  provide  for  the  re- 
porting of  sufficient  information,  and  they  did  not  at- 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      321 

tempt  to  coordinate  the  budget  with  the  work  of  the  civil 
service  commission  and  the  central  purchasing  office.  In 
the  preparation  of  the  budgets  for  1918  and  1919  the  es- 
timate blanks  previously  used  were  supplemented  by  other 
forms  calling  for  a  detailed  estimate  of  farm,  shop,  and 
industrial  activities,  a  complete  summary  of  requests  for 
appropriations  to  accompany  the  estimates  of  schools, 
and  a  similar  summary  to  accompany  the  estimates  of 
institutions.  The  institutions  were  required  to  give  their 
per  capita  cost  for  each  division  of  budget  classification. 
The  budget  classification  is  prescribed  in  the  law  as  fol- 
lows: (1)  maintenance  (other  than  salaries);  (2)  sal- 
aries; (3)  repairs  and  replacements;  (4)  miscellaneous, 
and  ( 5 )  new  buildings.  It  has  been  used  so  far  without 
modification. 

The  estimate  forms  were  prepared  by  the  continuing 
budget  assistant  and  sent  out  to  the  spending  agencies 
about  September  30th. 

Under  the  budget  law,  as  amended  in  191 8,  the  esti- 
mates are  to  be  prepared  and  submitted  to  the  governor 
by  October  15th.  It  is  reported  that  most  of  the  esti- 
mates came  in  on  time  with  one  exception.  The  depart- 
ment of  charities  and  correction  (controlling  all  char- 
itable and  penal  institutions  of  the  state)  did  not  get  its 
estimates  prepared  and  submitted  until  about  December 
25th.  This  delay  was  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  de- 
partment was  newly  organized,  having  been  created  by  a 
law  passed  in  191 8.  The  institutions  (charitable  and 
penal)  prepared  their  estimates  and  submitted  them  to 
the  department  of  charities  and  correction,  which  revised 
them  before  submitting  them  to  the  governor. 

Two  Budget  Assistants 

The  budget  staff  of  the  governor  was  composed  of  two 
budget  assistants,  one  clerk,  and  one  stenographer.  One 
budget  assistant  worked  about   four  months,  beginning 


322      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

about  October  15th.  He  is  by  profession  an  accountant, 
with  business  connections  in  New  York  City.  The  other 
budget  assistant  worked  the  year  around  at  an  annual 
salary  of  $2,500.  Formerly  he  was  in  the  newspaper 
business.  Both  assistants  were  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor. The  sum  of  $10,000  is  appropriated  to  carry  on 
the  expenses  of  budget  making.  The  continuing  budget 
assistant  has  an  office  in  the  statehouse,  and  wants  for 
next  year  a  statistical  clerk  attached  to  his  office,  whose 
duty  it  will  be  to  compile  certain  budget  data  during  the 
year.  At  the  present  time  he  receives  bi-monthly  a  copy 
of  all  pay  rolls  as  filed  with  the  civil  service  commission 
and  the  comptroller. 

The  "  Budget  Commission  " 

While  New  Jersey's  device  is  styled  an  executive  budget 
and  was  so  considered  when  the  act  was  passed ;  under  a 
section  of  the  budget  law  which  permitted  the  governor  to 
name  a  permanent  budget  committee,  he  has  appointed  a 
body  which  is  styled  the  "  Budget  Commission."  It  is 
composed  of  the  state  house  commission  {i.e.,  governor, 
state  treasurer,  and  state  comptroller)  and  the  two  budget 
assistants.  While  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  reading 
of  the  budget  law  that  the  governor  is  solely  responsible 
for  the  recommendations  for  appropriations  to  the  legis- 
lature, as  a  matter  of  practice  two  members  of  the  com- 
mission are  not  his  agents  and  the  judgment  of  all  five  of 
the  members  of  the  budget  commission  enter  into  the 
recommendations  as  finally  submitted  to  the  legislature. 
The  last  year  of  his  official  term,  it  is  said,  Governor  Edge 
was  inclined  to  trust  largely  to  the  judgment  of  his  budget 
assistants.  He  was  running  for  United  States  senator, 
and  was  therefore  busy  with  his  campaign  and  other 
duties.  Under  such  circumstances  it  may  be  fairly  ques- 
tioned whether  the  executive  budget  idea  was  not  aban- 
doned by  its  sponsor. 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      323 

Review  and  Revision  of  Estimates 

From  October  15th  to  about  November  20th  the  two 
budget  assistants  examined  the  estimates  as  filed  and  in- 
vestigated many  of  the  items  by  visits  to  the  departments 
or  institutions.  In  fact,  it  is  reported  that  during  this  pe- 
riod they  visited  all  of  the  state  institutions  and  looked 
into  the  need  of  their  requests.  The  budget  assistants 
were  permitted  to  call  upon  any  department  for  assist- 
ance. Following  these  investigations,  the  budget  assist- 
ants made  tentative  recommendations  for  appropriations 
to  the  governor.  Upon  receipt  of  the  tentative  recom- 
mendations of  the  budget  assistants  the  governor  began 
consideration  of  the  estimates.  The  budget  assistants 
had  arranged  all  budget  data  under  organization  units  and 
presented  them  to  the  governor  at  the  time  of  making 
tentative  recommendations. 

Public  Hearings 

The  governor  called  public  hearings,  beginning  on  No- 
vember 20th,  for  a  period  of  about  one  month.  During 
this  time  most  of  the  state  spending  agencies  appeared 
before  him  as  he  sat  with  other  members  of  the  budget 
commission.  The  prospective  members  of  the  joint  ap- 
propriation committee  of  the  19 19  legislature  were  in- 
vited to  sit  at  these  hearings.  Two  or  three  of  the  nine 
prospective  members  attended  several  of  the  hearings. 
It  is  said  that  the  policy  will  be  to  invite  the  governor- 
elect  to  sit  at  these  hearings  preceding  a  change  of  admin- 
istration. Just  how  far  his  suggestions  will  be  considered 
by  the  retiring  governor  in  making  recommendations  is  a 
question. 

The  Budget  Message 

A  summary  of  the  estimates,  together  with  the  gov- 
ernor's recommendations,  was  published  in  the  form  of  a 


324      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

budget  message  to  the  legislature  and  was  transmitted  to 
it  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  January,  1919.  This  docu- 
ment of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  pages  contains  the 
following : 

(1)  A  brief  and  general  budget   statement  by  the 

governor. 

(2)  A  statement  of  the  actual  and  estimated  condi- 

tion of  the  state  treasury  at  the  ends  of  the  last 
fiscal  year,  the  current  year,  and  the  year  to  be 
financed  prepared  by  the  comptroller  and  treas- 
urer jointly. 

(3)  A  summary  of  proposed  appropriations  by  or- 

ganization units  under  functional  grouping. 

(4)  Detailed  supporting  schedules. 

Each  member  of  the  legislature  was  furnished  a  copy  of 
this  message,  and  it  was  referred  to  the  joint  appropria- 
tion committee. 

The  Joint  Appropriation  Committee  and  Its  Work 

The  joint  appropriation  committee  of  1919  was  organ- 
ized immediately  after  the  fight  over  the  choice  of  a 
Speaker  for  the  House  ended.  The  committee  is  com- 
posed of  nine  members  —  four  from  the  Senate  and  five 
from  the  House.  The  chairman  of  the  joint  committee  is 
always  a  senator  —  this  year  it  was  Senator  Whitney,  who 
had  for  three  years  been  a  member  of  the  appropriation 
committee.  Usually  there  is  only  one  member  from  each 
house  on  the  committee  representing  the  minority  party  — 
this  time  the  Democratic  party. 

At  the  time  the  estimates  were  made  up  by  the  spending 
agencies  enough  copies  were  made  to  furnish  each  of  the 
nine  members  of  the  committee  with  a  copy.  With  these 
copies  of  the  estimates  and  the  governor's  recommenda- 
tions in  his  budget  message  the  committee  began  its  work. 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      325 

In  a  number  of  cases  new  estimates  were  prepared  by  the 
spending  agencies  for  presentation  to  the  committee  or 
additional  appropriations  other  than  those  recommended 
by  the  governor  were  requested  by  letter.  In  its  consid- 
eration of  the  requests  this  year  the  committee  permitted 
the  two  budget  assistants  to  sit  in  at  the  hearings  and  to 
accompany  it  on  its  visits  to  the  institutions. 

The  procedure  of  the  committee  was  practically  the 
same  as  that  of  previous  years.  Hearings  were  held, 
junkets  were  taken,  and  increases  were  made  in  the  gov- 
ernor's recommendations.  The  junkets  took  a  somewhat 
different  turn,  since  the  budget  assistants  accompanied  the 
committee  and  pointed  out  things  to  substantiate  their 
own  and  the  governor's  recommendations  for  appropria- 
tions. In  other  words,  it  was  an  attempt  to  justify  the 
governor's  stand  over  against  the  spending  agency's  re- 
quest in  some  instances.  One  day  a  week  during  Febru- 
ary and  part  of  March  was  set  aside  for  junkets  by  the 
committee.  All  the  state  institutions  were  visited.  Some- 
times as  high  as  three  or  four  were  visited  in  one  day, 
spending  an  hour  or  two  at  a  place.  In  order  to  jus- 
tify this  second  round  of  visits,  when  the  institutions  had 
been  visited  in  October  and  November  by  the  budget 
assistants,  one  of  the  governor's  budget  assistants  took 
the  position  that  it  was  considered  a  desirable  check  or 
verification  of  the  governor's  budget  recommendations. 

The  joint  appropriation  committee  spent  the  latter  half 
of  March  hearing  again  the  needs  of  the  various  spending 
agencies  as  the  governor  and  the  other  members  of  the 
budget  commission  had  done  during  the  preceding  No- 
vember and  December.  The  committee  then  set  to  work 
with  the  aid  of  one  or  two  assistants  to  draft  the  general 
appropriation  bill,  which  was  finished  and  ready  for  in- 
troduction on  April  8th. 


326      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Legislative  Action  on  the  General  Appropriation  Bill 

The  general  appropriation  bill  was  introduced  into  the 
Senate  by  Senator  Whitney,  following  the  usual  proce- 
dure, on  April  8th  (S.  B.  No.  244).  It  was  immediately 
referred  to  the  committee  on  appropriations  from  whence 
it  had  come.  An  "  official  copy  reprint  "  was  made  and 
introduced  in  the  Senate  on  April  9th.  This  likewise 
went  to  the  committee  on  appropriations.  On  April  10th 
Senator  Whitney,  chairman  of  the  committee  on  appro- 
priations, reported  the  appropriation  bill  out.  It  was 
taken  up,  read  a  second  time  and  ordered  to  be  printed. 
On  April  nth  it  was  taken  up  and  read  a  third  time  and 
passed  on  a  vote  of  fifteen  for  and  none  against.  There 
was  little  discussion  of  the  bill  and  no  amendments  of- 
fered. Immediately  after  its  passage  the  president  of  the 
Senate  directed  the  secretary  to  carry  the  bill  to  the  House 
and  to  inform  that  body  that  the  Senate  had  passed  it, 
and  to  request  concurrence.  The  House  received  this 
message  from  the  Senate  and  after  adoption  referred  it 
to  the  committee  on  appropriations.  On  the  same  day 
(April  nth)  Mr.  Glover,  chairman  of  the  House  com- 
mittee on  appropriations,  reported  the  bill  favorably  with- 
out amendment  to  the  House.  It  was  immediately  taken 
up  and  read  a  second  time,  whereupon  Mr.  Kellam  moved 
that  the  rules  be  suspended  and  the  bill  be  taken  up  for  a 
third  reading  and  final  passage.  The  motion  carried. 
Mr.  De  Voe  then  offered  an  amendment  providing  for  the 
appropriation  of  $500,000  for  the  purchase  of  the  rights 
of  way  of  the  New  Jersey  Intercostal  Ship  Canal.  This 
amendment  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  twenty-four  to  thirty- 
three.  The  appropriation  bill  was  then  taken  up  on  mo- 
tion of  Mr.  Kellam  under  suspended  rules  and  passed  by 
a  vote  of  fifty-eight  in  the  affirmative  and  none  in  the  neg- 
ative. There  was  little  discussion  in  the  House,  April 
nth  being  the  last  day  of  the  session.  Thus  it  appears 
that  the  general  appropriation  bill  was  introduced  in  the 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      327 

Senate  three  days  before  the  end  of  the  session,  and  passed 
both  the  Senate  and  House  on  the  last  day  of  the  session. 

Effect  of  the  Governor's  Veto 

The  general  appropriation  bill  was  approved  by  Gov- 
ernor Edge  on  April  17th,  and  became  Chapter  261  of 
the  Laws  of  19 19.  At  the  time  of  approving  the  bill  the 
governor  vetoed  seventeen  items  amounting  to  $69,207. 
The  veto  message,  it  is  stated,  was  written  by  the  gover- 
nor's continuing  budget  assistant.  The  items  vetoed  were, 
in  most  instances,  additions  which  the  joint  appropriation 
committee  had  made  to  the  governor's  budget.  In  fact, 
very  few  reductions  were  made  by  this  committee  in  the 
budget  recommendations  as  submitted  by  the  governor  to 
the  legislature.  Numerous  increases  were  made  in  the 
items  of  the  personal  service  schedules,  many  of  which 
were  lumped  together  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  the 
governor  from  vetoing  the  items. 

Form  and  Proznsions  of  the  General  Appropriation  Act 

The  appropriations  in  the  general  appropriation  bill 
are  made  to  organization  units.  Each  unit  is  given  a 
number  to  be  used  in  setting  up  and  keeping  the  expendi- 
ture and  control  accounts.  The  items  of  appropriation 
under  the  organization  units  are  usually  lumped  together 
under  a  few  main  heads.  Only  in  a  few  cases  are  the  ap- 
propriations for  personal  service  itemized.  The  appro- 
priation act  gives  the  comptroller  the  power  to  interpret 
the  purpose  of  all  appropriations;  the  intention  being  to 
give  flexibility  to  the  expenditure  of  the  state's  money. 
Transfers  may  also  be  made  by  permission  of  the  state 
house  commission  between  the  items  of  appropriations 
granted  to  an  organization  unit. 

The  provision  of  the  budget  law  providing  for  trans- 
fers within  appropriations  of  any  organization  unit  by 
application  to  the  state  house  commission  does  not  seem 


328      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  be  working  with  the  greatest  degree  of  satisfaction. 
The  experience  of  the  last  two  years  has  shown  that  large 
numbers  of  transfers  were  requested  and  made  during 
the  closing  months  of  the  fiscal  year.  As  soon  as  the 
spending  agencies  found  there  was  going  to  be  a  balance 
in  some  items  of  their  appropriation  they  immediately  re- 
quested a  transfer  to  other  items,  usually  personal  serv- 
ice, so  they  could  expend  all  their  appropriations. 

The  general  appropriation  act  contains  all  of  the  appro- 
priations for  the  fiscal  year  beginning  July  1,  191 9,  and 
ending  June  30,  1920.  Hence,  it  seems  that  the  provision 
of  the  budget  law  prohibiting  the  passage  of  supplemental, 
deficiency,  or  incidental  bills  has  operated  effectively. 
The  general  appropriation  bill,  however,  carries  an  "  emer- 
gency fund  "  of  $10,000,  and  a  "  revolving  and  supplemen- 
tal fund  "  of  $250,000,  the  former  to  be  administered  by 
the  governor  for  contingent  purposes,  the  latter  to  be 
under  the  control  of  the  state  house  commission  and  to  be 
used  in  its  discretion  to  supplement  other  appropriations, 
to  meet  deficiencies,  and  to  supply  the  purchasing  depart- 
ment with  a  revolving  fund  for  the  purchase  of  supplies. 
In  this  way,  it  is  claimed,  the  passage  of  supplementary 
appropriation  bills  is  avoided  and  all  appropriations  are 
included  in  one  bill. 

Use  of  Civil  Service  and  Central  Purchasing  Records  in 
Budget  Making 

The  civil  service  commission  of  New  Jersey  is  attempt- 
ing gradually  to  classify  and  standardize  the  personal- 
service  end  of  the  budget.  An  attempt  was  made  in  pre- 
paring the  budget  for  1919-1920  to  apply  a  scale  of  in- 
creases to  the  lower  gnades  of  personal  service.  Both  the 
governor's  budget  officers  and  the  joint  appropriation 
committee  took  into  consideration  the  recommendations 
of  the  civil  service  commission  in  nearly  every  instance 
•with  reference  to  compensation  for  personal  service.     The 


Ohio,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey  Budget  Plans      329 

joint  appropriation  committee  in  many  cases  referred  the 
department  heads  to  the  civil  service  commission  for 
agreement  upon  salary  increases  before  passing  upon  their 
appropriation  requests.  This  plan  seems  to  have  given 
the  civil  service  commission  a  rather  definite  voice  in  the 
matter  of  compensation  control.  Such  cooperation  seems 
necessary  to  proper  budget  procedure. 

In  the  case  of  the  central  purchasing  office,  which  con- 
trols the  supply  end  of  the  budget  through  its  power  to 
purchase  all  supplies  for  the  state,  there  was  an  apparent 
lack  of  cooperation  with  the  budget-making  authorities. 
It  is  stated  that  the  purchasing  office  was  not  consulted  in 
the  preparation  of  the  estimates  for  supplies  by  any  of 
the  departments  or  institutions,  except  to  a  limited  extent 
by  the  department  of  charities  and  corrections.  Neither 
did  the  budget  commission  nor  the  budget  assistants  con- 
sult the  purchasing  agent  about  the  probable  prices  of 
supplies  for  the  coming  year  before  making  up  the  budget 
recommendations.  There  was  no  cooperation  between 
the  work  of  the  joint  appropriation  committee  and  the 
purchasing  office.  It  seems  that  the  data  of  the  purchas- 
ing office  with  respect  to  the  trend  of  prices  and  the  pros- 
pective needs  of  the  several  state  agencies  should  be  made 
use  of  in  the  preparation  of  the  budget. 

New  Jersey  Budget  a  Hybrid  Type 

The  New  Jersey  budget,  instead  of  being  an  executive 
budget,  is  in  reality  the  work  of  a  budget  commission, 
consisting  of  the  governor,  comptroller,  treasurer,  and 
the  two  budget  assistants.  Members  of  the  joint  appro- 
priation committee  of  the  previous  legislature  are  also 
permitted  to  sit  with  this  commission  and  to  make  recom- 
mendations with  reference  to  the  proposed  appropriations. 
The  budget  recommendations,  as  finally  submitted  by  the 
governor  to  the  legislature,  are  the  result  of  the  composite 
judgment  of  both  administrative  and  legislative  officers. 


33°      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

The  New  Jersey  budgetary  procedure  has  another  seri- 
ous defect  which  some  states,  as  Maryland  and  Nebraska, 
have  foreseen  and  made  provisions  against.  Under  the 
budget  law  the  retiring  governor  is  required  to  prepare 
the  budget  and  immediately  upon  submitting  it  to  the  leg- 
islature goes  out  of  office.  Thereupon  the  governor-elect 
comes  into  the  office  and  assumes  responsibility  for  budget 
recommendations  which  he  did  not  make. 

For  constitutional  reasons  the  budget  law  of  New  Jer- 
sey contains  no  provisions  governing  the  legislative  pro- 
cedure upon  the  governor's  proposals.  It  has  been  the 
practice  of  the  joint  appropriation  committee,  after  hav- 
ing received  the  governor's  budget,  to  do  whatever  inves- 
tigating it  deemed  necessary  and  then  proceed  to  draft 
the  general  appropriation  bill,  disregarding,  if  it  chose  to 
do  so,  the  governor's  recommendations.  As  a  result,  the 
legislature  has  followed  practically  the  same  procedure 
since  the  adoption  of  the  budget  law  as  it  did  before  in 
making  appropriations.  Governor  Edge,  the  author  of 
the  law,  admitted  this  to  be  a  serious  defect  in  the  law, 
but  one  which  could  not  be  avoided  without  constitutional 
change. 


PART  IV.  PROPOSED  NATIONAL  BUDGET 
LEGISLATION 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE  TAFT  COMMISSION 

Specific  Recommendations  of  Commission 

In  the  report  of  the  commission  on  economy  and  effi- 
ciency sent  to  Congress  June  27,  19 12,  by  the  President 
with  his  approval  the  commission  said : 

"  The  development  of  a  budget  necessarily  carries  with 
it  means  for  developing  a  definite  administrative  pro- 
gram; and  means  for  presenting  and  defending  it  before 
the  legislative  branch  of  the  Government  and  the  country." 

The  recommendations  of  the  commission  were  these : 

1.  That  the  President,  as  the  constitutional  head  of 

the  executive  branch  of  the  government,  shall 
each  year  submit  to  the  Congress,  not  later  than 
the  first  Monday  after  the  beginning  of  the 
regular  session,  a  budget.1 

2.  That  the  budget  so  submitted  shall  contain :  2 

(a)  A  budgetary  message  setting  forth  in  brief 

the  significance  of  the  proposals  to  which 
attention  is  invited. 

(b)  A  summary  financial  statement  setting  forth 

in  concise  form : 

(1)  the   financial   condition    (a   state- 

ment  of   resources   and  liabili- 
ties. ) 

(2)  the  condition  of  appropriations. 

1  The  Need  for  a  National  Budget  —  House  Document  854,  Sixty- 
second  Congress,  Second  session. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  3  and  4. 

333 


334      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

(3)  revenues  and  expenditures  for  the 

last  completed  fiscal  year,  and 

(4)  the  effect  of  past  financial  policy 

as  well  as  of  budget  proposals 
on  the  general-fund  surplus. 

(c)  A  summary  of  expenditures  classified  by  ob- 

jects (things  bought)  setting  forth  the 
contracting  and  purchasing  relations  of 
the  Government. 

(d)  Summaries  of  estimates  setting  forth: 

(1)  the  estimated  revenues  compared 

with  the  actual  revenues  for  a 
period  of  years. 

(2)  estimated  expenditures  (by  depart- 

ments) compared  with  actual 
expenditures  for  a  period  of 
years. 

(e)  A  summary  of  changes  in  law  setting  forth 

what  legislation  it  is  thought  should  be 
enacted  in  order  to  enable  the  administra- 
tion to  transact  business  with  greater  econ- 
omy  and   efficiency,   i.e.   changes   of   or- 
ganic law  which,  if  enacted,  would  affect 
appropriations  as  well  as  the  character  of 
work  to  be  done. 
3.    That  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  be  required  to 
to  submit  to  the  Congress  the  following  reports 
supporting  the  general  summaries  and  executive 
conclusions  or  recommendations  contained  in  the 
budget  as  follows : 

(a)  A  book  of  estimates  containing  the  support- 
ing details  to  the  summaries  of  estimates 
of  expenditures  contained  in  the  budget, 
(b)  A  consolidated  financial  report  containing  a 
detailed  statement  of  revenues  and  a  con- 
solidated statement  of  expenditures  by  de- 


Recommendations  of  the  Taft  Commission      335 

partments  and  establishments  for  the  last 
five  years,  with  such  explanatory  matter 
as  is  necessary  to  give  information  with 
respect  to  increases  and  decreases  in  reve- 
nues and  expenditures  or  other  relations 
to  which  it  is  thought  the  attention  of  the 
executive  and  legislative  branches  is  to  be 
given. 
That  the  head  of  each  department  and  independent 
establishment  should  be  required  to  submit  to  the 
secretary  of  the  treasury  and  to  Congress  annual 
reports  which,  among  other  things,  would  con- 
tain detailed  accounts  of  expenditures  so  classi- 
fied as  to  show  amounts  expended  by  appropria- 
tions, as  well  as  by  classes  of  work,  together  with 
the  amounts  of  increases  or  decreases  in  stores, 
equipment,  property,  etc.,  including  lands,  build- 
ings, and  other  improvements  as  well  as  such 
other  data  Or  operative  statistics  and  comment  in 
relation  thereto  as  may  be  necessary  to  show  re- 
sults obtained  and  the  economy  and  efficiency  of 
doing  government  work,  as  well  as  of  contracting 
and  purchasing. 
That  the  President  and  heads  of  departments  issue 
orders  which  will  require  such  accounts  to  be 
kept,  such  reports  to  be  made,  and  such  estimates 
to  be  prepared  as  will  enable  them  to  obtain  the 
information  needed  to  consider  the  different  con- 
ditions, relations,  and  results  above  enumerated 
before  the  estimates  are  submitted ;  that  the  Pres- 
ident recommend  to  the  Congress  the  enactment 
of  such  laws  as  will  enable  the  administration  to 
comply  with  the  requirements  of  Congress. 
That  the  President  recommend  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  Congress  such  changes  in  the  form  of 
appropriation  bills  as  will  enable  the  Government 


336      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  avail  itself  of  the  benefits  of  the  exercise  of 
discretion  on  the  part  of  the  executive  in  the 
transaction  of  current  business  in  order  that  the 
Government  may  do  work  and  accomplish  re- 
sults with  economy  and  efficiency  and  as  will 
definitely  fix  responsibility  for  failure  to  exercise 
such  discretion. 

Discussing  the  "  reasons  urged  for  the  submission  of  an 
annual  budget  with  special  message  by  the  President," 
the  commission  said  :  1 

"  The  adoption  of  the  recommendations  .  .  .  would 
have  for  its  effect  to  make  him  [the  President]  respon- 
sible for  knowing  what  the  estimates  contained  before 
submission;  to  make  him  aware  of  financial  conditions; 
to  bring  before  him  for  consideration  the  changes  desired. 
The  recommendation  that  the  secretary  of  the  treasury 
shall  prepare  the  book  of  estimates  containing  the  detail 
items  in  support  of  the  summaries  contained  in  the  budget 
would  have  for  its  effect  to  make  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury  not  only  the  official  editor  of  estimates  prepared 
in  departments  (which  he  now  is)  and  the  ministerial 
agent  for  their  transmission  to  the  Congress,  but  also  an 
effective  assistant  to  the  President  in  bringing  together 
the  data  and  in  presenting  them  in  such  form  that  their 
significance  can  be  readily  understood  and  considered, 
thereby  enabling  the  President  and  his  cabinet  to  act  intel- 
ligently. To  this  end  there  would  be  worked  out  as  a 
result  of  conference,  and  stated  in  summary  form,  a  defi- 
nite administrative  program  to  be  presented  by  the  Presi- 
dent as  the  head  of  the  administration  in  the  consideration 
of  which  each  member  of  the  cabinet  would  arrange  the 
details  of  his  estimates  in  such  manner  as  to  support  this 
program.  .  .  . 

"  In  other  words,  it  is  assumed  that  the  President  as  the 

1  Ibid.,  p.  144. 


Recommendations  of  the  Taft  Commission      337 

one  officer  of  government  who  represents  the  people  as  a 
whole  is  in  a  better  position  to  lay  before  the  Congress 
and  to  state  to  the  people  what  the  Government  is  doing 
and  what  it  proposes  to  do ;  that  the  President,  under  the 
powers  given  to  him  by  the  Constitution,  is  in  a  better 
position  than  any  one  else  to  dramatize  the  work  of  the 
government  —  to  so  impress  this  upon  the  attention  of  the 
people,  through  the  public  press,  by  means  of  a  budgetary 
message  as  to  arouse  discussion  and  elicit  comment  such 
as  will  keep  Congress  as  well  as  the  administration  in  touch 
with  public  opinion  when  deciding  whether  or  not  the 
proposals  are  such  as  will  best  meet  welfare  demands." 

Submission  of  Budget  by  President  Taft 

Not  only  were  these  recommendations  commended  to 
the  favorable  attention  of  Congress  in  a  special  message 
asking  for  its  cooperation,  in  a  revision  of  laws  and  prac- 
tices to  make  their  adoption  practicable,  but  the  thought 
was  further  enlarged  upon  in  a  subsequent  message  sub- 
mitting a  budget  to  the  next  regular  session. 

"  The  recommendation  of  such  measures  as  may  be 
thought  to  be  necessary  and  expedient  and  requests  for 
support,  in  the  form  of  estimates  for  further  expendi- 
tures," the  President  said,  "  should  be  premised  on  a 
knowledge  of  service  needs.  The  needs  of  the  service  can 
only  be  known  to  those  who  are  in  charge  of  administra- 
tive detail.  Representation  of  what  has  been  done  as  well 
as  what  should  be  undertaken  in  the  future  must  come 
from  those  who  are  acquainted  with  technical  require- 
ments. A  sense  of  proportion,  however,  can  come  only 
from  those  who  must  assume  responsibility  for  the  ad- 
ministration as  a  whole.   .  .  . 

"  The  advantage  to  the  Congress  of  having  placed  before 
it  a  definite  statement  and  proposal,  one  which  is  submit- 
ted by  the  responsible  head  of  the  administration,  must 
also  be  apparent.     Such  a  statement  will  greatly  facilitate 


338      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  adoption  of  a  procedure  whereby  the  deliberative 
branch  of  the  Government  may  determine  the  gross 
amount  to  be  appropriated  in  advance  of  decision  as  to 
what  amount  shall  be  allowed  for  each  detail  of  the  Gov- 
ernment's business,  rather  than  leave  the  relations  of  in- 
come and  outgo  to  be  computed  after  the  action  has  been 
taken  on  the  many  matters  which  are  brought  before  the 
Congress  for  determination. 

"  Size  and  complexity  of  the  problem  make  it  necessary 
for  officers  to  have  the  advantage  of  seeing  the  business  of 
the  Government  in  perspective.  But  judgment  with  re- 
spect to  the  requirements  of  particular  services  requires 
that  exact  information  be  made  available  for  the  consid- 
eration of  detail.  This  budget  is  submitted,  therefore, 
not  only  as  an  instrument  through  which  a  perspective 
may  be  gained,  but  as  an  index  through  which  members  of 
Congress  and  the  public  may  obtain  ready  references  to 
supporting  reports  and  detailed  records  of  account. 

"  The  need  for  such  an  index  through  which  exact  in- 
formation may  be  obtained  as  a  basis  for  judgment  about 
problems  of  public  business  is  evident  to  one  familiar  with 
the  governmental  problems. 

"  The  highly  complex  and  technical  character  of  ques- 
tions that  must  be  decided  by  executive  heads  of  depart- 
ments is  suggested  by  the  complexity  of  departmental  or- 
ganization. In  the  department  of  the  navy,  for  example, 
there  exist  at  present  thirty-four  navy  yards  and  stations, 
thirty-one  naval  coaling  plants,  forty-three  naval  wire- 
less stations,  twelve  naval  magazines,  fourteen  purchasing, 
pay,  and  disbursing  offices,  nine  inspection  districts,  six- 
teen hydrographic  offices,  twenty  hospitals,  twenty  dispen- 
saries, fourteen  naval  schools,  three  schools  for  the  marine 
corps,  seven  naval  medical  schools,  four  naval  training 
stations,  thirteen  target  ranges  (naval),  one  target  range 
and  permanent  camp  of  instruction  for  the  marine  corps, 
three  medical  supply  depots,  thirteen  recruiting  stations, 


Recommendations  of  the  Taft  Commission      339 

forty-eight  marine  posts  and  stations,  and  a  naval  militia, 
besides  the  fleet,  which  is  the  actual  fighting  machine  of 
this  branch  of  the  military  establishment.  More  con- 
cretely, the  administrative  requirements  may  be  shown  by 
reference  to  a  single  station  (one  of  the  thirty-one  above 
mentioned),  such  as  the  proving  grounds  at  Indian  Head. 
Here  under  the  jurisdiction  of  an  officer  known  as  the 
senior  assistant  are  a  police  force,  office  buildings  and 
grounds,  living  quarters,  a  water-supply  system,  boats  and 
wharves,  a  railroad,  a  power  plant,  a  carpenter  shop,  an 
electrical  shop,  a  tin  shop,  a  repair  and  pipe-fitting  shop, 
a  storehouse;  and  under  the  jurisdiction  of  an  officer 
known  as  a  powder  expert  is  a  chemical  laboratory,  a  sul- 
phuric-acid factory,  ether  factory,  dry  house,  boiling  tubs, 
dehydrating  house,  an  intensifier  house,  a  solvent  recovery 
house,  a  reworking  house,  a  nitric-acid  factory,  a  roach- 
ing  and  pulping  house,  a  mixing  house,  a  press  house,  a 
blending  and  packing  house,  a  powder  factory  and  maga- 
zines, a  signal  house,  a  rocket  house,  and  a  storehouse. 
These  may  be  taken  as  illustrative  of  the  character  of  the 
administrative  attention  required  in  directing  and  con- 
trolling the  activities  of  one  of  the  many  institutional 
subdivisions  of  one  department  of  the  Government." 

Why  Commissions  Recommendations  Were  Limited 

The  conclusion  drawn  from  this  is  that  a  requirement 
laid  on  the  executive  to  prepare  information  in  advance 
of  the  meeting  of  Congress  needed  information  of  a  plan 
or  program  of  service  which  will  include  all  the  varied 
activities  of  the  Government,  to  put  upon  the  department 
heads  the  necessity  of  preparing  their  information  in  such 
form  that  they  can  explain  and  defend  their  expenditures 
and  estimates  to  an  executive  staff  engaged  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  budget,  and  then  to  justify  their  claims  in  the 
course  of  a  cabinet  inquiry  before  the  budget  is  made  offi- 
cial, is  desirable  both  from  the  viewpoint  of  executive 


34-0      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

management  and   for  purposes  of  review  criticism  and 
discussion  before  Congress. 

With  respect  to  the  development  of  a  procedure  or 
means  whereby  five  hundred  members  of  Congress  and 
the  country  at  large  may  be  informed  of  the  service  and 
financial  needs  before  money  is  voted  for  support,  the 
temper  of  Congress  at  the  time  was  such  that  the  subject 
was  purposely  avoided,  except  as  indicated  by  the  general 
principles  laid  down :  ( i )  that  the  executive  should  be 
made  responsible  for  preparing  and  submitting  a  plan 
which  would  include  the  needs  of  every  department  and 
establishment  which  the  executive  would  be  prepared  to 
explain  and  defend,  and  (2)  that  opportunity  be  given 
"  for  presenting  it  and  defending  it  before  the  legislative 
branch  of  the  Government  and  the  country."  Whatever 
may  be  the  use  made  by  Congress  of  committees  for  pur- 
pose of  inquiry  and  by  way  of  preparedness  of  its  leader- 
ship for  criticism  and  discussion,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
desired  end  could  be  achieved  only  by  bringing  inquiry, 
criticism,  and  discussion  of  budget  proposals  out  into  the 
open,  and  having  the  proceedings  conducted  in  such  a  way 
that  the  whole  membership  may  be  brought  face  to  face 
with  officers  in  charge  of  the  activities  which  are  made  the 
subject  of  review.  And  under  our  constitutional  form 
in  which  the  heads  of  departments  are  not  given  a  seat  in 
the  deliberative  body  while  in  formal  session,  this  may  be 
done  only  by  having  the  inquiry,  criticism,  and  discussion 
take  place  in  committee  of  the  whole  with  the  executive 
present,  instead  of  in  the  recesses  of  the  standing-commit- 
tee room  where,  if  other  members  and  the  press  were  per- 
mitted to  attend,  they  would  be  required  to  follow  the  per- 
formances of  a  twenty-nine  ring  circus  with  nothing  defi- 
nite or  authentic  as  a  measure  to  be  acted  on  before  them 
for  discussion. 


CHAPTER    XIX 

PROPOSALS  OF  CONGRESSMEN   FITZGERALD,  SHERLEY,   AND 

CANNON 

In  the  states,  opposition  to  boss  rule  had  carried  with 
it  a  prevailing  public  opinion  hostile  to  legislative  commit- 
tee domination.  Because  of  this  hostility  the  defenders 
of  the  standing-committee  system  (the  advocates  of  the 
"  legislative  budget  "  idea)  had  won  out  in  only  two  of  the 
forty-four  legislatures  where  new  budget  procedures  had 
been  passed.  In  the  other  forty-two  states  honors  were 
about  evenly  divided  between  the  advocates  of  the  "  ex- 
ecutive budget  "  idea  and  the  advocates  of  the  "  commis- 
sion budget  "  idea.  The  latter  were  made  up  of  advocates 
of  "  government  by  commission,"  who  had  succeeded  in 
all  of  the  states  in  making  the  government  more  service- 
able; but  it  finally  came  to  be  recognized  that  they  had 
done  this  in  a  way  to  weaken  instead  of  strengthen  the 
processes  of  popular  control.  The  advocates  of  the  ex- 
ecutive budget  idea  had  won  out  against  the  advocates  of 
the  commission  government  in  twenty-two  states ;  they 
undertook  to  preserve  the  advantage  gained  by  the  "  gov- 
ernment-by-commission "  advocates  by  way  of  improved 
service;  in  fact,  to  make  the  public  service  more  efficient, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  make  the  administration  respon- 
sive to  public  opinion  by  making  the  head  of  it  responsible 
directly  to  the  electorate. 

These  two  forces  had  been  opposed  to  each  other  as  to 
method,  in  controversy  over  the  budget ;  but  they  were 
united  in  opposition  to  the  boss,  and  to  the  irresponsible 
party  machine  —  i.e.  in  all  the  states  except  New  York 

341 


342      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

and  Arkansas,  where  "  government-by-commission  "  ad- 
vocates had  joined  with  "  the  old  guard,"  with  the  result 
above  described  (Chapter  XVI). 

Opposition  to  Executive  Budget  Idea  in  Congress 

In  the  Federal  Government  quite  a  different  situation 
was  present.  The  "  government-by-commission  "  advo- 
cates were  specialized,  and  their  leadership  was  local. 
The  "  commission  "  idea  made  little  headway  there  —  the 
effort  to  make  the  government  more  serviceable  coming 
from  the  executive;  and  the  executive  took  the  lead  in 
bringing  forward  a  budget  proposal.  So  that  the  con- 
troversy which  arose  over  methods  and  procedure  was 
between  these  forces :  on  the  one  hand  were  those  who 
advocated  changes  to  make  the  President  responsible  for 
leadership  in  matters  of  administration  and  finance;  on 
the  other  hand  were  those  who  sought  to  protect  the  ex- 
isting system  of  "  government-by-chairmen-of-standing- 
Committees-of-Congress." 

When  President  Taft  proposed  an  "  executive  budget," 
all  the  "  chairmen  "  in  Congress  were  of  the  opposition 
party,  and  his  measure  was  humanely  disposed  of  under 
the  rules  without  being  rough-handled  on  the  floor  —  in 
fact,  without  being  discussed  at  all  on  its  merits.  As  has 
been  said,  the  President  sent  to  Congress  his  recommenda- 
tion, June  27,  1912,  "to  suggest  a  method  whereby  the 
President,  as  the  constitutional  head  of  the  administration, 
may  lay  before  the  Congress,  and  the  Congress  may  con- 
sider and  act  on  a  definite  business  and  financial  program ; 
to  have  the  expenditures,  appropriations,  and  estimates  so 
classified  and  summarized  that  their  broad  significance 
may  be  readily  understood ;  to  provide  each  member  of 
Congress  as  well  as  each  citizen  who  is  interested,  with 
such  data  pertaining  to  each  subject  of  interest  that  it  may 
be  considered  in  relation  to  each  question  of  policy  which 
should  be  gone  into  before  an  appropriation  for  expendi- 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon      343 

tures  is  made ;  to  have  these  general  summaries  supported 
by  such  detail  information  as  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
economy  and  efficiency  with  which  business  has  been 
transacted ;  in  short,  to  suggest  a  plan  whereby  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Congress  may  cooperate,"  etc. 

Recognition  of  Need  for  Change  of  Rides 

While  the  only  legal  enactment  resulting  was  a  "  rider," 
the  purpose  of  which  was  to  prevent  the  preparation  of  a 
budget  by  the  President,  there  were  evidences  that  the 
many  and  frequent  attacks  on  the  standing-committee 
system  as  a  device  which  fostered  "  pork-barrel  politics  " 
had  opened  the  eyes  of  many  of  the  members  to  its  un- 
popularity. As  far  back  as  1864  a  resolution  had  been 
introduced  "  to  provide  that  the  heads  of  the  executive  de- 
partments may  occupy  seats  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  "  ;  and  in  1881  a  bill  was  introduced  to  ex- 
tend the  privileges  of  the  floor  to  heads  of  departments  in 
both  houses.  The  report  made  by  the  committee,  to 
which  the  bill  was  referred,  had  described  the  irresponsi- 
bility of  the  executive,  and  ascribed  it  to  the  rules  of 
Congress.  This  was  done  with  a  frankness  that  entitles 
the  picture  drawn  in  the  report  to  be  preserved  as  a  com- 
panion piece  to  the  one  drawn  by  Senator  Root  when  he 
described  "  the  system  "  before  the  New  York  Constitu- 
tional Convention  in  191 5. 

"  It  has  been  notorious  for  years,"  said  the  committee, 
"  that  by  personal  interview  with  members,  by  private 
conversation  at  the  office,  in  social  intercourse  at  casual 
meetings  on  the  floor  of  the  two  houses,  by  verbal  state- 
ments to  the  chairmen  of  committees  —  liable  always  to  be 
misunderstood  or  even  misrepresented  —  by  unofficial 
communications  to  the  committees  themselves,  these  offi- 
cers originate,  press  forward,  modify,  or  entirely  defeat 
legislation;  and  it  has  often  happened  that  the  rules  of  the 
House  have  been  violated  by  stating  what  occurred  in 


344      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

committee,  in  order    to  convey  to  members  the  opinions 
or  wishes  of  a  secretary.  .  .  ." 

"  Their  secret,  silent,  omnipresent  influence  is  felt,  yet 
they  are  without  responsibility.  It  is  not  necessarily  cor- 
rupt because  it  is  secret  and  silent ;  but  it  may  be ;  and 
wherever  opportunity  for  corruption  exists  there  will  be, 
there  ought  to  be,  suspicion  and  distrust." 

A  Proposal  Which  Would  Have  Given  to  the  Nation  an 
Executive  Budget 

The  proposal  to  give  the  cabinet  the  privilege  of  the 
floor  was  made  with  a  view  to  protect  Congress  from  the 
imputations  of  conspiracy,  at  a  time  when  the  whole  pub- 
lic service  was  honeycombed  with  placemen,  two  years 
before  the  civil  service  reform  act  was  passed,  and  two 
years  before  Cleveland  was  elected  in  a  campaign  the  slo- 
gan of  which  was  "  a  public  office  is  a  public  trust."  Had 
this  bill  been  passed,  it  seems  beyond  question  that,  long 
since,  we  would  have  had  a  budget  and  would  have  devel- 
oped responsible  government. 

"  Would  it  not  be  better,"  said  the  committee,  "  that 
their  opinions  should  be  expressed,  their  facts  stated,  their 
policy  enforced,  their  acts  defended  in  open  day  on  the 
floor  of  the  House,  in  the  face  of  the  nation,  in  public 
speech,  in  official,  recorded  statement,  where  there  can  be 
no  hidden  purpose,  no  misconception,  no  misrepresenta- 
tion? 

"This  would  enlighten  the  House,  inform  the  country, 
and  be  just  to  the  officer.  It  would  substitute  legitimate 
for  illegitimate  power.  It  would  establish  an  open,  offi- 
cial, honorable  mode  of  exercising  that  power  instead  of 
a  secret,  unrecognized  mode,  liable  to  abuse,  and  therefore 
always  subject  to  the  suspicion  that  it  has  been  abused. 
It  would  establish  authorized  and  accurate,  instead  of 
unauthorized,  and  therefore  uncertain  and  inaccurate, 
communication    with    the    House."     (Privilege    of    the 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  S  her  ley,  and  Cannon      345 

Floor  to  Cabinet  Officers,  Reports  to  Congress,   191 3, 

P.  19.) 

This  was  a  proposal  that  came  from  the  opposition  in 
Congress  at  a  time  when  the  executive  was  a  Republican. 
When  President  Taft  came  forward  in  19 12  and  urged 
upon  Congress  an  executive  budget,  although  he  did  not 
include  any  specific  proposal  with  respect  to  changes  in 
rules  and  organization  of  Congress  to  make  "  coopera- 
tion "  between  the  two  branches  effective,  the  measure  it- 
self carried  with  it  the  same  implications  and  the  same 
arguments  as  were  employed  by  the  committee  that  re- 
ported in  1 88 1 ;  and  the  old  question  was  again  revived. 
But  there  was  this  difference :  The  attitude  of  the  people 
toward  the  executive  had  changed ;  the  influence  of  Pres- 
ident Cleveland,  the  leadership  of  President  Roosevelt, 
the  frequent  attacks  on  Congress  and  state  legislatures 
as  dispensers  of  "  patronage  "  and  "  pork,"  the  confusion 
which  resulted  from  the  unrelated  and  irresponsible  lead- 
erships of  standing  committees,  all  helped  to  carry  convic- 
tion that  the  proposal  of  President  Taft  was  sound,  al- 
though he  himself  was  politically  discredited;  President 
Taft's  proposal  was  taken  seriously  by  the  people,  and 
therefore  it  was  a  matter  which  could  not  be  entirely 
passed  by  in  Congress.  It  called  for  a  counter-proposal 
by  the  friends  of  the  existing  system. 

Mr.  Fitzgerald's  Proposal  to  Return  to  the  Old  Practice 

It  is  an  observation  which  carries  with  it  the  full  weight 
of  experience,  that,  once  power  is  given,  those  who  pos- 
sess it  are  loath  to  give  it  up.  And  this  finds  exemplifica- 
tion not  alone  in  executives;  it  has  proved  to  be  equally 
true  of  the  "  chairmen  "  of  legislative  committees  on  whom 
the  representative  branch  has  bestowed  leadership  —  the 
leadership  which  customarily  goes  with  executive  respon- 
sibility. This  fact  finds  illustration  in  the  proposal  of 
Congressman  John  J.  Fitzgerald,  chairman  of  the  com- 


346      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

mittee  on  appropriations,  who  came  forward  in  a  speech 
with  a  counter-proposal.  We  need  no  executive  budget, 
said  he ;  all  we  need  is  to  return  to  the  committee  organi- 
zation and  procedure  in  use  in  Congress  from  1865  till 
the  Cleveland  administration.  The  organization  and  pro- 
cedure recommended  by  Mr.  Fitzgerald,  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served, was  brought  into  use  the  year  following  the  reso- 
lution to  give  to  the  cabinet  the  privilege  of  the  floor. 
Up  to  that  time  all  finance  measures  both  for  revenues 
and  expenditures  had  been  handled  by  one  committee  with 
results  that  were  appalling.  The  remedy  for  the  chaos 
that  obtained  in  disintegrate,  financial  and  administrative 
measures  passed  during  the  war  was  to  put  the  raising  of 
revenues  in  the  hands  of  one  committee  and  the  authori- 
zation of  expenditures  into  the  hands  of  another.  Fol- 
lowing this  act,  some  twenty  years  later,  in  a  quarrel  be- 
tween the  chairmen  of  the  two  committees,  the  leader  in 
charge  of  the  ways  and  means  committee  sought  to  de- 
tract from  the  influence  of  the  chairman  of  the  appropria- 
tion committee  by  breaking  up  and  distributing  its  pow- 
ers. Now  Mr.  Fitzgerald  proposed  to  return  again  to 
the  system  in  existence  during  the  time  that  so  much  dis- 
satisfaction had  been  shown. 

"  Enlarge  the  committee  on  appropriations  suffi- 
ciently to  enable  its  work  to  be  properly  done,"  said 
Mr.  Fitzgerald.  His  proposal  was  to  "  place  on  that 
committee  the  chairmen  of  the  committees  which  now 
have  annual  supply  bills,  so  that  they  could  continue 
in  touch  with  the  respective  bills  now  committed  to 
legislative  committees  over  which  they  preside.  This 
would  largely  reintroduce  a  practice  which  was  fol- 
lowed from  the  creation  of  the  committee  on  appro- 
priations in  1865  till  the  end  of  the  forty-fourth  Con- 
gress, of  having  as  conferees  on  the  respective  supply 
bills  two  members  of  the  committee  on  appropriations 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon      347 

and  one  member  of  the  legislative  committee  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  legislation  affected  by  the  bill." 

Evidence  oi  the  fact  that  this  was  not  a  question  of 
principle  but  one  of  power  is  found  in  the  approval  of 
Mr.  Fitzgerald's  proposal  by  Mr.  Cannon  of  Illinois,  who, 
perhaps  more  fully  than  any  other  man  now  living,  stands 
for  the  autocracy  exercised  through  the  committee  sys- 
tem. In  urging  a  return  to  a  single  appropriation  com- 
mittee, such  as  we  had  from  1865  down  to  the  time  of  the 
Cleveland  administration  when,  in  a  fight  between  Mr. 
Randall  and  Mr.  Morrison,  its  powers  were  dissipated 
among  a  number  of  departmental  committees — in  urging 
this  as  a  means  of  preventing  extravagance  and  waste, 
both  Mr.  Fitzgerald  and  Mr.  Cannon  seem  to  overlook 
the  fact  that  this  was  the  outstanding  period  of  our  his- 
tory during  which  patronage,  spoils,  and  pork-barrel  pol- 
itics ran  rampant;  and  that  the  history  of  congressional 
appropriations  during  this  period  is  one  which  caused 
every  disinterested  patriotic  American  to  blush  for  shame. 
If  there  are  good  reasons  for  a  return  to  the  methods  and 
practices  under  which  the  public  treasury  was  made  the 
football  of  "party"  politics  they  must  be  found  in  the 
operation  of  principles  of  representative  government  not 
then  invoked,  for  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  shameless- 
ness  with  which  the  treasury  was  legally  looted,  and  pat- 
ronage and  special  privileges  were  distributed  to  the  faith- 
ful. ' 

Mr.  Sherley,  ranking  majority  member  of  Mr.  Fitz- 
gerald's committee,  who  later  succeeded  him  as  chairman, 
supported  the  proposal  which  had  such  worthy  parentage 
and  sponsorship,  but  broadened  it  to  include  the  prepara- 
tion and  advocacy  of  revenue  bills  as  well  —  so  that  Con- 
gress might  have  brought  before  it  a  well-considered  finan- 
cial plan  in  the  form  of  a  "  legislative  budget."  His  pro- 
posal was  a  modification  of  the  legislative  practice  carry- 


348      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ing  it  still  farther  back,  before  1865  —  the  avowed  purpose 
of  the  modification  being  to  adapt  it  to  the  much  more 
highly  elaborated  standing-committee  system.  He  intro- 
duced the  following : 

"Resolved,  That  the  following  rule  be  added  to  the 
rules  of  the  House,  and  to  be  known  as  section  6  of 
Rule  X : 

"6.  There  shall  be  a  committee  on  estimates  and  ex- 
penditures, whose  personnel  shall  consist  of  the  following 
members:  the  chairmen  and  three  ranking  majority  mem- 
bers, and  the  ranking  minority  member  of  the  Committees 
on  Ways  and  Means  and  Appropriations,  and  the  chair- 
men and  ranking  minority  member  of  the  committees  on 
Rules,  Agriculture,  Foreign  Affairs,  Military  Affairs, 
Naval  Affairs,  Post  Offices  and  Post  Roads,  Rivers  and 
Harbors,  and  Indian  Affairs.  The  chairman  of  said 
committee  shall  be  selected  by  the  members  thereof.  Said 
committee  shall,  as  soon  after  the  convening  of  each  reg- 
ular session  of  Congress  as  may  be,  report  to  the  House 
the  amount  of  revenue  probably  available  for  appropria- 
tion for  the  next  fiscal  year,  and  apportion  the  amount  to 
the  several  appropriation  bills  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  committees  empowered  by  the  rules  and  practice  of  the 
House  to  report  appropriations  from  the  Treasury.  This 
report,  or  supplementary  reports  to  meet  the  exigencies 
of  the  public  service,  may  be  made  on  any  legislative  day 
after  the  reading  of  the  Journal,  and  when  agreed  to  by 
the  House  shall  limit  the  totals  of  the  appropriations  re- 
ported by  the  several  committees." 

Mr.  Sherley's  Proposal 

While  the  change  in  rules  proposed  by  Mr.  Sherley  is 
better  designed  to  bring  order  out  of  the  chaos  that  has 
existed  in  American  financial  legislation  for  a  century, 
and  better  adapted  for  a  businesslike  handling  of  finance 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon      349 

than  is  the  proposal  of  Mr.  Fitzgerald,  it  would  not  reach 
any  of  the  fundamental  defects  which  have  been  so  fre- 
quently described :  it  would  not  bring  before  Congress  at 
the  beginning  of  the  session,  as  the  chief  business  to  be 
transacted,  a  plan  or  program  of  service  to  be  financed ; 
but  in  the  nature  of  things  it  would  delay  finance  bills 
till  near  the  close  of  the  session ;  it  would  not  leave  Con- 
gress free  to  exercise  its  most  important  function  of  in- 
quest and  criticism ;  it  still  assumes  that  leaders  of  Con- 
gress, with  the  aid  of  their  respective  committees,  should 
prepare  and  submit  proposals  for  administration  and 
finance,  thereby  putting  responsibility  where  it  stands  in 
the  way  of  open,  free  discussion.  It  did  not  provide  for 
having  the  estimates  prepared  and  submitted  by  respon- 
sible executive  heads  —  but  made  them  simply  ministerial 
agents  to  collect  information  for  the  committees;  it  did 
not  provide  for  giving  adequate  information  to  members 
and  to  the  electorate  to  guide  them  in  their  voting;  it  did 
not  adequately  provide  for  accountability  by  requiring 
the  heads  of  departments  to  stand  up  like  men  before  Con- 
gress and  the  country,  openly  and  publicly  to  explain  and 
defend  their  acts  and  proposals  —  and  to  meet  criticism 
when  offered.  It  was  not  a  device  to  determine  and  en- 
force executive  responsibility,  but  was  a  device  to  secure 
and  enforce  secret  committee  domination  of  both  branches 
of  the  government.  It  was  frankly  a  measure  to  pre- 
serve the  standing-committee  system.  In  his  remarks 
supporting  his  proposal  it  was  admitted  that  all  inquiries 
would  still  be  made  and  all  conclusions  would  still  be 
reached  in  secret.  Speaking  on  the  size  of  the  committee, 
he  said : 

"  This  committee  would  consist  of  sixteen  majority 
members  and  ten  minority  members.  It  is  urged  that 
that  is  too  large  a  number,  but  I  desire  to  suggest  to  the 
House  that  it  is  really  two  committees,  because  the  major- 
ity members  would  necessarily  come  to  their  conclusions 


35°      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

in  private,  just  as  the  majority  members  of  tKe  Commit- 
tee on  Ways  and  Means  now  do." 

Mr.  Fitzgerald  and  Mr.  Sherley  both  give  us  the  very 
"  practical  "  reason  for  urging  a  legislative  budget  as 
against  the  executive  budget  proposed  by  Mr.  Taft,  viz. : 
that  members  of  Congress  will  not  consent  to  giving  up 
the  powers  which  under  the  old  system  of  standing-com- 
mittee leadership  they  have  come  to  enjoy.  This  was 
before  sides  had  been  taken  in  the  states  and  opinion  had 
come  to  register  itself  when  opportunity  was  given  to 
choose  between  irresponsible  and  responsible  leadership. 
But  whatever  may  be  the  effect  of  six  years  of  discussion 
outside  of  Congress  on  the  minds  of  individual  members, 
it  seems  that  they  still  hold  to  the  opinions  then  expressed. 
And  this  view  is  shared  by  Mr.  Cannon  of  Illinois. 

Support  Given  by  Mr.  Cannon 

Mr.  Cannon  not  only  supported  Mr.  Fitzgerald  in  his 
opposition  to  Mr.  Taft.  but  he  still  continues  to  hold  his 
views  even  in  opposition  to  the  platform  policy  of  his 
"  party  "  which  declared  for  the  executive  budget  in  their 
platform  on  which  candidates  went  before  the  people  for 
election  to  Congress.  In  a  recent  article  on  "  The  Na- 
tional Budget  "  he  has  more  fully  elaborated  his  views: 

"  When  we  [i.e.  members  of  Congress]  create  a  budget 
commission  we  will  keep  it  in  Congress,  and  as  far  as  pos- 
sible in  the  House  of  Representatives.  ...  I  believe  that 
the  House  of  Representatives  should  have  one  committee 
with  jurisdiction  over  appropriations." 

In  this  last  assertion,  Mr.  Cannon  evidently  has  in  mind 
the  proposal  of  Mr.  Fitzgerald  —  to  return  to  the  practice 
from  1865  to  the  first  Cleveland  administration,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  public  scandals  of  that  period 
came  near  landing  Mr.  Tilden  in  the  presidential  chair. 
Mr.  Cannon  also  seems  to  think  well  of  Mr.  Sherley's 
proposal.     Discussing  the  desirability  of  keeping  the  lead- 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon      351 

ership  in  matters  of  administrative  policy  in  the  hands  of 
committee  chairmen,  he  says : 

"  For  the  first  seventy-five  years  of  its  existence  the 
House  had  a  budget  committee  —  the  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means.  That  committee  reported  both  revenue  bills 
and  appropriation  bills." 

The  implication  is  that  such  an  organization  and  proce- 
dure for  leadership  and  accountability  would  solve  our 
difficulties.  But  he  makes  no  mention  of  the  fact  that 
during  all  this  seventy-five  years  when  "  the  House  had  a 
budget  committee,"  the  nation  never  had  a  budget;  nor 
is  mention  made  of  the  fact  that  it  was  during  this  period 
that  the  whole  "  American  "  system  of  government-by- 
chairmen-of-irresponsible-standing-committees,  and  the 
Y  American  "  system  of  patronage  and  spoils  became  firmly 
rooted  in  a  soil  made  fertile  by  democratic  ideals  —  a  soil 
in  which  the  Constitution  had  been  planted  in  the  hope 
that  it  would  give  to  the  people  a  fruitage  in  the  form  of 
responsible  government. 

Constitutional  Objections  Urged  to  Executive  Budget 

In  the  controversy  over  a  national  budget  the  defend- 
ers of  the  system  of  "  government  by  standing-commit- 
tees "  are  for  some  form  of  "  legislative  budget  "  or  by 
second  choice  for  a  "  commission  budget " ;  they  have 
never  been  for  an  "  executive  budget  "  procedure  which 
squarely  recognizes  the  right  and  the  need  of  the  execu- 
tive (as  the  one  responsible  to  the  people  for  the  manner 
in  which  the  public  business  is  done)  to  stand  up  before 
the  representatives  of  the  people  who  control  the  purse, 
and  give  an  account  of  executive  stewardship.  They  are 
squarely  against  giving  to  the  executive  a  chance  to  stand 
up  before  the  appropriating  body  to  explain  and  defend 
requests;  and  they  are  just  as  squarely  against  giving  to 
the  people  a  chance  to  take  sides  with  leaders  for  and 


352      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

against  policies  and  measures  thus  openly  discussed  when 
issues  are  joined. 

Mr.  Cannon  assumes  that  to  permit  the  executive  to 
prepare  and  present  and  publicly  explain  and  defend  a. 
plan  for  which  he  is  asking  support,  to  permit  the  execu- 
tive to  go  before  the  whole  membership,  submit  himself 
to  questioning,  and  be  accorded  only  the  privilege  to  par- 
ticipate in  discussion  without  a  right  to  vote,  and  without 
the  right  of  immunity  for  his  statements,  would  be  "  away 
from  the  budget  plans  of  those  who  prepared  the  Con- 
stitution, and  when  Congress  consents  to  the  executive 
making  a  budget  it  will  have  surrendered  the  most  impor-  | 
tant  part  of  a  representative  government.  .  .  . 

"  I  think,"  says  he,  "  that  we  had  better  stick  pretty  close 
to  the  Constitution  with  its  division  of  powers  well  defined 
and  the  taxing  power  close  to  the  people." 

These  Objections  Answered  by  Members  of  Congress 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  to  the  opinions  of  men  who 
have  occupied  both  judicial  and  executive  positions  to 
refute  that  idea.  Mr.  Taft  held  that  the  power  of  the 
President  to  prepare  and  submit  a  budget  was  amply  pro- 
vided for  in  the  Constitution  —  that  the  only  thing  which 
stood  in  the  way  now,  without  change  of  law,  was  the 
attitude  of  Congress.  Justice  Hughes  held  to  the  view 
that  an  executive  budget  is  not  only  consistent  with  the 
Constitution,  but  is  necessary  to  the  fixing  of  executive 
responsibility  —  the  very  reason  for  the  separation  of 
powers.  Governor  Lowden  and  some  twenty  other  state 
governors  of  both  parties,  most  of  them  lawyers  of  repute, 
have  urged  that  if  they  are  to  be  made  responsible  to  the 
people  they  should  be  given  a  hearing.  They  saw  nothing 
unconstitutional  in  these  proposals.  Only  those  who  are 
seeking  to  defend  a  present  practice  raise  the  issue.  But 
let  us  accept  the  view  that  all  persons  who  have  been  in 
executive  positions  are  interested  parties.     Let  us  return 


Congressmen  Fitzgerald,  Sherley,  and  Cannon      353 

to  the  report  of  the  committee  of  congress  to  which  was 
referred  the  question  as  to  whether  members  of  the  cab- 
inet should  not  be  given  the  privileges  of  the  floor.  These 
were  all  congressmen.  They  point  to  the  fact  that  two 
constitutional  objections  have  been  urged  to  giving  the 
privilege  of  the  floor  to  the  cabinet :  ( 1 )  that  it  is  inhib- 
ited by  the  provision  that  no  person  holding  office  shall  be 
a  member  of  either  house;  (2)  that  it  violates  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  separation  of  powers. 

With  respect  to  the  first,  they  have  this  to  say : 

"  The  provision  of  the  Constitution  that  '  no  person 
holding  any  office  under  the  United  States  shall  be  a 
member  of  either  house  during  his  continuance  in  office  ' 
is  in  no  wise  violated.  The  head  of  a  department,  re- 
porting in  person  and  orally,  or  participating  in  debate, 
becomes  no  more  a  member  of  either  house  than  does  the 
chaplain,  or  the  contestant,  or  his  counsel,  or  the  delegate. 
He  has  no  official  term;  he  is  neither  elected  nor  appointed 
to  either  house;  he  has  no  participation  in  the  power  of 
impeachment,  either  in  the  institution  or  trial ;  he  has  no 
privilege  from  arrest;  he  has  no  power  to  vote." 

With  respect  to  the  second  objection  —  that  it  was  a 
violation  of  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  —  they 
make  this  answer : 

"  Your  committee  is  not  unmindful  of  the  maxim  that 
in  a  constitutional  government  the  great  powers  are  di- 
vided into  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial,  and  that 
they  should  be  conferred  on  distinct  departments.  These 
departments  should  be  defined  and  maintained,  and  it  is  a 
sufficiently  accurate  expression  to  say  that  they  should  be 
independent  of  each  other.  But  this  independence  in  no 
just  or  practical  sense  means  an  entire  separation,  either 
in  their  organization  or  their  functions  —  isolation,  either 
in  the  scope  or  the  exercise  of  their  powers.  Such  isola- 
tion would  produce  either  conflict  or  paralysis,  either 
inevitable  collision  or  inaction,  and  either  the  one  or  the 


354      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

other  would  be  in  derogation  of  the  efficiency  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Such  independence  of  coequal  and  coordinate 
departments  has  never  existed  in  any  civilized  govern- 
ment, and  never  can  exist.  .  .  . 

"If  there  is  anything  perfectly  plain  in  the  Constitu- 
tion and  organization  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  that  the  great  departments  [the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial  branches]  were  not  intended  to  be 
independent  and  isolated  in  the  strict  meaning  of  these 
terms ;  but  that  although  having  a  separate  existence,  they 
were  to  cooperate,  each  with  the  other,  as  the  different 
members  of  the  human  body  must  cooperate  with  each 
other  in  order  to  form  the  figure  and  perform  the  func- 
tions of  a  perfect  man." 

A  Question  of  Responsible  Government 

Point  is  made  by  Mr.  Cannon  and  others  that  "  The 
representatives  are  the  men  who  have  to  bear  the  respon- 
sibility for  unpopular  taxes,  and  are  first  to  feel  the  weight 
of  the  voters'  dissatisfaction.  They  get  kicked  out  when- 
ever the  people  think  too  much  has  been  taken  out  of  their 
pockets  for  a  government  budget." 

Whereas,  "  none  of  these  executive  officials  are  respon- 
sible to  the  people  or  can  be  called  to  account  by  the 
voters." 

This  is  a  view  that  is  very  much  overworked.  It 
neither  bears  analysis  nor  squares  with  the  facts.  Sup- 
pose that  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  dissatisfied 
with  appropriations  made,  recommended,  and  pushed 
through  by  the  committee  of  which  Mr.  Cannon  is  a  mem- 
ber. How  can  they  reach  him  so  long  as  he  gets  enough 
appropriated  for  his  own  district  to  keep  up  his  fences 
there?  How  can  any  member  of  Congress  be  reached  by 
the  people  of  the  United  States  so  long  as  he  keeps  his 
own  district  behind  him? 


CHAPTER    XX 

BUDGET   BILLS   BEFORE   THE   LAST   CONGRESS 

Attempt  to  Preserve  the  Status  Quo 

From  a  careful  study  of  the  organic  laws  of  the  Amer- 
ican states  it  is  apparent  that  the  function  and  purpose  of 
a  budget  has  not  been  clearly  understood.  In  many  cases 
it  seems  to  have  been  assumed  that  a  budget  is  something 
to  be  adopted  and  used  with  little  or  no  thought  given  to 
the  administrative  and  deliberative  machinery  to  which  it 
is  to  be  attached.  It  is  assumed  that  it  is  something  that 
is  complete  in  itself  —  instead  of  being  a  procedure  or 
technique  to  be  learned  and  used  to  make  the  two  great 
political  branches  of  the  government  more  cooperative  and 
serviceable  to  democracy.  Of  the  forty-four  states  which 
passed  budget  laws  from  191 1  to  1919,  only  about  one 
fourth  of  them  took  any  steps  to  make  readjustments  in 
organization  and  practice  looking  toward  the  achievement 
of  the  desired  end.  In  the  two  states  which  adopted  a 
"  legislative  budget "  and  the  nineteen  states  which 
adopted  one  form  or  another  of  a  "  commission  budget  " 
this  might,  perhaps,  be  defended,  since  both  of  these  meth- 
ods of  review  and  control  of  administration  and  finance 
are  designed  not  to  disturb  the  status  quo  ante:  the  one  be- 
ing applied  to  protect  the  status  quo  ante  of  the  "  govern- 
ment-by-chairmen-of-standing-committee  "  form  of  legis- 
lative organization ;  the  other  being  applied  to  protect  the 
status  quo  ante  of  the  "  government-by-commission " 
form  of  administrative  organization.  And  while  the 
executive  budget  proposal  is  based  on  a  desire  to  get 
away  from  the  results  of  the  status  quo  ante  in  both 

355 


356      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

branches  of  the  government,  nevertheless  institutional 
inertia  and  the  desire  of  persons  in  power  to  stick  to 
and  protect  what  they  have  has  been  an  obstacle  difficult 
to  overcome  in  the  twenty-three  states  which  have  adopted 
the  executive-budget  principle. 

The  fact  is  that  although  a  majority  of  the  states  have 
adopted  the  executive  budget  idea,  there  are  only  three  of 
the  twenty-three  states  that  attempted  to  make  a  complete 
readjustment  of  the  administrative  machinery  to  insure 
the  effectiveness  of  this  method  or  technique  of  control; 
and  none  of  these  revised  the  deliberative  practice  to  make 
it  consistent  with  an  underlying  purpose,  viz.,  to  make  the 
administration  accountable  to  the  membership  of  the  con- 
stitutional appropriating  body;  none  of  them  even  con- 
sidered the  question  as  to  what  procedure  was  needed  to 
make  the  government  responsible  to  the  people.  After 
the  administrative  codes  of  Illinois,  Idaho,  and  Nebraska 
had  become  law  the  several  governors  of  these  states 
were  in  no  better  position  to  make  an  executive  budget 
operative  than  was  the  Federal  Government  at  the  time 
that  President  Taft  prepared  and  submitted  his  budget 
under  the  powers  given  to  him  by  the  Constitution  with 
the  assistance  of  the  staff  provided  by  special  appropria- 
tion. The  rules  of  the  deliberative,  appropriating  body, 
as  they  stood,  made  it  possible  for  an  opposition  majority 
in  Congress  completely  to  ignore  the  measure  submitted 
by  the  President.  The  rules  of  the  deliberative  appro- 
priating bodies  in  the  states  make  it  possible  for  them 
completely  to  ignore  the  recommendations  of  the 
respective  governors  —  and  in  the  standing-committee 
rooms  of  the  legislature  to  proceed  as  if  no  such  laws 
were  on  the  statute  books.  Assuming  that  the  existing 
rules  of  legislative  procedure  are  continued,  and  public 
opinion  lies  dormant  on  the  subject,  the  legislatures  of 
the  "  reorganized  "  states  may  do  exactly  what  Congress 
did  after  the  National  Government  had  been  organized 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         357 

in  1789  —  exactly  what  the  standing-committee  system 
has  done  to  the  Federal  administration  for  one  hundred 
and  thirty  years  —  exactly  what  the  New  York  legis- 
lature did  to  Governor  Whitman's  budget  measures  in 
1916  and  1917. 

Reorganization  of  Legislature  and  Revision   of  Rules 
Needed 

The  one  conclusion  which  may  be  drawn  from  state 
experience  that  will  be  helpful  in  the  consideration  of 
the  budget  measures  now  before  Congress  is  that  it  is 
not  administrative  reorganization  but  a  reorganization 
or  readjustment  of  working  parts  of  the  deliberative  body, 
a  revision  of  rules,  that  is  necessary.  All  the  most  pro- 
gressive of  the  states  have  sought  to  do,  in  their  efforts 
to  make  the  executive  responsible,  is  to  adopt  the  Federal 
Government  plan  of  administrative  organization :  —  to  do 
what  our  forefathers,  who  sat  in  the  Constitutional  Con- 
vention at  Philadelphia,  did  in  1787.  The  whole  history 
of  the  Federal  Government  stands  as  evidence  that  this 
alone  is  not  enough;  that  budget  making  involves  the 
working  relations  of  all  branches  of  the  Government;  that 
with  the  power  to  control  the  purse  in  the  hands  of  the 
representative  body  Congress  may  so  conduct  itself  as  to 
defeat  its  very  purpose  by  adopting  rules  which  bar  the 
administrative  leaders  who  are  to  be  made  accountable 
from  a  hearing,  and  convert  the  public  forum  of  the  nation 
into  a  lot  of  secret  conferences  for  inquest  and  determi- 
nation of  questions  of  public  policy,  the  information  thus 
obtained  to  be  used  for  personal  and  party  ends. 

Party  Interest  in  a  National  Budget  System 

There  is  at  this  time  a  favoring  circumstance,  however, 
in  a  new  public  opinion.  A  new  national  consciousness 
has  been  aroused.  And  party  managers  have  begun  to 
set  their  sails  to  catch  the  favoring  wind  in  the  hope  that 


358      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

it  will  waft  their  chosen  candidates  into  office.  While 
in  the  states  there  has  been  no  uniformity  in  party  align- 
ment on  the  subject  —  the  Democratic  party  demanding 
the  "  executive  budget  "  in  one  state,  and  the  Republican 
party  demanding  it  in  another  —  the  National  Republican 
party,  in  191 6,  adopted  a  resolution  and  made  an  appeal 
to  the  people  on  a  platform  favoring  the  adoption  of 
the  executive  budget.  In  the  election  which  followed 
they  did  not  succeed  in  gaining  control  of  either  branch 
of  the  government,  but  in  the  by-election  of  19 18,  a 
working  majority  of  this  party  was  elected  to  Congress 
and  presumably  had  a  moral  obligation  to  the  people. 

All  the  political  writings  of  President  Wilson  also 
seem  to  indicate  that  he  favors  a  political  system  that 
provides  for  responsible  executive  leadership  —  in  fact 
President  Wilson  as  student  and  teacher  of  politics  has 
done  more  than  any  American  to  call  attention  to  the 
essentially  irresponsible  quality  of  our  leadership;  all  of 
his  political  writings  seem  to  condemn  the  decentralized, 
irresponsible,  headless,  planless,  spineless  leadership  of 
a  multitude  of  standing  committees  in  Congress,  all  of 
them  seem  to  point  toward  favorable  consideration  of  a 
plan  which  would  give  us  some  form  of  responsible  exec- 
utive leadership  —  a  leadership  at  least  responsible  to 
the  representative  body  and  not  merely  a  "  supervisory  " 
executive. 

Bills  before  Congress: 

The  Republican  members  of  the  present  Congress  are 
pledged  to  the  executive  budget  as  a  method  of  handling 
questions  of  public  policy  so  far  as  these  are  reflected 
in  problems  of  administrative  organization  and  public 
finance.  It  is  therefore  from  the  viewpoint  of  this 
assumption  that  the  measures  brought  before  the  Repub- 
lican Congress  will  be  judged.  Shortly  after  the  incoming 
of  the  new  Congress,  a  number  of  bills  were  introduced 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        359 

in  the  House  and  the  Senate  to  effect  this  change.  Be- 
cause revenue  and  appropriation  bills  originate  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  the  budget  procedures  pro- 
posed by  members  of  that  body  will  be  stressed.  The 
budget  bills  as  proposed  in  the  House  during  the  last 
session  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

(1)  The  Frear  bills  (H.  R.  4061;  H.  R.  3738;  and 
H.  J.  Res.  83)  the  evident  purpose  of  which  is  to  provide 
for  an  out-and-out  executive  budget. 

(2)  The  Green  joint  resolution  (H.  J.  Res.  168)  the 
evident  purpose  of  which  is  to  provide  for  an  out-and-out 
legislative  budget. 

(3)  The  Good  bill  (H.  R.  1201)  the  evident  purpose 
of  which  is  to  provide  for  a  legislative  budget,  camou- 
flaged to  look  like  an  executive  budget,  or  a  commission 
budget. 

(4)  The  Andrews  bill  (H.  R.  551),  a  part-way 
measure  dealing  only  with  the  audit  function. 

(5)  The  Tinkham  resolution  (H.  R.  107),  a  part-way 
measure  dealing  only  with  the  organization  and  pro- 
cedure of  Congress. 

(6)  Various  initial  measures  to  provide  for  the  study 
of  budget  systems  and  to  report  recommendations  (the 
Mann  Resolution,  H.  J.  Res.  29 ;  the  Goodwin  Resolution, 
H.  J.  Res.  59;  and  the  Tinkham  Resolution,  H.  R.  1017). 

The  Frear  Bills 

Taking  these  up  in  the  order  above  listed,  Mr.  Frear 
presents  his  concept  of  a  needed  budget  plan  in  three 
separate  measures.  The  first  bill  listed  above  (H.  R. 
4061)  is  a  clear-cut  proposal  to  put  the  responsibility  on 
the  President,  as  the  constitutional  head  of  the  admin- 
istration, for  the  preparation  each  year  of  a  plan  of 
public  service  to  be  financed.  This  would  be  done  by 
making  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  the  finance  min- 
ister of  the  President  with  a  budget  bureau  under  him. 


360      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  head  of  which  would  be  appointed  by  the  President. 
Thus  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  would  be  given  both 
the  power  and  the  staff  facilities  to  perform  the  function 
of  initial  review  and  revision  of  estimates  both  of  rev- 
enues and  expenditures.  But  this  is  only  a  first  step. 
They  must  then  be  brought  before  the  President  not 
later  than  November  15th,  so  that  the  issues  raised  may 
be  threshed  out  with  the  cabinet  and  an  executive  deci- 
sion reached  before  Congress  assembles.  Thus  a  well- 
considered  administrative  plan  could  be  presented  to 
Congress  when  it  assembled.  The  second  bill  listed 
(H.  R.  3738)  provides  for  the  exercise  of  the  critical 
or  audit  function  by  Congress.  Mr.  Frear  would  furnish 
Congress  with  the  necessary  staff  by  transfer  of  the 
audit  organization  from  the  Treasury  to  an  independent 
office  of  Auditor  General,  the  head  of  which  would  be 
appointed  by  the  speaker,  the  majority  leader  and  the 
minority  leader  of  the  House,  to  hold  office  during  good 
behavior,  removable  for  cause  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  The 
office  would  report  the  results  of  critical  examination  to 
a  "joint  budget  committee."  The  third  proposal  of 
Mr.  Frear,  as  a  complement  to  the  other  two  described 
(H.  J.  Res.  83),  is  for  the  creation  of  "a  joint  budget 
committee  "  of  Congress,  with  power  to  inquire  into  the 
acts  and  proposals  of  the  administration,  and  to  report 
out  amendments  to  the  administration  revenue  and  appro- 
priation plan  —  with  no  power  to  amend  requests,  except 
to  reduce  items,  unless  upon  a  two-thirds  vote  favorable 
to  the  amendment. 

With  one  possible  exception  noted  below  these  bills 
are  straightforward  and  consistent  throughout.  If  there 
is  to  be  an  executive  budget,  three  things  must  hap- 
pen :  ( 1 )  the  executive  must  be  made  responsible  for 
preparing  an  account  of  past  acts  and  a  plan  of  service 
needs  to  be  financed  —  and  he  must  be  provided  with 
adequate  machinery   for  doing  it;    (2)    Congress   must 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         361 

exercise  the  critical  reviewing  and  the  approving  func- 
tion —  and  must  be  provided  with  adequate  machinery 
for  this;  (3)  the  procedure  must  be  such  as  to  enable 
the  people  through  the  electorate  and  the  representative 
body  to  enforce  executive  and  representative  respon- 
sibilities —  to  which  end  these  essentials  must  be  pro- 
vided :  (a)  the  executive  must  be  provided  with  the  means 
of  controlling  expenditures  after  appropriations  have 
been  made  so  that  he  can  defend  his  acts  and  give  a  good 
account  of  his  stewardship;  (b)  the  executive  must  be 
given  a  chance  to  come  openly  and  publicly  before  the 
representative  body  to  present  his  report  and  proposals 
so  that  he  may  defend  his  proposals  and  make  every 
member  of  Congress  responsible  as  well  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  votes;  (c)  both  the  executive  and  members 
of  the  representative  body  are  entitled  to  a  procedure 
by  means  of  which  responsibility  may  be  kept  clear  —  so 
that  no  action  can  be  taken  which  will  shift  or  confuse 
responsibilities. 

Reasons  pro  and  con  may  determine  that  it  would  be 
better  to  organize  an  executive  staff  in  some  other  manner 
than  provided  by  the  Frear  bills;  likewise  provisions  for 
current  allotment  and  executive  control  of  funds  appro- 
priated may  be  needful ;  some  other  or  further  elaboration 
of  audit  and  reviewing  organization  and  procedure  might 
be  desired.  But  the  underlying  principles  are  sound  — 
if  the  people  want  to  have  a  responsible  executive  and 
representative  body,  and  if  the  people  want  to  provide 
themselves  with  the  means  of  intelligent  enforcement. 

There  is  one  point  in  the  Frear  plan  on  which  there 
may  be  misunderstanding,  viz. :  Section  7  of  the  accom- 
panying resolution  (H.  J.  Res.  83)  provides,  "That  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  the  House  immediate  and  direct 
information  as  to  the  said  estimates  and  of  offering  ex- 
planations in  regard  to  the  proposed  expenditures  of  the 
said  budget  bill,  the  heads  of  the  several  executive  depart- 


362      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ments  may  be  required  to  appear  in  the  House  and  Senate 
during  the  time  said  bill  is  under  consideration,  to  answer 
questions  relating  to  the  provisions  of  said  bill."  Section 
2  provides  for  initial  hearing  in  a  joint  committee  of  the 
House  and  Senate.  Section  3  gives  to  this  committee  the 
power  to  call  executive  officers  before  it,  and  go  over 
the  estimates  item  by  item  in  hearings.  These  two  pro- 
visions are  antagonistic.  If  the  initial  hearings  are  in  a 
small  committee  made  up  of  leaders,  party  discipline  will 
prevent  a  real  effective  hearing  on  the  floor  or  in  com- 
mittee of  the  whole.  A  number  of  states  have  made  simi- 
lar provision  and  the  result  has  not  been  encouraging. 
The  whole  process  of  appropriation  has  been  just  as  "  in- 
visible "  as  before;  there  has  not  been  developed  an  open- 
forum-method  of  handling  questions  of  finance,  and  it 
may  be  safely  predicted  that  there  never  will  be  until  the 
executive  is  required  to  come  before  the  whole  body  to 
make  good  his  request  for  funds.  In  other  words,  the 
committee  work  must  be  in  the  nature  of  preparation  for 
the  trial  and  not  the  trial  itself.  If  the  Frear  bills  had 
been  pushed  forward  for  enactment  this  is  a  point  that 
should  have  been  made  clear. 

The  Green  Resolution 

The  Green  Resolution  (H.  J.  Res.  168)  has  the  merit 
of  being  a  straight  out-and-out  measure  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  legislative  budget.  It  provides  for  a  "  budget 
committee  "  to  be  made  up  of  five  members  selected  by 
the  ways  and  means  committee  of  the  Senate.  And  it 
is  made  "  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
immediately  upon  receipt  of  the  regular  annual  esti- 
mates ...  or  as  soon  as  practical  to  transmit  a  detailed 
statement  of  all  estimates  to  said  budget  committee." 
From  this  point  on,  everything  would  proceed  according 
to  the  Sherley  model.  There  would  be  no  executive 
responsibility  for  anything  except  to  see  to  it  that  the 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        363 

clerks  prepared  the  information  called  for.  It  is  simple. 
There  is  no  need  for  reorganization  anywhere,  because 
the  whole  past  development,  both  legislative  and  bureau- 
cratic, has  been  one  that  is  suited  to  such  a  planning 
agency.  The  Green  measure  would  simply  glorify  "  gov- 
ernment-by-chairmen-of-standing-committees  "  by  organ- 
izing a  "  super-committee."  With  this  the  whole  prob- 
lem of  budget  making  would  be  solved  —  unless  perchance 
it  might  develop  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
might  continue  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  to  find  fault 
with  the  "  invisible  "  and  "  irresponsible  "  government. 
In  that  event,  the  Green  bill,  or  the  Fitzgerald  proposal, 
or  the  Sherley  proposal,  or  the  Cannon  proposal,  or 
any  other  proposal  for  a  "  legislative  budget  "  if  adopted, 
would  in  time  be  relegated  to  the  political  scrap  heap  that 
is  already  piled  high  with  time  serving  palliatives  and  ill 
adapted  efforts  at  reform  sought  and  achieved  without 
disturbing  the  status  quo  ante. 

The  Good  Bill 

The  Good  bill  (H.  R.  1201)  has  not  the  merit  of 
clarity  possessed  by  the  Frear  Bills  and  the  Green  Res- 
olution described  above.  One  may  read  it  time  and  again 
and  still  be  in  doubt  as  to  what  it  does  aim  to  accomplish. 
But  of  one  thing  the  reader  feels  certain;  that  there  is 
an  attempt  to  capitalize  the  popular  clamor  for  responsible 
government  through  the  institution  of  a  budget  pro- 
cedure. The  framers  of  the  bill  have  evidently  tried  to 
be  nice  to  every  one.  The  bill  holds  out  the  appearance 
of  an  executive  budget  measure ;  but  on  analysis  it  is 
found  to  lack  the  essentials,  and  one  is  left  with  the 
conviction  that  it  is  a  complete  surrender  to  the  "  chair- 
men "  who  would  protect  their  great  powers  by  insisting 
on  the  Congressional  status  quo;  that  it  is  essentially  a 
well-camouflaged  legislative  budget  device  —  a  Republi- 
can measure  well  designed  to  fulfill  the  prophecy  of  Mr. 


364      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Cannon,  which  in  fact  is  a  redemption  of  the  party  pledge 
by  the  Fitzgerald-Sherley  route.  Or  it  might  turn  out  to 
be  a  "  commission  budget  plan  " —  a  thing  not  suited  to 
the  Federal  Government  and  therefore  in  effect  under  the 
domination  of  the  chairmen  of  standing  committees  be- 
cause opposed  to  executive  responsibility. 

The  apparent  executive  character  of  the  proposal  is 
given  by  clauses  like  these: 

"  There  is  created  in  the  office  of  the  President  a  bureau 
of  the  budget." 

"  There  shall  be  in  the  bureau  a  director  and  an  assistant 
director,  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President,  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate." 

"  The  bureau  of  the  budget  shall  assist  the  President 
in  the  performance  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  him  by 
this  act." 

But  none  of  these  deal  with  essentials.  The  location 
of  the  bureau  "  in  the  office  of  the  President  "  is  a  figure 
of  speech  unless  the  bureau  is  in  fact  his  staff  agency. 
Appointment  "  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Sen- 
ate "  does  not  fix  responsibility.  The  requirement  to 
"  assist  the  President  in  the  performance  of  the  powers 
conferred  "  depends  entirely  on  other  clauses  to  make 
it  vital.     These  are  discussed  below. 

The  Andrews  Resolution 

The  Andrews  Bill  (H.  R.  551)  does  not  assume  to 
be  more  than  a  part-way  measure.  It  has  for  its  pur- 
pose to  transfer  the  audit  function  to  Congress.  This  is 
entirely  consistent  with  an  executive  budget  —  in  fact 
a  complementary  part.  But  the  audit  function  should 
never  be  confused  with  accounting.  The  accounting 
must  be  performed  by  those  who  are  held  accountable. 
And  there  is  much  more  to  accounting  than  simply  keep- 
ing within  or  recording  charges  against  appropriations. 
There  must  be  accounts  with  properties  and  indebtedness ; 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         365 

account  showing  unit  costs ;  accounts  showing  operations 
by  functions  or  kinds  of  public  services  rendered ; 
accounts  by  organization  units  or  officials  to  be  held 
responsible.  There  are  various  subjects  concerning 
which  information  is  needed  for  purposes  of  administra- 
tion that  have  no  relation  whatever  to  the  question  of 
"  authority "  to  spend.  These  accounting  functions 
must  be  left  with  the  responsible  officer  as  a  means  of 
keeping  in  touch.  The  audit  function  is  one  of  review 
of  accounts  and  official  acts  and  should  be  in  the  hands 
of  the  critical  agency.  But  if  the  leadership  in  the  matter 
of  administrative  planning  and  finance  is  in  the  hands 
of  chairmen  of  congressional  committees,  then  the  audit 
function  is  at  once  impaired.  Only  in  case  of  an  executive 
budget  should  the  Auditor  General  be  put  under  the  com- 
mittee that  takes  leadership  before  Congress. 

The  Tinkham  Resolution 

One  of  the  measures  which  by  its  terms  seems  to 
recognize  a  need  for  revision  of  rules  of  Congress  is 
the  Tinkham  Resolution  (H.  R.  107).  The  preamble  of 
this  resolution  recites : 

"  Whereas  there  are  now  pending  before  Congress  a 
number  of  bills  providing  for  the  establishment  of  what 
is  known  as  a  national  budget  system ;  and, 

"  Whereas  an  essential  feature  of  this  system  is  that 
the  President  shall  annually  transmit  to  Congress,  upon 
its  assembling  in  ordinary  session,  a  document  known 
as  a  budget  which,  among  other  things,  shall  present  in 
one  place  a  complete  coordinated  statement  of  the  pro- 
vision which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  President,  should  be 
made  for  meeting  the  revenue  and  expenditure  needs  of 
the  government  for  the  next  ensuing  fiscal  year,  to  the 
end  that  the  problem  of  financing  the  government  may  be 
considered  as  a  whole  at  one  time,  and  especially  that 


366      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

a  proper  balance  may  be  maintained  between  prospective 
revenues  and  expenditures ;  and, 

"  Whereas  it  is  essential,  if  this  unity  of  financial  pro- 
gram is  to  be  maintained,  that  the  rules  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  shall  be  so  framed  that  the  budget,  when 
received,  will  be  considered  as  a  whole,  instead  of  being 
split  up  and  the  several  parts  being  considered  by  sep- 
arate committees  acting  independently  of  each  other  as 
is  necessary  under  the  existing  rules  of  the  House;  and 

"  Whereas  it  is  further  essential  that  safeguards  shall 
be  thrown  around  the  budget  bi'll  ...  to  prevent  its 
undue  change  by  individual  members." 

These  whereases  speak  of  the  necessity  for  change 
in  rules,  and  the  resolution  speaks  of  nothing  else,  except 
to  suggest  the  character  of  changes  to  be  made.  It  is  a 
question,  therefore,  whether  the  proposed  change  in  rules 
would  be  ill  or  well  adapted  to  the  institution  of  an 
executive  budget.  The  proposed  changes  in  rules  are 
deserving  of  special  consideration  because  it  is  proposed 
by  Mr.  Tinkham  that  the  "  super-committee "  idea  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  inquiry  and  discussion.  This 
is  the  device  proposed  by  Mr.  Sherley,  for  use  in  the 
preparation  of  a  "  legislative  budget."  Mr.  Tinkham 
would  adopt  it  for  use  with  the  "  executive  budget."  His 
suggestion  raises  the  question  as  to  whether  it  is  adapted 
to  the  purpose. 

Critical  Discussion  of  Executive  Proposals  Before  the 
House 

The  purpose  of  bringing  revenue  and  appropriation 
measures  of  any  kind  before  Congress  is  to  enable  the 
representative  body  to  control  the  administration  by  con- 
trolling the  purse.  To  achieve  this  result  some  one  who 
has  knowledge  of  the  service  needs  must  prepare  and 
be  sponsor  for  the  measure  to  be  inquired  into  and  voted 
on  by  the  members.     The  past  practice  has  been   for 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress       2>&7 

Congress  to  divide  up  the  work  among  a  large  number 
of  committees.  Special  committees  first  become  familiar 
with  service  needs  of  a  particular  department  or  office. 
Then  in  due  time  this  committee  frames  a  measure  to 
be  brought  before  Congress  which  measure  is  sponsored 
by  the  chairman.  The  useful  function  of  the  "  super- 
committee,"  as  seen  by  Mr.  Sherley,  was  to  enable  all 
of  the  chairmen  of  these  several  committees  to  get  to- 
gether, and  then  through  a  "  super-chairman  "  to  present 
a  consolidated  bill  or  "  legislative  budget." 

This  device,  however,  was  not  urged  as  a  means  of 
making  the  executive  responsible ;  nor  was  it  urged  as 
a  means  of  giving  publicity  to  the  work  of  Congress. 
It  was  urged  as  a  means  of  preventing  executive  leader- 
ship. The  "  executive  budget  "  is  based  on  quite  another 
assumption.  Its  purpose  is  to  force  the  executive,  who 
is  asking  for  financial  support  and  who  by  reason  of 
his  everyday  contact  with  the  problem  of  administration 
has  knowledge  of  service  needs,  to  assume  responsibility 
for  bringing  before  the  membership  of  the  deliberative 
body  a  well-considered  plan  of  service  and  finance  at 
the  beginning  of  the  session,  instead  of  leaving  it  to  a 
committee  to  bring  its  proposals  at  the  end  of  the  session 
after  they  have  had  time  to  study  the  service  needs. 

Both  the  protagonists  of  the  "  legislative  budget "  and 
the  protagonists  of  the  "  executive  budget  "  assume  that 
the  best  person  to  be  sponsor  for  a  plan  is  the  one  who 
prepares  it  and  is  therefore  most  familiar  with  the  con- 
siderations that  led  to  the  request  for  funds  in  the  form 
presented.  The  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  execu- 
tive, assisted  by  his  cabinet,  would  prepare  and  sponsor 
the  plan  in  the  one  case;  and  a  chairman  of  a  legislative 
committee,  assisted  by  his  fellow  members,  would  prepare 
and  sponsor  the  plan  in  the  other.  But  in  both  cases  the 
one  who  proposed  the  plan  would  be  expected  to  sponsor 
it.     Now  this,  being  the  one  principle  commonly  accepted 


368      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

by  both  groups  of  protagonists,  in  case  an  "  executive- 
budget  "  plan  is  adopted,  there  is  no  occasion  for  refer- 
ring the  departmental  requests  to  a  committee  to  obtain 
the  information  needed  for  the  preparation  of  a  finance 
plan,  as  would  be  the  case  if  a  "  legislative  budget  "  is  to 
be  prepared.  This  work  has  already  been  done  in  execu- 
tive cabinet  before  the  appropriating  body  meets. 

With  an  "  executive  budget  "  the  only  need  for  a  com- 
mittee is  to  develop  criticism  and  discussion.  And  for 
this  purpose  both  the  Frear  and  the  Andrews  plans  of 
audit  and  committee  inquest  are  adapted.  For  this  pur- 
pose the  congressional  bill  proposed  by  Mr.  Tinkham 
wou'ld  seem  to  be  as  illsuited  as  anything  that  could  well 
be  imagined.  The  committees,  whose  chairman  (together 
with  a  super-chairman  chosen  by  the  House)  would  con- 
stitute the  majority  of  this  "  super-committee,"  would 
not,  in  the  normal  course  of  events,  be  men  who  would 
be  disposed  to  criticize  the  executive  and  the  departmental 
heads.  Normally  they  would  all  be  of  the  same  party; 
politically  they  would  all  be  bedfellows.  If  the  members 
are  to  become  informed  through  searching  criticism  and 
discussion  before  they  are  called  on  to  vote  away  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  public  money  they  must  provide 
for  having  criticism  offered  by  persons  who  are  critically 
disposed  —  the  organization  and  leadership  for  this 
purpose  must  come  from  the  opposition. 

Such  an  organization  for  purposes  of  inquiry  and  dis- 
cussion as  is  suggested  by  Mr.  Tinkham,  assuming  that 
the  President  were  to  submit  a  budget,  would  be  adapted 
to  only  one  purpose  —  to  apply  vigorously  and  use 
effectively  the  well-known  principle  of  "  gag-rule."  This 
is  not  an  academic  conclusion  —  a  mere  matter  of  logic. 
This  result  has  been  the  uniform  outworking  of  such 
an  organization  —  a  committee  of  inquiry  controlled  by 
the  party  friendly  to  the  administration  where  an  "  exec- 
utive-budget "  plan  has  been  in  operation.     On  the  other 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         369 

hand  a  committee  whose  chairman  and  control  is  taken 
from  the  opposition  has  proved  most  useful.  An  example 
of  the  operation  of  an  opposition  committee  is  found  in 
the  British  Parliament  —  where  the  chairman  of  the 
"  Committee  on  Public  Accounts  "  as  the  critical  com- 
mittee is  then  called,  has  been  taken  from  the  opposition 
every  year  but  one  from  1866  until  191 4,  when  a 
Coalition  Cabinet  was  formed.  This  committee  was 
made  up  of  the  best  finance  and  administrative  critics  in 
the  House.  An  example  of  the  very  bad  results  achieved 
by  putting  the  critical  committee  under  the  control  of 
the  pro-administration  party  may  be  found  in  every 
province  of  Canada  and  the  Dominion  Government 
where  the  only  function  performed  by  them  has  been  to 
whitewash  the  government  and  "  gag  "  the  opposition. 
The  uniformity  of  operation  of  this  principle  is  found  in 
American  practice  in  the  "  committees  on  expenditures  " 
of  Congress.  They  become  actively  critical  only  when 
the  party  in  control  of  Congress  is  opposed  to  the  admin- 
istration. 

This  does  not  mean  that  committees  in  the  appropriating 
body  are  less  important  when  an  "  executive-budget " 
procedure  is  used  than  when  the  finance  measure  or  plan 
is  prepared  under  leadership  provided  in  the  deliberative 
body  itself.  Rather  this:  when  an  "executive  budget" 
is  laid  before  the  appropriating  body  at  the  beginning  of 
the  session,  sponsored  by  the  head  of  the  administration, 
the  committee  organization  within  the  deliberative  body 
may  and  should  devote  itself  to  getting  the  case  of  the 
administration  before  the  membership  in  a  manner  to  hav- 
ing it  considered  and  determined  on  its  merits.  That  is, 
the  crying  need  in  this  country  is  to  have  decisions  on 
matters  of  policy  reached  after  deliberation ;  and  the  com- 
mittee system  should  aid,  not  stand  in  the  way  of  this. 

This  is  one  of  the  chief  advantages  of  the  "  executive- 
budget  "  plan.     This  would  bring  the  executive  before 


$jo      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  money-granting  body  as  an  applicant  for  support  and 
relief  of  institutions  and  enterprises  which  together  serve 
the  welfare  needs  of  the  people.  Upon  this  application 
the  service  needs  are  to  be  determined  by  a  jury  of  500 
members,  chosen  by  an  electorate  which  is  authorized  to 
speak  for  a  hundred  million  people,  to  decide  matters  of 
this  kind.  The  real  problem  before  this  body  at  this  time 
is  to  develop  a  trial  practice  which  is  adapted  to  giving 
the  executive  as  applicant  for  funds  a  full  and  fair  hear- 
ing, and  the  members  of  this  great  jury  of  500  represent- 
ing the  American  people  full  information  and  a  fair 
chance  to  know  what  are  the  service  needs  calling  for  the 
action  to  be  taken  before  the  members  of  the  jury  are 
required  to  vote. 

Since  decision  involves  grave  questions  of  public  policy, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  plan 
of  program  proposed,  men  will  take  sides  "  for  "  and 
"  against "  and  the  purpose  of  the  proceeding  is  to  give 
information  so  that  each  member  may  voice  his  judgment 
when  voting  "  for  "  or  "  against  "  the  proposal  in  the  exact 
form  presented.  This  means  that  there  is  need  for 
counsel  "  for "  and  "  against "  the  proposal,  in  that 
the  rules  should  be  so  framed  that  counsel  "  against  " 
as  well  as  counsel  "  for "  this  the  greatest  of  all 
measures  that  can  come  before  Congress  may  have 
a  chance  to  prepare  their  case;  that  ample  provision 
should  be  made  for  two  committees  or  groups  of  counsel 
—  the  one  to  manage  the  case  of  the  administration,  the 
other  to  serve  the  membership  and  the  country  as  critics ; 
that  these  critics  may  serve  the  members  by  pointing  out 
all  the  social  and  political  dangers  that  might  follow  the 
adoption  of  the  plan  and  bring  to  their  attention  all 
the  facts  and  arguments  that  should  give  pause  before 
action  is  taken.  However  desirable  it  may  be  to  lay  down 
an  organization  and  procedure  for  the  conduct  of  the 
case  of  the  administration,  this  would   develop  in  any 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         371 

event;  the  most  important  consideration  of  all,  in  the 
development  of  a  trial  practice,  is  to  provide  for  an 
effective  organization  and  procedure  to  perform  the 
function  of  critical  review  and  discussion  —  the  reason 
being  that  the  disposition  of  majorities  is  to  override 
minorities  and  not  to  give  them  a  hearing. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  two  kinds  of  committees  now  exist 
in  Congress :  one  class  which  undertakes  to  represent  the 
needs  of  the  administration;  another  class  which  is  to 
act  as  its  critics.  The  one  class  is  made  up  of  the  various 
committees  which  prepare  and  sponsor  appropriation  bills ; 
the  other  class  is  made  up  of  what  are  called  "  committees 
on  expenditures "  whose  function  is  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  members  things  which  call  for  censure  or 
opposition.  If  the  functions  of  advocacy  on  the  one 
hand  and  opposition  on  the  other  are  recognized  as 
the  two  essentials  of  group  deliberation,  and  it  seems  best 
to  provide  departmental  specialists  in  Congress  for  each 
of  these  purposes  (or  committees  and  super-committees 
as  suggested  by  Mr.  Tinkham),  then  there  should  be  two 
leaderships :  the  one  should  be  organized  and  controlled 
by  those  who  are  "  for  "  the  administration;  and  the  other 
should  be  organized  and  controlled  by  those  who  are 
"against"  the  administration.  If  the  committees  are  so 
constituted,  instead  of  having  Congress  having  no  organic 
means  of  criticism  except  in  case  a  majority  is  "  against  " 
the  President,  and  no  organic  means  of  advocacy  except 
when  a  majority  is  "  for  "  the  President,  as  is  now  the 
case  under  the  rules  as  they  stand,  there  would  be  at  all 
times  a  way  provided  for  making  Congress  an  effective 
court  of  inquest  and  decision  —  at  once  a  public  forum 
and  a  grand  jury  for  the  nation. 

Appointment  of  a  "  Select  Committee  on  the  Budget " 

In  the  contact  developed,  the  exchange  of  ideas  on  bud- 
get proposals,  the  conferences  growing  out  of  the  several 


372      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

bills  introduced  looking  toward  the  introduction  of  an 
"  executive-budget  "  procedure  for  the  preparation  and 
consideration  of  service  needs  and  requirements  in  finan- 
cial support,  it  became  evident  that  there  were  many  facts 
still  to  be  developed  before  the  proponents  of  the  system 
would  be  ready  to  go  before  Congress  with  a  plan  that  they 
could  defend.  Therefore  all  the  moving  parties  joined  in 
advocacy  of  a  special  committee  to  collect  data  and  pre- 
pare a  well-considered  plan  to  be  laid  before  the  next 
Congress.  Mr.  Tinkham  had  proposed  that  the  Standing 
Committee  on  Rules  report  on  the  subject.  But  this 
would  be  a  committee  that  had  little  interest  in  a  new 
budget  procedure ;  its  instinctive  reaction  would  be  to 
perpetuate  the  rules  as  they  have  developed  around 
standing-committee  leadership  —  the  old  system.  Mr. 
Mann  and  Mr.  Goodwin  introduced  resolutions  for  a 
special  committee  to  report  on  a  plan.  Congressman 
Good  proposed  a  "  Select  Committee  on  the  Budgets,"  to 
which  was  referred  for  consideration  and  report  all  bills, 
resolutions,  and  documents  for  the  establishment  of  a 
national  budget  system  or  proposing  changes  in  the  present 
methods  of  dealing  with  appropriations,  estimates,  and 
expenditures.  This  committee  held  many  long  sessions, 
called  before  it  many  persons  in  and  out  of  public  life, 
and  then  reported  recommending  the  passage  of  the 
Good  Bill. 


The  Amended  Good  Bill  (H.  R.  9783)  Recommended  by 
the  Committee 

That  the  Good  Bill  is  not  intended  as  a  straight  out- 
and-out  "  executive  budget  "  measure  appears  both  from 
analysis  and  by  admission  of  its  sponsors.  For  purposes 
of  analysis  let  us  consider  each  of  the  three  phases  of  a 
budget  procedure  laid  down  by  the  committee  itself.  In 
its  report  this  formula  is  found : 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        373 

"  Broadly  speaking  a  budget  system  has  three  distinct 
phases,  namely: 

(1)  The  formation  of  the  budget; 

(2)  Action  on  the  budget  by  Congress; 

(3)  Supervision  and  control  of  the  executive  of  the 

budget." 

In  making  critical  appraisal  of  the  bill  as  it  came  from 
the  committee  let  us  also  consider  the  admitted  purpose. 
The  purpose  as  stated  is  to  make  the  administration  re- 
sponsible to  the  people.  Enlarging  on  this,  the  committee 
said: 

"  In  the  national  government  there  can  be  no  question 
that  the  officer  upon  whom  should  be  placed  this  respon- 
sibility is  the  President  of  the  United  States.  He  is  the 
only  officer  who  is  superior  to  the  heads  of  departments 
and  independent  establishments.  He  is  the  only  officer  of 
the  administration  who  is  interested  in  the  administration, 
who  is  interested  in  the  government  as  a  whole,  rather 
than  one  particular  part.  He  is  the  only  administrative 
officer  who  is  selected  by  the  people  and  thus  can  be  held 
politically  responsible  for  his  actions.  Furthermore,  as 
the  head  of  the  administration,  it  is  to  him  that  Congress 
and  the  people  should  look  for  a  clear  and  definite  state- 
ment of  what  provision  in  his  opinion  should  be  made  for 
revenue  and  expenditure  needs  of  the  Government." 

Only  One  of  Three  Essentials  to  an  Executive  Budget 
Provided  For 
Now  with  these  propositions  before  us  let  us  consider 
what  provision  is  made  for  placing  and  keeping  respon- 
sibility on  the  shoulders  of  the  President.  If  the  Presi- 
dent is  to  be  held  accountable  to  the  people  there  can  be 
no  question  about  this  proposition :     That  members  of  the 


374       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

representative  body  when  they  are  called  on  to  vote  for  or 
against  an  executive  proposal,  and  the  people  must  know 
what  it  is  that  the  President  stands  for.  That  is  to  say : 
It  is  not  enough  to  know  what  the  original  or  initial  re- 
quest was.  A  procedure  must  be  adopted  which  will 
enable  members  of  Congress  and  the  people  to  follow  ex- 
ecutive responsibility  through  each  phase  from  the  initial 
request  to  execution :  ( i )  What  the  plan  was  as  origi- 
nally prepared;  (2)  what  propositions  are  made  for  modi- 
fication before  enactment,  and  the  reasons  therefor;  and 
(3)  what  was  done  in  the  conduct  of  the  business  author- 
ized. The  Good  Bill  makes  provision  for  only  one  of 
these  three  essentials. 

With  respect  to  the  formation  of  the  plan  of  work  and 
finance  to  be  laid  before  Congress,  the  Good  bill  is  very 
explicit.  On  this  point  the  report  of  the  committee  offers 
a  convincing  argument  and  clear  expose : 

"  In  order  that  the  President  may  be  in  a  position  in- 
telligently to  formulate  such  a  plan  he  must  be  given  a 
machinery  through  which  he  can  keep  in  intimate  and 
immediate  touch  with  all  the  work  of  the  government  and 
be  able  intelligently  to  criticize,  revise,  and  correlate  the 
requests  for  authorizations  to  engage  in  work  or  for 
funds  with  which  to  pay  for  their  several  activities.  The 
bill  that  has  been  prepared  by  the  committee  provides  for 
such  machinery  by  the  creation  of  a  service  known  as  the 
Bureau  of  the  Budget.  This  service  is  placed  under  the 
immediate  direction  of  the  President.  Its  duties  are  to 
assist  the  President  in  the  performance  of  the  powers  con- 
ferred on  him  by  the  proposed  act." 

So  much  for  clarity  in  fixing  responsibility  for  prepar- 
ing a  plan  or  program  to  be  submitted  to  Congress.  But 
look  as  one  may  no  provision  can  be  found  either  in  the 
bill  or  in  the  accompanying  resolution  for  like  definition 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        375 

of  responsibility  through  the  other  two  phases.  On  the 
contrary,  the  provisions  made  are  no  other  than  those 
which  in  the  past  have  brought  to  pass  results  that  every 
true  American  abhors  — "  invisible  "  and  "  irresponsible  " 
government. 

The  President  Already  Has  All  the  Powers  Provided  For 

With  respect  to  the  various  changes  that  must  neces- 
sarily be  made  in  a  measure  prepared  weeks  or  months  in 
advance  of  enactment,  there  is  no  method  provided  for 
fixing  responsibility.  Neither  the  President  nor  the 
members  of  his  cabinet  are  expected  or  permitted  to  come 
before  the  representatives  of  the  people  in  Congress  assem- 
bled to  explain,  defend,  and  discuss  the  proposals  as  origi- 
nally urged  or  in  amended  form.  And  no  provision 
is  made  to  enable  the  President  to  direct,  control,  or  super- 
vise the  execution  of  the  activities  of  the  government  after 
appropriations  have  been  granted.  Both  of  these  are  es- 
sentials to  fixing  responsibility.  Without  them  there  can 
be  no  "  executive  budget  " —  there  can  be  no  clear  vision 
of  what  the  executive  really  stands  for;  there  is  no  way 
of  preventing  misrepresentation  of  the  acts  and  proposals 
of  the  administration  on  the  floor  of  the  House;  there 
can  be  no  clear  issues  joined;  there  can  be  no  publicity 
given  to  the  moving  considerations  that  affect  decisions 
reached;  there  can  be  nothing  to  guide  the  judgment  of 
members  or  the  people  in  voting  except  "  party  "  loyalty. 

Under  the  Good  bill  there  would  be  almost  no  gain  in 
furtherance  of  efforts  to  establish  "  visible  "  and  "  respon- 
sible "  government.  As  was  stated  by  President  Taft, 
the  constitution  gives  to  the  executive  the  right  to  pro- 
pose and  submit  a  budget  and  this  is  recognized  by  the 
committee  when  it  says  in  its  report : 

"  It  thus  makes  more  definite  the  constitutional  obliga- 
tion that  rests  on  the  President  '  from  time  to  time  to 


376      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

give  to  Congress  information  of  the  state  of  the  Union 
and  recommend  to  their  consideration  such  measures  as 
he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient.'  ' 

The  committee  might  also  have  pointed  to  the  constitu- 
tional provision  quoted  by  President  Taft  in  support  of 
his  proposal :  The  right  of  the  chief  executive  to  call  on 
"  the  principal  officers  of  each  of  the  executive  depart- 
ments "  for  such  information  as  he  may  desire  "  upon  any 
subject  relating  to  the  duties  of  their  respective  offices." 
Further  than  this,  by  Act  of  March  4,  1909,  known  as  the 
Smith  law,  Congress  has  already  made  it  the  duty  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  whenever  the  estimated  ex- 
penditures exceed  the  estimated  revenues,  to  transmit  the 
estimates  to  the  President  "  to  the  end  that  he  may,  in 
giving  Congress  information  of  the  state  of  the  Union, 
and  in  recommending  to  their  consideration  such  meas- 
ures as  he  may  judge  necessary,  advise  the  Congress  how 
in  his  judgment  the  estimated  appropriations  could  with 
least  injury  to  the  public  service  be  reduced  ...  or  if 
such  reduction  be  not  in  his  judgment  practicable  without 
undue  injury  to  the  public  service,  that  he  may  recom- 
mend to  Congress  such  loans  or  new  taxes  as  may  be 
necessary  to  cover  the  deficiencies."  So  far  as  the  Presi- 
dent is  concerned,  therefore,  the  Good  bill  has  done  noth- 
ing except  to  set  up  a  new  bureau  to  do  what  he  already 
could  do  if  he  had  wished  to  use  the  machinery  and  pow- 
ers already  provided.  There  is  no  reason  why  we  have 
not  had  an  executive  budget  except  the  dominance  of  irre- 
sponsible standing  committees,  and  this  the  Good  bill  does 
not  propose  to  change. 

Intent  of  the  Committee  not  to  Provide  for  an  Executive 
Budget 

Finally,  the  committee  in  support  of  the  Good  bill 
frankly  admits  that  it  does  not  intend  that  the  country 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress         $77 

shall  have  an  executive  budget.     On  this  point  the  report 
says: 

"  It  will  doubtless  be  claimed  by  some  that  this  is  an 
executive  budget.  .  .  .  The  plan  outlined  does  provide 
for  an  executive  initiation  of  the  budget,  but  the  Presi- 
dent's responsibility  ends  when  he  has  prepared  the  budget 
and  transmitted  it  to  Congress.  To  that  extent,  and  to 
that  extent  alone  does  the  plan  provide  for  an  executive 
budget.  .  .  ." 

The  committee  in  all  frankness  might  have  said :  It  is 
in  fact  to  be  made  a  Congressional  measure  before  it  will 
be  considered  by  the  membership;  the  executive  pro- 
posal is  for  the  information  of  the  standing  committees; 
the  super-committee  made  up  of  irresponsible  leaders 
will  undertake  to  prepare  the  instrument  that  comes 
before  the  members  for  inquiry,  discussion  and  ac- 
tion; what  we  propose  is  a  "legislative  budget."  In 
other  words,  it  is  simply  a  plan  to  do  exactly  what 
the  Smith  law  contemplates.  It  is  a  plan  to  induce 
the  President  to  assume  personal  responsibility  for  the 
details  of  the  estimates  as  well  as  a  financial  plan  to  be 
mulled  over  in  the  secrecy  of  the  committee  room, 
amended,  changed,  and  buffeted  about  in  any  manner  that 
a  group  of  irresponsible  "  leaders  "  may  see  fit,  and  then 
give  to  these  leaders  a  chance  to  play  ducks  and  drakes 
with  the  President  on  the  floor  with  no  opportunity  given 
to  him  or  to  his  cabinet,  openly  and  publicly  to  explain  or 
defend  the  executive  proposal  as  submitted,  to  meet  irre- 
sponsible criticism  or  to  challenge  the  independent  pro- 
posals and  the  log-rolling  measures  worked  out  and 
agreed  to  by  "  chairmen  "  of  standing  committees  who 
hold  their  positions  and  exercise  their  powers  by  reason 
of  length  of  service,  loyalty  and  subservience  to  an  oli- 
garchy which  controls  an  organization  that  exists  outside 


378      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

of  the  Government,  responsible  to  no  one,  and  which  con- 
trols the  Government  through  these  standing  committees. 

Action  in  the  Senate 

In  the  Senate  other  measures  were  introduced  and  a 
similar  select  committee  was  finally  appointed.  This 
committee  has  done  very  little  owing  to  the  preoccupation 
of  the  Senate  with  discussion  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
One  proposal  before  the  Senate  deserves  special  mention, 
as  bearing  on  the  executive-budget  commitments  of  the 
Republican  party  —  Senate  Bill  Nos.  450  and  456,  intro- 
duced by  Mr.  McCormick.  They  cover  much  the  same 
ground  as  the  Frear  Bills. 

The  McCormick  Budget  Bills 

Senate  Bill  No.  450  has  for  its  purpose  the  creation 
of  an  independent  audit  office.  By  its  terms,  Congress 
for  the  first  time  in  American  history  would  have  a  per- 
manent staff  possessing  the  necessary  powers  and  charged 
with  the  duties  of  currently  reviewing  all  acts  of  the 
administration  involving  the  receipt  and  expenditure  of 
public  money.  Heretofore,  the  functions  of  audit  and 
review  and  approval  of  transactions  have  been  under  the 
Treasury  —  a  branch  of  the  administration  responsible 
to  the  President.  But  Mr.  McCormick  would  make  the 
President  responsible  for  leadership  in  planning.  There- 
fore the  critical  faculty  would  be  in  Congress.  And  when 
leadership  is  exercised  by  Congress  and  the  President 
exercises  the  critical  and  veto  function  this  is  consistent. 
The  new  comptroller-auditor  general,  and  his  assistants 
would  be  independent  of  the  administration  whose  acts 
are  to  be  reviewed  and  reported  on;  and  to  make  the 
office  free  from  partisan  influence,  to  give  it  the  char- 
acter of  political  disinterestedness,  the  comptroller-auditor 
general,  the  assistant  comptroller-auditor  general,  and 
the   solicitor   of   the   audit   office   are   to   be   given   the 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        379 

same  tenure  and  freedom  in  the  exercise  of  discretion 
as  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The  bill  provides  that 
"  every  department  account  shall  be  examined  by  the 
comptroller-auditor  general  on  behalf  of  Congress  and 
such  examination  shall  determine  whether  the  payments 
which  are  charged  in  the  accounts  to  the  sums  appro- 
priated are  supported  by  vouchers  and  proofs  of  payment, 
and  whether  the  money  expended  has  been  applied  to 
the  purpose  or  purposes  for  which  such  appropriation 
was  intended  to  provide.  That  in  order  that  such  exam- 
ination may,  as  far  as  possible,  proceed  pari  passu  with 
the  cash  transactions  of  the  several  disbursing  offices  of 
the  executive  departments,  the  comptroller-auditor  gen- 
eral shall  have  free  access  at  all  convenient  times  to  the 
books  of  account  and  other  documents  relating  to  the 
accounts  of  such  departments  and  may  require  the  several 
departments  concerned  to  furnish  him  from  time  to 
time,  or  at  regular  periods,  with  accounts  of  the  cash 
transactions  of  such  departments  respectively  up  to  such 
times  or  periods."  On  the  fifteenth  days  of  January  of 
each  year  the  comptroller-auditor  general  would  be 
required  to  lay  before  Congress  the  accounts  of  the  pre- 
ceding fiscal  year  as  certified  and  reported  on  by  him, 
and  to  call  the  attention  of  Congress  to  every  case  in 
which  payments  exceed  or  are  not  properly  charged  to  an 
appropriation,  are  not  supported  by  proof,  or  any  other 
fact  or  information  which  may  show  irregularity;  and 
power  is  also  given  to  make  interim  reports  when  the 
circumstances  may  seem  to  warrant.  The  office  is  also 
charged  with  the  duty  of  critically  reviewing  estimates 
for  expenditures  for  the  information  of  Congress. 

Senate  Bill  No.  456,  introduced  by  Mr.  McCormick, 
by  its  terms  would  create  in  the  Treasury  Department 
an  office  to  be  known  as  the  Budget  Bureau,  charged  with 
the  duty  of  collecting  the  data  needed  to  enable  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  to  prepare  a  budget  for  the  Pres- 


380      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

ident  to  submit  to  Congress  "  in  giving  information  of 
the  state  of  the  Union  "  and  to  "  recommend  for  their 
consideration  as  a  measure  of  law  the  annual  estimates 
of  expenditures  of  the  several  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  also  such  changes  or  adjustments  in  the  rev- 
enue laws  as  may  in  his  judgment  be  necessary  to  meet 
such  expenditures " ;  for  which  purpose  it  would  be 
made  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  before 
submitting  them  to  the  President  "  to  revise,  to  consolidate, 
to  unify,  to  coordinate,  to  reduce,  diminish,  or  otherwise 
change  any  item  or  items  in  the  annual  estimates,  or  in 
any  deficiency,  supplemental,  or  other  estimates  of  ex- 
penditures for  the  various  branches  of  the  government 
in  such  manner  as  may  be  necessary  to  effect  economies 
and  to  prevent  waste,  extravagance,  loss,  duplication,  and 
the  like  " —  an  exception  being  made  of  the  technical 
branches  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  which  are 
to  be  submitted  to  the  President  without  change.  The 
budget  so  made  would  be  required  to  be  in  the  hands  of 
the  President  on  or  before  November  15th,  thereby  giving 
to  the  President  time  to  make  his  budget  a  matter  of 
cabinet  consideration  before  putting  it  in  final  form  for 
submission  to  Congress.  Thus  the  McCormick  Bills 
would  give  to  the  President,  under  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  a  budget  bureau,  and,  by  operation  of  existing 
law  not  repealed,  the  power  to  prescribe  and  install  an 
effective  system  of  administrative  accounts;  they  would 
give  to  Congress  an  independent  audit  office  for  the 
review  and  report  on  all  past  acts  involving  money  trans- 
actions, and  a  means  of  staff  review  and  criticism  of 
the  estimates,  for  the  information  of  members  at  the 
time  that  the  budget  is  taken  up  for  consideration. 

The  McCormick  Bills  are  more  complete  in  certain  re- 
spects than  are  the  Frear  Bills,  but  they  lack  one  essential 
taken  up  by  Mr.  Frear.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
McCormick  Bills,  nor  in  any  accompanying  resolution, 


Budget  Bills  Before  the  Last  Congress        381 

which  provides  for  or  suggests  a  modification  of  the 
rules  of  Congress  to  provide  for  a  fair,  open,  and  adequate 
consideration  of  the  budget  after  it  has  been  received  by 
Congress.  The  President  has  the  constitutional  right  to 
present  the  budget  in  person  or  by  letter.  But  there  is 
no  suggestion  of  need  for  provision  for  explanation, 
criticism,  or  defense  when  it  is  taken  up  in  detail  for  the 
information  of  members.  Assuming  that  the  majority 
in  Congress  is  favorable  to  the  administration,  there  is  no 
way  that  criticism  can  be  effectively  organized  except 
by  the  members  of  the  opposition;  and  to  effect  this  the 
rules  must  be  radically  changed.  Assuming  that  the 
majority  is  hostile  to  the  administration,  there  is  no  way 
to  insure  that  the  budget  will  be  considered  at  all  —  the 
whole  thing  may  be  ignored  and  resort  may  be  had  to 
the  same  practice  as  now  obtains.1 

1  This  was  written  during  the  last  session  of  Congress.  During 
the  2nd  session  of  the  Sixty-sixth  Congress  the  Senate  Committee 
began  hearings,  with  a  view  to  making  an  early  report.  It  is  under- 
stood that  some  of  those  giving  testimony  urged  that  the  cabinet  be 
given  the  privileges  of  the  floor  on  finance  and  administration  mat- 
ters and  that  Senator  McCormick  is  not  averse  to  tjhe  proposal. 
If  he  is  not,  or  a  majority  of  his  committee  is  not,  then  it  would 
seem  that  a  resolution  should  be  drawn  and  made  part  of  the  report. 
For  this  is  the  essence  of  the  whole  thing.  With  a  change  of  rules 
giving  the  privileges  of  the  floor  to  members  of  the  cabinet,  there 
can  be  no  other  than  an  "  executive  budget "  procedure.  Without 
it  a  visible  and  responsible  government  is  impossible. 


PART  V.  CONCLUSION 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE   OUTLOOK   FOR   RESPONSIBLE   GOVERNMENT 

In  writing  of  the  progress  made  and  of  results  ob- 
tained in  the  struggle  for  responsible  government,  we  are 
not  dealing  with  democracy  as  such.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion raised  as  to  whether  or  not  democracy  is  desirable. 
For  this  purpose  its  desirability  is  assumed.  We  are 
dealing  with  fundamentals  of  the  organization  and  the 
procedure  through  which  and  in  which  democracy  must 
express  itself  —  the  mechanism  by  means  of  which  "  gov- 
ernment of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people  " 
must  be  realized. 

A  Question  of  Machinery  for  Making  Popular  Control 
Effective 

This  is  the  reason  that  our  forefathers  undertook  to 
establish  here  a  representative  system.  A  representative 
system  is  a  type  of  organization,  a  kind  of  machine.  The 
purpose  of  its  adoption  was  to  make  democracy  possible 
to  a  numerous  and  widely  scattered  people.  It  was  to 
provide  a  great  and  growing  nation  with  the  instruments 
whereby  the  will  of  the  people  might  control  their  insti- 
tutions of  public  service  —  to  provide  an  effective  mechan- 
ism of  popular  control. 

Fundamentally,  all  processes  and  methods  of  popular 
control  rest  on  the  recognition  of  the  need  for  leadership 
—  the  purpose  of  the  control  being  to  make  the  organiza- 
tion subservient  by  providing  practical  ways  of  holding 
the  leader  accountable  to  those  for  whose  benefit  an  insti- 
tution is  established  and  maintained.  And  the  exercise 
of  this  function  of  control  is  the  only  end  or  aim  of  adopt- 
ing the  representative  principle. 

385 


386      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

Every  device  of  popular  control  rests  on  the  principle 
that  control  over  the  organization  must  be  exercised 
through  its  leadership.  In  a  small  local  democracy  pop- 
ular control  is  made  effective  by  bringing  the  head  of 
the  service  to  be  controlled  before  an  assembly  composed 
of  the  whole  democratic  "  electorate."  In  a  populous, 
widely  scattered  democracy,  it  is  conceived  that  popular 
control  may  still  be  made  effective ;  that  this  may  be  done 
by  interposing  a  body  of  representatives  —  bringing  the 
head  of  a  service  to  be  controlled  before  an  "  Assembly  " 
or  "  Congress  "  made  up  of  persons  chosen  by  the  broad 
democratic  "  electorate "  to  represent  them,  and  in  a 
manner  to  give  the  process  news  value,  and  then  make 
their  acts  and  decisions  reviewable  by  the  people.  In 
order  to  achieve  this  result  the  vicarious  town  meeting 
has  to  pursue  the  same  method  of  inquiry  and  deliberation 
and  initial  decision  as  is  used  in  the  real  town-meeting  of 
the  small  democracy.  The  success  of  the  representative 
principle,  however,  depends  on  having  the  proceedings 
conducted  openly  and  publicly  and  in  a  manner  to  make 
news  of  them.  In  a  great  democracy  it  is  only  through 
"  news  "  that  the  people  may  be  kept  as  well  informed  as 
if  each  voter  attended  the  meeting.  By  means  of  such 
a  procedure  popular  control  may  be  made  quite  as  effec- 
tive through  a  plebiscite  as  if  the  people  in  fact  came  to- 
gether in  one  great  meeting. 

In  a  large,  populous,  widely  extended  democracy  both 
the  representative  "  assembly  "  or  "  congress  "  and  a 
"  democratic  electorate  "  are  necessary  to  the  exercise  of 
popular  control;  the  "electorate"  is  helpless  unless  the 
representative  "  assembly  "  or  "  congress  "  performs  the 
inquisitorial  and  deliberative  function,  and  does  it  in  an 
open  public,  news-making  manner  —  serving  as  the  organ 
by  means  of  which  the  acts  and  proposals  of  officers  who 
are  to  be  held  accountable  are  made  known  to  the  people. 
This  done,  then  the  electorate  may  act  with  intelligence. 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      387 

Adequacy  of  the  Instruments  Provided 

In  our  political  institutions,  both  of  these  instruments 
or  organs  of  control  have  been  provided.  The  first  essen- 
tial of  the  mechanism  of  control,  the  representative  "  as- 
sembly "  or  "  congress,"  was  provided  in  our  early  con- 
stitutions ;  in  fact,  insistence  on  this  essential  as  a  means 
of  controlling  the  executive  led  to  our  war  for  independ- 
ence. But  its  establishment  did  not  give  us  responsible 
government.  Then  the  second  essential,  a  democratic 
electorate,  broad  enough  to  include  all  classes,  was  added 
by  statute.  But  still  we  did  not  have  responsible  govern- 
ment. And  if  we  may  accept  the  statements  of  such  men 
as  President  Roosevelt,  President  Wilson,  and  Senator 
Root,  or  even  rely  on  our  own  much  narrower  knowledge, 
the  everyday  experience  and  observation  of  citizens,  and 
the  everyday  comments  of  the  press,  we  must  conclude 
that  we  do  not  now  have  either  "  visible  "  or  responsible 
government. 

The  Purpose  of  the  Mechanism  of  Control 

The  two  essential  parts  of  the  mechanism  of  control 
are  both  here.  But  the  mechanism  as  a  whole  has  not 
worked.  What  is  the  matter?  When  we  think  of  the 
outworking  of  our  organs  of  popular  control,  it  is  evident 
that  something  has  gone  wrong  from  the  beginning.  In 
looking  for  cause,  in  matters  of  performance,  we  have 
therefore  taken  a  long-range  view.  In  looking  for  cause, 
in  contemplation  of  the  working  mechanism  itself,  we 
have  asked  ourselves  these  questions : 

(1)  On  what  is  the  mechanism  of  control  to  operate? 
That  is,  whose  action  is  to  be  made  subservient  to  the 
people  through  its  use?  Who  is  it  that  is  to  be  made 
responsive  and  responsible? 

(2)  Why  —  with  our  system  of  elections  which  pro- 
vides for  freedom  of  choice  of  officers,  secret  ballot,  ac- 


388      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

curate  count,  etc. —  has  our  broad  democratic  electorate 
failed  in  its  controlling  purpose  ? 

(3)  Why  have  our  Congress  and  Assemblies,  with 
their  unlimited  powers  of  inquest  and  discussion,  still  left 
the  electorate  without  the  information  needed  to  enable 
them  to  act  wisely  and  effectively  ?  Why  have  the  doings 
of  those  who  are  to  be  held  accountable  been  "  invisible"  ? 

(4)  WThy  has  our  leadership  been  irresponsible? 
We  ask  ourselves  the  first  question  to  make  sure  that 

there  is  no  disagreement  with  respect  to  the  end  to  be 
achieved  by  use  of  the  controlling  mechanism.  The  other 
three  questions  call  for  critical  judgment.  There  is  no 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  is  the  end  to  be  achieved. 
The  purpose  of  the  controlling  mechanism  is  to  render 
the  public  service,  the  administration,  subservient  to  the 
popular  will. 

In  a  monarchical  system  the  king  both  made  the  laws 
and  executed  them;  he  decided  what  should  be  done  by 
the  government  as  an  organ  of  public  service,  and  headed 
the  organization  for  doing  it.  In  a  democracy  the  de- 
termining and  the  doing  functions  are  divided  —  the  first 
being  used  to  control  the  second.  In  a  simple  democracy 
those  who  come  together  in  a  meeting  or  moot  (i.e.  the 
voting  members  of  the  community)  made  the  laws  and 
the  executive  officer  chosen  by  them  looked  after  their 
enforcement;  the  meeting  or  moot  decided  what  should 
be  done  and  the  chosen  head  of  the  doing  organization 
was  made  responsible  to  the  membership  by  being  brought 
before  the  assembly  to  give  an  account  of  himself.  When 
the  representative  principle  was  adopted  the  meeting  or 
assembly  had  the  same  determining  function  to  perform, 
and  the  electorate  reviewed  their  determination  and  en- 
forced their  decisions  by  retaining  to  themselves  the  right 
to  elect  the  representative  reviewing  body  as  well  as  the 
executive.     Thus  the  objective  of  the  controlling  mecha- 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      389 

nism  unquestionably  has  been  to  adapt  it  to  using  the 
determining  function  in  such  manner  as  to  control  the 
doing  organization  —  the  administration.  It  is  primarily 
the  executive  who  is  to  be  held  accountable. 

The  Mechanism  Not  Properly  Used 

Starting  from  this,  the  cause  of  the  trouble  has  not  been 
hard  to  find.  We  have  not  been  using  our  representative 
assemblies  or  congress  with  a  view  to  locating  executive 
responsibility  and  helping  the  electorate  to  enforce  it;  we 
have  not  used  them  as  a  means  of  inquest  and  discussion 
of  the  acts  and  proposals  of  the  administration  having  in 
mind  giving  publicity  to  what  has  been  going  on  and 
raising  issues  with  the  executive  —  the  elected  head  of  the 
administration ;  consequently,  the  "  electorate  "  could  not 
intelligently  perform  its  function  either  in  choice  of  an 
executive  or  in  choice  of  the  representative  body. 

In  all  the  constitutional  discussion  of  democratic  or- 
ganization this  fact  seems  to  have  been  missed :  That  the 
thing  to  be  controlled  is  the  administration ;  and  that  the 
only  effective  way  to  control  the  administration  is  through 
its  leadership.  Or  to  put  it  in  another  way :  Responsible 
government  depends  on  holding  executive  leadership  re- 
sponsible. In  this  country  we  have  not  had  responsible 
government  because  the  head  of  the  public  service  over 
which  control  is  to  be  exercised  has  not  been  brought  be- 
fore the  vicarious  town  meeting  provided  for  in  our  Con- 
stitution.    Why  ? 

Question  of  Leadership 

Going  over  our  history,  there  are  a  number  of  things 
that  are  significant.  We  find  that  the  people  are  still  ac- 
cepting and  using  a  type  of  political  reasoning  developed 
at  a  time  when  they  were  trying  to  get  rid  of  their  execu- 
tive because  they  preferred  no  executive  to  an  irrespon- 


39°      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

sible  one  —  a  type  of  reasoning  developed  in  appeals  to 
the  people  to  accept  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  We  find  that 
during  the  pre-revolutionary  conflict  for  responsible  gov- 
ernment our  foreign  executive  refused  to  submit  himself 
to  the  will  of  the  American  people  as  expressed  in  their 
representative  bodies  and  by  the  electorate,  and  the  people 
rose  up  and  overthrew  the  executive  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment. And  in  this  emergency  a  revolutionary  leadership 
was  developed  in  the  representative  body  itself  to  run  the 
government.  Thus  the  representative  bodies  temporarily 
absorbed  the  function  of  executive  leadership  and  forsook 
their  function  of  inquest  and  discussion  of  executive  acts 
and  proposals,  because  there  were  no  such  acts  to  inquire 
into  and  no  such  proposals  to  discuss.  Having  devel- 
oped a  leadership  of  their  own  in  their  committees,  true  to 
all  human  experience,  powers  once  acquired  have  not  been 
willingly  surrendered.  So  that  we  still  have  an  organi- 
zation in  the  representative  body  as  if  the  executive  did 
not  exist. 

Refusal   of   Constitutional   Reviewing   and   Controlling 
Bodies  to  Surrender  Leadership 

After  we  had  gained  our  independence  the  people  de- 
cided to  adopt  new  constitutions  reestablishing  the  execu- 
tive branch  of  the  government  —  making  this  separate 
and  distinct  from  the  representative  body.  But  we  find 
that  the  representative  body  did  not  readapt  their  organi- 
zation and  procedure;  they  did  not  surrender  the  type  of 
leadership  which  had  been  set  up  immediately  before  and 
during  the  revolutionary  period. 

Leadership  and  Responsibility  Part  Company 

During  the  Revolutionary  War  legislatures  had  execu- 
tive responsibilities ;  when  our  constitutions  were  set  up 
providing  for  the  separation  of  powers,  legislative  leader- 
ship had  taken  away  administrative  responsibility.     Thus 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      391 

when  the  representative  bodies  refused  to  surrender  the 
leadership  that  goes  with  executive  responsibility,  leader- 
ship and  responsibility  parted  company.  And  they  have 
remained  parted  to  this  day,  with  the  results  all  too  well 
known. 

Our  Congress  and  our  assemblies  refused  to  accept  our 
executives  as  our  chosen  leaders  to  take  the  initiative 
in  matters  of  finance  and  administration ;  by  so  doing  they 
abdicated  their  function  of  serving  the  people  as  a  part  of 
the  mechanism  of  popular  control,  for  they  cannot  investi- 
gate their  own  leadership  unless  the  leadership  developed 
by  them  is  also  made  responsible  for  administration,  as  is 
done  in  the  English  cabinet  system. 

Continuing  to  assert  for  themselves  and  their  own  or- 
ganization and  members  the  powers  of  leadership  without 
responsibility  for  management,  our  Congress  and  assem- 
blies proceeded  to  set  up  rules  for  the  protection  of  these 
powers;  to  this  end  they  forbade  the  executive  the  right 
to  appear  before  them  in  open  forum  and  organized 
standing  committees  to  develop  and  protect  their  own 
leadership.  It  was  to  protect  the  leadership  of  its  own 
members  that  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Con- 
gress refused  to  permit  Alexander  Hamilton  to  appear 
before  it  to  present  the  plans  of  finance  and  administration 
approved  by  Washington  and  made  his  own.  It  was  to 
protect  the  leadership  of  its  own  members  that  the  Senate 
of  the  Congress  took  the  attitude  toward  Washington 
himself  which  caused  him  to  turn  away  in  disgust.  It 
was  for  like  reason  that  the  State  Assembly  refused  the 
governors  and  their  cabinets  the  privilege  of  the  floor  to 
explain  and  defend  their  acts  and  proposals.  And  this  is 
the  reason  that  our  executives  are  not  permitted  to  come 
before  our  representative  bodies  to-day.  It  is  not  for 
constitutional  reasons;  it  is  for  the  protection  of  the  lead- 
ership of  the  committee  chairmen. 


392       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

"  Invisible  "  Government  —  Electorate  Left  Helpless 

Failure  to  recognize  the  President  and  the  governors 
as  leaders  might  have  been  made  consistent  with  prin- 
ciples of  responsible  government  if  they  had  placed  on 
the  chairmen  of  their  committees  executive  responsibility. 
But  they  did  not.  Instead  of  linking  up  executive  re- 
sponsibility with  their  committee  leadership,  as  in  a  par- 
liamentary cabinet  system,  or  of  accepting  the  alternative 
of  bringing  the  elected  executive  before  the  representative 
body  to  give  an  account  of  past  acts  and  to  explain  future 
proposals  before  supplies  were  granted,  the  Congress  and 
the  assemblies  turned  over  their  powers  of  inquest  and 
discussion,  their  function  as  one  of  the  two  essential  or- 
gans of  popular  control,  to  the  standing  committees  which 
had  been  organized  by  them  to  be  exercised  in  a  secret 
irresponsible  manner.  And  this  is  the  reason  that  we 
have  "  invisible  "  and  irresponsible  government. 

Organisation    by   Irresponsible   Bosses    to    Control   the 
Electorate 

With  leadership  exercised  by  a  multitude  of  chairmen 
of  standing  committees  some  provision  must  be  made  for 
central  control,  otherwise  there  could  be  no  coordination 
of  action.  At  first  this  function  was  performed  by  a 
"  junta  "  within  the  representative  body  itself.  But  after 
the  electorate  had  been  made  broadly  democratic,  cen- 
tralized control  came  to  be  organized  outside  the  govern- 
ment. Because  there  was  no  issue  raised  and  no  appeal 
taken  direct  to  the  people  by  a  responsible  leader,  the  way 
was  open  for  direct  appeal  by  designing  office  seekers  un- 
der control  of  "  bosess."  And  so  it  has  happened  that  for 
nearly  a  century  we  have  had  in  this  country  the  strange 
phenomenon  of  leadership  in  quest  for  votes  being  organ- 
ized as  a  business  for  profit.  In  violation  of  every  ideal 
of  democracy  and  every  principle  of  responsible  govern- 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      393 

ment,  private  organizations  have  grown  up,  calling  them- 
selves political  parties,  which  have  undertaken  to  frame 
up  issues  (they  call  them  platforms)  as  a  basis  for  appeal, 
and  to  nominate  and  elect  both  executive  officers  and 
members  of  the  representative  body  which  will  do  the 
bidding  of  irresponsible  leaders,  the  heads  of  these  organ- 
izations, popularly  known  as  bosses.  Thus  our  demo- 
cratic electorates  are  made  the  tools  of  a  commercialized 
oligarchy  that  gains  its  support  through  the  patronage  of 
elections  and  appointments  and  thrives  by  dividing  the 
spoils  derived  from  the  diversion  of  public  power  and  the 
trust  estate  gathered  for  the  promotion  of  the  common 
welfare  to  private  and  partisan  uses. 

This  is  the  "  system  "  which  has  come  to  take  the  place 
of  the  representative  government  as  conceived  by  those 
who  framed  our  charters  of  liberty  and  our  constitutions 
for  the  exercise  of  popular  sovereignty. 

During  the  last  ten  years  the  American  people  have 
come  to  realize  that  all  their  efforts  to  establish  popular 
control  and  thereby  make  their  government  responsible 
must  come  to  naught  unless  this  "  system  "  which  has 
grown  up  and  surrounded  this  maladjustment,  this  dis- 
severing of  responsibility  from  leadership  is  made  the 
issue  of  the  day.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  steps  taken 
to  reorganize  the  administrations  around  a  responsible 
executive;  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  new  interest  taken  in 
a  procedure  of  control  over  the  purse  which  will  make 
this  power  granted  to  legislative  bodies  the  means  of  defin- 
ing issues  and  enforcing  executive  responsibility. 

Protest  Against  Irresponsible  Leadership 

It  was  because  the  "  system  "  had  become  so  fully  in- 
trenched and  has  gained  such  complete  control  over  both 
parts  of  the  mechanism  of  popular  control  —  the  repre- 
sentative "  assemblies  "  and  the  "  electorate  "  —  that  civic 
bodies  interested  in  building  up  the  public  service  decided 


394      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  abandon  the  representative  principle.  They  had  run 
up  against  the  system.  They  found  that  all  the  machin- 
ery of  nomination  and  election  was  in  the  hands  of  these 
private  profit-sharing  organizations.  They  themselves 
were  not  able  to  cope  with  these  "  parties."  And  they 
started  an  active  propaganda,  carried  out  with  the  sup- 
port of  independent  voters,  to  put  each  of  the  public  serv- 
ices which  they  undertook  to  build  up,  one  after  another, 
into  the  hands  of  the  trustees.  Thus  it  came  about  that 
during  our  generation  the  administration  has  been  broken 
up  into  a  multitude  of  boards  and  commissions  with  long 
and  overlapping  terms,  responsible  to  no  one,  but  free 
from  the  domination  of  the  bosses  —  public  opinion  re- 
sponding to  the  appeal  that  it  was  better  to  rely  on  the 
"  conscience  "of  these  trustees,  as  they  had  come  to  rely 
on  the  "  conscience  "  of  their  courts,  instead  of  trusting 
to  the  abortive  processes  of  representative  and  electoral 
control.  All  the  state  administrations  having  thus  been 
disposed  of  in  the  main,  the  hold  of  the  boss  thus  being 
weakened,  there  followed  a  movement  to  reestablish  the 
representative  principle  on  such  a  basis  that  both  of  the 
essential  organs  of  popular  control  (the  representative 
"  assembly  "  and  the  "  electorate  ")  could  function  —  the 
one  to  bring  the  executive  to  account  and  define  issues, 
and  the  other  to  serve  as  a  court  of  last  resort  to  decide 
whether  the  indictment  of  a  majority  of  the  representative 
body,  acting  as  a  grand  jury,  should  be  sustained  or  the 
accused  executive  would  be  acquitted  and  continued  in  of- 
fice as  the  trusted  servant  of  the  people  —  their  chosen 
leader  to  manage  their  affairs. 

Recent  Acts  Looking  Toward  Establishing  Responsible 
Government  in  the  States 

In  the  recent  organic  acts  and  budget  procedures  adopt- 
ed by  the  states,  opinion  has  been  divided  between  those 
who    would    retain    "  government-by-commission "    and 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      395 

those  who  would  reestablish  the  representative  principle. 
Nineteen  of  the  states  have  declared  for  irresponsible 
trusteeships.  In  effect  they  have  said :  We  will  continue 
"  government-by-commission  "  because  by  this  means  we 
have  succeeded  in  achieving  results  which  we  could  not 
achieve  through  the  boss-ruled  machinery  of  representa- 
tive government  as  it  has  developed  under  the  standing- 
committee  system;  we  see  no  end  of  irresponsible  "  party  " 
domination.  Twenty-three  of  the  states  have  accepted 
the  view  that  the  best  way  to  get  rid  of  the  irresponsible 
party  and  its  boss  is  to  elect  a  responsible  leader  and  then 
provide  the  means  for  making  his  acts  and  proposals 
visible  "  so  that  he  may  be  held  accountable  to  the  elec- 
torate. Two  states,  New  York  and  Arkansas,  have  de- 
clared for  an  enlargement  of  the  powers  of  the  standing 
committees  of  the  representative  bodies  —  preferring  to 
retain  the  multifarious  irresponsible  trustees  and  the  irre- 
sponsible party  boss  to  a  responsible  executive. 

The  Contest  Now  Before  Congress 

The  contest  is  now  on  in  Congress  as  to  whether  its 
rules  will  be  so  changed  that  the  popularly  elected  execu- 
tive will  be  made  responsible  and  accountable  to  the  elec- 
torate, or  the  processes  of  invisible  government  will  still 
continue.  The  contest  between  the  opposing  factions 
takes  concrete  form  in  proposals  to  change  the  rules  and 
statutes  governing  the  exercise  of  control  over  the  purse. 
The  select  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives  to 
which  this  subject  was  referred  on  October  8th  reported 
in  favor  of  continuing  the  processes  by  which  we  have  had 
a  hundred  and  twenty  years  of  invisible  government.  The 
report  is  in  favor  of  still  maintaining  the  separation  be- 
tween responsibility  for  administering  the  public  business 
and  leadership  —  making  a  concession  to  the  President, 
however,  that  he  may  prepare  and  submit  a  service 
plan  with  no  opportunity  to  meet  his  opposition   face 


396      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

to  face.  This  is  a  right  that  the  President  has  always 
had,  but  he  has  refused  to  exercise  it  under  conditions  that 
give  to  him  no  protection.  In  1909  Congress  tried  to 
force  this  on  the  President  by  the  Smith  law,  but  still  he 
refuses  to  act  —  and  rightly  so,  for  no  man  who  has  the 
judgment  to  command  the  respect  of  a  broad  electorate 
would  think  of  submitting  himself  to  trial  for  official  acts 
and  proposals  by  star-chamber  proceedings. 

Fight  Over  Using  Power  to  Control  the  Purse  to  Protect 
Irresponsible  Leadership 

The  committee  of  the  Senate  has  not  yet  reached  a 
conclusion  —  it  has  not  reported  what  stand  it  will  take. 
But  the  real  question  is  this :  Shall  a  procedure  of  control 
be  established  which  will  do  away  with  irresponsible 
"  parties  "  and  irresponsible  leaders?  Shall  the  proceed- 
ings of  Congress  be  such  that  the  people  may  know  what 
the  responsible  head  of  the  government  and  those  under 
him  have  been  doing  and  what  he  proposes  to  do,  so  that 
the  very  inquiries  and  discussion  of  finance  and  adminis- 
trative measures  will  bring  issues  and  leaders  before  the 
electorate ;  or  shall  Congress  still  continue  to  bar  its  doors 
against  the  executive  and  develop  a  leadership  of  its  own 
in  the  secret  confines  of  the  committee  room,  leaving  is- 
sues to  be  framed  and  candidates  to  be  nominated  by  an 
irresponsible  oligarchy  that  has  no  acts  to  defend?  All 
of  the  other  questions  raised  about  "  executive  "  budgets 
and  "  legislative  "  budgets,  staff  organizations,  account- 
ing, reporting,  are  mere  details  —  necessary,  but,  never- 
theless, details  to  be  settled  after  it  is  decided  what  kind  of 
an  instrument  of  control  we  are  to  have. 

The  Cause  of  the  Independent  Voter 

The  system  reaches  out  to  every  branch  and  root  of  the 
government.  It  is  intrenched  in  the  lifelong  habits  of 
men  who  have  given  themselves  to  politics.     It  is  the  only 


The  Outlook  foi   Responsible  Government      397 

thing  known  to  citizens  and  to  the  business  world  in  its 
dealings  with  the  government.  To  require  the  President 
to  come  before  Congress  with  a  budget,  and  to  give  the 
cabinet  the  privileges  of  the  floor  to  explain  and  defend 
their  acts  and  proposals  would  in  the  end,  if  carried  out 
on  a  basis  to  make  popular  control  effective,  upset  all  of 
the  traditions  and  practices  of  Congress  —  it  would  make 
the  executives  who  went  before  Congress  and  the  leaders 
of  the  opposition  who  stood  up  against  them  the  outstand- 
ing men  before  the  country.  Much  has  been  said  about 
the  development  of  the  "  independent  voter  "  in  this  coun- 
try, especially  since  women  have  been  given  the  suffrage. 
If  the  floor  of  Congress  were  made  an  open  forum  in  which 
the  responsible  heads  of  the  administration  would  meet 
their  critics  in  full  view  and  hearing  of  the  nation,  this 
would  change  the  whole  electorate  into  "  independent  " 
voters ;  and  "  parties  "  as  we  now  know  them  could  not 
exist.  In  place  of  "  bosses  "  we  would  have  "  leaders  "; 
and  in  place  of  "  parties  "  we  would  have  divisions  "  for  " 
and  "  against  "  leaders  whose  public  acts  and  proposals 
would  be  their  "  platforms."  In  such  circumstances 
parties  would  necessarily  be  constituencies  which  take 
sides  on  real  issues.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  a  change 
of  such  fundamental  importance  as  this  which  strikes  at 
the  very  life  of  the  "  party  "  system  will  be  advocated  by 
any  who  are  not  independent. 


The  Irresponsible  Party  One  of  the  Questions  in  Issue 

This  is  the  real  issue  before  the  American  people.  The 
fundamental  question  is  whether  we  are  going  to  have  re- 
sponsible or  irresponsible  leaders.  Since  the  irresponsible 
"  party  "  organization  is  the  thing  which  stands  out  large 
in  the  minds  of  the  people  we  need  not  rely  entirely  on 
the  negative  action  taken  by  those  who  advocate  govern- 
ment-by-commission as  an  antidote.     Within  a  week  after 


398      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

the  select  committee  on  the  budget  reported  to  the  House, 
the  committee  on  elections  and  qualifications  of  members 
reported  a  condition  which  rings  true  to  the  lifelong  ex- 
perience of  every  citizen.  Recommending  the  unseating 
of  Congressman  Fitzgerald  of  Massachusetts,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  majority  give  this  picture  of  conditions  as  they 
existed  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord,  1918: 

"  Your  committee  finds  and  reports  that  Martin  Lo- 
masney is  the  political  boss  of  the  Fifth  Ward ;  that  he  and 
his  lieutenants  work  through  an  organization  located  in 
the  Fifth  Ward  known  as  the  Hendricks  Club;  that  he  has 
built  up  his  power  through  a  number  of  years  largely  by 
means  of  fraudulent  votes  of  the  liquor  dealers,  bar- 
tenders, and  city  job  holders,  illegally  registered  in  his 
ward,  and  in  the  padded  returns  of  alleged  residents  in 
cheap  lodging  houses." 

Following  this  is  an  extended  review  of  evidence  which 
tells  the  story  in  detail  of  how  the  boss  and  the  "  organi- 
zation "  managed  by  him  works  to  subvert  the  electorate 
to  the  uses  of  the  "  party."  The  members  of  the  con- 
gressional committee  who  belong  to  the  same  "  party  "  as 
the  contestant,  recommended  that  the  seat  now  occupied 
by  Mr.  Fitzgerald  be  given  to  Mr.  Tague ;  the  members  of 
the  congressional  committee  who  belong  to  Mr.  Fitzger- 
ald's "  party  "  agreed  with  their  political  adversaries  that 
Mr.  Fitzgerald  should  not  continue  to  represent  the  peo- 
ple of  Massachusetts  after  such  fraudulent  acts  have  been 
brought  to  light,  and  they  urge  a  new  election  for  this 
reason : 

"For  many  years  it  has  been  common  knowledge  in 
Boston  that  many  men  whose  real  homes  are  in  the  sub- 
urbs make  an  annual  pretense  of  living  in  the  locality  here 
concerned  for  financial,  political,  or  social  reasons.  It 
has  also  been  commonly  known  that  men  in  unreasonably 
large  numbers  have  been  registered  from  lodging  houses, 
with  the  effect  of  making  impersonation  easy,  inasmuch  as 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      399 

repeaters  can  vote  on  the  names  of  such  men  with  little 
fear  of  detection. 

"Mr.  Tague  took  no  offense  at  this  state  of  affairs  while 
it  accrued  to  his  advantage.  He  then  made  no  request  to 
the  election  commissioners  that  lists  should  be  purged. 
He  employed  no  investigators,  no  challengers.  He  did 
not  assume  it  to  be  a  part  of  good  citizenship  to  lay  the 
facts  before  the  legislature  and  suggest  a  remedy.  He 
acquiesced  in  what  he  now  declares  to  be  fraud,  because 
that  was  then  to  his  benefit." 

This  report  with  its  evidences  of  "  party  "  practice  to 
elect  those  who  are  subservient  is  not  introduced  here  in 
the  thought  that  taken  by  itself  it  is  of  more  than  passing 
interest.  But  it  does  not  stand  by  itself.  Its  significance 
is  found  in  the  fact  that  this  is  but  one  of  a  long  list  of 
similar  or  related  occurrences  that  run  back  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  business  history  of  these  "  parties  "  which 
thrive  on  the  profits  of  such  traffic  —  and  who  find  their 
opportunity  because  there  is  no  responsible  leader  before 
the  people  whose  acts  and  proposals  have  been  gone  into 
by  an  inquisitorial  or  deliberative  body,  charged  with  the 
duty  of  granting  or  withholding  support.  In  the  recent 
Massachusetts  Constitutional  Convention  many  days  were 
spent  in  committee,  and  out  discussing  the  question  as  to 
how  popular  control  could  be  made  effective,  but,  when  it 
came  to  the  question  of  making  the  General  Court  a  grand 
jury  for  the  people  to  frame  issues  to  be  settled  by  the 
electorate,  the  delegates  who  had  been  elected  on  a  "  party  " 
ticket  shied.  This  system  is  still  at  work.  It  is  still  at 
work  not  alone  in  Boston ;  it  is  at  work  in  New  York,  in 
Philadelphia,  in  Pittsburgh,  in  Cincinnati,  in  Chicago,  in 
St.  Louis,  in  San  Francisco.  And  we  may  be  assured  that 
it  will  remain  in  operation  throughout  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  land  so  long  as  the  people  have  no  alterna- 
tive before  them  —  no  issues  and  no  candidates  except 
those  who  are  put  before  them  by  irresponsible  profit- 


400       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

sharing  business  organizations  which  have  appropriated 
the  names  of  "  parties." 

Again  be  it  said,  that  in  a  responsible  government  a 
"  party  "  is  one  side  in  a  division  on  a  question  arising 
over  the  acts  or  proposals  of  a  responsible  leader.  The 
head  of  a  responsible  party  is  a  responsible  leader;  the 
head  of  an  irresponsible  party  is  a  boss.  We  now  have 
the  irresponsible  "  party  "  system  because  no  other  form 
of  centralized  control  is  possible  in  a  democracy  which 
has  permitted  its  mechanism  of  popular  control  to  be  made 
ineffective. 


Government  by  Chairmen  of  Irresponsible  Committees 
Must  Go 

We  need  not  go  to  Mr.  Tomasney's  ward  to  see  the 
effects  of  a  system  in  which  a  representative  "  Congress  " 
or  "  assembly  "  shuts  its  doors  to  a  responsible  leader  and 
leaves  the  people  in  ignorance  as  to  what  is  going  on. 
There  has  been  an  occurrence  within  the  last  two  months 
that  challenges  the  attention  of  the  world:  An  American 
President,  charged  with  the  duty  of  negotiating  treaties, 
after  two  months  in  conference  with  the  heads  of  the 
Allied  Powers,  at  the  conclusion  of  a  world  war,  going 
to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  as  his  constitutional 
advisers  —  every  member  of  which  is  bound  by  his  oath  of 
office  to  vote  for  or  against  a  proposed  covenant  that  must 
seriously  affect  national  life  for  all  time  to  come  —  is 
turned  away.  When  he  knocks  at  the  Senate  door  he 
finds  it  closed,  and  standing  in  front  of  it  is  a  "  party  " 
leader  who  tells  him  that  if  he  has  anything  to  say  he  can 
take  it  up  with  a  committee  of  which  this  "  party  "  leader 
is  the  head.  The  President  says  that  he  has  no  business 
with  a  committee ;  that  his  business  is  with  the  Senate ; 
that  he  comes  as  the  responsible  head  of  the  government, 
elected  by  the  voters  of  the  nation,  to  confer  with  the 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government     401 

representative  body  selected  by  forty-eight  sovereign  states 
to  approve  or  disapprove  the  negotiation  which  he  has  on 
hand.  But  the  Senate  refuses,  as  has  been  its  custom  for 
a  hundred  years.  Its  members  do  not  wish  to  ask  any 
questions  of  President  Wilson;  they  do  not  wish  to  have 
the  head  of  the  nation  come  into  their  sacred  chamber. 
Why?  This  would  put  "  party  "  leadership  and  the  com- 
mittee system  into  the  discard.  It  would  make  it  a  matter 
between  President  Wilson  and  the  members.  They  don't 
want  to  hear  from  President  Wilson ;  they  want  to  hear 
from  their  committee,  after  they  have  worked  the  whole 
matter  out  in  secret  session ;  they  want  to  hear  from  their 
committee  leaders,  too,  when  the  President  is  not  present ; 
they  want  to  cast  their  votes  "  for  "  or  "  against  "  the 
measure  with  no  chance  given  to  ask  questions  of  the  one 
who  is  best  informed,  or  to  listen  to  his  defense  when  at- 
tacked by  an  organized  opposition.  Then  President  Wil- 
son, being  denied  access  to  the  Senate,  decides  to  tell  the 
people  of  the  United  States  about  the  treaty.  He  starts 
out;  leaves  the  executive  office;  makes  a  trip  across  the 
continent.  And  several  senators  trail  after  him  seeking 
opportunities  to  go  before  the  popular  audiences  where 
he  has  been  to  answer  his  arguments.  Does  history  re- 
cord a  greater  travesty  ?  This  is  a  caricature  on  represen- 
tative government. 

The  incident,  ludicrous  as  it  is,  is  not  an  exception.  It 
is  typical.  It  is  true  to  form.  It  is  the  necessary  and 
normal  result  of  the  action  taken  in  1789  to  protect  the 
committee  system  established  as  a  revolutionary  measure 
and  which  in  turn  produced  our  irresponsible  party  sys- 
tem. The  exceptional  feature  about  it  is  that  the  Presi- 
dent considered  the  matter  of  such  exceptional  importance 
that  he  took  his  proposal  out  of  the  closet  and  went  before 
the  people  with  it  instead  of  waiting  to  have  it  mauled 
about  the  Senate  in  his  absence;  it  is  exceptional  in  that 
President  Wilson  insisted  on  giving  to  the  American  peo- 


402       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

pie  his  side  of  the  case  before  it  was  put  to  a  party  vote. 
But  how  much  more  fully  might  the  people  be  informed 
if  the  Senate  had  opened  its  doors,  given  the  full  mem- 
bership a  chance  to  ask  questions,  and  the  President  a 
chance  to  meet  his  critics  face  to  face.  Is  there  any  other 
way  that  the  conscience  and  the  judgment  of  a  nation  can 
assert  itself  ?  Is  there  any  other  way  that  public  opinion 
can  be  informed  and  popular  control  can  assert  itself  de- 
liberately ? 

Mr.  Cannon's  Defense 

Congressman  Cannon  in  his  recent  article  on  the  na- 
tional budget  in  defense  of  leadership  by  standing  com- 
mittee says : 

"The  multifarious  duties  of  the  members  of  Congress 
in  considering  25,000  bills  justifies  them  in  following  the 
committees  having  jurisdiction." 

What  are  all  these  25,000  measures  about?  Does  any 
one  know?  —  either  before  or  after  the  committees  have 
got  through  with  them  ?  Can  any  indictment  be  brought 
against  our  legislative  system  which  is  more  severe  than 
this  statement  made  in  defense?  If  Congress  passed  a 
hundred  measures  a  year  which  were  well  considered  and 
fully  understood  by  members  and  the  people,  this  would 
satisfy  all  the  requirements  of  a  progressive  people.  But 
to  pass  bills  by  the  thousand  and  vote  money  by  the  bil- 
lions without  any  one  knowing  what  are  the  reasons  which 
lie  back  of  this  exercise  of  sovereign  power  except  a  few 
members  of  one  or  another  of  half  a  hundred  or  more 
committees  this  is  the  "  system  " ;  this  is  the  cause  of  those 
"  fits  of  popular  rage  "  that  become  the  moving  cause  with 
a  greater  democratic  electorate  that  has  been  made  our 
constitutional  organ  for  voicing  the  will  that  determines 
the  destinies  of  one  hundred  million  Americans. 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government      403 

The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government 

This  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  present  outlook 
for  responsible  government  in  the  United  States.  What 
are  the  conditions  which  cause  hope  to  rise  in  the  minds 
and  hearts  of  those  whose  civic  interest  centers  in  their 
faith  in  democratic  institutions? 

First,  there  is  this  great  outstanding  fact :  that  from 
the  day  of  our  independence  the  soul  of  the  American  peo- 
ple has  been  growing  more  and  more  democratic,  and 
where  the  spirit  of  democracy  is,  whatever  the  institu- 
tional maladjustment,  even  a  kleptarchy  cannot  go  far 
wrong.  The  spirit  of  rightness  in  a  democratic  people 
must  in  the  end  prevail,  however  maddening  may  be  the 
conditions  which  stand  between  the  spirit  and  its  goal. 
The  spirit  of  the  nation  cannot  be  reconciled  with  "  invis- 
ible government  "  in  any  of  its  forms.  If  we  read  the 
signs  of  the  times  aright  the  great  American  democratic 
electorate  will  not  much  longer  continue  to  accept  the 
domination  of  an  irresponsible  oligarchy  in  matters  of 
election  and  appointment  because  American  democracy 
has  come  to  look  to  the  Government  and  its  leadership  as 
something  vital  to  the  people.  Government  is  no  longer  a 
necessary  evil;  it  is  the  needed  servant  of  the  people. 
Public  offices  are  no  longer  to  be  filled  by  those  who  are 
"  smart  "  at  playing  a  game  of  deceit  and  treachery.  The 
people  are  beginning  to  demand  real,  genuine,  whole- 
souled  leadership  which  rests  on  the  good  will  of  citizen- 
ship built  up  through  long  years  of  service. 

A  second  fact  gives  us  courage  and  challenges  attention. 
For  the  first  time  in  our  history  the  people  are  beginning 
to  think  in  terms  of  the  underlying  principles  of  the 
mechanism  of  popular  control.  The  people  are  beginning 
to  demand  that  the  acts  of  the  government  be  made  "  vis- 
ible " ;  that  obstructions  to  the  effective  use  and  malad- 
justments of  the  mechanism  of  popular  control  be  re- 


404      The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

moved ;  that  an  effective  use  be  made  of  the  instrument  of 
visibility  set  up  by  them  in  their  constitutions.  The  peo- 
ple are  beginning  to  see  that  it  is  due  to  them  and  their 
chosen  leaders  that  executives  be  brought  before  the  rep- 
resentative assemblies,  in  order  that  through  their  chosen 
representatives  their  decisions,  when  voting  on  the  ques- 
tion of  support,  may  be  based  on  knowledge  —  and  that 
full  publicity  may  be  given.  The  people  are  beginning  to 
demand  that  proceedings  of  inquiry  and  discussion  be 
taken  out  of  the  committee  room  and  that  subjects  of  vital 
concern  be  criticized  and  discussed  openly  so  that  both  the 
members  of  the  appropriating  body  and  the  people  may 
know  what  the  issues  are  and  what  are  the  facts  and  argu- 
ments on  which  a  decision  may  be  based. 

A  third  fact  stands  out  in  recent  discussions  and  in  the 
action  taken  by  some  of  the  states :  that  to  obtain  the  re- 
adjustments necessary  to  make  popular  control  effective, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  tear  down  the  institutions  which  have 
been  built  up  with  such  pains ;  that  it  is  not  necessary  to 
adopt  new  constitutions;  that  it  is  only  necessary  to 
change  the  rules  and  the  statutes  which  have  made  the 
conditions  favorable  to  boss  rule. 

Of  no  less  importance  is  the  conclusion  that  changes 
should  be  made  gradually.  It  is  not  necessary  or  desir- 
able to  work  out  in  detail  all  the  changes  necessary  to  sat- 
isfy the  popular  demand  for  control.  A  beginning  can  be 
made  by  changing  the  rules  of  the  assemblies,  or  of  Con- 
gress, so  as  to  require  the  chosen  leaders  of  the  people  to 
come  before  these  vicarious  town  meetings.  The  rules 
can  be  so  changed  that  responsible  officers  are  required  to 
stand  up  before  the  representatives  of  the  people  and  ex- 
plain their  requests  for  further  support,  answer  questions 
asked  and  criticisms  offered,  and  responsible  leaders  will 
have  a  fair  trial  and  the  people  will  have  open  public  dis- 
cussion, and  the  boss,  the  irresponsible  party,  and  irre- 
sponsible government  will  cease  to  exist.     The  trouble 


The  Outlook  for  Responsible  Government     405 

has  been  that,  in  most  of  the  readjustments  made,  those 
in  control  of  the  political  forces  have  consented  to  every 
other  change  of  procedure  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of,  but 
have  staunchly  refused  this  one  —  the  primary  essential 
of  responsible  representative  government. 

Responsibility  for  Unrest 

In  these  days  when  great  apprehension  is  felt  lest  pop- 
ular unrest  may  assert  itself  in  acts  of  violence,  let  those 
who  hold  dear  the  ideals  of  the  republic  read  again  the 
story  of  "  The  Lost  Battalion,"  made  up  largely  of  push- 
cart men,  shoestring  peddlers,  garlic  venders,  teamsters, 
and  laborers  from  the  lower  East  Side  in  New  York, 
many  of  them  foreign -born.  There  is  also  food  for 
thought  in  the  following  questions  which  each  American 
should  consider  and  answer  for  himself: 

In  1774  who  were  responsible  for  the  revolution  that 
for  eight  years  disturbed  the  peace  and  happiness  of  the 
American  people?  Was  it  our  Franklins,  our  Adamses, 
our  Jeffersons?  Or  was  it  King  George  and  his  auto- 
cratic hierarchy  ? 

In  1861  who  were  responsible  for  precipitating  the 
greatest  civil  war  of  modern  times?  Was  it  the  Garri- 
sons, the  Browns,  the  Stowes,  or  was  it  an  aristocracy  of 
slaveholders  ? 

In  1914  who  was  responsible  for  bringing  on  the  World 
War  in  which  the  lives  of  7,500,000  men  were  spent  and 
which  was  followed  by  these  turbulent  times  which  cause 
alarm  lest  the  foundations  of  time-honored  institutions 
are  being  undermined  ?  Was  it  those  who  advocated  re- 
sponsible government,  or  the  smug  complacency  and  over- 
bearing conduct  of  the  autocrat? 

American  ideals  were  never  stronger  and  higher.  The 
conscience  of  an  enlightened  people  was  never  more  keen. 
Those  who  put  their  trust  in  the  right-mindedness  of  the 
people  and  devote  their  energies  to  the  outworking  of  the 


406       The  Budget  and  Responsible  Government 

procedures  of  social  and  political  justice  may  look  for- 
ward with  renewed  hope.  Those  who  put  their  trust  in 
the  assumed  superiority  of  a  class,  who  rely  on  the  abili- 
ties of  the  few  who  work  in  secret  and  in  defiance  of  pub- 
lic opinion  to  continue  a  control  which  has  resulted  in  the 
upbuilding  of  an  irresponsible  oligarchy,  whose  ears  are 
dead  to  appeals  for  justice,  and  who  hope  to  succeed  by 
practicing  sabotage  on  the  mechanism  of  popular  control 
—  for  them  the  day  of  judgment  is  at  hand. 


THE   END 


PRINTED    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    OF    AMERICA 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


Hi****, 


HK'D  LD- 
OCTo  7  jmo 


Form  L9-Series  4939 


,™era'/'''.   iV'l'i 


nJ85B»  849  - 


ipiiir 

3*    001204  978   9 


